This is an  appeal  from a  judgment  of  the  Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Hon. Massimo Abano, presiding, prohibiting Lorenzo D. Licup, Justice  of the Peace of Clark Field, from  taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 523 filed in said justice of the peace court and entitled The People of the Philippine vs. Cayetano B.  Liwanag, accused, for violation  of section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code.

In said criminal case, Robert S. Hamill, Major, USAF, Assistant Base Provost Marshal,  Clark  Air Force Base, province of Pampanga, filed an amended complaint against Liwanag for violation of section 174 of the Internal Revenue . Code.  It is alleged in the  amended complaint that Liwanag, "a private individual, without authority whatsoever,  and without paying the corresponding specific tax of Two Pesos  (P2) per cartoon, * * *, did then  and there willfully, unlawfully  and feloniously, possess and have in his control seventeen cartoons of imported free of tax American cigarettes for use only of the US Military and Naval Forces stationed in the Philippines * * *."  The  complaint was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Lorenzo T. Licup. Counsel for Liwanag moved to quash the complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court,  but this was denied.  There upon  Liwanag filed a petition  for prohibition  with the Court of  First Instance, alleging i;hat  Robert S. Hamill has no personal capacity to subscribe to the complaint and the Justice of the Peace court, therefore, acquired no jurisdiction to  conduct  the  preliminary  investigation The Court of  First Instance held that respondent Robert S. Hamill is not  a peace  officer of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, is not authorized to file a  complaint in accordance with section  2,  Rule  106 of the Rules of Court.  Against this  decision,  the complainant Robert S. s Hamill has filed this appeal.

We note that the  appeal  should have been prosecuted in the name  of the  People of the Philippines,  which is the offended party and the plaintiff in the criminal case filed against accused Cayetano  B.  Liwanag.  When Liwanag, however, filed  his  petition for prohibition,  he predicated his action oh  the claim that Robert S. Hamill  is not an officer of the Government of the Philippines and can not represent, the plaintiff, the People of the Philippines, in the criminal case.   Evidently, in accordance  with this theory, the  People  of  the  Philippines was not made a party in the prohibition ease.  This theory was sustained by the lower court.  The real party in interest is not Robert S. Hamill, but the People of the> Philippines, although the complaint .was  signed  by Hamill.  However, we assume, for purposes of the appeal, that Hamill  is representing the People, of the Philippines,  as he represented it  when he filed the amended complaint.

It is admitted that the Provost Marshal  of Clark  Field is a peace officer.   Provost Marshals  in Army  bases are police  officers, and  they have  the powers  and  duties  of chiefs of police in  municipalities.

"An officer appointed in an army iircamp, garrison, or the field, to preserve order  as head of the  military police, arrest soldiers guilty of offenses  of a general nature, secure prisoners properly delivered into  his .custody  by military or naval  authority, and to perform other duties pertaining to police and discipline."  (Webster's International Dictionary, second edition, unabridged, p. 1995.)

The essence of the decision appealed from is that as the Provost Marshal of Clark Field is not a peace officer of the Republic of the  Philippines, he is not authorized to  file a complaint for violation of the Internal Revenue Code.  We find this  theory to  be incorrect.  Under  the  agreement between the Republic  of the  Philippines and the United States of America,  for the establishment of bases by the latter within the territory of the former, laws of the Philippines continue to  be in force in said bases  except when otherwise  agreed upon in  the  agreement.  And  for the purpose of hearing eases therein, justices of the peace are appointed and hold  office.  They are not appointed by the United States of America, but by the President of the Philippines, subject to confirmation by the Commission, on Appointments.  But other than  justices  of  the  peace, no other  officers of the Republic of the Philippines are appointed  in  the bases, much  less peace officers, although agents of the Republic of the Philippines may have access in the bases to  see that the laws of the Philippines are enforced.  But the question of peace and order within the bases is  left to peace officers of the United States of America, the  chief of whom is the provost marshal.  To allow peace  officers  of  said Republic  to go therein and  make arrests or institute prosecutions for violation of Philippine laws would certainly give occasion for conflicts of authority.  So no provision is made for the appointment of peace  officers  of  the Republic of the Philippines within the bases, and it is understood that the enforcement of Philippines laws is left to the officers of the United States of America.  It is illogical to deny to these peace officers (of the  United States)  the power to prosecute  violations of Philippine  laws in  the  military bases.   Since  these bases were  established the Republic of the Philippines has abstained from appointing peace officers of its own; this must have been with the understanding that the.execution of Philippine laws would be taken care of  therein by the peace  officers of the United States of America.  It would be inconvenient if not detrimental to the enforcement of the laws of  the Philippines for  peace officers  of the Republic of the Philippines alone to be the ones authorized to prosecute offenses before the justice of the peace courts established  in the  bases.  It is,  furthermore,  technical ceremony to allow a provost  marshal to apprehend  violators of  Philippine  laws and deny him  the authority to prosecute such offenses before a Philippine court established inside the bases.   Such was never  in the  contemplation of the parties when the agreements regarding  the  bases were entered into.  The absence of peace  officers  of the Republic of the Philippines in these bases is due to the fact that the enforcement and prosecution of offenses  against Philippine laws was intended to be lodged with the peace officers of the United States of America.

We  hold that provost marshals  in  military bases established  by agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States  of America  have the power  and . authority to file complaints for violation of Philippine laws. The decision appealed  from is  hereby  reversed  and the action  for  prohibition,,  dismissed.   Costs  against  the petitioner-appellee Cayetano B.  Liwanag.

Parás, C.  J.,  Padilla,  Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.