In Cadastral  Case No.  27,  L.  R.  C.  (G.L.R.O.)  Cad. Rec. No. 284, a petition was, on February 23, 1956,  filed by Gabino  Bachoco in the  Court  of First Instance  of Occidental Negros,  asking for the  reconstitution of the Original  Certificate  of Title No. 25977 issued in the name of Juana Montinola for lot No. 106 of the Sagay Cadastre on the basis of the decree  of registration entered in  that case, the reconstitution to be made  in  accordance  with Republic Act No. 26 from a copy of  said decree on file in the office of the Register  of Deeds.  The petition alleged. among other things, that the lot in question was adjudged to Juana Montinola in said cadastral case on May 31, 1923 and the corresponding  original  certificate of  title therefor  (OCT No.  25977)  was subsequently issued in her name pursuant  to the decree of registration issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office on December 7, 1928; that Juana Montinola was married  to Nicolas Batusing and  upon her death she left four children with him  as her only heirs, one of whom was Cresencia Batusing;  that Cresencia Batusing's share in the lot in  question was by her  conveyed to petitioner through  a deed of  sale dated January 17, 1925 and acknowledged before a notary public; that due to the loss or destruction of the original certificate of title to the lot as well  as the owner's  duplicate copy thereof,  the  deed in question had remained unregistered; and  that to quote from the petition "it is  the  desire of petitioner that  the said original certificate  of  title be reconstituted so that, not only may he then be able to register his deed of sale affecting  the portion of  Cresencia Batusing,  but that he be  able  to  secure  a  certificate of title covering  his portion of  said  lot No.  106."

As provided  in  Republic Act No. 26, which is the law invoked  by  petitioner,  the petition was set for hearing with  notice to interested parties, and in due time Ignacia Esperancilla and Tomasa Esperancilla,  children of Cresencia Batusing, appeared  and opposed the petition,  claiming that they had  no knowledge  of the existence of  the deed alleged to have been executed by their  late mother and that,  in  any event, the said  deed, which was alleged  ta have  been executed more than three years before the issuance of the decree of registration on December 7, 1928, was ineffective and did not  convey to petitioner any interest which would entitled him to ask for  the reconstitution of the certificate  of title.

After  hearing, the court,   having found   the  facts  to be as alleged  in  the  petition, ordered  the  register  of deeds  of the province  to reconstitute the  original  certificate of title (No.  25977)   for  the  lot  in question,  as well as  the  owner's duplicate of  said  certificate, on the basis  of  the decision  rendered in the cadastral case and the decree issued  by the General Land Registration  Office. And the  court further ordered that once the  reconstitution had been accomplished, a second owner's duplicate  certificate of title  be issued to petitioner.   But on a motion for reconsideration on  the grounds (1)  that the alleged sale was ineffective as  against a decree of registration subsequently issued and  (2) that as the certificate of title was not  lost in petitioner's  possession, the   reconstituted owner's duplicate  certificate of title should not be delivered to him,  the  court reconsidered its order  and denied the petition for reconstitution.

Appealing from the  order  of  denial, petitioner  raises various questions; but  under our view  of  the case not all of them need be considered.

Under Republic Act No. 26, a petition for the reconstitution  of a lost  or destroyed original  certificate of  title for registered land may be  filed  with the Court of First Instance "by the  registered owner,  his  assigns or  any person having an  interest in the  property."   Petitioner claims  to have such interest,  and as the  validity of the claim is disputed,  it would be most convenient  for the proper resolution of that claim that the missing certificate of title be first reproduced.  Insofar,  therefore, as  petitioner  merely asks for the reconstitution  of the  original certificate of title, we  can see no reason why his petition may not be granted, and, as a matter of fact on page 23 of the  record on  appeal, there is an allegation, which has not  been challenged,  to  the  effect that  the  oppositors in open court had expressly manifested that they were not opposing the reconstitution of the  title of Juana Montinola and that what they were opposing was the delivery of said title  to petitioner  for him to hold  and possess1  once it was reconstituted.

It appears, nowever, that it is not merely the reconstitution  of Juana  Montinola's original  certificate of  title that petitioner wants.  For as already stated, the petition avers  that  he wants  the  said  certificate  reconstituted so that he  may  have the deed in his favor  registered and secure for himself a certificate  of title covering his portion of the lot in question, and in his brief he also prays that  the previous  order of  the court authorizing  the reconstitution of  the original certificate and the issuance to him  of the second owner's  duplicate thereof  be carried out, all of which  would involve a material change in  the original certificate  of  title,  a change which,  not being consented to by the other parties whose interest  will be affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No.  26.   Reconstitution of a lost  or destroyed certificate of title under that  Act is limited  to the reconstitution of the certificate  as  it stood at the time of its loss  or destruction  and should not be stretched to include changes which alter  or affect the  title  of the registered  owner A change of that nature, specially  when  urged on the basis of a disputed deed and opposed by other parties in interest, raises an issue which should be ventilated and decided in an ordinary action.

And  it may be well  to  state here that not even the proceedings authorized  in section 112 of the Land Registration  Act could be availed of for the end which appellant has in view, for such proceedings  apply only "if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest"; otherwise the  matter  in controversy should be  threshed out "in an ordinary case or in a case where the incident belongs"  (Enriguez,  et  al. vs. Atienza,  et  al., 100 Phil., 1072  and  cases therein cited).

This  view of the case  dispenses with  the necessity of discussing appellant's objection to the  order  appealed from on the ground that the said  order does not contain a statement  of the facts or  the  law upon which  it is based.

Conformably to the   above, the order  appealed  from is modified  in the sense  that appellant's petition for reconstitution  is  granted  only insofar as  it orders the reconstitution  of  the  original  certificate of  title  issued in the  name of Juana  Montinola, without prejudice  to the filing, once the said  title  is reconstituted, of the proper  action to have appellant's alleged interest recorded in said  certificate. Without special  pronouncement as to costs.

Paras,  C.  J., Bengzon,  Padilla,  Montemayor,  Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,  J. B.  L., and  Endencia JJ., concur.