In its petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, the National Association, of Trade Unions, a labor organization organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines,  prays that a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the  Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case  No.  33913  thereof,  entitled  "People's Bank and Trust Co. vs. Association of Bank Employees, et al.," be set aside, that Hon.  Froilan  Bayona, be restrained, as Judge of said court, from further proceeding  with  the determination and  hearing of  said  case, and  that said petitioner be allowed "to prove damages as well as expenses incurred" on account of "the  improvident  issuance of the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction."

The  pertinent facts are not  disputed.  On September 30,  1957, members  of the aforementioned  labor organization working in the People's Bank and Trust Co., the main respondent herein,  declared  a  strike and  set  up  picket lines around the premises of said  Bank.   Soon thereafter, or on October 3, 1957, the latter instituted said Civil Case No. 33913  against the Association of Bank Employees People's Bank and Trust Co. (NATU) and several officers and employees of such  labor  organization.   The Bank in its complaint that the defendants had performed a number of illegal acts specified  in said  pleading; that said acts would  cause  substantial and irreparable injury to  the Bank,  "unless a temporary  restraining  order,  without notice", were  "immediately issued to restrain the defendants from  committing the illegal acts above described"; that "the public officers charged with the duty to protect" its  "property, although  willing,  are unable to furnish adequate"  protection;  that  the Bank has  "no  adequate remedy at law";  and  that this case is one cognizable by said court as held  in  PAFLU vs. Tan (99  Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz.  [13]  5836).  Relying upon  these allegations in the complaint, which was sworn to, on the basis of his own "knowledge, information and  belief," by Antonio de  las Alas, Jr., secretary of said Bank, respondent Hon. Froilan Bayona, as Judge of First  Instance of Manila,  forthwith issued, on October  3,  1957, a writ of preliminary injunction, pertinent parts of which read:

"To Asso. of Bank  Employees-People's  Bank & Trust Co. (NATU, et al.)

Greetings:

"Complaint having been filed before this Court of First Instance of Manila in the above-entitled cause, against the defendant Association of Bank Employees,  et  al.,  above mentioned, praying that a preliminary injunction be  issued  against said defendant restraining them from continuing the performance of certain acts mentioned in the complaint  and more  particularly described hereafter; upon considering said complaint and affidavit by  plaintiff, People's Bank & Trust Co., Inc. and it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that this is a case where a writ of injunction should issue, sufficient reason having been alleged,  and the bond required  by  law having been given in the sum of five thousand pesos, Philippines currency (P5,000.00), to  the satisfaction of the  Court:

"It is hereby ordered  by the undersigned Judge of the  Court of First Instance that, until  further order, you, the said Association of Bank Employees, et al. and all your attorneys, representatives, agents,  and any other person assisting you, refrain from engaging in mass picketing,  violent  picketing,  boisterous  picketing or  any manner of unlawful picketing which prevents the  free,  normal  and unhampered ingress into and egress from the bank's main entrance by any person;  (b)  coercing, intimidating, molesting, harassing, embarassing, interfering  with,  injuring, and instilling or causing to be instilling or causing to  be instilled fear into, the customers desiring to  transact business with the  bank, or any other person or persons including  the plaintiff's employees who are now inside the bank, (c) preventing the free and unhampered entry into  and removal from the Bank  premises of any foodstuff, papers, mail-matter, clothing,  or any  matter whatsoever, whether in connection with the bank business or  otherwise;  (d)  preventing the security guards  of  plaintiff  from  accompanying  or escorting any person to and from the bank; (e)  unlawfully impeding, obstructing, hampering or interfering with the business of the bank, until further orders from this Court."  (Annex 1.)

Two (2)  days thereafter, or on  October 5,  1957,  said labor organization instituted the present case against Judge Bayona and the Bank.  In its petition, it alleged, among other things,  that  respondent Judge  had unlawfully  exceeded his jurisdiction and  committed  a  grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and in taking cognizance of said Case No. 33913 because:  (a) the same involves a labor dispute, cognizable only by the Court of Industrial Relations; and (b) the provisions of  Section  9(d)  of Republic Act No. 875 had been violated.

In their answer, respondents herein alleged, in substance, that the picketing by members of petitioner's organization had  been conducted in an illegal manner; that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by  respondent Judge was effective  for five (5)  days only; that the Court of  First Instance  of  Manila has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues raised  in said Case No. 33913, pursuant to PAFLU vs. Tan supra, and PAFLU vs. Barot (99 Phil., 1008; 52  Off. Gaz., 6544) ; that petitioner herein has a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in said Case No. 33913; that the issue raised in  the case at bar "has become moot and academic" by  reason of the expiration of said  period of five (5) days, and is "no longer justiciable"; and that any question  of damages suffered by petitioner herein in  consequence of the  issuance  of the restraining  order  complained of, "should be heard and tried in said  Civil Case No. 33913."

Although the issue between the parties in said case arose, admittedly, out of a labor dispute, this Court has already held  in  the  aforementioned  cases  of  PAFLU  vs.  Tan (supra), and  PAFLU vs. Barot (supra), that  courts of first instance  have jurisdiction  to  settle  said issue and determine whether a  writ of preliminary or permanent injunction should be issued, inasmuch as said labor  dispute does not affect an industry which  is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President  (Sec. 10, Republic Act 875), and the controversy neither refers to minimum wage, under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602), or to hours of employment, under the Eight-Hour Labor Law  (Commonwealth  Act 444), nor involves an unfair labor practice  (Sec.  5[a], Republic Act  875).

However, it is obvious that respondent Judge had  exceeded his jurisdiction  in issuing  the restraining  order complained of, upon the allegations of the verified complaint in said  case No. 33913,  without taking the testimony  of any witness in support  thereof.   In Reyes vs.  Tan (99 Phil., 880; 52 Off. Gaz. [14], 6187), this Court, in a unanimous decision, penned by Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.),  explicitly  declared, more than  a year before  the institution of said  Case No. 33913:

"Under section  9(d) of Republic Act 875, an injunction  ex parte can be issued only 'upon testimony under  oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice'.  In other words, there is still necessity for a hearing at which sworn testimony for the  applicants would be  received, and not only that, the court should be satisfied that such testimony would stand under cross-examination by the Court and be  sufficient to overcome denial by the defendants.  As no hearing was held in the Court below and the injunction issued on the basis  of mere affidavits submitted by respondents (petitioners-applicants  in  the Court below), the injunction in question is  void for not  having been issued in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 875." (Italics ours.)

This view was reiterated in PAFLU vs. Barot (supra), in which,  after quoting section 9(d) of Republic Act 875, Mr. Justice Labrador, speaking for the Court,  used the following  language:

"Judged by the above-quoted provision, the order complained of is subject to the following objections: (1) there was no hearing of the testimonies of witnesses in open court; (2) there is no finding of fact by  the court that unlawful acts have been threatened  and will be  committed nor that complainant has no  adequate remedy at law,  and that public officers charged  with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable  or unwilling to furnish adequate protection."  (Italics ours.)

With respect to respondents' allegation to the effect that the  restraining  order  in  question was effective  for five (5)  days only, that said order expired, therefore, on October 8, 1957, and that the question of validity o*f said order has, therefore, become "moot and academic" and is "no longer justiciable", it should be noted that the present case was instituted  two (2) days after  the issuance of said order and  before the expiration  of said  period of five (5)  days. Besides, the writ of  preliminary  injunction  issued  by respondent Judge specifically  and explicitly enjoined the defendants in Case No. 33913  to refrain from performing the acts therein specified  "until further orders from this Court."  In other words,  apart from neither  holding the hearing, nor taking the testimony  required in section 9 (d) of Republic Act  No. 875, respondent Judge violated the same by imposing a restraint for a longer period than that authorized by said legal provision.

At any  rate,  the expiration of said  period, after the institution of the proceedings questioning  the legality of the writ of  preliminary injunction,  has not deterred this Court from nullifying similar orders  in the  past.  Thus, referring to a temporary restraining order issued on May 10, 1955, this Court in  a decision  promulgated on August 31, 1956 or over  fifteen  (15) months later, held in PAFLU vs. Tan  (supra):

"We believe however that in order  that an injunction may be properly issued the procedure laid down in section 9(e£) of Republic Act  No. 875  should be  followed and cannot be granted ex parte as allowed  by Rule 60, section 6, of the Rules of  Court. The reason is that the  case, involving as it does a labor dispute, comes under said section  9{d)  of the law.  That procedure requires that there should be a  hearing at which  the  parties should be given an opportunity to  present witnesses in support  of  the  complaint and of the opposition, if any, with opportunity for cross-examination; and that the other conditions required by said section as prerequisites for the granting of relief must  be established and  stated in the order of the court.  Unless  this procedure is  followed, the proceedings would be invalid and of no effect.  The court would then be acting in excess of its jurisdiction.  (Lauf vs. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., supra.)

"It appearing  that in the present case such procedure  was not followed, we are  persuaded to conclude that the order of respondent court of May 10, 1955 granting the writ of injunction prayed for by plaintiff-respondent is invalid and should be nullified.

"Petition is granted.  The order of respondent court dated May 10, 1955 is set aside.  Costs against RE MA, Incorporated."   (Italics ours.)

Moreover, in United Pepsi-Cola  Sales  Organization vs. Canizares, et al., 102 Phil., 887; 55  Off Gaz. [21], 3837 in which an ex parte writ of injunction was validly issued after taking the testimony of witnesses  under  oath, we had the following to say:

"Finally, a temporary restraining  order issued ex parte, 'shall be effective for no longer than five days and shall be void at the expiration of said  five days',  according to sec.  9(d)  of Republic Act 875.  The order of injunction in question having been issued ex parte, it became void and  of  no effect after the fifth day of its issuance, by  operation  of law  and even without  any judicial  pronouncement  of that  effect  (Reyes vs.  Tan,  52 Off.  Gaz.  No.  14, 6197;  Allied  Free  Workers  Union vs. Apostol, 102 Phil., 292).

"Wherefore, the  petition for  certiorari is denied, but the writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the trial court on 25 April 1957, is declared no longer operative.  No costs."   (Italics ours.)

This notwithstanding, we  agree with the  respondents herein that the  determination of  the amount  of damages sustained by petitioner  herein, if any, on account of the restraining order in  question,  should be made, not in the case at bar, but in Case No.  33913, where the writ was issued.

Wherefore,  the  petition for  a writ  of  certiorari is granted, but the writ of prohibition prayed for is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on  October 3, 1957,  is hereby declared null  and void,  with  costs against  respondent  People's Bank  and Trust Company.  It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.