These  are two  (2)  unlawful detainer cases  originally filed  with  the  Municipal  Court  of  Manila  (Civil  Casea Nos.  12687  and  12688  thereof),  on August 8 and  11, 1950.   Said  court having  decided both  cases in favor  of plaintiff  Consuelo Legarda  Vda.  de Prieto, the respective defendants, Maria Santos and her husband John Doe, and Alejo  Gaddi, appealed to the Court  of First Instance of  Manila  (Cases Nos.  12465  and 12466), which,  after a joint  trial, rendered a decision the dispositive part  of which reads as follows:

"In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered follows:

"(a) Defendants Maria  Santos and Alejo Gaddi are  entitled to the possession  of the respective lots described  in  the amended complaints in these cases within a period of six months from the date this decision becomes final, provided each of them deposits regularly the monthly rentals in  court;

"(b) Within ten days from  the date this decision becomes  final, plaintiff is hereby directed to inform the court whether  or not she shall pay to each of the defendants one-half of the value of the: respective houses  of the latter, to wit,  Maria Santos,  one-half of r7,000; Alejp Gaddi, one-half of P8,000;

"(c) In the event of the failure of  plaintiff  to reimburse the defendants the amounts set forth in the preceding1 paragraph  (b) of the dispositive part of this decision, the court shall, upon plaintiffs motion,  direct defendants  to remove  their said houses from the premises  involved herein; and

"(d) In the event of  defendants' failure to remove their  respective houses from the lots  in question when directed by the court to do so, as  set forth in  the  preceding  paragraph   (c)  hereof, plaintiff may obtain from the  court an order for the  demolition of the said  houses.  No costs  allowed."   (Record  on  Appeal, pp. 61-63.)

From  this decision the  defendants in both cases have appealed to this Court  and now they allege that:

"The trial court erred in fixing the period of the leases between plaintiff-appellant (?) and defendants-appellants in accordance with Article 1687 of the new Civil Code instead  of dismissing both cases for lack  of cause of action, there being no controversy as to the non-expiration  of the period of the lease."   (Defendants-Appellants' Brief, p. 4.)

The  facts,  upon which there  is  no  dispute,  are  set forth in  said decision of  the Court  of  First Instance  of Manila, from which we  quote:

"Maria  Santos, defendant  in  Civil  Case No. 12465, admittedly occupied the parcel of land described  in  paragraph 3 of  the amended complaint  since  the  year  1944 (Japanese occupation) and  still continues occupying that said  land.  The  monthly rental is P17.65.  Said defendant's house standing on the lot  in  question was purchased by  her during  the  Japanese  occupation  for  the  sum  of  P25.000, occupation  currency.  Sometime after the liberation,  she made repairs to the house amounting to P7,000.

"There  is no question but that  defendant Maria  Santos  paid plaintiff  the rentals due  up  to  and  including  April,  1950.  Since then and up to the  time  of  the  filing of the  complaint herein, she did not pay the  rentals because, as testified to by Clarencio  Foronda, plaintiff's collector, he refused to  accept  any rental upon instructions of plaintiff, for  the  reason that in accordance with the letter dated June 1,  1950, Exhibit B, plaintiff terminated  the  lease as of the 30th of June, 1950, although  said defendant was  given up to the 31st of July, 1950, within which  to vacate the premises and  remove her  house  therefrom.

"Alejo Gaddi, defendant  in Civil  Case No.  12466, occupied the land, the subject  of the complaint in same case, since 1947.  The monthly  rental is  P8.43.  His house now standing thereon is valued at P8,000, although only assessed at P2.000.

"As in the case of Maria Santos, on June 1, 1950,  plaintiff wrote a letter  Exhibit E  to defendant Gaddi informing the  latter that the lease on the land  in question was to terminate on the 30th of June, 1950, and that defendant was  given up  to the 31st of July, 1950, within which  to vacate the premises.

"Likewise, as  in the case of Maria Santos,  Gaddi  was unable to pay  the rentals  due  from and  after May,  1950,  for the reason that plaintiff  had  instructed her  collector  to refuse payment  of any rentals by reason of  the  fact that  plaintiff  terminated the lease contract.

"Upon these facts,  the above  two eases present but one single legal question, viz.:  Has the plaintiff the right  to  obtain judgment for the immediate possession" of the parcels of land,  the subject of these suits, or,  are  defendants in the  above  cases  entitled  to  ask that the court fix longer terms for their respective leases"?   (Record on Appeal, pp. 55-57.)

After considering the provisions of sections 1678t 1687 and 2253 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, said court concluded:

"Balancing the rights  of plaintiff and defendant in one equation, the court feels that these defendants should be given each an additional period of  6 months from the date this decision becomes final to (remain as lessees on the land in question.

"The  court declares  that the value  of the house of  defendant Maria Santos is P7,000, and the value  of the "house of defendant Alejo Gaddi is P8,000."  (Record on Appeal, p. 61.)

and disposed  of the  case  in  the  manner above  stated. Defendants-appellants argue that,  under  Article,: 1687 of the Civil Code  of  the Philippines, the  court may fix a longer  term for the contracts of lease, between the  parties herein; that, accordingly, they could not have  been,  and were not,  guilty  of unlawful  detainer at the time of the initiation of these proceedings  in the Municipal Court of Manila,  on August 8 and 11,   1950;  that instead of filing these unlawful detainer cases, plaintiff-appellee should have instituted, in  the  court of  first instance, the  proper action  or  actions for  the  fixing  of said  term. and the determination   of  the rights of the parties in  relation to the  buildings constructed by the defendants on the lots leased to them; and that the filing of the present ejectment .cases should have been deferred until after the expiration of such term  as may have been  fixed by the  court in said  action or actions.

We  are  of  the opinion  that this  pretense cannot be sustained, for plaintiff's  notice of the termination of the respective contracts of lease was given to the defendants on June 1, 1950, when the Civil Code  of  the Philippines was not, as yet, effective.  There  being no stipulation as to the  duration of  said  contracts  and the parties  thereto having agreed on a monthly  rental, the  lease under the provisions  of   Article  1581 of  the Spanish Civil Code, which  was  in force on said dates-is understood to be from month  to month, and to have been terminated, therefore, upon the  expiration  of each month, "without necessity of a special notice", in the absence of an implied renewal (Article 1566 of the Spanish Civil Code),  which  did not take  place, and  could not  have  taken place, beginning from June, 1950,  owing to  said  notice.  Plaintiff's right to discontinue her contracts of lease  with the defendants, in order to recover the possession of the leased properties, accrued  and  became vested  before the Civil Code  of the Philippines took effect, and should  be governed,  therefore,  by  said Article  1581  of the Civil Code of  Spain, pursuant to  which said  lease expired  in  June,  1950 Hence, there  was unlawful detainer on the part of appellants  herein,  before the commencement of  these  proceeding in August,  1950.

Moreover, Article 1687 of the Civil Code  of the Philippines is  of the following tenor:

"If the period for  the lease (has not been fixed,  it is understood to be from year to year,  if the  rent agreed upon is annual; from month to  month, if it is monthly;  from  week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to  day, if the rent is to ho paid  daily. However,  even  though a monthly rent is paid,  and no period for the  lease  has been set, the courts may fix a longer term  for the lease after the  lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possesion for  over six  months. In case of daily rent, the  courts  may also fix a longer period after the  lessee has stayed  in the place for over one  month.

Under this provision, if  the period of  a lease  contract has not been  specified by the parties therein, it is  understood to  be from month to month, if the rent agreed upon is monthly,  as  in  the cases  at  bar.  Consequently,  the contract expires at the end of such  month, unless, prior thereto,  the  extension  of  said term  has  been  sought by appropriate action  and judgment is,  eventually, rendered therein granting said relief.

Defendants herein  maintain  that their  lease contracts did not,  and could  not,  come  to  an  end  until  after the court has fixed its lifetime and  the  term  thus fixed has  expired.  This view, is to our  mind, untenable. To  begin  with,  defendants assume that their contracts  are without term, prior to the judicial action authorized in said Article 1687, whereas the same  provides  that  the duration of lease contracts  shall be yearly, monthly, weekly,  or daily, depending upon  whether  the rental  agreed upon is annual, monthly, weekly, or daily.  In other words, said contracts have  a term fixed by  law,  and are  not indefinite in duration, before said  judicial  intervention. Secondly,  said  Article  1687  merely  gives  the  court discretion to extend  the period of the lease,  The court. is not bound to extend said term.  It may legally refuse to do so, if the circumstances surrounding the case warrants  such  action.   Thirdly,  under appellants'  theory. said contracts of lease would  be of indefinite duration, subject to the authority of the court to fix its term.  By the exercise of such authority the  court would determine, therefore, the  limits  of the lifetime of  said contracts, which, otherwise, would be indeterminate, and would subsist indefinitely, pursuant to appellants' contention.  Thus,  the exercise of said authority would, in effect, shorten  the period of the lease, which, in the absence of judicial intervention, would be for a  longer period.  In other words, the result of appellants' theory would be exactly the opposite of that sought to be  achieved by  Article  1687, which is to permit the court to extend, not to reduce, the term of the lease.

It is next  urged that, an extention of six  (6)  months, from the time  when  the  decision  appealed  from shall become final, having  been granted therein to the defendants,, it follows that there was no unlawful detainer when these cases were  filed,  and that,  accordingly, the  same should have  been  dismissed for lack of cause of action. As above stated the contracts of lease in question expired in June, 1950,  and defendants' possession  thereafter was unlawful.  However,  the  lower  court merely availed itself of the provisions of Article 1687 of the Civil. Code of  the Philippines to justify deferment of the  execution of the judgment of ejectment against the defendants herein, who Caking advantage of  the technicalities of  the law,  have already succeeded in  holding the  leased  properties for over five  (5)   years  after  the  expiration  of their  respective contracts of  lease.  It  is obvious, therefore, not only  that they cannot complain.of deprivation  of  due process, but, also, that they have enjoyed more than that which  is required by  the most liberal demands of justice and equity.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto with cost against said defendants-appellants.   It is so  ordered.

Parás, C.  J.,  Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes,  A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.