In  and prior  to. the year  1933, Carlos  N. Francisco and Ceferino Francisco claimed to be the owners of the  above mentioned  lots by virtue of  Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.  938, 1430  and 6982 covering them and issued  under G. L.  R. O. Record No. 917. . On November  3, 1933, the two Franciscos filed a motion in said registration.case alleging  that the  technical descriptions appearing in  said Transfer Certificates of Title were based on plans  which were never approved by the Bureau of Lands or the General Land Registration Office  because  they were prepared on the  basis of the old system of surveys, which was not accurate; so they had a new  survey  made which resulted in Plan PSU-96841 duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, which new plan they prayed be approved by  the  court; and that their old transfer certificates of title be ordered cancelled and new ones issued in lieu thereof covering the same lots or parcels but with  the correct technical description shown on the new plan.

The motion was opposed by Jose de Borja, an adjoining owner,  on  his own  behalf and on behalf of  his  father Francisco  de Borja, another adjoining  owner, claiming that a part of lot 6 of the new plan,  designated as lot No. 2 of the Plan PSU-99657 belonged to Jose  de  Borja, the other portion of  said lot 6 being the property of Francisco de Borja designated as lot 5 in Plan PSU-99657; and that lot No. 3  Plan  PSU-96841 designated as lot  4 in Plan PSU-99657 belonged to Francisco de Borja.  Subsequently, however, Francisco  de Borja entered a constancia  saying that he had no opposition to present the case  "nunca ha tenido ni tiene oposicion que presentar en este expediente." In view of that disclaimer of  his father,  Jose de Borja filed an amended opposition  substituting his claim to lot No. 4 for  the previous claim  he had made for  his father, and reiterating  his  claim to lot No. 2, thereby  leaving movants' claim to lot 5  undisputed.

Jose  de Borja filed a  petition to quash the motion  of November 3, 1933 on  the ground that the  court had no jurisdiction for  the reason that section  112  Act No. 496 prohibits the reopening  of original  registration  proceed ings.  After  hearing, the trial court promulgated  a resolution finding that the lots claimed by Jose de Borja were not included in his certificate of title No. 12377 and that the court had no jurisdiction to rule on the claims of both petitioners and oppositor.  Petitioners appealed the resolution to  the  Supreme Court  and on May 14,  1942, this Tribunal thru Associate  Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, rendered judgment in  (G.  R. No. 48890)  the very same 'decision  sought  to be revived.'  Because  of  the decisive effect  on and  intimate  relation of  said  decision to  the present  proceedings,  as  well as  the facts  and  the issues contained therein, we are quoting it in toto for purposes of reference:

"In  G.L.R.O. Record  No. 917, a petition was filed b%Carlos N. Francisco  and Ceferino,  Francisco praying that a new plan covering  certain parcels of land)  title to which had been  decreed before by the  court, be approved and- that new  Certificates be issued in favor of  the  said petitioners.

"Jose de Borja objected  to the petition on the ground  that some of the  lot mentioned  therein,  form an  integral part of his land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12877,  but according' to the evidence and the findings  of, the lower court his claims  is utterly  unfounded because the said lots  are outside of  the limits ,  covered by the title in his name.   The said court, however,  denied "the  petition on. two grounds First, ( that  it has no  jurisdiction to sit thereon as the  title; to the land  had been decreed long  before by the  Court  and- second, that Exhibit "A", the deed of Transfer from the  former  owner to  the  petitioners  is not  competent  evidence to.  show any  title in  favor of the  latter.

"It appears  that  the old title was  based on a plan which was never approved by  the  Bureau of  Lands, the  survey not having been made .under the modern  system which  is more scientific.  When the  land  covered by the old title was  resurveyed and  subdivided into lots,  the  total area in  the now plan did not tally  with that contained  in the  old one.  However, the boundaries  remained the same, as regards Lots 4-a  and  6 of Plan Exhibit F .it appears that either through omission or  error they were not included in the subdivisions, although  as a matter  of  fact they were within  the boundaries of .the  whole land covered  by the  old certificate  of  title, The correction of this  omission is now sought in the petition.

"There  is absolutely no valid reason why the court should deny the  approval  of the new' plan and consequent  issuance  of a new certificate  of  title  corresponding:  thereto  as  recommended  by the Chief of the General Land  Registration Office.,  No right of a third party is affected. There is no change in  the identity of the land. When surveys under the  old  system are not correct and differ from the  result obtained  by the modern and  more scientific way  of surveying, corrections of errors contained in the. old plan should be permitted by the  court so  long as the boundaries laid down in the description as enclosing the land  and indicating its limits are not changed;  If they are  not  allowed in the  expediente  of the  case, no other remedy may be resorted to by which errors or imperfections in the old plan call be cured and to permit a decree base on such erroneous survey  to stand would be absurd.  The decree is not re-opened and thereby modified. It is the new plan that is made to conform to the decree,  which procedure should be allowed arid even encouraged in these islands where, as the court record show many certificates of title are still based, on the  old  and highly defective surveys.  Such correction is authorized by  Section 112 of act 496. "In regard  to  Exhibit A, suffice it to state  that it a public document whereby the conveyance of the property (Lot No. 6) is duly confirmed by  the legal  representative of the former owner, the  Compania Apfricola de Ultramar. As  stated above,  the oppositor,  has not shown  any right  or interest  in the  lots covered by the new plan. His objection to  the  admission of document as evidence  should therefore  be overruled.

"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the remedy prayed for  in the petition is hereby granted, with costs against appellee."

A motion  for the reconsideration of  the above-quoted decision was denied by this Tribunal on August 7, 1942, and thereafter  it became final and executory.

In the year  1944 Carlos Francisco  died. On June 4, 1946, Ceferino Francisco filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a motion for  the execution  of the final decision of  the  Supreme  Court of  May  14, 1942,  but he was informed that  the records of said case had been burned or  destroyed  during  the battle  for  liberation. So on August  22,  1946, he filed  a motion  for  reconstitution of said records.  Eventually,  the trial court thru  Judge  Ambrosio Santos by  order of February  3,  1947 declared  the records reconstituted, and on February 20, 1947 the motion for execution was renewed.  On March 7, 1947 an urgent the same time  asking for postponement of the hearing of 1947, was filed on behalf  of  oppositor Jose  de Borja, at motion for  reconsideration of  the order of February 3, the motion for execution.   On March  21, 1947  an order Was issued setting aside the order  of  February 3, 1947 so as  to give the oppositor an opportunity to present and prove his objection to the reconstitution.   On June 6, 1947, after hearing, the trial court, Judge Juan P. Enriquez presiding, granted the petition for' reconstitution and set for hearing the motion for admission of the depositions presented on behalf of the oppositor.   After the hearing  an  order was issued  on June 23, 1947 by  Judge Enriquez,  denying admission  of those  depositions which tended to prove that counsel for oppositor had filed a second motion  for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court  of May 14, 1942.

On July 14, 1947 a motion for execution  of said  Supreme  Court decision was again  filed by petitioners and on July 22nd of the same year, said motion was granted by Judge  Ambrosio Santos.  The oppositor perfected his appeal from the orders of June 23rd and July 22nd, both of 1947.   On September 15, 1947 the trial court issued  an order  approving the  record on appeal  but modifying  its order  of July 22, 1947 in the sense that the order of execution was to be enforced only as to the lots  not disputed by'  the oppositor.   The appeal  was.. docketed  here  as G. K.  No. L-1854 *  and  was  decided by this Court  on January  18, 1951, affirming  the  order  of June 23, 1947. Jose de Borja's motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied in  a resolution dated  March 29, 1951.

Thereafter plaintiff filed in the trial  court four motions for execution  dated May 17, .1951,  June 28, 1952, July 25,  1952  and February 26, 1953,  all ex-parte, but all said motions were denied on March 7, 1953 by Judge Tan for lack of notification  and  service  on the adverse party. A motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was filed,  which motion  was later granted  by Judge Area on April 11,  1953,  after copies of all those pleadings  were furnished  the  oppositors in open  court.  On April  13, 1953  another motion for execution of the decision of this Court of May 14, 1942 was filed.  .After hearing,  Judge Area granted the motion on April 18, 1953.   On May 9, 1953, oppositor Borja filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by Judge  Tan in an order dated May 15, 1953 setting  aside the order of April 18, 1953,  thereby denying the motion for execution, on the  ground that under the Rules of Court a writ of execution can only be issued within five years from the date of the final entry of the judgment.  A  motion for reconsideration  of the order dated May 15, 1953 was denied by Judge Tan on June 8,  1953.

So, on  June 17, 1953 the present action  was  filed by Ceferino Francisco and the heirs of Carlos N. Francisco for the re-enforcement or revival of the decision  of this Court on May 14, 1942  (G. R. No. 48390).  Defendant Jose de Borja moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the  motion was  barred ' by.. the statute  of  limitations. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that the running of the statute of limitations was suspended by the destruction of the records of this  case and their reconstitution,   On the basis of this opposition Judge Demetrio Encarnacion   denied the  motion to  dismiss.  Then  on October  12, 1953 defendant filed a motion for a  bill of particulars.  Plaintiffs opposed  this .motion  for a bill of particulars and claimed that since the cause of action  was only for revival  of  the decision of  the  Supreme Court, defendant had no defense  to said cause  of action for the reason, that his previous motion to dismiss based on prescription had already been denied by the  court so that the motion for a bill, of particulars was  merely dilatory  and should be  treated as pro  forma and did not even stop the  period within which  to  answer which  period  had already expired so that defendant  should be declared in default.  Despite said  opposition of  plaintiff  Judge Tan . declared  the motion for a bill of particulars well-founded, granted it and ordered plaintiffs to  amend the complaint and  include therein specified items of all their claims, at the same time denying the motion for default.

To plaintiffs' amended complaint defendant again interposed a  motion for  a bill  of particulars  and  despite plaintiffs' opposition to the effect that the purpose of the action was  not to re-examine  or retry the issues  already decided but merely to revive the judgment,  Judge Tan ordered that the amended complaint be further re-amended specifying the object of the  decision upon which the present action ,is based.   On January 11, 1954, plaintiffs filed a re-amended complaint, stating the facts about the decision of this Court  on May  14,  1942,  the expiration  of five years  after  its promulgation  but not  of  the  ten years prescriptive period, and reiterating the prayer contained in their original motion  of November 3, 1933.  To said reamended complaint defendant  Borja  filed an answer with the special defense that the property  in question was his, further claiming prescription in his favor, and asking for attorney's fees.   At the trial,  plaintiffs presented  as evidence  the bill of exceptions in G. L. E. 0. Record  No. 917, the decision of the  Supreme Court of May  14, 1942, and  the resolution of the  same court of August 7, 1942 denying the motion  for reconsideration of the defendant; and the defendant presented his own testimony concerning his mode of acquisition of the land in dispute, the resolution of the Supreme  Court of March  29, 1951 denying  his motion for reconsideration in G. R. No. L-1854, the sketch of the land  in  dispute made  by  the defendant himself, the deed  of sale  of February 11,  1919 between  Carlos N. Francisco as vendor and Jose de Borja as vendee, and evidence of  additional payment made by Jose de Borja to Ceferino Francisco on October 14, 1922.  Oh May 17, 1954 Judge  Tan rendered the. decision now on  appeal wherein he dismissed plaintiffs' re-amended complaint, with costs, declared the defendant owner of lots 2 and 4, Plan PSU- 99657  as included in the deed  of sale  (Exhibit  3)  above referred to but dismissing defendant's claim for attorney's fees  in the sum of P2,000.  Failing to secure a reconsideration of said decision, plaintiffs  have  appealed directly to this Tribunal alleging the following errors: 

I

The lower  court erred in admitting the evidence presented by defendant-appellee regarding ownership of  the lots in question,

II

The lower court erred in dismissing the  instant action; and, not rendering a decision reviving or reenforcing the  judgment of the Supreme Court dated May 14, 1942.

III

The lower  court erred in  declaring defendant-appellee owner of the lots in question.

In arriving at the conclusion that lots 2 and 4 belonged to  defendant,  Judge  Tan  went into the  merits of  the original  case and admitted evidence presented by  said defendant about his ownership of said two lots based on the supposed deed of  sale made to him in 1919 by  Carlos N.  Francisco.  This is  really re-opening of the original case and re-examining  the facts.  Judge Tan based his action in doing so on the theory advanced by the defendant that in  a  resolution  of this  Court  on his  motion  for reconsideration, his right to bring a separate action against plaintiffs on the ownership  of  the land in question was reserved to him; that instead of filing a separate action, he  embodied said right in a counterclaim  in the present action, which counterclaim  was neither  answered  or rebutted by the plaintiff, that  it is true that defendant did not present evidence in support of his  ownership  of the land in question in the original case but it was thru no fault of his,  because  the trial  court there  dismissed the case and declared  itself without jurisdiction to  entertain the same and that not to allow  his claim to the  said  land now, would be tantamount to depriving him of his property without  due process of law.

The question  presented is whether or  not in  an action to revive a judgment the facts in the case wherein  said judgment was rendered may be re-examined and a decision different from the  judgment sought to  be revived  may be entered.   We hold that a judgment sought to be revived after the lapse of five years from its rendition must necessarily be final  and executory.   Consequently, it cannot be re-opened,  much  less, the facts found  therein modified or changed.  The only question presented in a revival of a  judgment  is whether  the  party asking for it  is  still entitled to  it.  The only defenses to said revival would be that more  than ten  years had passed since  the entry of judgment and so  the action has  prescribed;  and  facts occurring after the judgment such as satisfaction  thereof by the losing party or counterclaims arising out of trans- actions not connected with the former controversy (Compañia  Gral. de Tabacos vs. Martinez, 29  Phil., 521.)

As  regards  defendant's claim that in  a resolution of this Court his right to  bring a separate action  against plaintiffs to  vindicate his  claim to  the land  in  dispute was reserved, no  copy of  said, resolution  could be shown by  said  defendant.   Moreover,  said  alleged   reservation of his right to  file a  separate action had  been passed upon by this Tribunal in its resolution of March 29, 1951, which we quote below:

"Besides, in view of the  above quoted  decision  and resolution of this Court,  the reservation in question,  whether made or not, in the  alleged  resolution of the second motion for reconsideration,  is of no legal. consequence.  If under the decision and the  law the  oppositor-appellant has  no  right  to  litigate in  a  separate action the  ownership  of lots  Nos.  4-A  and 6,  such  reservation could not  grant the oppositor-appellant such  right.   Otherwise, if the oppositor-appellant has,  said  right, ho could litigate in a  separate motion  the ownership of said lots even though there was  no  such reservation.  The courts cannot change the legal effects of  its  decision by such reservation unless they  are expressly granted by law tho  power to do so, as in the cases provided for in Rule 30 of the Rules  of  Court, and others.  Such reservation  or  a statement on a court's order or decision that this is without prejudice to the right  of a party to  institute  another action or litigate again the same question,  is a  mere  surplusage."

So that whether or not said reservation was made  by  this Court  becomes  immaterial.

As to the contention that  defendant would be deprived of his property without  due process  of law,  should the evidence  of ownership  presented  by him  in the present case, be not considered,  this,  point was squarely' discussed and decided by this Tribunal in its resolution of August 10, 1942,  a portion of  which we quote below:

". .  . it appearing that the appellee Jose de Borja failed to produce , the evidence he had previously', offered to  present on the day set by the court below, at his  own request, for  the  reception of such evidence;  motion denied."

Moreover, the merit of  defendant claim as owner of the land disputed had already been passed upon.   For instance, in the resolution of  this Court  of  March  29,  1951, a portion of the same reads as follows:

"In view of the above quoted decision and resolution of this Supreme Court  [referring to  the decision of May 14, 1942 and the resolution of August 7,  1942], it is  evident that the appealed resolution  of June  28,  1947, which  held that  the  finding in  the order  dated January 25, 1940, to, the  effect  that  the lots Nos. 4-A  and 6 claimed by the oppositor are not included in his Certificacte of Title ¦ No. 12377, has become final is correct not because the  oppositor had' not appealed therefrom but because  it  was  affirmed by this Court."

Again, in the resolution of this Court  dated January 18, 1951, in the same ease G. R. No. L-1854, the following observation or  statement was made:

". . . After the lapse of fifteen  days,'the hearing was continued on December 1,  1939, and  the oppositor-appellant then renounced to  present- evidence,  and  without making  any reservation,  asked for the dismissal of the case; and  the  court decided the holding in  its order  of January 25, 1940, the pertinent part of  which ¦was quoted  in the order appealed from, that the lots  claimed by the oppositor-appellant are  not included in  the Certificate of Title No. 12377 of the oppositor, and dismissed the  petitioners' motion or .  petition."   (p. 192,, Record.)

With regard  to the question  of prescription,  in maintaining  that the  present action had prescribed for the reason that the decision  of this Court  sought to be revived was entered on  May 14,  1942, while the  present action for revival was filed on  June 17, 1953, the trial court and the defendant  evidently  overlooked the  provisions of Act 3110, section 41 thereof  regarding the interruption of the running  of  the period   of  prescription  because  of  the destruction of the records and their reconstitution. Section 41 of Act No. 3110  provides:

"SEC. 41.  All terms fixed by law or regulations shall  cease to run from the date of destruction of the records and shall only begin to run again on the date when the parties  or counsel shall have received from the Clerk  of  Court notice to the effect  that the records have been reconstituted."

Even taking as a basis  the date of promulgation of the decision of this Court which is May 14, 1942,  although as a matter of fact, it did not become final until August 7, 1942, when the motion for reconsideration was  denied, the records of this case were destroyed around february 21, 1945, during the battle for liberation.  So that up to the time of said destruction, only 2 years, 9  months and 17  days  had  passed from the  promulgation of the judgment.  The period of prescription  again  began  to  run on  March  31, 1951 when plaintiffs received  notice from the Clerk of the Supreme Court regarding the final decision of the petition for reconstitution.  From March 31, 1951  up to the filing of  the present  action on June 17, 1953, a period  of 2  years,  2 months,  and  16 days have elapsed which, added to the 2 years,  9 months  and  17 days will give a total of only 5 years and 3 days  of the  prescriptive period  which is  far from  the ten years within which the  decision may be revived; and, if we  consider the decision  appealed from as  having become  final on August 7,  1942 when  the  motion for reconsideration was denied by  this Court,  then the present  action  may be regarded as having been  filed even less than five years after the Supreme Court  decision become final; discounting the period  of interruption.

But counsel for  defendant-appellee  contends  that  the interruption of the running of prescription mentioned, in Act No. 3110 is not contained in Article 1155 of the new Civil  Code which reads as follows:

"Art. 1155. The prescription of actions  is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there  is any "written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor,"

However, Article 1155 is only the general law on  interruption of prescription of action while section 41, of Act 3110  is a special law on the same  subject matter.   Consequently, the special: law  prevails  over  the general  law. Furthermore, we have  Article  1116 of the new  Civil Code  which  reads thus:

"ART.  1116.  Prescription  already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since'  the time  this Code took effect  the entire period  herein required for prescription should  elapse, the present Code shall be applicable even though by the  former laws a longer period might be required."

According to the  first  part of the  above-quoted article, Since  the period of prescription in the present  case began to run in 1942, long before the new Code  became effective in 1950, said prescription should be governed  by the old law, including Act No.  3110, section  41,  governing  interruption of prescription.

In  view of  the foregoing, the  decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the prayer in the action for revival  of judgment is  hereby granted, with costs.

Parás, C.  J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo,  Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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* 88 Phil., 83.