This  appeal stems  from  an action instituted  in the Court of First Instance of Manila by  plaintiff  against the defendant seeking the refund of the sum of P57,551.10 representing certain compensating' taxes collected by the latter under section 190 of the National Internal Revenue Code.  Subsequently,  plaintiff reduced the  amount of its claim to P50,152.27 recognizing that  its right  to claim for the  refund of P7,398.83 was barred by prescription in view of  the lapse of two years from its payment to the filing of the suit.

Plaintiff's action is based upon its claim that said section 190  of  the i National  Internal Revenue Code  is  in effect a  tax  on  imports and the  same, can  have  no  valid effect unless  approved  by  the President of  the  United States in line with the provisions of section 1 (9)  of the Ordinance  appended to  our.  Constitution.   And  since the requisite approval was proclaimed  only on October  16, 1940, after the importation subject of the tax was made, plaintiff contends  that  the  collection  of the tax is  invalid and  unconstitutional.

Defendant set  up  as main defense that the  amount which plaintiff seeks  to recover was collected as compensating tax under  section  190 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which was in effect from July 1,  1939 to October  15,  1940, which section  imposes,  not a  tax on imports, but rather a percentage tax on the; privilege of use, and that  for  such  kind of  tax the approval  of the President of the United States is  not necessary to make the  law  valid  and effective.

The trial  court sustained the  view  of the plaintiff holding that the tax imposed by section 190 of the National  Internal  Revenue  Code as  originally  enacted, is "essentially and inherently a tax on imports" and as such it requires  the  approval bf  the President  of  the  United States.  Consequently, it rendered judgment ordering  the defendant  to  refund  ta  the  plaintiff the  amount  of P50.152.27.  Hence this appeal.

It  appears  that  on July, 15,  1939, the  President  of the  Commonwealth Government approved  Commonwealth Act No.  466,  otherwise known as  the National Internal Revenue Code.  With the  exception of  section 187 thereof, the  law was made  effective  as of July  1,  1939. 'Section 190 of said  Act , provides  for a  compensating tax  on commodities, goods,  wares, or  merchandise  purchased  or received  by any  Philippine  resident  from without  the Philippines.  Said  section, as originally  enacted, reads as follows:

"SEC. 190. Compensating tax. -All persons purchasing or receiving from  without the Philippines  any  commodities,  goods, wares, or merchandise,  excepting  those  subject to specific taxes under Title IV of  this Code, shall pay on the total value thereof at the time they are Received by such  persons, including freight, postage,  insurance, commission,  and all  similar charges,  a  compensating tax equivalent to the percentage tax imposed under this Title on original transactions  effected' by merchants, importers, or manufacturers, such tax to  be paid upon  the  withdrawal or removal of said commodities, goods, wares, from  the customhouse or the  post  office; Provided, however, that merchants, importers, and manufacturer's, who are subject to tax under  sections 184,  185, 186,  187,  and 189 of this Title  shall not  be  required to pay the tax herein imposed where  the articles purchased  or received by  them  from without the Philippines  are to  be resold, bartered,  or exchanged, or used in connection with their  business."

The foregoing provision was subsequently amended  by section 6 of Commonwealth  Act  No. 503 which provides that  said amendment  "shall be  effective  only  when  the same  shall  have been  approved by  the President of  the United States * * * and   such approval shall have been made  known  by  proclamation by  the  President  of  the Philippines."  Such approval  was obtained and was embodied in a proclamation which was issued by the President of the Philippines on October 16,  1940.  But before the approval and proclamation aforesaid, plaintiff bought and  imported from outside the Philippines certain merchandise for use exclusively in connection with its mining business and defendant  collected thereon the amount  in question as compensating tax under section  190  of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The  issue to be determined is  whether  said  section 190, under  which  the tax in  question  was assessed, imposes an import tax and, therefore, did not acquire validity until after  the  President of  the  Philippines proclaimed on October  16, 1940 its approval by the President of the United  States pursuant to paragraph 9, section 1,  of the Ordinance appended to our Constitution.

The  issue raised is not  new.  It was raised for the first time in International Business Machines Corporation of the  Philippines vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, No. L-6732, Infra, p. 595, wherein this Court had occasion to express its view on the  matter.   In discussing the nature  of the tax imposed by section 190 of the  National Internal Revenue Code,  this Court said that the  compensating tax imposed therein is not a tax on the importation of goods. "This is evident",  said the Court, "from the proviso that imported merchandise which is to be disposed of in transactions  subject of  sales tax under sections 181, 185, 186, 187  and 189 of the Internal  Revenue  Code, is expressly exempted  from  the  compensating  tax. This   feature shows that  it is not the act of importation that is taxed under  section  190, but  the use of imported  goods not subjected to a  sales tax: otherwise the  compensating tax would have been levied  on  all imported goods regardless of any  subsequent tax that might accrue.  Moreover, the compensating tax  accrues whether  or  not the imported goods are subject to pay  customs duties."

The above ruling finds support in the decision  of the United States Supreme Court in Henneford vs. Silas Mason Co. Inc., 300, U. S. 577,81 L. Ed., 814, 818-819, the pertinent portion of which we quote:

"The tax is not  upon the  operations of interstate  commerce,  but upon the  privilege  of use after commerce is at an end.

"Things acquired or  transported in interstate commerce  may  be subjected  to  a property tax,  non-discriminatory in its  operation, when they have become part  of the common mass of property within the  state  of destination.  Wiloil  Corp;  vs. Pennsylvania,  294  U. S. 169, 175,  79  L. ed. 838, 840, 55 S. Ct. 368; Cudahy. IJacking Co. vs. Minnesota, 246  V. S. 450, 453, 62 h. ed. S27, 829, 88  S:'-.Ct. 373 Brown-Forman Ca. vs.  Kentucky, 217 D.  S. 563, 575, 54  L. ed. 883 887, SO S.  Ct. $78; American Steel and Wire Co. vs. Speed,  192 U.S. BOO,  519, 48 L. ed.  538, 546, 24 S. Ct. 365; Woodruff vs. Parham 8  Wail.  123,  1ST,  19 L. ed. 38S, 386.   This  is so, indeed,, though they are still  in the original  packages.  Sonneborn Eros. vs. Cureton (Sonrohorn Bros.  vs. Keeling) 262  U.S. 506, 67 L. ed. 1095, 43 S. Ct.  643; American  Steel and Wire Co. vs. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L.  ed. 538, 24 S. Ct. 365, supra; Woodruff vs.  Parham, S Wall, 123, 19 L. ed. 382, supra.  For like reasons they may  be subjected, when  once they are at rest, to a non-discriminatory tax upon  use or enjoyment.  Nashville, C.  and St. L. E.  Co. vs. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 267, 77 L. ed.  730,  738,  53 S. Ct. 345, 87 A.L.H. 1191; Edehnan vs. Boeing Air Transport 289 U.S.  249, 252, 77 L. Ed. 1155, 1157, 58 S.  Ct. 691'; Monamotor Oil  Co.  us. Johnson,  292 U.S.  86, 93, 78 L. ed. 1141, 1147,  64 S. Ct.  .575.  The  privilege of use is only one attribute, among many, of  the bundle of privileges  of use that make up property or ownership,  Nasville, C. and St. L. U. Co. vs. Wallace, 288 U.S.  249, 77 L. vs. Henneford,  183 Wash. 317,  49 P.  (2d)   14)  does not make the power  to impose it v less, for anything  the  commerce clause has to  say of its validity, than calling  it a  property  tax and  laying  it on ownership. A non-discriminatory  tax  upon local  sales . . . has  never been   regarded as imposing a direct burden upon interstate commerce  and has no greater or different effect upon that commerce  than a general property  tax to  which all  those  enjoying the protection  of  the State may be subjected. Eastern Air Transport vs. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U.S. 147, 153, 76 L. L. ed. 673, 675, 52 S. Ct. 340. A tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an impost so common that its validity has  been withdrawn from the arena  of debate. Nashville, C.  and St. I. R. Co.  vs.  Wallace, 228 U.S. 249,  77 L. Ed, 730, 53 S. Ct. 345,  87 A.L.R. 1191,  supra;  Edelman vs. Boeing Air Transport,  289 U.S. 249, 77  L. ed.  1155, 53  S. Ct.  591, mpra,;, Monamotor Oil Co.  vs. Johnson, 262  U.S.86, 78  L. Ed. 1141, 54 S. Ct  575, supra; Cf. Vancover Oil Co.  vs. Henneford, 183  Wash. 817, 49 P.  (2d)  14, supra."

The decision appealed from  is  reversed.  The case is dismissed, with costs  against appellee.

Parás,  C. J.,   Padilla,,  Montemayor,  Reyes,  A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,  J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.