Dr. Maximo Borromeo died  in Cebu on July 31, 1940 leaving a will wherein  he instituted  the  Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc., a family corporation, as his heir.   He named in the will as his executor Canuto O. Borromeo who in due time assumed the position as such.

On July 12, 1949, Johanna Hofer Borromeo, widow  of the  deceased, moved for the removal of Canuto O. Borromeo as executor and for her appointment in his place  as administratrix of the estate.  After hearing, the court  issued an order removing Borromeo as executor but denying the  widow's request  for appointment as administratrix. Canuto having appealed from the order of removal,  this Court rendered a confirmatory judgment, and in compliance therewith, Borromeo ceased to  take charge of the estate, which in the meantime remained without any administrator.

On January 26, 1956, the widow filed a motion reiterating her  appointment as administratrix,  which was opposed by the  heir-corporation, but this opposition notwithstanding, the  court issued an order appointing her administratrix of the  estate.  On January 27,  1956, after putting up the required  bond, which was approved by the court, letters  of administration were issued to her,  and in due course she assumed her trust.  On January 30, 1956, a motion for reconsideration of this  order was filed by the oppositor, and when this motion  was denied, the oppositor filed  a notice of appeal on July 19, 1956.  Thereafter, on July 1956 the court issued another order directing the removed executor to deliver certain records in his possession to the administratrix.   The order also contained  a notice to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China to the effect that the  account of  the estate  in said bank was placed under the custody of the widow as administratrix.

On August 1, 1956, oppositor filed a motion to  set aside (1) the letters of administration issued to  the administratrix on January 27,  1956, and (2) the order of July 21, 1956 ordering the removed executor to deliver certain records to  the  administratrix and notifying the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China  of the change in the administration as above stated.  This motion was denied in two orders entered on August 15, 1956. Failing to secure a reconsideration of these orders, oppositor filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.

In its decision, dated January 30,  1957, the  Court  of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that respondent judge did not exceed his jurisdiction nor act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its order of July 21, 1956.   With respect to the letters of administration issued to the widow, said court decided not to act or pass upon the applicability of Section 2,  Rule 39, of the  Rules of  Court to the order granting  said letters  of  administration, stating that the proper remedy of the oppositor is appeal and not certiorari. Hence the present petition for review.

The main issue raised by petitioner refers to the propriety of the issuance by respondent judge of his order of January 27, 1956 directing that letters of administration be  issued to the widow so that  she may  qualify as administratrix, as well as of the  order of July 21,  1956 directing the removed executor to turn over to the widow  certain records belonging to the estate, and notifying the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China that the account of the estate was already placed under her administration.  It is contended that the order appointing the widow as administratrix having been appealed, the same cannot be given due course,  nor immediately executed, by granting letters of administration to the widow, or allowing her to qualify as administratrix, without said  widow having before  hand filed a motion to that effect, giving notice to the interested parties, and without a special order having been issued by respondent  judge pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, stating the reasons for allowing the immediate execution of the order.   And since respondent judge has allowed the immediate execution of the order  appointing the widow as administratrix notwithstanding the appeal taken therefrom in disregard of the rule above set forth, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction,  or with grave abuse of discretion.

While under the section above cited,  before the expiration of the time  to appeal, execution may issue in the discretion  of the court, on motion  of the  prevailing party, with notice to the adverse party, only upon good reasons to  be stated in a special  order,  there are however cases where the application  of this rule may be relaxed when there exist special reasons or  circumstances  that warrant it.   The application  of this rule is not deemed  absolute. Cases there are where, in the use of  its sound discretion, the court, may even  without any previous motion to that effect, give immediate effect to an order when the  interest of the parties so  justifies.  This is the view entertained by this Court in at least two recent cases involving  the  appointment of a regular administrator.  We  refer  to  the cases of Alcasid, et al. vs. Samson, et al.,  102 Phil.,  735; 54  Off. Gaz. [15], 4479, and Borja, et al. vs. Tan, et al., 93  Phil, 167, which we will briefly essay in the following paragraphs.

In the first case, the estate was at first under the administration of a  special administrator.  When the probate court found that nothing has been accomplished during the entire period that the estate was  under his administration, it issued an  order appointing a regular  administrator to whom the corresponding  letters  of administration  were immediately issued notwithstanding the fact that an appeal had been taken from said  order.  The respondents in that case maintained that the  latters  of administration could not  be issued while  the appeal that had been interposed was still pending.  On  appeal by certiorari, however, this Court overruled this contention and held that the immediate issuance of the letters of administration and the assumption of the regular administrator of his  office  was  justified under the circumstances  even  though the  provisions of Section  2, Rule 39,  of  the Rules of Court  had  not been followed.

Thus, in the Alcasid  case, this Court said in part:

"Even assuming that the rule in Cotia vs. Pecson, 49 Off. Gaz., 4313 (tho it actually dealt with  the removal of a  regular administrator) is applicable to the case at bar, in the sense that the appointment of a new administrator should  be made effective pending appeal only if Rule 39, sec. 2 (execution pending appeal) is  complied with, such compliance exists in the present case, for the order of April  3, 1956 (issued upon motion of  herein petitioners) that  required  the special administrator to turn over  the properties and funds of the estate to the  regular administrator, was in effect a special order for the carrying out of the regular administration notwithstanding  the appeal of respondents that  was not perfected until April 12, 1956; while the  special reasons for immediately  carrying the order  into effect are given in  the order of  March 12,  as supplemented by that of May 9, 1956, heretofore quoted.   We  find these reasons sufficient (cf.  De Borja  vs. Encarnacion, 89 Phil., 239).

"The fact that these reasons were not expressed in the very order of April  3, 1956, is  not by itself fatal or constitutive of abuse of discretion; for while Rule 39, sec. 2,  prescribes  that execution pending appeal may  issue for  good  reasons to  be  stated in a  special order, this Court has decided that the element that gives validity to an order of immediate execution is the existence of good reasons,. if they may be found distinctly somewhere in the record, altho not expressly stated in the  order of execution itself (Lusk vs. Stevens, 54 Phil.,  154;  Guevara  vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 70 Phil., 48; People's Bank vs. San Jose, 96 Phil., 895; 51 Off. Gaz. [6] 2918; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court  (1157 Ed., Vol. I, p. 140).

In the  Borja case,  the estate was  at first  under the administration of the executor named  in the will.  When the lower court found  later that the executor was too old and too weak to  discharge his  duties, and  the estate is being administered by another person over whom the court had no authority,  it issued an order  appointing another person as  co-administrator to  whom  the  corresponding letters of administration  were  immediately  issued.  The petitioners maintained  that the co-administrator could not discharge his  function until  the  appeal that  had been interposed from the order  appointing him as co-administrator had been finally decided.  In overruling this contention, this Court held:

"* * * Be that as it may, we find that the qualification of Jose de Borja as co-administrator and  his immediate assumption of the  position were fully  justified.  The court  had found out as  a fact that the report of  the administrator was made by another person.  The administration of one of the estates  under administration was entrusted  to an  encargado, over  whom the court had no direct power or authority.  The administrator, because of his old age and physical inability, had  to perform his duties through  others  over whom the court had no power or control. These circumstances must have impelled the court in allowing Jose de Borja to assume  his position immediately, without  waiting for the  perfection of the appeal.  We can not say that the  court  abused its discretion in appointing a co-administrator  under these  circumstances."

Moreover, the rule which requires that before the expiration of the time to appeal, execution may issue in.the  discretion of the court, on motion of the prevailing party, upon good reasons to be stated in  a  special order, as already adverted  to,  is  not to  be  strictly  construed  if  it would defeat the interest of justice.   By this we mean  that, even if the reasons for the  granting of  execution are not expressed in the very  order, the same would  not have an adverse result, nor constitute abuse of discretion, for, as this Court  has  already decided, the element that gives validity to an order of immediate execution is  the existence  of good reasons, which may be found somewhere in  the record,  even if  not expressly stated in the order.^[1]  Here these reasons exist.   One is the  fact  that  the  executor named in the will  has been removed with the result that the estate was  left without any  administrator.  Another is that, under the law, if the executor  or administrator is found to be  incompetent,  the administration should  be given preferentially to the surviving  spouse  (Section 6, Rule 79); and the third reason is that, during the pendency of the appeal, it is not proper nor convenient that a special administrator be appointed  considering that this  special proceeding has been dragging for almost ten years during which little progress has been done towards  its early termination.  And, as we know, the  powers and  duties of a special administrator are limited to the preservation of the assets of the estate (Section 2, Rule 81), which means that the administration  would be at a stand  still  if the estate were placed in the hands of a special administrator.

It is  true that the  order dated February  21, 1951  the trial court did not consider the widow a suitable  person for the management of the estate for which reason it denied her motion to have her  appointed as co-administrator, or that in its order of March 29,  1951, denying the  widow's motion for reconsideration, it stated that it is the constant friction between the widow  and the deceased's collateral heirs that  made  the court  desist from considering  her appointment, but such an observation cannot have the effect of perpetually  disqualifying her, for  the situation may change or circumstances may arise  which may make the court change its opinion.   Such  is the situation herein obtained.  The  court, perhaps upon a further study of all the factors surrounding the matter, decided to reconsider its previous orders in the interest of all parties concerned.

It must be noted that as early as February 21, 1951, the trial court already expressed the opinion "that the widow has a  better claim to  the management  of the estate as against deceased's brothers who  are not collateral heirs," and this must have  influenced the court in reconsidering its stand.  We do not find any abuse of  discretion on the matter.

Wherefore, the decision  appealed from  is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla,  Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Lusk vs. Stevens, 54 Phil., 154; Guevara vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 70 Phil., 48; People's Bank vs. San Jose, 96 Phil., 895; 51 Off. Gaz. [6] 2918; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., Vol., I, p.  140.