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https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2e05?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[TEOFILA SALVADOR v. HERMOGENBS CALUAG](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2e05?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. L-7458, Feb 29, 1956 ]

TEOFILA SALVADOR v. HERMOGENBS CALUAG +

DECISION

98 Phil. 552

[ G.R. No. L-7458, February 29, 1956 ]

TEOFILA SALVADOR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HERMOGENBS CALUAG, ETC., AND THE YEK TONG LIN FIRE & INSURANCE CO., LTD., RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

ENDENCIA, J.:

On  June  11,  1953, the  respondent  corporation,  Yek Tong Lin Fire & Insurance Co., Ltd., filed in the Municipal Court of  Quezon City Civil Case No. 993, for ejectment, against the  herein petitioner Teoflla Salvador, wherein, after  trial,  a decision  was  rendered  against  her,  the dispositive part of which is as follows:
"Procede dietar senteneia en favor de  la demandaiite ordenando a la  demandada que deje vacante  la  propiedad deadrita  en la demanda y entregue  su posesion a la demandante; pague a esta, por el  uso y  ocupacion  de  la prbpiedad en cuestion la  cantidad de F120 al mes a partir del 26 de Mayo de  1953 hasta  la fecha de la entrega  de la posesion de dicha propiedad; pague, ademas, las costas del juicio.  Se sobresee la reconvencion de la demandada por carecer de merito y falta  de  substanciacion."
Not satisfied with the question, the petitioner herein, in due  time, filed a notice of  appeal  and the necessary  appeal bond together with a  supersedeas  bond in the  sum of P480 for  the  rentals corresponding  to four  months from May 26, 1958 to September 26, 1953.

On September  8,  1953, and before the case was  docketed in the  Court of First Instance of Rizal,  the respondent corporation filed an urgent motion  for execution of  the aforequoted judgment but the same was  denied  in view of the fact  that the herein  petitioner was  allowed by the Municipal Court to file, and in fact did file, a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of  the judgment.

On  September 25, 1953, the case was docketed in  the Court of  First Instance of Rizal  as Civil case  No. Q- 746.   On October  12, 1953, the  respondent  corporation again  filed an urgent  motion for execution on the  ground that the  September, 1953  rental  of P120 was  not paid or deposited with the Clerk  of Court  of  the Court  of First Instance of Rizal on or before October 10, 1953 in accordance with  the provisions  of section 8, Rule 72  of the Rules  of  Court.   On November 3,  1953,  the Court of First Instance of  Rizal granted  said  motion  and on November  17, 1953 a  writ of execution was issued.  Immediately thereafter, or on November 19, 195S, the herein petitioner filed  a  motion to set aside  the order of November 3,  1953 on  the  ground  (1) that  the rentals for four months from  May 26,  1953 to September 25, 1953 were covered by  the supersedeas bond in the amount of P480;  (2)  that on October  20,  1953,  the defendant deposited with the Clerk of Court the  sum of P120 for the rental of the premises for the month  of from September 26, 1953 to October 25, 1953; (3)  that  on November 19, 1953,  the  defendant  has made another deposit of P120 for the rental  corresponding to October 26, 1953 to November 25,  1953; and  (4)  that pursuant to section 8  of Rule 72,  the rental for the  period of  September 26,S1953 to October 25, 1953 could be paid  or deposited until November 4,  1953  and  that for October 26, 1953 to November 25,  1953, on December 4,  1953.

This motion was  opposed by the respondent corporation invoking that in the case of Carbungco, et al. vs. Amparo, et al., * L-2245, promulgated on May 20, 1949, it was ruled that the legal provision about the deposit of rental corresponding to  the  previous   month  within  the first ten days of the next  succeeding month is  mandatory and that upon  violation thereof a writ of execution should be granted upon petition of the plaintiff.

On  January 14,  1954, the Court of  First  Instance, denying petitioner's motion'  of  November 19, 1953, entered the following order:
"By virtue of  the order issued by this Court on November  3, 1953, a writ of execution of the decision rendered by the inferior court ordering the  defendant to  vacate the  property in  question and to deliver possession thereof to the herein plaintiff was issued. On  November 19, 1953,  a motion was presented  by  the  counsel for the defendant praying that the said order of November 3, 1953 be set aside and  that  the writ of execution  issued be cancelled. An opposition  to  the  said motion to set aside  was presented  by the counsel for the plaintiff.

"After  going over the  arguments  set forth In both motion  to set aside and  opposition  thereto,  the Court  has  arrived at  the conclusion that said order of November 3,  1953 ordering the issuance of a  writ of  execution of the decision  rendered  by  the  inferior court must stand.  In the case of Bagtas vs. Tan, et al,  (L-6050), Our Supreme Court held:
'In  a forcible entry or detainer case,  a supersedeaa bond covers only  rentals  in arrears,  up to the  elevation  of the case to  the court of first instance on  appeal, by  the perfection  of the appeal, and in addition to the  supersedeas bond, to stay execution during the appeal, the  defendant-appellant   should deposit in the  court or pay to the  plaintiff the current  rentals as they  become due on or before the  tenth' of each calendar month  for the  preceding month (Rule 72, Sec.  8).'

From the  foregoing  doctrine, it is clear that  the  mere  filing  of the supersedeas bond to  cover  rentals in arrears  up to  the perfection  of  the  appeal will not  relieve the  defendant-appellant  in the present case from depositing  in court or paying to the  plaintiff the  current rentals  as they  became  due  'on  or  before  the tenth  of  each calendar  month  for   the   preceding  month'.   As shown by the record of this case, the defendant herein failed to make the necessary  deposit or to pay  the  plaintiff the  rental due  as required by Sec. 8, Rule  72 of the Rules of Court;  she only made the first deposit on October 20,  1953,  date is far beyond the period when .she. should have done so as provided by said Rule.  Likewise, in the case of  Guzman vs. Lichauco  (42.  Phil. 291)  it was held that the term 'calendar  month' does not mean every  period of  thirty days beginning from the date  of the appeal, but it has reference to the month in the calendar.

"In view of  the foregoing, the  motion  to set aside the order of this  Court dated  November 3,  1953  is hereto denied, and let the writ of execution issued  be given  due course."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, injunction, and prohibition.

It  is  contended  fey  the  respondent  corporation   that the  rental  of the  premises corresponding  to the  period September  26,  1953 to October  25, 1953 should be  paid or deposited  on or before  October 10,  1953 and the rental for October 26, 1958  to  November 25, 1953  should be paid on or before November 10, 1953.  Petitioner, in turn,  contends  that the first rental in  question  can be paid until November 4, 1953 and the second, on December 4, 1953.

In the aforequoted decision of  the Municipal  Court of Quezon City, the herein petitioner was ordered  to  pay P120 monthly from  May 26, 1953, and  not from  May 1 to May 30, 1953.  Therefore,  the first rental that the herein  petitioner should pay or deposit  in this case should mature on June 25, 1953  and the  second and succeeding rentals would mature every 25th day of the succeeding month.  The record disclose  that the rentals from May 26, 1953 up to September  25,  1953 in the sum of . f 480 was covered by the supersedeas  bond approved by the Municipal Court  and  transmitted to  the  Court of First Instance of Quezon City; the rent for the month of from September 26,  to  October 25, 1953 wag deposited on October 20, 1953, as per Official Receipt No. B-4265175; the rent for the month of from October 26, 1953 to November 25, 1953 was deposited on November 19, 1953, as  per  Official Receipt  No.  B-4265206; and the rent for one month corresponding  to the  period  from November 26,  1953 to December 25, 1953 was deposited on December 10,  1953,  as  per  Official Receipt  No. B-4265238. Yet, on  January 14,   1954,  the  respondent judge  gave due course to the writ of execution.  Certainly,'  this is an evident error, for in the present case there has been payment in due time, for the first rent could be paid up to  October 25th, the second up to November 25th,  and the third up to  December  25th,  yet said rents were not incurred in the  delinquency of payment of the rents in  question.   So,  there is  no legal basis  for  executing the  decision  of  the Municipal  Court of,  Quezon  City which  according  to  the aforecited section 8  of Rule 72 of the Rules  of  Court should be executed if  the defendant fails to deposit in court within  ten  days of the succeeding month the  rental  corresponding  to  the previous month.   In  reaching the foregoing conclusion, we are not unmindful of the ruling laid  down  in  the case of De Guzman vs. Liehauco (42 Phil.,  291) which the lower court took  into  consideration in  issuing  the disputed writ of  execution,  but the question raised in that case, was  whether the starting point for  the  computation of one month is the date  of the appeal  and not the  calendar month composed of thirty days  as  denned by Section 18 of the  Revised  Administrative Code.   Thai case  therefore has  no parity  with the present  case ^wherein the point in issue  is whether the decision of  the Municipal Court  of  Quezon  City  should be executed only  because the rent corresponding to September 26,  1958 to  October 25, 1953  has  been paid  on  October 20  and not  on  or before October 10, 1953  and the rent  for  October 26, 1953 to November 25,  1953 was paid  on  November 19, 1953 and  not on or before November 10,  1953.  It is our considered opinion that in cases of  monthly  rents  which could be  paid  from a  given day of a  month  up  to  a given day of  the following month, the  calendar month within which the rent could be deposited or paid should be that following the month  in which the rent matured, i.  e., if the rent matures on any day for the  month of October, the calendar month referred to in section 8 of Rule 72 within which the rent should be paid to avoid  execution of the decision shall be the month of November,  and so  on. Wherefore, the petition is  hereby  granted and the preliminary injunction issued in this case made permanent enjoining  the respondent judge to execute his  Order dated January 14, 1953, without costs.

ParĂ¡s,  C.  J., Padilla,  Montemayor,  Reyes, A.,  Jugo, Bautista Angela, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L,, JJ., concur.



* 83 Phil., 639.

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