Plaintiffs  impleaded the defendant before the  Court of First  Instance of Leyte to recover certain rentals for the use of a portion of land belonging to them and the amount of 500 as damages.  Answering the complaint, defendant set  up certain special defenses and  a counter-claim.

On  motion of  plaintiff's counsel, the case was originally set  for hearing on August 3, 1953.   When this date came the hearing was postponed to August IS, 1953 upon petition of defendant's counsel.  The case was  not  heard on  that date because of the  inability of counsel for defendant to appear 'and  so the hearing was  again  postponed to  September  23,  1953.  On  this date,  the  attorney for  the plaintiffs was sick and upon their petition, the court granted another postponement to July 20, 1954.   In the meantime, plaintiffs engaged Attys. Fernando C. Sudario and Alfredo Singzon in substitution  of their former counsel and when the date of  hearing  came, these  new attorneys requested the court for another  postponement  alleging that  they did not have time to prepare because  the case had  been recently entrusted to them, and there being no  objection on the part  of defendant's counsel, the  hearing was again postponed to August 23, 1954.

On  that date,  Attorney  Singzon appeared for the plaintiffs but instead of going  to  trial, he again asked for postponement on the ground that he had been  informed of the hearing by the previous counsel only the day before, which was granted  over the objection of defendant, the court  postponing the  hearing for the last time to September 1, 1954.  But when this  date came, the following is what happened:  "Atty.  Sudario informed the court that while the plaintiffs are  present  his witnesses  could not come because he had no time to contact them.  Attorney Singzon also informed the Court that he has  duly received  the subpoena and tried to contact the plaintiffs that he could not locate them.  In  view of these facts Attorney Benedicto strongly objected to  further postponement and insisted in his motion for dismissal" (p. 13,  Record on Appeal.

As a result, the court then and there issued an order dismissing the case without pronouncement  as to  costs.  To set aside this order, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal.

It appears that the hearing of this case has been postponed  several times upon petition of  both plaintiffs and defendant.   The original counsel for plaintiffs was  Attorney Marcelino  R.  Veloso who was  on  July 20, 1954 substituted by Attorneys  Fernando C. Sudario and Alfredo Singzon.  After the  substitution, the hearing  was postponed to August 23, 1954 and on this date only Attorney Singzon appeared as counsel for the plaintiffs who, because of lack of time, again asked for postponement which was granted and the hearing was again set to September 1, 1954  with  the warning  that it  would be  the last postponement that the court will entertain.   But  when this date came,  the attorneys  for the plaintiffs  again were not ready  for trial  and when  they  asked for  another postponement, upon objection of  counsel for defendant, the court dismissed the case.

It is now contended by  appellants that the dismissal was improvidently made for the reason  that the two attorneys of record of the  plaintiffs were  not given  the notice of hearing required by the rules for which reason they were not able to contact their witnesses nor prepare their  evidence.  And  this claim is made  to depend upon the fact that, while  the notice  of hearing for Attorney Alfredo Singzon was  sent by mail to one  Serafln Singzon, no  such notice was sent either  personally or by mail to the other attorney of record, Fernando C. Sudario. It is contended  that such  omission or  lack of  notice  is  a violation of  section 2, Rule 27, which provides  that, if a party appears by an attorney service upon the latter shall  be made  unless otherwise ordered by the court.

While it is true that the notice intended  for  Attorney Alfredo Singzon was sent by mistake to another attorney by  the name of Serafin  Singzon, the mistake has  been cured  when the first named Singzon manifested  in  open court that after; all "he has duly received the subpoena" which gives  the impression that the notice  has been relayed to him.  And it may be said in this connection that said attorney cannot be heard  to  complain  of such lack of notice in  view  of the fact that the  postponement was granted upon his  own request and  he  was present when the date  was  set  by the court.  The case  is  different with  regard  to Attorney Sudario  who was  not  actually notified of  the hearing but came to  know it only one day before when he went to the court to attend to the hearing of another  case and casually was informed that the present case was to be heard on September 1, 1954.  The question that now  arises  is:  Is this  lack of notice to Attorney Sudario of such a nature that would invalidate the action taken by the court?  Did such lack of  notice deprive the plaintiffs of their day in court?

The answer must of necessity be in the negative considering the  undisputed fact  that the plaintiffs  are represented in this case by two attorneys  of record,  namely, Fernando  C.  Sudario and  Alfredo Singzon,  and at  least one of them  was duly notified of the hearing.  The rule in such a case is that the notice of  hearing may be made either upon both attorneys or upon one of  them, unless the  court  directs  otherwise.  Thus, section  2,  Rule 27 provides that, "If  any of  such parties has  appeared by an attorney or  attorneys, service upon  him shall be made upon  his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the  party himself is ordered by the court."  This provision 13 too clear to admit of any other interpretation.

Counsel  for appellants contends  that  the above interpretation is only feasible  of  the attorneys who appear for a party are law partners or working in the same law office and not when they are  practising one independent of the other m which,  case  notice to both would be necessary ;  but such  construction is  unjustified  because It appears contrary to the very letter of the rule.  When the rule employs the words "his attorneys or one of them"  it can only  refer to those employed regardless of whether they belong to the. same law firm or office, otherwise that meaning would have been expressed therein.  The reason for the  rule undoubtedly  is that,  when more' than, one attorney appears for a party,  notice to one would suffice upon the theory that he would notify or relay the notice to his colleagues in the case.  This is a rational  and logical interpretation and we find no plausible reason  to rule otherwise.

We may  perhaps give a  concession to  situation where either by an 'agreement or proper, manifestation one  of the attorneys  is expressly designated as the one to whom service of all  pleadings j.is  to  be made,  or where it  is admittedly clear or obvious  that one is the leading counsel and the  rest mere helpers,  and this notwithstanding, the notice is given to  one  not  intended to receive it thereby causing as  a  result the failure of the party  or counsel to appear due to lack of such a  notice. In such a case, there is indeed4 failure of  due process, and if  it arises we would  not hesitate to  give due relief.  But  such, is not the situation obtaining  in the instant case.

As to whether the trial court has committed an abuse of discretion in dismissing  this case notwithstanding the motion for reconsideration set up  by the plaintiffs, we find in the record  enough  justification  for  such dismissal it appearing  that  the .case has been postponed many times and had been pending  trial for nearly three years.  The trial  court  took particular  notice of this situation when it refused  to reconsider its order of dismissal  (p.  21, Record on  Appeals).

The order appealed from is affirmed, without pronounce merit as  to  costs.

Parás,  C.  J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B, L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.