This is an appeal  by certiorari  against a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations ordering the  petitioner to reinstate  Luis Mabagos to his former  position as  warehouseman or any equipment  position,  with  back wages from January  1,  1950  until reinstatement,  at P3.000 per annum.

Luis  Mabagos   started  working in the service  of the Government  in 1918.  He had three  civil  service eligibilities, third grade, second grade  and typist.  In  1937 he transferred  to the Naric.  He served in said  Government corporation  in various capacities,  namely,  as  provincial inspector, district inspector,  branch  manager,  provincial buyer and cashier,  warehouseman, and  lastly supervisor of all Narie  warehouses in Manila. According  to the records he was an  efficient employee.  In July, 1948, he was suspended because he was  implicated in  a case of  theft in a warehouse under his supervision.  The case was not finished until 1950,  when he was acquitted by  the  Court of Appeals.  Upon  his acquittal,  he  demanded his  reinstatement and  the payment of his back wages.   He was paid back wages  until  December 31,  1949,  but the  reinstatement was denied on  the ground that his position had been abolished.  He  sought the  payment of his gratuity under the Osmena  Retirement Act, but this was also denied. So his union  instituted  these proceedings for his reinstatement and for the payment of his back salary from January 1, 1950  until, he  is  actually  reinstated.  The  Court  of Industrial Relations found that his separation was without just cause and granted the  petition.   The Nark appealed from this  decision.

It is claimed that the decision directly contravenes Executive Order No.  350, Series of 1950, which provides in part:

"*  * *; Provided, further, That the personnel of said corporations hereby transferred  shall  be  reappointed in the PRISCO and those not reappointed within sixty (60) days from, the  effective date of this Order shall be  considered separated  from the service"'  (Italics ours.)

It is argued that as Mabagos was  not  reappointed within 60 days  from  October 3,  1950 he should  be  considered separated from the service  in accordance with the abovequoted provision.

In order to decide  the issue presented,  it seems pertinent and relevant to determine  the  status of Mabagos as an employee  by reason  of his suspension.  The suspension must have been ordered by the head of the Naric by virtue  of section  694 of  the  Revised Administrative Code, which provides:

"* * *. With the approval of  the proper head of  department, the chief of a bureau or office may likewise suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct  or neglect  in  the performance  of duty."

He  was  implicated in the charge of theft,  which  implies dishonesty. As he was merely suspended from office pending  determination of  the  criminal charge, there  was  a temporary cessation of his duties, not a removal, dismissal or permanent separation from service.   Suspension means temporary withdrawal or separation, as distinguished from removal  or dismissal,  which  amounts  to permanent separation.

"Word 'suspend' is defined  as to cause  to  cease  for a  time. Derrick vs. City of Vallejo, 40 P. 2d H&,-951, 4 Cal. App. 2d. 25". (Words and Phrases, Vol. 40, p. 918)

"'Suspend means to  cause  to cease for a  time;  to  postpone. Bishop vs. Bacon, 196  A, 918,  921,  130 Pa.  Super.  240."  (Id., P. 918)   

"Municipal employee who suffers a 'layoff suffers a 'suspension,' and such 'layoff' or 'suspension' differs  from 'removal' from service only in degree, in that 'removal' implies permanent separation from service, while 'suspension' or  'layoff implies  temporary separation from service.  State ex  rel. Ausburn vs.  City of Seattle, 67 P. 2d 913, 921, 190 Wash. 222,  111 A. L. E. 418,"  (Id., p. 920.)

"Under statute' giving  municipal janitors and laborers two weeks' vacation without loss of -pay except in cases of 'dismissal,' 'dismissal' means  permanent  severance or  complete  separation from  service accomplished by removal, and imports an ending of the employment; "whereas 'suspension' means temporary withdrawal or cessation from public  work and imports possibility or likelihood of return to work when reason for  suspension ceases  to be operative.  G. L.  (Ter. Ed.) c. 41, Sec. Ill,  as  amended by St. 1932, c,  109, Commissioner of Labor  and Industries vs.  Downey,  135 N.  E,  742,  230  Mass. 432."  (Id., pi 920)

The suspension  of  Mabagos in  1948 did not operate to separate Mm from the service.   The rule  is  that if  an employee is exonerated from the charges preferred against him, by virtue of which he was suspended, his back salaries withheld during the full period of his suspension are  paid to him  (section 260,  Revised  Administrative Code.)    To this effect is our  ruling in  the case of  Batungbakal vs. N.DC, et al.,  93 Phil.,  182; 49  Off. Gaz.  No.  6, pp.  2290, 3399.

"Having proven  that  he  (the  plaintiff had been  suspended and dismissed  without'  cause, contrary to the express provision of  the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain  ministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty whose  performance may be  controlled and enjoined by mandamus.  There is  no room for discretion.  The Auditor General is not being  directed  to perform an act which he may or may not execute according  to his discretion.  He is being asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong.  And the payment of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement,  this, aside from the parallel and  analogy which may be found in section 200, paragraph  1,  Revised Administrative Code which  provides  for.the payment  of back  salary upon reinstatement

The import of section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code and of the ruling  herein above-quoted, which direct the payment  of back salaries of a suspended employee, is that  the position is not vacated by the incumbent or suppressed  by reason of the  suspension.  The legal provision requiring payment of salaries during the suspension implies the continuance  of the  position  during the said suspension;  the salaries  corresponding  to  the  position during the time of suspension can  not be ordered paid if the position is  suppressed or eliminated.  The argument of the petitioner that Mabagos was no longer in the employ of the Naric upon the approval  of  Executive Order No. 350, s.  1950, by reason of the suspension, is therefore incorrect.   The position was still  in  existence, with  the salary corresponding thereto.   The suspension merely  operated to prevent Mabagos from exercising the duties and prerogatives pertaining to his office,  not his  removal  or dismissal therefrom.  The petitioner should have retained the position of Mabagos during  the suspension, to await the result of the charges brought against him.  The petitioner had  no right to abolish the suspended employee's position, or to give it permanently to another during  the pendency of the case against the  employee.

It is to be noted that the principle we have explained above, to the effect that Mabagos should be  returned to his position upon his exoneration, is applicable to officials and employees belonging to  the  Civil  Service.  But  these rights and privileges have also been extended to employees in Government-owned  or controlled corporations, such as the  Naric, by virtue of Executive Order  No. 399, s.  1951, section 14, which provides:

"All officers and employees of the corporation shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations,  except those  whose positions may, upon recommendation of the  Board of Directors and the  Administrator of  Economic  Coordination,  be  declared by  the President of the Philippines as policy-determining, primarily confidential or technical in nature."

Section 6 of Executive  Order No. 319,  s. 1950, is also to the same effect.

"The officers and employees  of the department of  Economic Coordination and of the different corporations and agencies,  under it may hereafter  be employed shall  be subject,  in  all respects to the application  of the  Civil Service rules and  regulations, as in the case of the other officers and  employees   of the  Government."   Section  1 of the above Order (Executive Order  No.  319) includes the Narie among  the government corporations  under the supervision  of the Department of Economic Coordination.

The petitioner also contends that  as Mabagos was under suspension at the time  of the merger  of the  Naric into the Prisco,  and as he  was not reappointed within sixty days  from the said merger, he should be  considered  as permanently separated from the service  (section 12, Executive Order  No. 350, s.  1950).  The  argument fails  to consider the directive contained in the Executive Order which in effect is  as follows: "Provided, further, that the personnel of said corporations hereby transferred shall be reappointed in the PRISCO."  Mabagos was a personnel of the Naric at the time of the promulgation of said Order. In  accordance  with the directive  Mabagos should  have been  reappointed.  The failure of petitioner  to comply with the order  is without justifiable reason because it was found out that the suspension was  illegal and unjust.

Another defense submitted by the petitioner is the supposed fact that the position of Mabagos  had been abolished or given to  some  other  employee of the Naric.   It is impossible to conceive that the position of Mabagos held  by him at the time of the merger could have been suppressed. The maintenance of warehouses is  an inherent  and indispensable activity of the Naric.  The Naric would  find it impossible to comply with its' duties and functions without warehouses.  If Mabagos could not be appointed  to the position of supervisor because this  position was abolished, he could hold that of actual warehouseman wherever  such warehouse of the Naric may be situated.  In any ease, as pointed out above, the Naric should have kept the position open  for  Mabagos  when the  latter's case was  terminated by the dismissal of the charges against him.

For the foregoing  considerations,  the  decision of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed  from  is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Parás,  C. J.,  Padilla,  Montemayor, Reyes,  A.,  Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.