On October  15,  1954, Venancio Potente,  a former bus inspector of the Saulog Transit Incorporated, a public utility operator, hereafter referred to as the employer, filed with the Wage Administration Service, hereafter referred to as WAS, a claim or complaint for unpaid overtime compensation, unjust dismissal and vacation and sick leave pay allegedly due him from said employer.   On March 10, 1955, a WAS investigator recommended the rendition of a "decision", finding that Potente was entitled to P8,359.75  as unpaid overtime compensation,  plus  the salary for one (1) month, or P210.00,  for his indirect dismissal, or the aggregate sum of P8,569.75, and requiring the employer to deposit this sum with the WAS within a specified period. The Acting Chief of the Wage Protection Division recommended  approval of this  "decision", and the same was approved by the Acting Chief of said WAS.  Over a year later, Potente  filed, with the Court of First Instance  of Rizal,  a petition alleging that he had filed said complaint with the WAS; that  the latter had  rendered the aforementioned "decision"; and that said "decision" had become final and executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom, and praying "that a writ of execution be issued" by said court "to  satisfy the  amount  of P8,359.75 due  the petitioner in accordance with the decision of the Wage Administration Service." Without, either notice to the employer, or hearing, said Court issued, on October  25,  1956,  an order granting the aforementioned petition and ordering "that a writ of execution be issued against the respondent, Saulog Transit Inc., to satisfy  the amount of P8,359.75 due to the  petitioner, Venancio Potente,  in  accordance with the aforementioned decision of the Wage Administration Service."

Upon receipt of copy of this order and of the writ  of execution, issued  in  compliance therewith, the employer filed a petition to  set aside the former and to quash the latter, which was denied on January 18, 1957.  On motion of Potente, the lower court ordered, on February 8, 1957, the issuance of an alias writ of execution.  The employer now seeks a review of the foregoing orders of October 25, 1956  and January 18,  and February 8,  1957.

The issue before us is whether a "decision"  of the WAS, finding that  Potente is entitled to recover P8,359.75, from his former employer,  by way  of unpaid overtime compensation, may be ordered executed by  a court  of justice, without an ordinary action for the recovery  of  said  sum of money, and without a decision of such court sentencing the employer to pay the aforementioned  amount.   It is obvious to us that the answer must be negative.

Neither the  lower court, nor the appellee has  cited any legal  provision sanctioning the procedure followed in this case by the lower court.  What is more, the law creating the WAS indicates clearly  that  an  "action"  must be brought,  "in any competent  court", for the  recovery of unpaid wages which the employer fails or refuses to satisfy. Thus,  for instance, sections 15 (d),  15(e)  and  16(a) of Act 602, provide:

"SECTION 15 (d). The Secretary (of Labor)  may bring an action in any competent court to recover wages owing to an employee under this Act, with legal interest * *  *."

"SECTION  15 (e). Any  employer who underpays an employee in violation of this  Act shall be liable to the employee affected in the amount of the unpaid wages with legal interest.  Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by any one or more employees on behalf of himself or themselves  * * *."

"SECTION  16(a). The Court of First Instance shall  have jurisdiction  to restrain violations of this Act; action by  the Secretary or by the employees affected to recover underpayment may be brought in any competent court, * * *".  (Italics ours.)

"An action," pursuant to Rule 2, Section 1,  of  the Rules of Court,  "means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes  another for the  enforcement or protection of a right, or  the prevention or  redress  of a wrong."  (Italics ours.)  It is apparent that the authority to bring "an action," for the recovery of wages due to an employee or  laborer, would not have been  explicitly vested  in  the WAS,   if it  had the  power to  render a "decision" sentencing  the employer to  pay  the amount found to  be  due  said employee or laborer,  and  judicial intervention were necessary  only to  execute  such  "decision" inasmuch as  a petition,  before a court of justice, for  the execution of said  "decision" would  not  be  "an action," as  adverted  to  above.

The  rules  and  regulations promulgated  by the  WAS, on January 20, 1953, to implement the Minimum  Wage Law pertinent provisions of which are reproduced  at the footnote lead  to  the same conclusion.   Pursuant to  said

"ARTICLE 7. Claims for Unpaid Wages

"SEC. 1, Claims for  unpaid wages  may be classified  into two kinds,  namely,  (a)  claims  for nonpayment,  and  (b)  claims for underpayment of wages. * * *.

"SEC.  2. A claimant shall accomplish the  corresponding claim form in triplicate * * *.

"SEC. 4. Notice of conference in triplicate shall be simultaneously prepared with the foregoing claim, the original copy to be attached to the record of the  claim,  the duplicate to  be mailed together with the duplicate  of  the claim to  the  respondent, and  the  triplicate given to  claimant.

"SEC. 5. The date and hour of the conference shall be  set not later than one week from the date of the filing of the claim.

*  *  *

B. Mediation

"SEC.  6. At  the opening of the initial  conference,  the claims investigator or claims attorney shall endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the claim by amicable agreement.  If any agreement as to the whole or part  of the claim is arrived at between the parties, a memorandum of its terms shall  be made in writing, signed and acknowledged by the parties  thereof before the claims investigator or claims  attorney.  Such agreement shall dispose  of the claim in whole or in part, as the case may be.

C. Arbitration

"Sec.  9. If  no amicable agreement is  arrived  at between the parties on the whole or  part of the claim, the claims investigator or claims attorney, shall immediately ask the parties whether they are willing to arbitrate or submit the case to arbitration by the Service, with him or any claims  attorney or investigator acting as arbitrator whose decision  shall  be  binding, final, and conclusive  between them, the agreement  to arbitrate  shall be  in writing and  signed by the parties before the  claims investigator or claims attorney.  In case of  arbitration, the  hearing on the claim shall not exceed one week from the initiation thereof.

*******

rules, when a  claim for unpaid wages, due, either to nonpayment, or to  underpayment thereof,  is  filed,  the WAS shall  call the parties  to  a conference, at which the claims investigator or  claims  attorney  of  the  WAS shall resort to mediation, by endeavoring "to reconcile the parties and induce them to  settle the claim by amicable agreement." However, "if no amicable agreement is arrived at between the parties", said  investigator or attorney "shall immediately ask the parties whether they are willing to arbitrate or submit the  case to arbitration by the Service", and, "in the event that  mediation  fails  and  the parties  are  not willing to  arbitrate",  the  claim  "shall immediately  be assigned to a claims attorney", who will conduct an investigation, "to find out whether said claim is meritorious or: not.  If meritorious  the attorney shall  prepare the corresponding complaint *  *  * for court action *  * *."

In  other words, the WAS may cause the employer to satisfy the unpaid wages through mediation,  arbitration, or court action, and by no other means.   It has no authority to render a "decision" in  the sense in which  this term is  used in legal  parlance on the claim for wages, except

D. Prosecution

"SEC. 14. In the event that mediation fails and the parties are not willing to arbitrate,  the claims shall immediately be assigned to a claims attorney, who will investigate the claimant and his witnesses to find out if such claim is meritorious or not.  If meritorious,  the attorney will prepare the corresponding complaint and  petition  for indigency for court  action, as the case may be,  within one week after receiving the case.

"SEC. 15.- When a claimant  is represented  by  a private counsel, the Wage  Administration  Service shall refrain from  representing such claimant In any court  action."  (Chapter II.)

insofar as it has to determine whether, in its opinion, the claim is meritorious,  as  a condition precedent to the institution,, before  "any  competent  court",  of  an  ordinary "action" for the recovery of the  sum of money it considers due to the claimant.  But, then, no writ of execution shall issue, except when the judgment rendered by said court after due notice and hearing, as demanded by the tenets of  due  process and  provided in  the Rules of Court shall have become final and executory.

Seemingly, counsel for Potente and the lower court have labored under the erroneous impression that the claim of the former  may be enforced  in the manner set forth in the  Workmen's Compensation  Law  (Act  No. 3428,  as amended), section 51 of which provides:

"Any party in interest may file in any  court of record  in the jurisdiction  of which the accident occurred a  certified copy of a decision of any referee or the Commissioner, from which no petition for  review or appeal has been taken within the time allowed therefor, as the case may be, or a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement duly approved by the Commissioner, whereupon the court shall render a decree or judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties thereof.

"The decree or judgment shall have the same effect,  and all proceedings  in relation thereto shall thereafter be  the  same, as though the decree or  judgment had  been rendered in a suit duly heard and tried  by the court, except that there  shall be no appeal therefrom.

"The Commissioner shall, upon application by the proper party or the Court before which such action is  instituted, issue  a  certification that no petition for review or appeal within the time prescribed by section forty-nine hereof has been  taken by the respondent."

It should  be noted, however,  that this  section does not authorize the issuance of a writ of execution of a decision of  the Workmen's Compensation Commission.  It permits the rendition, by a court of justice, of a decree or judgment in  accordance  with the decision  of  a referee of said  Commission, or  of a Commissioner thereof, which has become final  and executory, and said decree  or  judgment of the court not the decision of the referee or Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is what may be  enforced by writ of execution.   At any rate,  there is no similar provision, either in the Minimum Wage  Law (Republic Act  602,  as amended), or in the  Eight-Hour Labor Law  (Commonwealth Act 444, as amended), or in any  other statute, applicable to  the  collection of unpaid overtime compensation.

Wherefore, the orders  appealed from  are hereby reversed, without special pronouncement as to costs.   It is so ordered.

Paras, C.  J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.