The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only questions of law.

Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors:

"Primer Error. El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otorgado de acuerdo con la ley.

"Segundo Error. Erro finalmente al legalizar el referido testamento."

The alleged will read as follows:

"Primera Pagina (1)

"EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN.

"Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 anos de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de persona extrana, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:

"1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos hijos;

"2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga;

"3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herreros todos mis bienes ya que muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a Don Carlos Worrel.

"4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza;

"En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil nove-cientos treinta y nueve.

"CARLOS GIL

"Testificacion:

"Segunda Pagina  (2)

"Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en Ietras y numeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.

"(Fdo.) Alfredo T. Rivera

 "(Fdo.) Ramon Mendiola

"(Fdo.)    Mariano Omana"

Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court below said:

"* * * The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G. R. No. L-254, entitled 'Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee.' Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the will." (P. 10, Record on Appeal).

The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of the attestation clause.

It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it affects the very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or corrected only in matters of form which do not affect the substance of the statement.

It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by inferences, implications, and even by internal circumstantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear, unequivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the following provision:

"* * * But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.'

However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences, implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain requisites for the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence.

It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the function of the witnesses. But the important point is that he attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be more accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. Adding a zero to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.

It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.

The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645.

In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say:

"1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 and 634 of the Code op Civil Procedure Construed. The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention.

"2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. The Philippine authorities relating to the attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Safio vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra, adopted and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.

"3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other" applied and enforced.

"4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. (Safio vs. Quintana,supra.)"

In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following pronouncement:

"* * * En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuesti6n, se hace constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres testigos instrumental y que estos firmaron el testamento los unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos firmaron el testamento en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de los se-gundos y vice-versa.

"En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado."

The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:

"1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.)

"2.ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION, OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defective execution of will. (40 Cyc, p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.)

It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine of the Gumban vs. Gorecho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an attestation clause similar to that involved herein.

In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court said:

"In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that: * * *" (p. 381, supra.)

The attestation clause involved herein is very different. In the case of Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:

"An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: 'We, the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite our respective names, do hereby certify that the testatrix, whose name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the same and each page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each other,' held not to be fatally defective and to conform to the law."

This is very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.

In the case of Grey vs. Fabie^[*] (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated that "each of the pages of which the said will is composed" was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the signature was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency was cured by the phrase "as well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix signed also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to "also." The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the presence of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it was unnecessary.

In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:

"Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testador, Valerio Leynez. El testamento consta de dos (2) paginas sola-mente."

The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact, however, appears in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in that case the will complied with all the requisites for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted.

In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa ^[1] (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:

"Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionados otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamento com-puesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clausula de atestigua-miento. Que estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el testamento arriba mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro paginas en papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes cuando el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno da nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en presencia del testador y de cada uno de nosotros."

The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it says "testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador." The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the verb "firmamos."

In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil ^[2] (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held that this deficiency was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages.

In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads as follows:

"Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemo3 firmado es el testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de Numeriano Eallos, quien despues de leer y de leerle el mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firtno y marco con su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, loa testigos, firmamos en presencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros."

It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured by the fact that, their signatures appear on every page. This attestation clause is different from that involved in the present case.

There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.

"The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory creation, and is available only upon a compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with the statute." Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac, 815, 30 L.R.A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac, 700,  701.)

"In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention, but of what he actually did, or * * * failed to do * * *. It may happen* * *   that * * *  wills * * *  truly expressing the intentions of the testators are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. * * * The legislature * * * has thought of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention, * * * in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. * * * The evil of defeating the intention * * * is less than the evil probably to arise by giving validity to wills made without any form, * * *' or, in derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.

"It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be presented apparently meritorious." (In Re: Maginn, 30 A.L.R., pp. 419, 420.)

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With costs against the appellee.    It is so ordered.

Moran, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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^[*] 68 Phil., 128.

^[1] 71  Phil., 561.

^[2] 72 Phil., 546.

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TUASON, J.,

The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was copied in the stipulation of facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the correctness of the copy an issue thereby raising the question of not whether the burnt will possessed the statutory requirements but whether the copy is erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appellee's case is built; since, in fact, the objection to the form of the attestation clause, with which the decision wholly deals, would disappear if the appellee's contention were well founded, it is proper that in this dissenting opinion we should accord the matter at least a passing notice.

It may be stated as background that the original of the will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for probate, it was destroyed by fire or looters; that in the probate proceeding after liberation, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts in which the will was reproduced as copied in the record on appeal in another case docketed in this court on appeal as G. R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further appears from the record of that case and from the decision of this court that the controversy there concerned the right of a, nephew of the testator to impugn the will, it being alleged that he was not a legal heir and had no interest in the probate.

As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation clause is truncated and meaningless. The last of the compound sentence is incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase. Counsel for appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado por el testador" or equivalent expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if the sentence is to be complete and have sense. The attestation clause with the inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize should read thus:

"Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certifica-mos que el testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de las paginas utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y niimeros en la parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo (Ha sido firmado por el testador) en nuestra pre-sencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros."

It seems obvious that the missing phrase was inadvertently left out. The probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will was not in controversy. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or no care was employed in the copying thereof in the pleading or record on appeal above mentioned. The absence of the signature of the testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof that little or no pain was taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is another..

Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the decision says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omana, who drafted the whole instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law and, by the context of the whole instrument, has shown familiarity with the rules of grammar and ability to express his idea properly.

Read in the light of these circumstances without mentioning the evidence on record, not objected to, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the attesting witnesses so important an omission as to make the sentence senseless granting such omission existed in the original document could not have been intentional or due to ignorance. The most that can be said is that the flaw was due to a clerical mistake, inadvertence, or oversight.

There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it was "reproduced in the Record on Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of a stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring them or either of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. That there was such mistake, is indubitable. It is noteworthy that the opponent and appellant herself appears not to have noticed any defect in the attestation clause as copied in the stipulation. It would seem that in the court below she confined her attack on the will to the alleged failure of the testator to sign the iirst page. We say this because it was only the alleged un-signing of the first page of the document which the trial court in the appealed decision discussed and ruled upon. There is not the slightest reference in the decision, direct or implied, to any flaw in the attestation clause which is by far more important than the alleged absence of the testator's signature on the first page.

As stated, the problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which requires certain formalities to be observed in the execution, but by the rules of construction applicable to statutes and documents in general. And this rule would obtain even if the omission had occurred in the original document and not in the copy alone. In either case, the court may and should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or words.

In Testamentaria del finado Emjlio Alcala, a similar situation arose and the Court said:

"Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su redaction se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el sentido comun pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervinieron en el otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraseologia de la segunda parte de la clausula se observara que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en meros errores gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discretion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de interpretation de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan sus efectos.

"La interpretation que se acaba de dar a la clausula de atestacion y la correction de los errores gramaticales de que la misma adolece, incluyendo la insertion del verbo 'firmamos' que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de acuerdo con las reglas fundamentales de interpretation de documentos segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya redactado el instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; Pecson contra Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R.C.L., sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.)"

"La solution que se acaba de dar al asunto es la que se halla mas conforme con la justificia en vista de que no se ha presentado prueba alguna que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a cualquiera. (Testamentaria de Emiano Alcala, 40 G. O., 14." Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)"

From 69 C. J., 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will; but not where the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal."   On pages 50, 51, the same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of an ambiguous will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the construction or interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will should be construed according to these established rules of construction." Speaking of construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable to construction of documents, the same work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says: "Where it appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently omitted from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative intent.

Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)

Let us assume, for the purpose of this decision only, that the attestation clause was drawn as the draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in said clause was not inadvertent, and consider the case on the premise from which the court has approached it; is the decision well grounded, at least in the light of this court's previous decisions ?

At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will was sustained, found its way into this court. (Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378). That case was more than foursquare behind the case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more radical, in that the testator took charge of writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the witnesses limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature. Here, at most, the testator took away from the witness only a small part of their assigned task, leaving them to perform the rest.

Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a unanimous decision in bane, through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus) "When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation appear to have been made by the testator himself."

That was good doctrine when it was announced. We think it is good law still. That ruling should set the present case at rest unless the court wants to discard it. On the possibility that this is the intention, we will dwell on the subject further.

This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills the one being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." In the Abangan case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceiia, later Chief Justice, observed: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded."

Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle were numerous: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil, 216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartagena (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de M. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Panganiban (1934), £9 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs. Yap (1939)^[1], 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabie (1939)^[2], 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939)^[3], 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940)^[4], 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941)^[5], 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941)^[6] 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941)^[7], 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948)^[8], 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.

The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deliciences in wills? Where are we to draw the line?" These same questions might well have been asked in the cases above cited by the opponents of the new trends. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The decisions we have cited to tell us when and where to stop; the dividing line is drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and where evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document is attempted. They only permit a probe, an exploration within the confines of the will, to ascertain its meaning and to determine the existence or absence of the formalities of law.   They do not allow the courts to go outside the will or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.

The case at hand comes within the bounds thus denned. If the witnesses here purposely omitted or forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into consideration.

To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the thing that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of form in preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has shown, that the mechanical system of construction has operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must be conceded, is the effect in this case of this court's rejection of the will under consideration. For the adverse party concedes the genuineness of the document. At least, the genuineness is superobvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator or fraud.

It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses' presence "would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile, we say with due respect, does not look to us quite well placed. Under physical law a man cannot raise his body from the ground by his own bare hands without the aid of some mechanical appliance, at least not for more than a flitting moment. But there is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless forbidden by rules of positive iaw. The rationale of our dissent is that he is not. If we were to make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more appropriate to say that a man can and generally does himself pull the bootstraps to put the boots on.

Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate practical reason for objecting to the testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the latter. The will is the testators, and the intervention of attesting witnesses is designed merely to protect the testator's and not anybody else's interest.

If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), what better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a certification by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling it or the attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the end themselves, and that end is achieved by another method slightly different from the prescribed manner, what has been done by the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should satisfy both law and conscience. The chief requirements of statute are writing, signature by the testator, and attestation and signature of three witnesses. Whether the courts profess to follow the harsher rule, or whether to follow the milder rule, they agree on one thing that as long as the testator performs each of those acts the courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, 483, 484.) Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ.t concur.

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^[1] 68 Phil., 126.                              

^[2] 68 Phil., 128.

^[3] 68 Phil., 745.                               

^[4] 70 Phil., 89.

^[5] 72 Phil., 531.                               

^[6] 72 Phil., 546.

^[7] 71 Phil., 561.                                

^[8] 81 Phil., 429.

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