On January 19, 1950, plaintiff, a  corporation duly organized under the laws  of the Philippines, filed an action against defendants before the Court  of First Instance of Manila  to  recover the amount of P1,800, plus 12% interest thereon  per annum, based on an indemnity agreement entered into between plaintiff and  defendants.  In due time, the Court rendered judgment ordering defendants to pay  plaintiff the  sum of P2,006.25,  with 12 %  interest per  annum,  plus P100 as  attorney's  fees  and costs of suit.  Defendants failed to appeal from the decision which became final and executory.

On August 4, 1952, plaintiff moved for execution of the decision, which was granted, and,  accordingly,  a writ of execution was  issued on August 23, 1952, as a result of which the sheriff levied upon  a parcel of land belonging to defendant Emilio D. Dizon which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15198 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.   After the  requisite publication, the property was sold at  public auction and adjudicated to plaintiff as the  highest  bidder for the  sum  of  P3,100.   Meantime, defendant Dizon tried to negotiate the repurchase of the property from  plaintiff, but the negotiation failed.  And so, on July 2, 1956, plaintiff filed  in the same case, a petition to cancel the title issued in the name of the original owner and to have a  new one issued  in its name, praying at the same time that the property  be placed in  its possession in  accordance  with Section  31, Rule 39,  of the Rules of Court.

Defendants opposed this petition verbally on the ground that the court  has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the same comes under the  court which took cognizance of the original case  relative  to the  registration of the property.  On August 18, 1956, the court, overruling the opposition, issued an order directing the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15198 and issue in lieu thereof a new one in the name of plaintiff, directing at the same time the sheriff  to place  plaintiff in possession of  the property under Section 31, Rule 39,  of the Rules of  Court.   From this  order  defendants  took the present appeal.

The  appeal is meritorious.   The  property in question is one registered under the  provisions of Act 496.  Under Section 78 thereof, upon the expiration of the time for the redemption of the land sold by virtue of a writ of execution, a person claiming under the  execution "may petition  the court for entry of a new certificate to him",  and under Section 112 of the same Act, this petition  should be filed in the  original registration case as may be inferred from the  following paragraph:  "Any petition filed  under  this section and all petitions and motions filed  under the provisions of this Act after original registration shall be filed and entitled  in the original case in which the decree of registration was  entered"   (Italics ours.)

Thus, in the case of Gavan vs. Wislizenus, 48 Phil., 632, the facts of  which  are  similar to  those involved  in  the present, this  Court, interpreting the scope  of Section  112 of Act  496, made the following pronouncement:

"It will be observed that  the motion  of June 29 was not filed in 'the original case in which  the decree of registration was  entered, but in an ordinary civil action and in view of  the provisions quoted, it is evident that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting  the motion under these  circumstances.

Land registration  proceedings are as separate and distinct from ordinary civil actions as are the latter from  criminal actions,  and it will probably not  be contended that our courts  have jurisdiction in  civil  actions to convict  persons of criminal offenses.

"The  rule  that all petitions and motions  filed  under the provisions of the  Land Registration  Act  must  be presented in  the original registration case, was  adopted  with an  intelligent purpose in view;  to allow such petitions  and motions to be filed and disposed of elsewhere would eventually lead to confusion  and render it  difficult  to  trace the origin of  the entries in the registry."   (Italics ours)

It  is obvious that the  lower  court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when  it granted plaintiffs  petition in  the  instant case  praying for the  issuance of  a  new title in  its name in lieu of that of the original owner of the property. Hence that portion of the  order has no legal validity.

With regard however to the portion of the order which directs that plaintiff be placed in possession of the property, which was acquired by it as highest bidder in the execution sale carried  out by the sheriff  and  which  sale became absolute for lack of the requisite redemption on the part of the  owner, the court acted properly pursuant to Section 31, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which provides:

"Sec. 31. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period.  By whom executed  or  given. If no redemption be made within twelve months  after the sale, the  purchaser,  or his assignee, is entitled  to a  conveyance  and possession  of  the property;  or, if so redeemned, whenever sixty days have elapsed and  no other redemption has been made,  and notice thereof given, and  the time for  redemption has expired,  the last redemptioner, or his  assignee,  is entitled  to the conveyance and possession;  but in all  cases the judgment debtor  shall have the entire period  of twelve  months from the date of the sale1 to redeem the property. The deed  shall be executed by the officer making the sale or  by his successor in office, and in the  latter  case shall have the same validity as  though the officer  making the  sale had  continued  in office and executed it.   The possession shall be given by the same officer  if  no third parties  are  actually  holding  the  property adversely to the judgment debtor."   (Italics ours.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside insofar as it orders the Register of Deeds to issue a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiff in lieu of that of its original owner, but the order  is affirmed insofar as  it orders the sheriff to deliver the possession of the property in question to plaintiff.  No costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ.,  concur.