This is  an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court of  Industrial Relations holding that  tournahauler drivers  and their  helpers and truck  drivers, employed in transporting cane from the field  to  the "switch" where they are loaded on railroad cars for transportation to the mill, are industrial workers and therefore entitled to 50 per cent for overtime  work  in excess of 8 hours  and whatever they are entitled  thereto, from  1947 to 1952.

It is  first  contended  that the work of harvesting the cane; an admittedly agricultural work, should include that of loading it in tournahaulers and trucks and of transporting it in these railroad "switches  as  the same  constitute what is  known as the "initial means  of transporting the cane.   Such work is claimed to be similar to bringing farm products to the roadside.   The  cases  of  American  Fruit (1948)  75 N.L.E.B.  1157 and L.  Maxey, Inc.  (1948)  78 N.L.E.B. 525 are cited  in  support of this claim.  In the first case the nature  of the work  of grove  truck drivers, who were employed by the Fruit Growers, was as follows:

"During  the  harvesting season,  from  October or  November  to May or June, the Employer  requires tile services  of fine,grave truck drivers.   They are  hired by  the  Employer's  field superintendent, who, together with the Employer's field  foreman, gives them their orders and supervises their work.  Paid with the Employer's checks, they drive trucks  owned by  the Employer.  They  report  daily for work at the  Employer's  packing  house  where  they  punch the time  clock  used by  the  employer's  packing house  employees at  the  beginning  and  end  of each  day.  They convey  empty fruit  containers from  the  packing  house  to  the  groves  where fruit is  being harvested.  The  nearest grove serviced by the Employer is about  3%  miles from  the packing house;  the  furthest is approximately  SE miles  away.  The time spent  by  grove truck drivers in transit and at the groves varies considerably.  After  the boxes have been filed with fruit and loaded on  the trucks by the harvest hands, the grove truck drivers bring the  trucks back  to the Employer's packing house.. Upon their  return  to  the plant, the. drivers spend an hour or more at  the packing  house, unloading the fruit and moving it to the designated location  where each grower's fruit is  being stored prior to packing-.   Grove truck  drivers work from1 9 to 11 hours  per  day, averaging  four round trips."

But it  was held  that said grove  truck drivers are not agricultural workers,  thus:

"It is  also clear from  the record that the  functions of the grove truck  drivers are  of  a non-agricultural nature.  The  mere fact that these employees are engaged in handling agricultural products does, not  of  itself  classify  them  as 'agricultural  laborer.' The administrate regulations of governmental agencies and the decision of the  Courts interpreting  the 'agricultural  labor'  exemption   in various  statutes,  including  National Labor Relations  Act, make it  clear  that  there is a differentiation  between those engaged  in industrial activities connected with the processing and marketing  of agricultural products, and those who are  engaged in work incidental  to  ordinary  farming operations.  As  to - the  status of workers such as those here involved, the  decisions  of the Courts  interpreting the Agricultural exemptions in  the  Friar Labor Standards Act  of 1938, indicate that they are not engaged  in 'agriculture' as defined in section 3 ( f)  of that Act, as the  employer  is not a grower,' and its  packing facilities  are  not  located 'on  a farm,' * * *."

In  the other case,  it was  held:

"4. The Petitioner seeks a unit of all the Employer's truck drivers at its  Frostproof, Florida, plant,  excluding supervisors as defined by the Act.  The Employer is  in  general agreement with the unit . sought by  the Petitioner, but would exclude  therefrom goat-truck drivers and flat  bodied truck drivers upon the ground that they are agricultural employees  and  thus  excluded from  the  benefits  of collective bargaining.

"The Employer  is  engaged  in  the harvesting,  packaging, and marketing of citrus fruit grown  in its own orchards and in orchards owned  by  independent  growers.  As part  of this operation, the fruit is picked  and loaded onto trucks by field  crews.  It  is  then either  hauled by the Employer's goat trucks to the roadside where the fruit is transferred to a semi-trailer  for  transportation  to the plant,  or it  is hauled  directly from the grove to the plant by either goat-or flat-bodied trucks.  Except  for  the operation  of hauling the fruit from the orchard to the roadside, the goat and flat bodied drivers have similar  duties.  However,  the  record indicates  that goat-truck  drivers  spend part of their time in  hauling fruit from the orchard to  the roadside  as  distinguished  from  the hauling.of fruit directly from the orchard to  the plant.  The evidence  is  in conflict as to what percentage of their time goat-truck drivers spend on each type of hauling operation,

"The Board has held that the function of  goat-truck drivers  in hauling fruit from the  orchard  to the roadside  is within the agricultural exemption, and requires that employees thus  engaged  be excluded from the  benefits  of the  Act.  On  the other hand, the Board  has  held that the  transportation  of  agricultural  products from farm to processing plant is work which  is not covered by the agricultural exemption."

As pointed out  by  respondent, however,  the above  cases were  decided  on questions involving collective bargaining, not  the  interpretation  of  the  Eight-Hour  Labor  Law. This  notwithstanding,  we find nothing therein which  can be  said to support  petitioner's claim;  they do hold the truck  drivers hauling agricultural produce to a plant are non-agricultural.

If petitioner were  a small farmer using tractors  and trucks on a small scale, its contention would perhaps merit serious,  if not  favorable, consideration, because, the very ones engaged in cutting the cane would be the  same ones that bring it to the "switches."  But petitioner is a highly mechanized  industrial concern,  with the  work of planting and harvesting  clearly distinguished  from  that of transporting the  cane from the fields,  first to a "switch" and later to the mill.  The rule, therefore, should  be that all its workers are to be considered industr-j&l workers, except1 those devoted to purely agricultural work.  We can perhaps concede that the actual  loading of the cane on the trucks and tournahaulers is part of the agricultural operation.  This may be done by the laborers cutting the cane themselves.  In the case of Vives vs. Serralles,  145 F.  2d. 551-554  (cited  by petitioner), the workers held to be agricultural workers were those engaged in operating cars, from  one place to another.  But  this case can have no application to the case at bar,  which concerns  drivers of trucks and tournahaulers.   Both drivers and operators of . trucks and tournahaulers are distinct from tho  harvesters or from  the loaders;  they  do no other  work than hauling. They do no agricultural  work of  any kind at  all;  the industry which employs them is a big one permitting specialization for the different phases  of the work.   With the highly industrialized organization  to which  they  belong, it seems more in consonance with reason to consider them part of the mill organization, not of the agricultural workers as are the planters and harvesters.

It is  also contended that it  would  be  unjust to  make petitioner liable  for  overtime of said laborers  in  view of the fact that the Secretary of Labor had previously been consulted and reliance had been placed  in good faith in his opinion.   We  find  nothing in this official's opinion which supports petitioner's contention.  The  opinion  says,

"We agree with you and Mr. A. A. Werner  of the Pampanga Sugar Mills that the tractor drivers and their helpers while in  the field engaged  in  plowing  and harrowing  and in other activities closely connected with such work are included in the  term 'farm laborers' and,' therefore, exempt from the- 8-hour  requirement under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 444. * * *."'  (See p. 5 and 114 of the Record  on Appeal)

By no stretch of reasoning may the above opinion be interpreted to mean  that drivers of trucks and tournahaulers engaged in transporting cane  to  "switches" are farm  laborers.  If petitioner  had interpreted the above  opinion in the sense that  tournahaulers and  truck drivers are to be  considered farm laborers, it can blame  no one else therefore, much less the Secretary of Labor, for the latter's opinion contains nothing to justify his belief or inference.

The last argument  is that  as the  Secretary of Labor has not issued the permit required  by section 2  of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the tournahauler and truck drivers should not be entitled to overtime pay, in accordance  with the ruling in the case of Pasumil Workers  Union vs. Court of Industrial Eolations, 89 Phil., S70, 375-376.  The case cited has become  obsolete because of the  repeal of  Acts Nos. 4123 and 4242.   Under Commonwealth Act No. 444, only the employer has the obligation to secure authority to perform overtime work.  Why should a violation by him of  his duty  exempt him from liability?  This matter has already  been settled against the petitioner by Us  in Gotamco  Lumber  Co.  vs.  Court  of  Industrial  Relations, (85 Phil., 291).

"The decision now under review  grants to all workers and  employees of the company 50 per cent additional compensation for work performed in  excess of eight hours a day including  Sundays  and Holidays effective  October  21, 1947.  The petitioner maintains that as the overtime work has been performed without a permission from the Department of Labor,  no extra  compensation  should be authorized.  Several  decisions of this  court  were invoked. But  those decisions were based on the reasoning  that 'as both the laborer  and the employer are duty bound' to secure the permit from the Department of Labor, both were in pari delicto.  However, the present  law in effect imposes that duty upon the employer.   (Commonwealth Act No. 444)."

In view of the  foregoing  considerations, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Parás, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Concepcion,  Reyes,  J.  B. L., and Endencia,  JJ., concur.