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[COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. JUNIOR WOMEN'S CLUB OP PHILIPPINES](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2db7?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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98 Phil. 496

[ G.R. No. L-6992, February 28, 1956 ]

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. JUNIOR WOMEN'S CLUB OP THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

The Junior Women's  Club of the  Philippines, a subsidiary unit of the National Federation of Women's Club of the Philippines a registered, charitable organization, held a cultural pageant at the Fiesta  Pavilion of the Manila Hotel on September 20, 1952. The pageant which was advertised  as "Malayan Festival" included as a main feature a benefit dance and as  a privilege to take part in its admission  tickets were issued to the public at the rate of P5  each.  The amount  collected  as  admission fees was ¦PI,355 and the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed thereon  the sum of P150.42  as amusement tax pursuant to the provisions of the first paragraph of section 260 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to section 261 of the same Code,  as amended by Republic  Act No. 586. The Junior Women's Club paid the tax as assessed but later on  it requested for the refund of the amount of P82.67 claiming it to be an overpayment.   This claim having been denied,, the Junior  Women's Club  elevated the case to the Board of Tax Appeals (now Court of Tax Appeals), which rendered a  decision  in favor of  the club.  The Collector of Internal Revenue interposed the present appeal.

The amusement tax in question was collected under section 260 in relation to  section 261, of the National Internal Revenue Code.   Section  261 provides that "Where the admission fees or charges are collected by or for and in behalf of a duly registered charitable institution or  association, the tax on such admission fees or  charges  shall be fifty per  centum of the rates  provided in section two hundred and sixty of  this  Code."  And section 260  provides that an amusement tax  shall  be  collected from a proprietor, lessee, or operator of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses,  boxing exhibitions and other places of amusement, fixing the rates to be paid upon the amounts paid for admission to  said places.  Said section also  provides for  a similar tax to be paid by the proprietor, lessee or operator of cockpits, cabarets and night clubs, and the rates are to be fixed  on  the gross receipts  from the admission to said places.   For ready reference, we are quoting hereunder the pertinent provisions of section 260:
"Sec. 260. Amusement  taxes. There shall be collected from 'the proprietor,  lessee, or operator of theaters,  cinematographs, concert halls, circuses, and other places of amusement the following taxes:

"(i)  When  the amount  paid  for admission exceeds  ninety-nine centavos, the tax will be thirty per Centum.

In the case  of cockpits, cabarets, and night clubs, there shall  be collected from the proprietor, lessee, or operator a  tax equivalent to ten per centum, and in the case of race-tracks, twenty per centum of the  gross  receipts, irrespective of whether  or  not  any amount is charged  or paid for admission: * * *."
Appellant  contends that when appellee held its Malayan Festival at  the Fiesta  Pavilion  of the Manila Hotel charging certain fees for admission to the show, it became taxable under the aforequoted  first paragraph  of section 260 because  it   comes within  the  purview  of  the  phrase "lessee ... of ... other places  of amusement."  Appellee on the other hand contends  that it comes under the third paragraph of the aforequoted section because  in holding such festival it became a lessee of a night club.   The Board of Tax Appeals, in upholding the view of  appellee,  went further by saying that it was not merely a lessee but an operator  of  a night  club run in  the form of "a  cabaret style party"  and ordered the refund of the amount claimed.

We  agree with the  Secretary of Justice  in his  opinion on the nature and character of  the Manila Hotel rendered on December 10, 1951 to the Administrator of the Economic Cooperative Administration to the effect that "hotel is one which furnishes a traveler  with lodging in addition to food and drinks", and that a night club is a "place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks, where the customers are  allowed to dance", following the definition given to said club in Executive Order No. 319,  series of 1941, issued  in connection with the operation of different places of amusement in the  Philippines.  We also agree ' to the conclusion that the dancing pavilion of the Manila Hotel  squarely comes within said  definition  bec&use it sells food or drinks to  the public and its customers are allowed to dance therein.   But we disagree with the  contention of appellee  that  it stepped into the  shoes  of the Manila Hotel as an operator of a night club  when it  contracted the use of the Fiesta Pavilion for the  celebration of its  Malayan Festival and, therefore, at should be  considered as a  lessee or operator of a night club within the purview of the third paragraph of section 260.  Evidently, said paragraph contemplates  the  operation  of a certain place of amusement as  of business or for profit and not merely for special occasions more or less casual' or circumstantial.  In other words, to come under the purview of said paragraph, the place must be  used and operated as a night club in Us true sense and not merely for some  occasional celebration.  Otherwise,  the  subject  of the lease  would be merely a place of amusement and in that case it would come under  the first  paragraph of the same section. In fact, it was  only for this specific purpose that the  Fiesta Pavilion was leased by appellee, and certainly not for profit . but for charitable purpose.  It  is therefore erroneous  to hold that appellee became the lessee or operator of a cabaret or night  club  when it leased the  Fiesta  Pavilion for the celebration of its Malayan Festival on September 20, 1952. The  decision appealed from is reversed.   The case is dismissed without  pronouncement as to costs.

Parás, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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