Two motions for reconsideration are pending determination before this Court: one, filed by  plaintiffs-appellants, and another submitted by defendants-appellees.

The latter pray, in effect, that the decision of this Court, dated October 29, 1955, be modified in the sense that defendants' obligation in favor of the plaintiffs, and the interests thereon, be paid in conformity with the Ballantyne scale, in view of the provisions of Articles 2253 and 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, reading:

"The  Civil Code  of  1889 and  other previous laws  shall govern rights originating, under said laws,  from  acts done or  events  which took place under their  regime, even though this  Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not  recognize them. But if a' right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act  or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does  not prejudice' or impair any  vested  or acquired right, of the same  orgin."

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"In case an extraordinary inflation or  deflation of  the currency stipulated should  supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary."

Defendants maintain that these provisions are applicable to the case at bar, the term of their  obligation having been extended for ten  (1)  days,  by virtue of  a letter of  the plaintiffs,  dated June 29,  1951, an  alleged photostat copy in which is attached to said motion  for reconsideration as Annex A; that, pursuant to the deed of mortgage between the  parties, defendants' debt in favor of the plaintiffs is payable one (1) year after the  expiration of five  (5) years from June 29, 1944, the date of said instrument; that said period of  one (1)  year expired on June  29, 1950, which should be deemed extended by  ninety (90) days, or up to September 27,  1950, because of the mortgagors' equity of redemption, under   Section  2,  Rule  70,  of the  Rules  of Court; that, as a consequence, plaintiffs' right,  as mortgagees,  became vested on the date  last mentioned, or on September 27, I960,' when the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in force; and that said Code  would apply to the  present  case, even if plaintiffs'  right were  treated  as an ordinary credit, inasmuch as the defendants were not in default until after plaintffs had made a valid demand, and this took place on July 24, 1951, when plaintiffs rights were vested and the new  Civil Code was already effective.

To our mind, the theory of defendants-appellees is untenable, for the following reasons:

1.  The date of maturity of an obligation affects the enforcement thereof, not its existence.  In a contractual obligation, like the one under consideration, the right of the obligee accrues upon the  perfection of the contract.  The term fixed therein determines, not the vesting of the right of the creditor, but, merely, the time at which he may exact performance of  the debtor's obligation.  Although compliance with said obligation,  in the case at bar, was not demandable until June SO, 1950, plaintiffs acquired their corresponding right on June 29, 1944, and, hence, the same is not subject to the provisions  of  the Civil Code of the Philippines.
   
   
2. Even, however, if the term fixed in the contract  in question  suspended  the  vesting of plaintiffs' right although,  as  already  adverted to, it has no such  effect the provisions of the Civil Code of the  Philippines  would still be inapplicable, because the obligation of defendants herein became payable from June 29, 1949 to June 29, 1950, when said  Code was not in force.
   
   
3. It is undeniable that plaintiffs could  have legally demanded payment of defendants' obligation on June  30, 1950.  This indicates clearly that the former had a vested right at the time.  The period of three  (3)  months granted in Section 2, Rule 70, of the  Rules  of Court, to the mortgagor  did not postpone the vesting of the mortgagee's right.  On the contrary,  it implied  that the rights of the latter had vested already, for said provision of. the Rules, of Court directs  the rendition of judgment in favor of the mortgagee which would  be inconceivable, if his rights had not accrued  as yet although foreclosure  shall not take place unless the mortgagor fails to satisfy said judgment  ninety (90) days, at least, after notice thereof.
   
   
4. Said Article 2253, authorizing the application of the provisions of the new Civil Code to acts or events which may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, exempts from' its operation the case when "any vested or acquired right  of the same origin"  shall be impaired thereby.   In the present case, plaintiffs' right were established prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code and. would be impaired by its provisions if the same were  given retroactive effect.
   
   
5. Defendants' pretense could not be sustained, even under the provisions of the new Civil  Code.  Article 1250 thereof pursuant to which the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of an obligation shall be  the basis' of payment, when an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency  stipulated  should  supervene expressly declares that it shall not apply to contracts containing an "agreement to the contrary".   In the case at bar, the parties herein sti* pulated that defendants'debt shall be paid one (1) year after the expiration of five (5) years from June 29, 1944.  This limitatiori upon the time at which the debtor could.pay his qbligation leaves no room for doubt that the parties were aware of the fact (then commonly known) that, on June 29, 1944, the  Japanese military notes had depreciated in value; that the process of depreciation would continue at an accelerated tempo;  that the contract  sought  tp relieve  the plaintiffs  from the consequence of said depreciation; and  . that this  is the reason why the  defendants were not permitted by the  contract to pay  their debt until after  the expiration of five (5) years from June 29, 1944.  In other words, said provision in the contract between the parties herein is equivalent  to "an agreement to the contrary", as the expression is  used in said Article 1250 of the new Civil Code.

Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration of defendants-appellees must be, us it is hereby, denied.

Upon the other hand, plaintiffs-appellants, in a pleading entitled "Petition for Additional Grant," which is in the nature of a motion for reconsideration, pray that our decision of October 29, 1955 be so amended as to sentence the defendants-appellees  to pay,  also,  the additional sum of P3,000.00, by way of attorney's fees, in conformity with the following stipulation of said contract:

"Na subalit di narain mabayaran sa tailing  na panahon ang Tiasabing halaga at dalhin sa juzgado ang bagay na ito upang doon kami piliting- magbayad ay nangangako kaming magbabayad ng halagang P3,000.00 bilang honararios  ng abogado tangi ang gastos sa juicio" (Record on Appeal, p. 4.)

Inasmuch as, apart from the present case,  it had been necessary for the plaintiffs-appellants to defend themselves in civil case No. 156 of  the  Court of First  Instance  of Nueva Ecija,  instituted by herein defendants-appellees, which case  was  appealed, first, to the Court  of Appeals, and, later on, to this Court, said plaintiffs are prima facie entitled to the benefits of the above stipulation.  Considering, however, that plaintiffs- will  collect for their investment of P30,000.00, in  Japanese  currency, made on June 29, 1944 the  sum of  P30,000.00  in Philippine currency, with interest thereon at the rate  of six per centum  (65%) per annum, or the aggregate  sum  of P48.000.00, more or ' less, in Philippine currency, we believe that the demands of justice and equity would be satisfied if the defendants-appellees were sentenced to pay only the additional sum of Pl.000,00 by way of attorney's fee, with the understanding that so much of the compensation to which plaintiffs' counsel  may justly be entitled as  exceeds  the aforementioned sum  of  P1,000.00,  shall  be  satisfied  by. the  plaintiffs-appellants.

Wherefore,  the dispositive part of the decision of this Court, promulgated on October 25, 1955, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

Wherefore, the defendants-appellees are hereby  sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs-appellants,  either directly or through the clerk of the lower court, within  ninety  (90)  days from the date  on which this decision shall become final, the sum of P30,000.00 in Philippine currency, with interests  thereon at the rate of six  per centum  (6%)' a year, from June 29,  1945.   In default of  such  payment, let the mortgagee in question be foreclosed in the manner provided by law and the rules of court.  Defendants-appellees shall, also, pay to the plaintiffs-appellants  the  additional sum of P1,000,000, by way of attorney's fee. With costs  against  the defendants-appellees."

It  is so ordered.

Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista  Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J.  B. L., JJ., concur.

Parás, C.J.:  I  dissent for the  same reasons stated in the  original decision.

Padilla, J.:  I  dissent for the. reasons referred to  in my dissent from the original decision.