This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 12, of Act No. 2706, as amended by Commonwealth  Act No. 180, and sentencing her to pay a fine of  P250, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused is the owner of Pioneer Institute of Arts and Fashions  which  was operated  in  Manila  since 1917 upon  a temporary  permit  issued  by  the Secretary  of Public Instruction on September 9,  1947.  On April  27, 1949,  she applied for the renewal of the permit to operate her vocational school.  The evidence is  not clear whether the application  was approved  although  a witness  for the Government testified that it was  not,  of which  she was notified even if a copy of the  notice  to  that effect was misplaced when  the Office of the Bureau of Private Schools moved from  its former place to the present one. The accused  denied  having received  said  notice and so she continued  advertising her school as authorized by the Government in the newspapers as a result of which many students were  enrolled therein one of them being Pacencia Sorongon who was enrolled on May 10, 1954 upon payment of the sum of P315  as tuition fee.   The  accused denied having been  informed  in  writing  or verbally  by  the Bureau of Private Schools  that her application for renewal had been disapproved.   It also  appears that  the accused was formerly charged with the same offense before the  same court but was acquitted on the ground that,  having been issued a  permit  to  operate her school and there being no evidence that the same was cancelled, she could not be held liable for the offense charged.

She appealed from  the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the  case was certified to us on the ground that the issues raised by her are  purely of law.

The issues posed are;  (a)  Do fashion and beauty schools fall under the provisions of  Commonwealth Act 180?; and (b) Can defendant validly  set up  the defense  of  double jeopardy?

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 180,  amending Section 2 of Act No. 2706, provides:

"For the purposes of this Act,  the term private school or college shall be  deemed to  include  any private  institution  for teaching, managed by private individuals or corporations, which  is not subject to the  authority and regulations of the Bureau  of  Education  or of the University of the Philippines, or of the Bureau of Public Welfare, and  which  offer courses of kindergarten, primary, intermediate or  secondary. instruction or superior courses  in vocational, technical,  professional or special schools by which  diplomas or certificates are to be granted or titles and degrees conferred."

Section 12 of Commonwealth Act  No. 180 also provides:

"Sec. 12. Any person or group  of persons who  shall open, direct maintain,  or manage a private school or  college as defined  by this Act, without the  prior approval of the  Secretary of  Public Instruction  or who  shall advertise, publish,  or  otherwise  announce, verbally or by means of signs, cards, letterheads, or advertisements, or through any other form of publicity, that such  person or group of persons has applied for  authority to  open  a private school  or college, or for the recognition of such school  or  college, when he has  not actually  so applied, or that such  private school  or college has  been duly authorized, when,  in  reality, the same  has not been so authorized, or such authority  has been  cancelled,  or that it  is recognized, when,  in reality, it has riot  been  recognized, or such recognition  has been withdrawn; or  that it permits itself to be called a university when, in fact, it has not fulfilled  the requirements set forth in section three of this Act, or that it has not been granted authority to do so, shall be deemed guilty  of misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos,  or  by imprisonment not exceeding six  months, or both,  in the discretion  of the court; Provided,  That in  the  case of corporations or partnerships,  the president, secretary, director, administrator, manager shall be held responsible for the violation."

It would appear that the term private school or college includes any  private institution which offers  courses in vocational, technical, professional or  special  schools by which diplomas or certificates are granted or degrees conferred, which is not subject to the authority of  the Bureau of Education, University of the  Philippines, or Bureau of Public Welfare.  On the other hand,  a  vocational school may be defined as follows:   "In its broader sense, 'vocational education' refers to life experiences, education,  and training,  both direct and indirect, that fit one to carry on  a socially  useful vocation.  In a more restricted sense 'vocational education' refers to specific, junctional training for  useful employment"  Encyclopedia  of Modern Education, Rivlin and Schueler, F. Hubbuer and Co. Inc., New York, 1943, p. 882).

Tested under  the above definition,  it cannot  therefore be  disputed that the school operated by the accused is vocational in character and as such comes within the purview of  Com.  Act 180.   In  fact, it was so understood by her when in  1947 she applied for a  permit from the Office of Private Education  and was  granted  the  permit  applied for by the  Secretary  of Public Instruction,  the permit stating that  it  was  for "special  vocational  courses in accordance with the  provision  of Com. Act  180."   The school operated  by the accused  cannot therefore be  operated or maintained  without the prior  approval of the Secretary of Public Instruction, or without obtaining the authority, recognition, or permit required by law.  And if said authority or permit has lapsed or has been cancelled, it is necessary that it be renewed, otherwise the operation of  the school cannot be continued.  Here,  it  is true, the accused was  given  temporary permit  by the Secretary of Public Instruction in 1944 but the same became ineffective when the period for which it was granted expired.   The permit was only temporary in  character for it is there clearly stated that the "authority is given for one  year only,  beginning September 9,  1947 and expiring on  September 8, 1948."  The permit, being of a limited duration, formal  Cancellation  thereof  is  not necessary.  It automatically expires and there is need of renewing it before the school could continue to operate.

The accused argues that the Secretary of Public Instruction has  not  prescribed any  standard of  instruction for fashion and beauty schools to indicate that they come under the jurisdiction of his department.  This is incorrect.  The Department of Instruction has prescribed minimum requirements concerning equipment,  supplies, first aid facilities, library, cutting and  sewing tools,  sewing machine  attachments, equipment and  supplies for the fitting room, etc., aside from the  general  and  special  requirements prescribed in the manual of information  issued by said  department concerning minimum qualifications  for faculty members,  methods of teaching, limitation of enrollment, and financial  requirements.

It  is clear that while  the  accused complied with the requirements of the  law for the opening of her school by getting a temporary permit,  she failed  to  comply  with the requirement for  continuing  its operation by securing a certificate of recognition, and yet she continued advertising her school, enrolling students, and charging tuition fees  in spite of the expiration  of the temporary permit given her,  thus rendering herself  amenable  to prosecution  under  Section 5 of Com. Act 180, amending  Section 12 of Act 2706.

With regard to the plea of double jeopardy raised by the accused, we agree to the following comment of the lower court:

"It  is further  contended that  the  accused  is placed in double jeopardy because  she has  already  been acquitted in  Criminal Case No. 14936  when she was charged for having committed similar acts but for the period comprising  from 1948  to 1952. But she is now being prosecuted for subsequent acts committed  from  1952 to November 18, 1954, when the information at bar was filed.  Therefore, the  accused is herein charged for acts other  than those covered by Criminal Case  No. 14936 wherein  those subsequent acts are not  necessarily included as provided  for  in  Rule 113,  sub-sec.  9, Rules of Court. And as already ruled by this Court in  the motion to quash  filed  by the accused (p. 34,  rec.)  her  acquittal in  said Criminal Case  14936  does not constitute a certificate of immunity or a certificate of recognition by the Government as provided for  in said Commonwealth Act 180.  To rule otherwise, an anomalous, situation will be created because another fashion school may be opened and advertised, as recognized by the Government although it was not, and  for so  doing the owner of  said school maybe prosecuted  and punished for the violation of said  Act 180, while this  accused  is continuously operating said school without said authority but she could not be held criminally liable for violating Act 180 just because of her acquittal in  Criminal  Case No. 14936."

The  decision appealed  from being in accordance  with law and the  evidence, the same  is hereby  affirmed,  with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.