This is a petition  for prohibition  filed  by Jose  U. Ochate, Mayor of the municipality of  Clarin, province of Misamis  Occidental against the Provincial Governor therein, Diego H. Ty Deling or his successor,  and  the town Vice Mayor, Tomas  Torres of the same  municipality, praying that the  said respondents be  prohibited from proceeding in the administrative charges against  petitioner  and  to declare unlawful and  without authority of law, the order of respondent Governor suspending  him  from  office pending  investigation  by the  Provincial Board.

The uncontroverted facts are as follows:

Petitioner  Jose  U.  Ochate is the incumbent municipal mayor of Clarin,  Misamis Occidental, while respondents Diego H. Ty Deling and Tomas Torres are the incumbent provincial governor and vice-mayor  of the  said municipality,  respectively.

In an administrative complaint dated December 18, 1957, petitioner was charged  before the Provincial Board of:

"I. Organizing, tolerating, and participating  in illegal  cockfight and other  forms of gambling;

II. Committing grave public  scandals  and acts unbecoming  of public official;

III. Corruption of subordinate employees."

which complaint was later amended on December 23, 1957 to include the following  specifications:

"1. Misconduct in  Office

(a) That while the municipal council of  Clarin,  Misamis Occidental, was  in  session  on August 31,  1956, presided by the petitioner  as mayor,  the latter  abruptly  left  the  said session and slapped his daughter and boxed  his wife  before the councilors and in the presence of numerous persons inside the municipal  building, thereby disturbing and interrupting: the council's meeting with the ensuing commotion and  disorder in violation of Articles 144 and 153 of  the Revised Penal Code.

(b) That on  and before December 29,  1957, the petitioner,. being a municipal mayor, organized or participated directly in illegal  cockfights in unlicensed cockpits,  and allowed or tolerated gambling therein.

(c) That on the same date, the petitioner and his policemen resisted with firearms and violence and prevented the policemen of the neighboring municipality  from arresting those  engaged in illegal  cockfights, instead of assisting the latter in  performing their  duty.

2. Neglect of Duty

That the  petitioner, knowing that illegal cockfights  and gambling were held in his presence, maliciously refrained from instituting or causing the prosecution of the  violators of the law thereby committing dereliction  of  duty as  mayor in violation  of Article 208 of  the  Revised Penal  Code.

3. Oppression

That he ordered  anyone  of  his  policemen to accompany him to illegal  cockpits and  gambling, or assigned  them as bodyguards of his mistress, or prevented them from enforcing the gambling laws,  thereby  depriving them of their liberty of  action in the performance of their duties, thus  inducing them to commit dereliction of duty, as in  fact, two of them are now  indicted with him for assault."   (Memorandum  for Respondents, pp. 1-2)

On the same date that the original administrative charge was filed,  the respondent Governor issued Executive Order No. 7 suspending the petitioner from office and  directing the latter to turn  over the same to the respondent Vice-. Mayor.

The petitioner questions the legality of the administrative  charges and of the  order of  suspension.  Upon  his motion and filing a bond of five Hundred pesos, this Court, by resolution dated  January  20, 1958, issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction.

In the mind of the Court, the pivotal issue in the whole case is the question whether or not  the facts alleged in  the administrative  charge,  as substantiated  by affidavits  of certain  complainants, justify  the administrative proceedings against petitioner  and warrant the order of suspension of the Governor.

Section 2188 of the  Revised Administrative Code provides, and we quote:

"Supervisory  authority  of provincial  governor over municipal officers. The  provincial governor  shall receive  and  investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by  final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.  For minor delinquency, he may reprimand the offender; and if a more  severe punishment  seems to be  desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter  to the provincial board, furnishing  a copy of such  charges to the accused either personally or  by registered mail, and  he may in such  case  suspend the officer (not  being the  municipal  treasurer) pending action  by  the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the  official integrity of the officer in  question. Where suspension is  thus  effected,  the written  charges  against the  officer shall be filed with  the board within five days."

The  authority of the  provincial governor, under  the aforequoted section of the Code, to  receive and investigate Complaints against municipal officials  rests on two general grounds, and  these  are  (1)  neglect  of duty,  oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office and  (2) conviction by final judgment of any crime involving  moral turpitude.  Pending action  by  the provincial board, the provincial governor may suspend the officer concerned  if in his opinion the charge is  one affecting the official integrity  of the officer charged.  Following the statutory  construction  that  "a  statute prescribing  the grounds for which an officer may be suspended is penal in nature and should be  strictly construed", the  prepositional phrase  "in office qualifies  the  various grounds for legal suspension."    (Cornejo vs. Naval,  54 Phil.,  809)

While  it is primarily  for the  provincial  governor to determine  whether  the  gravity  of  the offense  charged would warrant  the  filing of administrative charges  and the  propriety of the suspension, he  will only have occasion to exercise  such power where the charge is one affecting the official integrity of the officer or is connected with the  performance of his duties  as  a   municipal  official. (Mondano vs. Silvosa, et al.,  97 Phil.,  143; 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, p. 2884).   "In office"  indicates  that  the grounds mentioned in  the law must be such as affect the officer's performance of his duties as an officer and not such as affect only his character as a private individual.  "In such cases it is necessary 'to separate the character of the man from the  character of the officer' " (Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, section 457, p. 290; State of Minnesota ex Rel. John G. Rockwell vs.  State Board  of Education, et al., 143 A. L. R. 503, 512-513; State ex rel. Knabb vs. Frater, 89 P. 2d. 1046; Opinion of the Justices, 33 N. E. 2d 275).

With these standards in mind, let us examine the administrative charges against the petitioner.  Under the charge for  "misconduct in office",  respondents  base  the  suspension on the mayor's having  inflicted  injuries  upon his wife and daughter  inside the municipal building and for which he was later convicted for  slight physical injuries by the Justice of the Peace Court of Clarin;  on  having participated in illegal cockfighting; and in resisting arrest. As correctly maintained by the petitioner, however, such acts  or  omissions cannot  be  safely  said  or  considered to be related to the performance of his  official  duties and petitioner does not have to be the mayor to commit the offenses charged.  Hence, in the case of Arsenio H. Lacson vs. Marciano Roque, et al., (92 Phil., 456; 49 Off. Gaz. 93, 100101),  it  was ruled:

"Misconduct in  office  has  a  definite  and  well-understood legal meaning.  By  uniform legal  definition,  it  is  misconduct such  as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects  his character  as  a  private individual.  In  such cases, it has been said at  all times, it is  necessary to separate the character of the  man from the character  of  the  officer.   (Mechem,  supra, section  457)  'It  is settled that misconduct,  misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting  removal  from office  of an  officer,  must have direct relation  to and be connected with the performance of  official duties  amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and  failure  to  discharge the  duties  of the  office * * *' (43 Am. Jur. 39, 40). To this effect is the principle laid down  in Cornejo vs. Naval,  supra.

"Judged  by the  foregoing, standard definition  of  misconduct in office, the alleged  libel imputed to the suspended Mayor was not such misconduct even  if the term 'misconduct in office' be taken  in  its broadest sense.  The radio broadcast in which the objectionable utterances were made  had nothing  or very little to do with  petitioner's official  functions and  duties  as mayor.  It was not  done by  virtue or under color  of authority.  It  was not any wrongful  official  act, or omission to perform a  duty of public concern, tacitly or expressly annexed to his  position.   Neither  can it be  said that Mayor Lacson committed  an abuse or took advantage of his office.   One does not have to be  a mayor to make those remarks or to  talk on the radio. The use of the radio is a privilege open to anyone who would allow for reasons of his own.   The mere circumstance that  the broadcast was transmitted from the City Hall instead of the radio  station did not alter the situation. It is the character of the remarks and their immediate relation to the  office that are of 'paramount  consideration. It is our considered opinion that the  petitioner acted as a private individual and  should be  made to answer  in his private capacity if  he  committed   any breach of propriety  or  law."   (Emphasis supplied.)

The records fail to indicate that, in the acts complained of,  the petitioner was motivated by any official considerations; on the contrary,  it appears that it was  more for personal reasons that he performed the acts and  omissions complained of.

Of course, abetting gambling by the  mayor within his territorial jurisdiction is an  infringement of his official oath to compel  obedience to the laws and  may  therefore constitute "misconduct" or "neglect of duty" (which brings us  to the charge of "neglect  of duty"), but where, as in this case, the  alleged violation of  gambling laws occurred within another municipality (barrio Casilac,  municipality of  Tudela, Misamis Occidental), it is too  far fetched to say that in  organizing,  tolerating  and participating in gambling thereat, petitioner went  beyond his personal and private  life  and  committed  a  wrongful conduct  that affected, interrupted or  interfered with the  performance of  his  official duties as mayor of Clarin.

Neither can the charge of "oppression" be substantiated by  the  records  of  the  case,  particularly the  affidavit of one Nasciancino Jalalon and the unsworn letter  and  affidavit of Teodora  M.  Ochate.  "Oppression" has been denned as  "an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or excessive  use of authority"   (United States  vs. Deaver,  14 Fed. 495).  The charges made  seems to be too superficial to meet  the standard fixed in the above definition.  It is noticeable that no complaint or  written statement was ever made or at least shown in the  records by  those alleged to have been oppressed by the petitioner.

The justification  of administrative charges under section 2188 of the  Revised Administrative  Code is  not based on  the  sufficiency  of the complaint  as appearing on its surface  or form, but must be judged  by its substance. In  a way, the delay of the provincial governor (for almost a  year)  in  filing the  administrative  charges  against petitioner indicates the non-substantiality or non-sufficiency of  the charges.

Petitioner was accused and convicted of slight physical injuries which did not involve moral  turpitude;  and  although there are other pending criminal  charges against him, e.g., for illegal cockfighting and Assault upon Agents of Authority, he  does  not appear  to have been finally convicted thereof.   The facts, standing alone, cannot therefore be  the  subject  of administrative  charges  against petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, in considering that the charges filed do not constitute misconduct or maladministration of office, the writ of prohibition  is granted  and respondent Governor of Misamis Occidental is prohibited from proceeding further with  the  investigation of  the charges  filed against petitioner Jose U. Ochate, as well as from enforcing the order for his suspension.   The writ of preliminary injunction  heretofore  issued  is  made  permanent.   Costs against respondent  Diego H.  Ty Deling.  So ordered.

Paras,  C.  J.,  Bengzon,  Padilla,  Reyes,  A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.