You're currently signed in as:
User
Add TAGS to your cases to easily locate them or to build your SYLLABUS.
Please SIGN IN to use this feature.
https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2d92?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09
[JOHANNA HOFER BORROMEO v. DR. VENUSTIANO H. J. BORROMEO](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c2d92?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
{case:c2d92}
Highlight text as FACTS, ISSUES, RULING, PRINCIPLES to generate case DIGESTS and REVIEWERS.
Please LOGIN use this feature.
Show printable version with highlights

[ GR No. L-7548, Feb 27, 1956 ]

JOHANNA HOFER BORROMEO v. DR. VENUSTIANO H. J. BORROMEO +

DECISION

98 Phil. 432

[ G.R. No. L-7548, February 27, 1956 ]

JOHANNA HOFER BORROMEO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DR. VENUSTIANO H. J. BORROMEO, DR. JOSE C. BORROMEO AND ESTATE OF DR. MAXIMO BORSOMEO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J.:

Johanna Hofer Borromeo, widow of the late Dr. Maximo Borromeo who died  on July 31, 1948,  brought this action alleging (1) that during her marriage  with the deceased, the latter bought a certain real property situated in Cebu, this property becoming  one of the conjugal properties of her husband and herself;  (2)  that in June,  1948, before his death and at the time when he was seriously ill and bedridden, her husband signed, or was  made to sign,  a fictitious deed of sale of said property in favor of Dr. Venustiano H. J. Borromeo and Dr.  Jose  C. Borromeo purporting to convey said property to them for P3,000; (3) that the property was assessed at P42,480 and had a market value of P80.000,  and there was a  mortgage thereon of P125,000 in favor of  the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation ; (4) that the sale was fictitious,  as no payment of the stated price was made, and the  price stared was in adequate; (5) that defendants took possession of the property in bad faith and  deprived plaintiff  and the estate of the deceased of the fruits and rentals  amounting to not less than P100 a month, and praying that the sale be declared null and void, and the registration of  the sale and the title issued to them be cancelled.  The complaint includes Canuto C. Borromeo, executor of the estate of the deceased husband, for the alleged  reason that he refuses to join.as party plaintiff.   The defendants moved to dismiss  the  action on three grounds, (1)  that  plaintiff has no legal capacity to  sue; (2) that the complaint states no cause of  action; and  (3)  that the action  is premature. The  trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the interest of the wife in the community property is a mere expectancy, which  does not ripen into a  legal title, until a liquidation has been had of the conjugal partnership.   It  is  against  the order of dismissal  that, the appeal to this Court is  prosecuted.

The decision appealed from cites the case of Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose,. 41 Phil., 718, as authority for dismissing the action.  In  this Court the appellees also invoke our decisions in the cases of Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil, 213, and De la Cruz vs. Buenaventura, et al., 46 Off. Gaz., No. 12, p. 6032.  But the principles decided in the above  eases are not applicable to the case at bar because  the facts involved are  entirely  different.  In  Nable  Jose vs. Nable Jose, the question involved was. the rights of the heirs of the deceased wife to the conjugal property pending liquidation thereof by the husband as administrator.  Clearly the heirs of the deceased wife have no direct title or  interest in the communal property as such, until a liquidation is made and the net  remainder is distributed.   In  the case of Baello vs. Villanueva, et al., a donation  of  conjugal property was  made by the deceased husband to the grands children  of  a brother,  so we held that while the gift is illegal, the action for its  illegality  can be brought by the wife only alter  the  liquidation  of the  conjugal  partnership, if she is prejudiced  by  the  donation,  because the illegal gilt should be charged against the husband donor and deducted from his capital pursuant to Article 1419 of the old Civil  Code.  The prejudice can be,  ascertained  only after  liquidation, so an action to  annul the gift before liquidation is premature.  In the De la Cruz vs. Buenaventura, et al., case, the sale sought to be annulled was alleged to be "fictitious and fraudulent",, but this Court overlooked the allegation of fictitiousness and merely  considered the contract  as  "illegal and fraudulent", void only if  it would exceed the amount which the husband  would be  entitled to upon  liquidation.  It was, therefore, decided that the case fell under the  second paragraph of Article  1413 of. the old Civil Code, and that the action would lie only after the liquidation  of the conjugal  partnership.

The case which most  resembles the case now under consideration is that of Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil.,  561.  In that case the  sale sought  to be annulled by the wife was made  by the  deceased  husband during his lifetime  without consideration.  We  said that as the sale is alleged to be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration, it should be regarded as non-existent, not merely annullable.
"El concepto  de  la  causa falsa se confunde por  lo relacionadoa que estan, con el de la simulacion, segun  advertimos comentando el articulo 1.265 y por tanto,  a  este precepto, o Sea  al 1.276, y  a sua concordantes, habra de referirse la solucion en nuestro derecho acerca de la simulacion.  Reconociendo' esta analogia tiene declarado la Jurisprudencia que los contratos simulados, o sea celebrados con causa falsa, no confieren dcrechos ni puedert surtir efecto alguno legal (sentencias de 31 de Octubre de 1865 y 21 de" Marzo de 1884), y en la de 23 de Noviembre de 1877 esta declarado que ''la  simulaeion de un contrato Heva consigo neeesariamente la falsedad  de  la causa del mismo, y pueden alegarla  todos aquellos a'quienes interese, salva la jesponsibilidad que en su  caso eontraigan."  De estas  declarapiones muy importantes, de la jurisprudencia, se deduce  la ineficacia total de l'os' contratos con  causa falsa, que, corao expresion del criterio segnido  en el derecho  anterior al Codig-o Civil, no quedc  aplicarse a contratos bajo el imperio  de este, aunque si  a los anteriores; pero  en lo  demas,  eomo  no se oponeh  al  articulo 1,276,  que solo contradice  aquella  ineficacia.  afoosluta,  sirven  para expresar la relacion de la simulacion eon  la causa falsa  y  para regular  el ejercicio de la accion de  nulidad fundada  en esta, puntp  del  eual trataremos mas  adelante."  .(Manresa, Cwdigo Civil Espanol,  Tomo 8, paginas 623-623.)
In the case  at  bar the sale is alleged to be fictitious because no payment of the stated price was made.  The sale therefore,  was non-existent,  because one of the elements, that of  consideration,  was  absent.   To  such  effect is Article 1261 of the old Civil Code which  provides:
  1. "There is no contract unless the following requisites  exist:

  2.  The consent  of the contracting parties;

  3.  A definite object which is the subject-matter of  the  contract;

  4. A consideration for the  obligation established."
The  theory  that  the right  of the widow to  contest the simulated  sale arises only after the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,  is  based  on  Article  1413  of  the old Civil Code, which provides:
"In addition to his powers as  manager the husband may  for  a valuable consideration alienate  and encumber the property of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife.

"Nevertheless, no alienation or  agreement  which the husband may make "with  respect  to such  property in1 contravention of  this code or in fraud  of the wife shall prejudice her or her heirs."
It will be noted from  the  above  Article that the husband, as the administrator, is given the power to dispose of conjugal property under  onerous title without the consent of the wife.   In  the  second paragraph this power is  limited by the reservation that the wife's rights will not be prejudicated by the assignment or sale made by the husband, when the said assignment or agreement violates the provisions of the Code or is in fraud of the  rights of the wife. The instances,  therefore,  to which said paragraph two refers are those eases of sales, conveyances  or assignments which have, been made tvnder onerous title  in violation of the provision of the Code or in fraud of the rights of the wife.  Said contracts or agreements have the three essential requisites of contracts, namely,  consent of the parties, subject-matter and consideration, although  they are subject to annullment because they violate the provisions of the Code or are in fraud of the rights of the wife.  These kinds of conveyances or contracts  must be distinguished from those in which  no consideration  exists,  as already pointed out above; in these latter  cases, the contracts or agreements lack one of the  essential elements for their validity,  namely,  cause or consideration, and,  therefore, they are considered as non-existent.  It  is under this category  (of non-existent  contracts)  that the  fictitious sale, alleged in the case at bar to have been executed by the husband without consideration or with false  consideration, falls.  In other words, in accordance  with the allegations of the complaint filed the simulated sale has nonexistent,  because there was no consideration for the execution thereof.  The sale executed by the deceased husband was not  sale by onerous title, executed in violation of the provisions of the  Code  or in  fraud of  the rights of the wife; if it was not a sale or conveyance which suffers from invalidity by  reason of  the violation of the provisions of the Code or of fraud  to the rights  of the wife.  It is, according to the allegations of the complaint, a non-existent contract  which never came into  being  or effect because of the express provision of Article 1261  of  the Civil Code. As the deed of sale  executed by the  deceased husband was, according  to the allegations of the complaint, without consideration because the supposed price did not  exist and was not paid, it follows that the sale  is not the one contemplated by the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 1413 of the old Civil Code, and it is not, therefore, correct to hold that the right of the wife to assail its effectiveness Is made to depend upon the outcome of the liquidation of the conjugal  partnership.  The case at  bar falls clearly under  the principle stated in  the case of Pascual vs. Pascual, supra, where the wife, who had an interest in the conjugal property subject of the sale, was allowed to bring the action, making the executor a party-defendant because of Ma refusal to institute the  suit.

In view of the foregoing considerations,  the order dismissing the complaint is  hereby reversed  and "fee  case remanded to the Court of First Instance of Cebu for further proceedings.  With costs against the defendants-appellees.

ParĂ¡s,  C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

tags