The facts in  this case are not disputed.   Briefly stated, they are as follows.   Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal  Mayor of San Juan  del  Monte,  Rizal, and the petitioner Nicanor  G.  Salaysay  is  the duly elected  Vice- Mayor.  In the month of September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto,  Santos was under suspension from his office due to administrative charges filed against him and so petitioner Salaysay  acted as Mayor under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary disability of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged  by the  Vice-Mayor.  On September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor,  Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running for the office of Mayor  as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice-Mayor  under the provisions of  section 27 of the Revised Election Code, as a  consequence of which he no longer had authority to continue  acting as  Mayor,  the Office of the President of the Philippines  on  September 12, 1955  designated Braulio Sto. Domingo  acting Municipal Vice-Mayor of  Sail Juan del Monte, Rizal.  On the same date Salaysay was  advised by respondent Provincial  Governor  Wenceslao  Pascual of  Rizal that in view of his (Salaysay's) automatic cessation as Vice-Mayor due to his having filed his certificate  of candidacy  for the  office of Mayor, and in  view of the appointment  of Sto. Domingo, as acting Vice-Mayor by the  President of the  Philippines, and because he (Pascual)  had directed  Sto. Domingo to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor Santos, he (Salaysay) should turn over the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo.   On  September 13, 1955,  Salaysay was also advised by Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro to turn over the office  of Mayor to Sto. Domingo immediately, otherwise he might be prosecuted for violation of Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code for prolonging performance of duties.

Salaysay refused to turn over. the office of Mayor to Sto. Domingo and  brought this action of Prohibition  with preliminary injunction against Executive  Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual'  and Sto. Domingo, to declare  invalid, illegal and unauthorized  the designation.of Sto. Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor of San  Juan  del Monte as  well  as his designation by  Governor Pascual to assume the office of Mayor during the suspension of Mayor Santos; to order respondents to desist and refrain from molesting, interfering or in any way  preventing petitioner from performing his duties as acting Municipal Mayor and prohibiting Sto. Domingo from  performing or attempting to perform any of those powers and duties belonging to petitioner.   Acting upon  a prayer contained in the petition, we issued a writ of preliminary  injunction.

Petitioner  contends that his ease does not come  under section 27 of the Election Code for  the reason that when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, he  was  actually holding  said  office.  The  respondents, however, maintain  that the office  petitioner was actually holding when he filed his certificate of candidacy  for the office  of Mayor was that of Vice-Mayor, the one to which he had been duly elected; that he was not actually holding the office of Mayor but merely  discharging the duties thereof and was merely acting as  Mayor during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.  Elaborating, respondents  claim  that  a  Vice-Mayor acting as  Mayor merely discharges  the duties of the office but does  not exercise the powers thereof;. that his tenure is provisional, lasting only during  the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.  Petitioner counters with  the  argument that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not  only  discharge the duties  of the office of Mayor  but  also  exercises  the powers thereof; and that while acting as Mayor, he  actually holds the office of Mayor for all legal purposes.

It is clear that  petitioner's stand is taken  from  the point  of view  of his  acting  as Mayor, and not  of  his office  of  Vice-Mayor, while respondents' position is taken from  the point of view of petitioner actually holding the office  of  Vice-Mayor though incidentally and temporarily discharging the duties of the office of Mayor.

We have given the case considerable study and thought because we find no precedents to aid and guide us.  The parties have ably adduced pertinent and extensive citations and arguments  not only at the original  hearing but also at the re-hearing.  As to whether a  Vice-Mayor  acting as Mayor may be regarded  as actually holding the office of Mayor, there are plausible arguments and good reasons for either side.   We are inclined  to agree with petitioner that one acting as Mayor not only discharges the duties of the office  but also  exercises the powers of  said  office, and that in one sense and literally, he  may  legitimately be  considered  as actually  holding the  office  of Mayor. But there  is  also  force  and  logic  in the argument  of respondents that inasmuch  as a  Vice-Mayor  takes  over the duties of the Mayor only temporarily and in an acting capacity, he may not be regarded as actually holding the office, because the duly elected Mayor incumbent though actually  under  temporary disability such  as  suspension, illness or absence  (section 2195,  Revised Administrative Code)  could and should be considered  as  retaining his right to the office of Mayor and actually holding the same; otherwise there would be a situation  where two officials at the same time would be having  a right to the same office and actually holding the same.   In view of the possible uncertainty and doubt as to whether or not a Vice-Mayor by  acting as Mayor can  be regarded  as actually holding said office of Mayor, we have to go back  and resort to the legislative proceedings had, particularly the discussions and interpellations  in-both houses  of  Congress leading to the enactment of section 27 of the  Revised  Election Code, with a view to ascertaining the  intention of that  body.   After all,  in interpreting a law,  the primary consideration is the  ascertainment of  the intent  and the purpose  of the legislature promulgating  the same.

"Statute law  is the  will of  the legislature;  find  the object of all  judicial interpretation  of it  is to  determine what intention is conveyed,  either expressly or By implication,  by the language used, so far as it  is necessary for determining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it." (Black, Handbook on the Construction  and Interpretation of  the Laws, 2nd ed., p.  11.)

HISTORY OR  BACKGROUND OF SECTION 27
REVISED ELECTION CODE

Before the  enactment of section 27 of the Revised Election  Code,  the law in force  covering  the point or question in controversy was section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666.   Its burden was to allow an elective  provincial, municipal, or city official such as Mayor, running for the same office to continue in office until the expiration of  his term.  The legislative intention  as we see it was "to favor re-election,of the incumbent by allowing him to continue in his office and use  the  prerogatives and influence thereof in his campaign for re-election and to avoid  a break in or interruption of his incumbency  during  his current term and provide for continuity thereof with the next  term of office if  re-elected.

But section 2, Commonwealth Act No.  666 had reference only to provincial  and municipal officials duly elected to their  offices and who were occupying  the same by reason of said election  at the time that they filed their  certificates of candidacy for the same position.' It did not include officials who hold or  occupy elective provincial and municipal offices not by election but by appointment.   We quote section  2,  Commonwealth Act No. 666:

"Any elective provincial, municipal or city official  running  for an office other than the one for which  he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from  the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,"

However, this was exactly the situation  facing the Legislature in  the year 1947 after the late President  Roxas had assumed office as President and before the elections coming up that  year.   The  last national elections for provincial and  municipal  officials  were held  in  1940,  those elected therein to serve up  to  December, 1943.  Because of the war and  the occupation by the Japanese, no  elections for provincial  and municipal officials could be held in 1943. Those elected in 1940 could not hold-over beyond 1943 after the expiration of their term of office because according to the views of the Executive department as later confirmed by this Court in the case of Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil., 12, through Commonwealth Act No. 357, Congress had intended to; suppress the doctrine or rule of hold-over. So, those provincial and municipal officials elected in 1940 ceased in 1943  and  their offices  became vacant, and  this was the situation when after liberation,  President Osmefia , took  over  as  Chief  Executive.   He  filled  these  vacant positions by appointment.   When President  Roxas  was elected  in  1946 and  assumed office in  1947 he replaced many  of these Osmefia  appointees  with his  own  men. Naturally,  his  Liberal Party followers  wanted to extend to these appointees the  same privilege of office retention thereto given by section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 to local  elective  officials.  It could  not be  done because section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666 had reference only to officials  who had been elected.  So, it was decided by President Roxas and his party, to amend said section 2, Commonwealth  Act  No.  666 by  substituting the  phrase "which he  is actually holding", for the phrase "for which he has been lastly elected" found in  section 2 of Commonwealth  Act No.  666.  The amendment  is  now  found in section  27  of the Revised Election  Code which we quote  below:

"SEC. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial municipal, or city official  running for an office, other than one which he is actually holding, shall be  considered resigned his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

The purpose of the Legislature in making the  amendment, in our opinion, was to give the benefit or privilege of retaining office not only to those who have been elected thereto but also to those who have been appointed; stated differently,  to  extend the  privilege and benefit  to  the regular incumbents having the right and title to the office either by election or by  appointment.  There can  be no doubt, in our opinion,  about  this intention.  We  have carefully examined the proceedings in both Houses of the Legislature.  The minority Nacionalista members of Congress bitterly attacked this amendment,  realizing that  it was partisan legislation intended to favor those officials appointed by President Roxas; but despite their opposition the amendment was passed. „

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

We repeat that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 27 of the  Revised  Election Code  was to allow an official to continue occupying an elective provincial, municipal or  city office to which he had been appointed or elected, while campaigning for  his election as long as he runs  for the same office.   He may keep said office continuously without any break,  through the elections and up to the expiration of the term of  the  office.  By continuing in office, the office holder was allowed  and expected to use the prerogatives, authority and  influence of  his  office in his campaign for his election or re-election to the office he was holding.  Another intention of the Legislature  as we have  hitherto adverted to  was  to provide  for  continuity of his incumbency so that there would be no interruption or break, which would happen if he were required to resign because of his filing his certificate of candidacy.   Bearing this intention of the Legislature in this  regard in mind, can it be said that a Vice-Mayor like the petitioner herein, merely acting as Mayor because of the temporary disability of the regular incumbent,  comes under the provision and 1 exception of section 27 of the Election Code?  The answer must necessarily be in the negative.  A Vice-Mayor acts as Mayor only in a temporary, provisional capacity.  This tenure is indefinite,  uncertain  and precarious.  He may act for a few days, for a week or a month or even longer. But surely there, ordinarily, is no assurance or expectation that he could continue acting as Mayor, long, indefinitely, through the  elections  and up to the end of  the  term of the office because the temporary disability of the regular, incumbent Mayor may end any time and he  may resume his duties.

VICE-MAYOR ACTING AS MAYOR, OUTSIDE
LEGAL CONTEMPLATION

The case of a Vice-Mayor acting  as Mayor could not have been  within the contemplation and the intent of the Legislature because as we have already stated, that law- making  body or at least  the majority thereof  intended to give the benefits and the privilege of section 27 to those officials holding their offices  by  their own right and  by a valid title either by election or by appointment, permanently continuously  and up to the end of the term of the office, not to an official neither elected nor appointed to that  office but merely acting provisionally in said office because of the temporary  disability of the  regular incumbent.   In drafting and enacting section 27, how could the Legislature  have possibly had in mind a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, and include him  in its scope, and accord  him the benefits of retaining the office  of Mayor and utilizing its authority and influence in his election campaign, when his tenure in the office  of Mayor is so  uncertain,  indefinite and precarious that  there may be no opportunity or  occasion for him to enjoy said benefits; and how  could Congress  have contemplated his continuing in  the office in  which he is acting, when the very idea of continuity is necessarily in conflict and incompatible with the uncertainty, precariousness  and temporary character of his  tenure  in the  office of Mayor?

"ACTUALLY HOLDING OFFICE"  EQUIVALENT
TO "INCUMBENT"

All these doubts about the meaning and application of the  phrase "actually holding office"  could perhaps  have been avoided had the  intention of this Legislature  been phrased differently.   It could perhaps  have more happily used the term "incumbent" to refer to those provincial and  municipal officials who  were holding office  either by election or by appointment,  and so had  a  legal title and right thereto.   As a matter of fact, this term "incumbent" was  actually  used by Congressman Laurel in explaining the idea of the committee that drafted this amendment to section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 666, of which committee he was the  Chairman.  The  deliberations  of the lower House  as quoted by the very counsel for petitioner reads as follows:

"Mr. Roy. What must be  the reason,  then, Mr. Chairman of the Committee for deleting the words 'has been lastly elected'? "Mr. Laurel.  The idea is to cover the present incumbents of the local  offices."  (II Congressional  Record  1143.)

In this  connection, a happier phraseology of another portion  of section 27 could have been used for  purposes  of precision.  For instance, the first part of said section reads thus: "Any elective  provincial, municipal  or city official running for an office", and  yet as we have  already said, the Legislature intended said section to refer to officials who were appointed  by President  Roxas to  fill vacancies in provincial,  municipal  and city elective offices. In other words,  those  officials were  not really elected or elective officials but they were officials occupying or holding  local elective offices by  appointment.  All this goes  to  show that we should not  and cannot always  be bound by the phraseology or literal meaning  of a law  or statute  but at times may interpret, nay,  even disregard  loose or inaccurate wording in  order to arrive  at  the real meaning and  spirit of a statute  intended and breathed into  it by the law-making body.

MEANING OF PHRASE "RESIGNED FROM HIS OFFICE"

Section 27  of  Republic  Act No. 180 in  providing that a local elective official running for  an office other than the one  he is  actually holding, is considered  resigned from his office, must necessarily  refer  to  an office which said official can resign, or from which he could be considered resigned, even against his will.  For instance, an incumbent Mayor running for the office of Provincial  Governor must be considered as having resigned from his office of Mayor.  He  must resign voluntarily or  be compelled to resign.  It has to be an office which is subject to resignation by the one occupying  it.  Can  we say this of a Vice-Mayor, acting as Mayor? Can he  or could he resign from the office of Mayor or could he be  made  to resign therefrom?  No.  As long as  he holds  the office of Vice- Mayor to which he has a right and legal title, he, cannot resign or be made to  resign from the  office  of Mayor because the law itself requires that as Vice-Mayor he must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the regular or incumbent Mayor. If he cannot voluntarily resign the office of  Mayor in which he is  acting temporarily, or could not be made  to resign therefrom, then the provision of section 27 of the Code about  resignation,  to him, would be useless, futile and a dead letter.  In interpreting a law, we should always avoid a construction that would have this result, for it  would violate the fundamental  rule that every legislative act should be interpreted in order to give force and effect to every provision  thereof because the Legislature is  not presumed to have done a useless act.

"A statute is  a solemn enactment of the  state acting through its legislature  and it muat be assumed that this  process achieve result.  It cannot the presumed that the legislature would  d futile thing."  (Sutherland, Statutory Construction,  Vol. 8, p.  237.)

EXAMPLE

To emphasize and illustrate this inapplicability of section 27 to a  Vice-Mayor acting as  Mayor, let us consider an  example.   A Vice-Mayor  while acting as Mayor files his certificate  of  candidacy for the office of Vice-Mayor. In  other words,  he wants to  run for  re-election.  The Provincial Governor, especially if belonging to a  different political party wants  to keep  him out  of the  office of Mayor, especially during the electoral campaign, and instead have his party man, the councilor who obtained the highest number of votes in the last elections, act as Mayor (section  2195,  Revised  Administrative  Code).  So, he hastens to the Municipal  building and enters the Mayor's office where the Vice-Mayor has installed himself.  Using the same argument  of herein petitioner, he tells  the Vice- Mayor that inasmuch as while acting as  Mayor, he was "actually holding" said office of Mayor, and because while thus holding it, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor which is  a different office, he must be considered resigned from; the  office of  Mayor; and he even asks him to leave the Mayor's room and office.  The Vice- Mayor, a law  abiding citizen  acquiesces  and obeys,  he reluctantly,  leaves and abandons the office of the Mayor and repairs to his own room as Vice-Mayor.  But he has a happy inspiration and  remembers the law (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code); he rushes back to the office of the Mayor and tells the  Governor and the authorities that he is  still  the  Vice-Mayor because when  he filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-Mayor, he was also actually holding said office,  and  so  did not  lose  it; that as such Vice-Mayor, he can  act and must act as Mayor during the temporary disability of the  incumbent, because he cannot resign and no one can make him resign from the office of Mayor; and he defies the Governor to oust him from the office and room of  the Mayor.   The  Governor is helpless for the Vice-Mayor  is right, that is, if we apply section 27 of the Election Code to  him.  This  possible,  undesirable and anomalous situation  is another reason  why section 27 may not be applied to the case of a Vice-Mayor  acting as Mayor.

In the above  given example, the Governor might contend that when the Vice-Mayor filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor, he was actually holding only the office of Mayor and not that of Vice-Mayor and so he lost his office of Vice- Mayor.   But that contention of the Governor is untenable. Even counsel for herein petitioner in his memorandum admits  that a Vice-Mayor  while acting  as Mayor,  also actually holds his office of Vice-Mayor.  And it has to be that way.  A Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not cease to be Vice-Mayor.  In fact,  that is his real, principal and basic office or function.  Acting as Mayor is only an incident, an accessory.  Let him cease holding the office of Vice-Mayor even for an instant, and he automatically, also ceases acting as Mayor.  Furthermore, a Vice-Mayor has administrative duties to perform.  He  is  an  ex-officio member of the Municipal Council and he is in charge of the barrio or district where the town offices are. located (section 2204, Revised Administrative Code).  While acting as Mayor he may not say that he ceases to hold the office of Vice-Mayor and so cannot look after the needs of the residents  of his  district and present  them  to the town council.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE

The  regular incumbent  Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.  Then he goes on leave of absence or falla sick and the  Vice-Mayor acts in his place,  and while thus, acting he also files his certificate of candidacy for the same office of Mayor.  Then the Vice- Mayor also goes on leave or  falls sick or is suspended,, and because the regular Mayor is still unable to return to office, under section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes, acts as Mayor, and  while thus acting he  also files his certificate of candidacy  for the office of Mayor.  The  Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post of Mayor claiming like the herein petitioner that he did not, lose  Ms office of Vice-Mayor  because he filed his certificate of candidacy while acting  as  Mayor and thus was actually holding the office of Mayor.  Using the same argument, the councilor who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns for his election to the same post of Mayor while keeping his position as councilor.  Thus we would have this singular situation  of three municipal officials occupying three separate and distinct offices,  running  for the  same  office  of  Mayor,  yet  keeping  their different respective offices, and strangely enough two  of those offices (Vice-Mayor and Councilor) are different from the office of  Mayor they  are running for.   Could  that situation have  been contemplated  by  the Legislature  in enacting section 27 of the Revised Election Code?  We  do not think so, and yet that would happen if the  contention of the petitioner about the meaning of "actually  holding office" is to prevail.

CONGRESS CONTEMPLATED ONLY ONE OFFICE
ACTUALITY HELD

Another argument against the contention that  a  Vice- Mayor acting as Mayor actually holds the office of  Mayor, occurs to us.   For purposes of ready reference we again quote section 27 in its  entirety:

"Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective  provincial, municipal, or city official running for an  office, other than the one which  he is actually holding, shall  be  considered resigned  from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

It will readily be noticed from the quoted section, especially the words underlined by us that the Legislature contemplated only one office,  not two or more.  To us, this  is significant  as well  as important.  As  we have  previously stated, there is no question that a Vice-Mayor acting  as Mayor still  holds  the  office  of Vice-Mayor.  Petitioner himself admits this  in his written  argument and  even contends that  there is nothing  wrong or illegal in an official holding two offices at the same time provided  there is no incompatibility between them.   If the  Legislature believed that a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor actually  holds the office of Mayor and that he would thus be actually holding two offices, then it would have provided in section 27 for offices ill the plural instead of employing the words office, his office, and the one which it used in the singular.

Besides this clear expression of legislative intent for only one office being actually held and to be resigned from, to say that the Vice-Mayor when' acting as Mayor is actually holding two offices would create confusion and uncertainty because we would  not know which  office  he  would  be considered  resigned from.

TWO OFFICIALS "ACTUALLY HOLDING" THE SAME
ELECTIVE OFFICE
We have already said that a Mayor under temporary  . disability  continues to be Mayor  (Gamalinda  vs. Yap* No. L-6121,  May  30,  1953)  and actually holds the office despite  his temporary disability to discharge the duties of the office; he receives full  salary corresponding to his office, which payment may not be (legal if  he were not actually holding the office, while the Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor does not receive said salary but is paid only a sum equivalent  to it   (section  2187,  Revised Administrative Code).  Now, if a Mayor  under temporary  disability  actually holds the office  of Mayor and the Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor,  according  to his claim ia also actually holding the office of Mayor, then we would have the anomalous and embarrassing situation of two officials actually holding the very same  local elective office.  Considered from this view, point, and  to avoid the anomaly, it ia to us  clear that the Vice-Mayor should not be regarded as holding the office of Mayor but merely  acting for the regular incumbent, a duty or right as an  incident to  his office  of Vice-Mayor and not as an independent right or  absolute title to the office by reason of election or appointment.

ACTING MAYOR AND  ACTING AS MAYOR, DISTINGUISHED

Petitioner claims that he  is  the  acting Mayor,  Respondents insist that petitioner is merely acting as Mayor.

It is pertinent and profitable, at least  in the present case, to make a distinction between  an Acting  Mayor and a , Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor.  "When a  vacancy  occurs in  the  office  of  Mayor, the  Provincial Governor under section 21 (a)  or the President under section 21(6),  (d) and  (e)  of the Election Code appoints  or designates an Acting Mayor.  In  that  case the person  designated or  appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds the office for the unexpired term of the office  (section 21 [f]) because when he was appointed there was no regular incumbent to the office.  However, when a Vice-Mayor  acts as Mayor, there is  no vacancy  in the  post  of  Mayor.  There  is  a regular incumbent  Mayor only that the latter is under temporary disability.  So,  strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may not be considered Acting Mayor.  He is  only acting as Mayor  temporarily, provisionally  and during the temporary disability of  the regular  incumbent. He is not the incumbent.   In baseball parlance, petitioner is only a  "pinch hitter", pinch hitting for, say, the pitcher in an emergency.  As a  mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular line up, he  is not the pitcher, does not hold the position of pitcher, neither does he receive all the benefits and privileges of the  regular pitcher. Ordinarily,  this apparently fine and  subtle distinction would seem unimportant and unnecessary.  When a Vice- Mayor acts as Mayor we usually call him Mayor or Acting Mayor and deal with him  as though he were the regular incumbent;  but there are times  and occasions  like the present when it is necessary  to make these distinction and use  correct and  precise  language  in  order to determine whether  or not  under section 27 of the  Election  Code a Vice Mayor acting as  Mayor like the petitioner herein comes within the phrase "actually holding office" used in that section.

EXCEPTION TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY

Section 26  of the Revised  Election Code  provides that every person  holding an appointive office shall ipso  facto cease in his office  on the date he files his certificate of candidacy.  Then we have section 27 of the  same  Code as well as section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 which it  amended, both providing that local elective officials running for  office  shall be  considered  resigned  from  their posts, except when  they run for the same  office  they are occupying or holding.   It is evident that the general rule is that  all Government officials  running for  office  must resign.  The authority or  privilege to  keep  one's  office when running for the same office is the  exception.   It  is a settled rule of statutory  construction that an exception or  a proviso  must be strictly  construed specially  when considered in an attempt to ascertain the legislative intent.

"Exceptions, as  a general rule, should be strictly, but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts  should be resolved in favor of the  general provision rather than the exception. Where. a general rule  is established  by statute with exceptions, the court will not  curtail the former nor add to the  latter  by implication,  and  it is a general rule that  an express exception  excludes all others,  although it ,is  always  proper in determining  the applicability of this rule, to  inquire whether,  in the  particular case, it accords  with reason and justice.   *   *  *." (Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing  69  C.  J.,  section 643,  pp. 1092-1093; Italics supplied.)

"As in  all other  cases, a proviso should be interpreted consistently with the  legislative intent.  Where the proviso  itself  must be considered.  In an attempt to determine the  intent of the Legislature it should  be strictly construed.  This is true because the  legislative purpose set forth  in the general enactment expresses the  legislative policy and only those  subjects  expressly  exempted by the proviso should be freed from  the operation of the statute.   (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 471-472.)

Applying this rule, inasmuch as petitioner herein claimed the  right  to  retain  his office under the  exception  above referred to,  said claim must have to be judged strictly, whether or not  his mere acting in the office  of  Mayor may be legally  interpreted as actually holding the same so  as  to come within the exception. As we have already observed, literally and generally  speaking, since he is discharging the duties and exercising the powers of the office of Mayor he might be regarded as actually holding the office; but strictly speaking and considering  the purpose and intention  of the  Legislature  behind section 27 of the  Revised Election Code, he may not and  cannot  legitimately be considered as actually holding the office of Mayor.

RETENTION OF OFFICE

We have, heretofore discussed the case as regards the resignation of an office holder  from his office by reason of his running for an  office different from  it; and  our conclusion is that it must be an office that he can or may resign or be considered  resigned from; and that the office of Mayor is not such an office from the  stand point of a Vice-Mayor.  Let us now consider the case from the point of view of retaining his office because he is  running for the same office, namely retention  of his offidej... As we have  already said, the  Legislature  intended  to  allow  an office holder and incumbent to retain  his office provided that he runs for  the same.  In  other words, he  is  supposed to retain the office before  and throughout  the elections and up to the expiration of the  term of the office, without interruption.   Can a Vice-Mayor acting  as Mayor.be  allowed  or expected to retain the office  of Mayor?  The incumbent Mayor running, for the same office  can and has a right to keep and retain said  office up to the end of his term.  But a Vice-Mayor merely acting as  Mayor and running for  said office of  Mayor,  may  not  and  cannot be expected to keep the office up to the  end of the term, even assuming that  by acting  as  Mayor he  is  actually holding the office of Mayor, for the simple  reason that his holding of the same is temporary,  provisional and precarious  and may end any time when the incumbent Mayor returns to duty.  Naturally,  his temporary holding of the office of Mayor cannot be the retention or right to keep the office  intended by  the Legislature in section  27 of Republic Act No. 180.  So that, neither from  the point of view of resignation from the office of Mayor nor the standpoint  of retention  of said office,  may a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor, like herein petitioner,  come within the provisions and meaning of section 27 of the Election Code, particularly the exception m it.

SUPPOSED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICE-MAYOR
ACTING AS MAYOR

During the hearing and oral argument of this case, the suggestion  was made, which  suggestion was also used as an  argument during the deliberations among the members of this Tribunal, that to include in section 27 particularly the phrase  "actually  holding office"  one who has  been appointed as acting official such as Acting Mayor and at the same time exclude a Vice-Mayor who acts  as Mayor, would be discriminating  against an official  (Vice-Mayor) who by  statutory provision  and  sanction is required to act as Mayor, and give  more importance to one  merely appointed to said office.  We fail to see any discrimination for the reason that an appointee to the office of Mayor fills a vacancy  and serves  until  the end  of the  term of  the  office,  whereas  a Vice-Mayor acting  as  Mayor fills no vacancy because there is none and he serves only temporarily until the disability of the incumbent, such as suspension, absence, illness, etc. is removed.  Now, if  a vacancy  is created in the office  of Mayor by removal, resignation, death or cessation of the incumbent, then the Vice-Mayor automatically fills the vacancy, becomes Mayor (section 2195, Revised Administrative Code),  and serves until the end of the term (section 21[/], Revised Election Code).   That is the time when he may invoke  section 27 because he would then be actually holding the office of Mayor.

CONCLUSION

In  conclusion, we believe and hold that a Vice-Mayor . acting as Mayor  does not "actually  hold the office" of Mayor within the meaning of section 27 of Republic Act No. 180; that a Vice-Mayor who files his certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor, even while acting as Mayor, is considered resigned from the office  of Vice-Mayor for the reason that that  is the only  office that he "actually holds" within the contemplation  of  section  27 of the Revised  Election Code and the office  he is running for (Mayor)  is naturally other than the  one he is actually holding  (Vice-Mayor); and that having  ceased  to be a Vice-Mayor, he automatically lost all right to act as Mayor.

A word of explanation.  This decision should have been promulgated long before now.  In truth, this Tribunal was anxious  and determined  to decide this case before  the last  November elections, at least before the newly elected local officials assumed office.   However, after long, careful deliberations the court was deadlocked, the vote  standing five  to five.. The  rehearing  ordered by us as decreed by ., law  failed to break the deadlock.  It was only when the new addition to  the membership  of  the Tribunal,  Mr. Justice Endencia studied the case, weighed the arguments and  considered the authorities on either side, that the tie vote could be broken.  He voted for and signed the .present opinion which now becomes the majority opinion.

The question involved in the present case may in a way be regarded as moot.  Just the same, we doomed it advisable to proceed with  its final determination, even elaborate on the discussion  of  its different aspects, by reason of its importance and for the information and guidance of  local elective  officials, and perchance so that  the Legislature, apprised of the judicial interpretation and meaning given to section 27 of the Revised Election Code, may be  in  a better position  to decide whether to  continue and leave it as it stands on the statute books, or amend or change it before the next general elections.

In view of the foregoing the petition for prohibition is denied, with  costs.  The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued  is hereby dissolved.

Padilla, Jugo, Labrador, and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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REYES, A., J.;

The chief function of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker and, that  intention has been ascertained, to give effect thereto.  By reference to legislative record  Mr. Justice Montemayor has, I think, arrived  at the true legislative intent and has therefore fashioned his  opinion  so as to give effect to that intent. I readily subscribe to  that opinion  as the  correct judicial solution to" the present controversy.

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REYES, J. B. L., J.;

I fully concur with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Concepcion,  but would only add that I fail to see how the majority can hold that the vice-mayor, acting as mayor, cannot be considered resigned from the mayoralty, because "it has to be an office which is subject to resignation by the one occupying it." That conclusion would only be true if the law required the candidate  to resign voluntarily from his office. But the law does not  require him to resign; it considers him resigned, treats him as if he had resigned;  and  that is altogether  a different  thing. In order that an  official  can be  considered resigned  all that is needed is that the  office be  one that he  could forfeit or  loss. And the mayoralty is certainly an  office that can be lost  or forfeited by petitioner,  even if he  could not resign from it.  The trouble, I suppose, is that the structure of our language is such  that  (as semanticists have  pointed out)  it enables us  not only to use words about realities  but  also to use words about words. And it is  precisely  because the law here involved decrees  a forfeiture  that restrictive interpretation  becomes imperative  and  doubts  should be  resolved against the petitioner's forfeiting  his office.

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DISSENTING:


CONCEPCION, J.;

This case  hinges on  the interpretation of section 27  of Republic  Act No. 180  (Revised Election Code), reading:

"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is  actually holding, shall  be considered resigned from his  office from the moment of the filing o£ his certificate of candidacy."  (Italics supplied.)

The main  issue is whether petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is "actually holding" the office of municipal mayor  of San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal.

ORDINARY AND  LEGAL MEANING OF THE PHRASE
"ACTUALLY HOLDING"

"Actual" implies

"Real, in opposition to constructive or speculative,  something 'existing in act.'  State vs. Wells, 31 Conn. 213; real as opposed to nominal; Astor vs. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 4 Sup. Ct. 413, 28 t. Ed. 401."  (Bouvier's Law  Dictionary, 8th ed., p. 130.) (Italics supplied.)

"That  which exists  in  fact;  a  reality."  (Webster's New International  Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 27.)  (Italics supplied.)

According to  Ballantine  Law Dictionary (1948 ed., p. 28):

"That which is actual is something'  real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or. to something which is presumptive or constructive.  See Steen vs. .Modern Woodmen of America, 296, 111, 104, 17 A. L. B.  406, 412, }29 N. E. Eep. 646." (Italics supplied.).

Hence,  "actually"  means  "in  act  or fact; in  reality; truly as, he was actually there."   (Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary, 1952 ed.,  p. 31.)   In  other words, actually, "is opposed to seemingly, pretendedly, or f eignedly as actually engaged in farming means really, truly, in fact. (In re Strawbridge  & Mays,  39  Ala.  367)"  (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3rd  ed., p. 130.)

Upon the other hand, to "hold"  is "to possess; to occupy; to  be  in possession  and  administration  of; as  to hold office."   (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 897.)   Consequently, to  "actually hold" is  to possess in fact or in reality, that is to say, physically  or materially.

A public  office, however, "is the  right, authority  and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period either fixed  by law  or induring at the pleasure of the creating power,  an  individual is invested with  some portion of the  sovereign functions of the government, to be  exercised by him  for the benefit of the public." (Mechem, Public Officers, section  1.)  Being intangible, it is incapable, of physical or material  occupation.  As a consequence, the actually holding of an office is. determined by its physical, external or tangible manifestations,  namely, the exercise of the powers and performance  of the duties appurtenant thereto.  For this reason, it has been held that:

"Actually holds office within statute regulating tax commission's salaries, means discharge of duties after due appointment and qualification.  (Acts 1923, p. 14, section 1;  p. 1S4, section 85.)"  (Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 266)  (Italics  supplied.)

" 'Actually holds office' means the discharge of the duties thereof after due appointment and qualification, as required  by law, subject to removal at the will of the appointing power. Touart  vs. State ex rel Callaghan,  173 Ala. 453,  56 So. 211; Williams, Judge vs. Schwarz, 197  Ala.  40, 72 So. 330, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 869; Nolen's case, 118 Ala.  154, 24 So. 251."  (Brussel vs. Brandon, 136 So., 577.) (Italics supplied,)

In  the case at bar, it  is  not  disputed that, being the vice-mayor of San Juan del  Monte,  Rizal, petitioner Salaysay is, and has been, discharging the  duties of mayor of said  municipality, since the suspension of its mayor, Engracio E. Santos.   Consequently, the former is "actually holding" the office of the  mayor.

PETITIONER DISCHARGES  ALL  OF THE DUTIES AND
HAS ALL THE  POWERS  OF  THE  MAYOR

Although  maintaining that petitioner merely performs said duties,  without  the powers  vested in said office, the Solicitor General  has  been unable to  name a  single power of the-mayor which may not be  legally exercised by the vice-mayor,  during  the former's suspension.  That  petitioner possesses all the powers attached to the office of the mayor  is conceded  in the very  opinion of  the majority. Indeed,  in the ease of Eraña vs.  Verge! de Dios  (47 Off. Gaz., 2303, 2307), it was held that appointments "or  other official acts- made by the Undersecretary of  Health  when acting  as Department Head, have the same efficacy and  legal effect as the acts of the regular incumbent," who was then absent.  Inasmuch as petitioner is clothed with all the duties and powers of the municipal mayor.of San Juan del Monte, Rizal, and this by operation of law (section 2196, Revised  Administrative  Code) we  cannot  escape  the conclusion that he is  "actually holding" said office.

PETITIONER IS THE  "ACTING MAYOR"

In fact, while  performing  said duties and exercising said powers, petitioner "acts as mayor", or is the "acting mayor." This is admitted  (1) in the  majority opinion, which states that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of the mayor while "acting as mayor" (pp. 1,. 2, 8 and  16); and  (2) in the very letter of the Provincial Governor of  Rizal   (Annex  C),  to  petitioner herein, advising him of the appointment of respondent Sto. Domingo  as Acting Municipal Vice-Mayor, which letter is addressed to said petitioner as  "Acting .Municipal Mayor." This is in conformity with our view, in Erafla vs.  Vergel de Dios   (supra), to  the effect that  the Undersecretary of Health who,  during the absence  of the Secretary of Health, performs the  duties  of the  latter pursuant to. section  79 of  the Revised  Administrative  Code is  the "Acting Secretary"  of Health,  and that his acts, as such, have "the same efficacy  or legal  effect" as those  of the Secietary of Health.

Now, then, "acting", according to Ballentine  Law Dictionary (p. 19) is "substituting, taking the place of another officer temporarily, as an acting Judge."  Since an acting mayor, therefore, temporarily  takes the place of the regularly elected mayor, who, prior thereto, was actually holding said office, it  follows' that the same  is actually  in  the possession of,  and,  hence,  "actually holding"  the  former, upon the  aforementioned substitution. Said majority opinion states:

"Petitioner claims that he' is the acting  mayor.  Respondents, insist that petitioner is merely acting as  Mayor.  It is  pertinent and profitable, at least in the present case, to make a distinction between an Acting Mayor and a Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor. When a vacancy occurs  in the office of  Mayor, the Provincial  Governor under section 21 (a) or the President under section 21 (b),  (d) and (e) of the Election Code appoints or designates an Acting Mayor. in that case the person designated, or appointed becomes the Mayor and actually holds the office for the unexpired term of the office (section 21[f]) because when lie was appointed there was no regular incumbent to the  office.  However,  when a"  Vice-Mayor acts  as Mayor,  there is  no vacancy in the post of Mayor. There is a regular incumbent Mayor only  that the latter is under temporary disability. So, strictly and correctly speaking, the Vice-Mayor may not be  considered  Acting  Mayor.  He  is only  acting as Mayor temporarily,  provisionally and during the temporary disability of the regular incumbent.  He  is not the incumbent.  In base parlance, petitioner is only a pinch hitter, pinch hitting for the pitcher  in an emergency. As a mere pinch hitter his name does not grace the regular  line up, he is not the pitcher, doe hold the position of pitcher, neither  does  he receive all the benefits and privileges of the regular pitcher"  (pp. 17-18).

To  begin with, when a  permanent  vacancy occurs  in the office  of municipal  mayor, under section 21  (b)  of Republic Act No. 180,  no  appointment or  designation is made by the  President, for the vice-mayor becomes  the mayor.  Upon the  other hand,  section 21(d)  and  (e)  of said Act provides;

"When a local officer-elect  dies before assumption of office, or fails to qualify for any reason,, the P resident .may in his discretion either call a special election or fill the office by appointment,

"In case a special election  has been called and held a have resulted in a failure to elect, the President shall fill t by appointment."

The appointments made  by the  President under either paragraph  may be temporary or permanent in nature.  If permanent, the appointee is the mayor, not "acting mayor." If temporary,  the  appointee  is an "acting  mayor" who, said  opinion impliedly admits, holds actually the office  of mayor.

Secondly,  there  is  no  legal distinction  between  the phrases "acting mayor"  and  "acting  as  mayor."  The distinction  in these  expressions is imposed  merely by the rules of grammar.   When  availed  of  as a  gerund  of the verb  "to act," for the purpose of indicating the capacity in which an act has been performed,  the word "acting" must be followed by the preposition  "as," which is improper when said word is used as a noun, to describe the status of an officer.  Thus, the Undersecretary of Health, "acting as" Secretary of Health, during  the absence of the latter, is "acting Secretary of  Health." '  (Eraña  vs. Vergel de Dios, supra.)   Similarly, the vice-mayor "acting as mayor" during the suspension of the mayor, is the "acting mayor," and, this  is confirmed by the aforementioned letter of the Provincial Governor of Eizal (Annex C) and by the established practice referred to in  the  aforesaid majority opinion of addressing the vice-mayor  discharging  the duties of the  Mayor,  either as  "Mayor"  or as"'acting mayor."

Thirdly, the word "acting," when preceding the title of an office, simply connotes, in legal parlance, the temporary nature with which said office is held (Austria vs. Amante, 45 Off. Gaz., 2829).   What is more, it indicates that the "acting"  officer is  physically in possession of the office, or actually holding it.

Fourthly, although a  "pinch  hitter" may. not  be  the "regular  pitcher," when he  pitches  or  bats,  is  he  not the "actual" pitcher or batter?   When he "strikes out" a batter or  connects a  "hit",  or commits an "error", is the "strike, out", "hit", or "error" not  counted  actually,  as a real  one?

Fifthly,  the vice-mayor  acting  as  mayor,  during  the suspension of the mayor, is in  a better position  than a pinch-hitter,  who, it  is  said,  does not  "receive  all  the benefits and privileges of the regular pitcher."  Said acting mayor has all the powers and  duties of the suspended mayor, who, in turn, can not discharge  the functions of his office or even receive the emoluments.attached thereto, until exonerated or reinstated.

PETITIONER HAS ASSUMED THE OFFICE OF MAYOR

When a vice-mayor discharges  the duties of a suspended mayor, the former "assumes" the office of the latter. This was acknowledged,  expressly, in Laxamana vs.  Baltazar (48 Off.  Gaz., 8869), and by implication in said case of Eraña  vs. Vergel de  Dios (supra).   Thus, in the aforementioned communication of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner was informed  that  respondent  Sto.  Domingo, who has been appointed Acting Vice-Mayor, was to "assume the ' office of mayor during the suspension of Mayor Engracio E. Santos".   Considering that to assume an office  is to take  possession thereof, it is obvious to us that a vice-mayor performing the functions of the mayor who has been suspended, actually holds  the office of the latter.

PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF 'THE OFFICE OF MAYOR
HAS BEEN  RECOGNIZED BY THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT

Again, said Provincial Governor and the Executive Secretary have directed and advised petitioner "to turn over the office of mayor" to respondent Sto. Domingo,  thus implicitly,  but, clearly,  conceding that petitioner herein is the  actual holder of  said office.   Otherwise, how could he turn it over, even if he wanted to, to said respondent ? This is so patent that the majority opinion accepts the fact "that one acting as mayor not only  discharges the. duties of the office, but, also exercises the powers of  said office * * * so ,that in  one sense and literally, he may be legitimately considered as actually holding the office of the mayor",  and that "when a vice-mayor acts as mayor we usually call him mayor or acting mayor and deal' with him as though he were the regular incumbent" (p. 18).  These views, we believe, must, however, be qualified.   Petitioner is the "actual" holder  of the mayor's office, not "in one sense and literally," but in every sense, namely, literally and legally, in-ordinary parlance, as well as from  the viewpoint of the law on  Public  Officers.  Similarly,  although petitioner  is not the regular incumbent of the  office of ' mayor, he is its actual and legal incumbent, for he holds office and, accordingly, he is its actual incumbent pusuant  to law, which  legalizes his status.

"ACTUAL HOLDING"  AND  "CONSTRUCTIVE HOLDING
DISTINGUISHED

The issues would,  perhaps, be clearer if we considered at closer  range, the nature of a public office, the essence of which is. the right, authority and duty,  forming part of the sovereign functions of the government, delegated by operation of law. Insofar as public officers are concerned, two other  elements  are material,  namely,  (1)  title to the office, and (2)  authority to exercise its  powers and discharges  its duties.   The  former is  usually  acquired either by. appointment or by popular election although, in some instances,  it may be secured by legislative enactment.   Thus, by statutory provision,  a vice-mayor becomes ipso facto the mayor upon the death, removal, resignation or  permanent disqualification  of  the  regularly elected mayor (section 21[b], Republic Act No. 180).  . The latter, in general, exists when the possessor of the former assumes office.  At times, however,  the  regular incumbent cannot  exercise the functions of his office,  as when he: (1) is ousted  by another, who enters upon the discharge of said functions; or (2) absent or  becomes temporarily incapacitated"to perform his duties;  or (3)  is suspended from office by competent authority.

If, in the first case, the person who effected the ouster, and  assumed  the office in question, has color  of  title, which is defective,  and  the people,  unaware of the defect, submit to, or invoke, his action,  supposing him to be the officer he  claims to. be, he is legally considered a  de facto officer, the  one ousted  being regarded a  de  jure officer. It should  be noted that the status of  a de facto officer requires  the  concurrence  of  the following conditions,  to wit: (a) there must be  a, de jure office; (b) there must be actual possession of the office; and (c) this must be coupled with color of title. In such event, the de facto officer is "actually  holding"  the  office. The person vested with  a valid title thereto, or the de jure officer, is not in  material possession of the office.  Hence he is not "actually holding" the same.   Yet, he is deemed to hold the office, in the sense only, that there  is no vacancy which may be filled  by appointment or election, as the case may be.   As a consequence, the office is held by two individuals, in different capacities:  the de facto officer actualy  holds  the office, whereas the de jure  officer retains  possession thereof  by legal fiction.  This distinction between the actual and the constructive possession of a public office is vitally important in the case  at  bar.

If the office involved  in the second  and third  cases  is that of  a municipal  mayor, the  law  (section  2195,  Revised administrative Code; Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra) requires the vice-mayor to  discharge  the duties of the mayor.  In  compliance with such requirement, the vice-mayor  assumes  the  office of  mayor, wields its powers, performs its1 duties, and,  as a  consequence,  actually holds  said  office.  The  regular incumbent  does  not exercise  said  power or  perform  said duties, because  he can not do  so, owing, in the second case, to. his absence or  disability,  and, in the third case, to the  order of suspension, which temporarily  divests  him  of said  powers and duties.   The suspended  officer  is legally deprived  of the  authority to  exercise  those  powers and  perform said duties.  Should  he do so, in violation of the order of  suspension, his acts  would be  null  and void,  for,  in the eyes of the law,  the mayor is, not he,  but the vice-mayor  acting  as mayor-  In short, said order oust the mayor, for  the time being,  from physical  possession  of. the  office,  thus resulting  in its  "temporary  vacancy" (Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra), which is actually filled by  the vice-mayor acting as mayor, in compliance with section 2195  of the  Revised Administrative Code. The suspended mayor merely, hold the legal title to the office, and, in  this sense, only he  is in constructive  possession thereof. His  condition  is comparable  to the  holder  of the naked title to a property, the  usufruct of which  is vested in another, who  is in the  material possession and enjoyment  of said property.  The latter is physically  occupied .by the  usufructuary, in the same manner  as petitioner is "actually holding" the office  of mayor,  unlike the suspended mayor who, though actually holding the title to the office, does not hold the office itself, except constructively, or by legal fiction.

AS ACTING MAYOR, PETITIONER RECEIVES THE COMPENSATION
FOR THE OFFICE OF MAYOR

Pursuant to section  2187  of the Revised Administrative Code,  "the mayor shall receive full salary when  absent "from the municipality" on official business "or * * *  when he is absent from his office because of  illnessy contracted through  no fault of his own,  provided the absence in the latter case does  not exceed thirty days  during, the  year *  * * ; and if during  such authorized or justified absence the  vice-mayor  * * * temporarily  discharge  the  local duties of the mayor,"  said  vice-mayor "may receive  compensation  in an  amount to  be fixed by  the council * *  * which shall not be in excess of the salary of the mayor for the  same  period." However, section 2192 provides that "a municipal officer  suspended from duty pending  an investigation of  charges against him shall receive no pay during such suspension; but upon  subsequent exoneration  or reinstatement, the  Department  Head  may order the payment of the whole or part of the  salary accruing during such   suspension."   The  vice-mayor,   acting  as mayor during the suspension of the mayor, "shall  receive compensation equivalent  to the  salary  of the mayor," (Section  2187, Revised Administrative Code.)

In line  with a practice established as early as  1916- when, the first  Administrative Code was adopted-and followed,  then, by the Department of the Interior,  now, by the Division  of  Local  Governments  in  the Office of the  President,  as well as by the  Department  of Finance and the Office of the Auditor General (before,  the  Insular Auditor),  said compensation of the vice-mayor,  acting as mayor, in lieu of the  suspended mayor,  is paid from the appropriation for salary of the mayor. Should, the suspended mayor be eventually exonerated or reinstated with pay, as provided  in  section 2192, the municipal council approves a new appropriation therefor, the original appropriation for salary of the mayor having been applied to the payment of the emoluments of the acting mayor.

The distinction between the case  of  a mayor. who is absent on  official  business or is sick, without his  fault, for not more  than 1 month a year,  and the mayor who is suspended,  as regards the right to compensation-for both the mayor  and the vice-mayor acting in his place and the appropriation from which payment shall  be  made, constitutes another tangible and significant evidence that, when the mayor is suspended, the vice-mayor,  who discharges the duties  of the  mayor, is  regarded by law  as the actual holder of the office of mayor. This conclusion becomes even  more imperative when we  consider that,  by explicit  legal  provision, said  vice-mayor may no longer receive his 'per diems as vice-mayor, for attendance of the sessions of the  council  (section  2187, Revised  Administrative Code.)  Thus, during his incumbency as "acting mayor", by which name he comes to be known, he is more a mayor than  a vice-mayor.

In the case  of Rodriguez vs. Tan (48  Off. Gaz., 3380), the petitioner in  an election protest,  for the  office  of Senator, who  won  said protest,  Was not allowed to  recover the salary collected by the defeated protestee during the period of  his  incumbency, despite the fact  that the latter had actually held  office merely as a de facto officer. , Surely, petitioner  herein, who had, not  only the  right, but, also, the duty, to act as mayor, even if temporarily, has a better status than a de facto, officer and,  like the latter, at least, must be considered legally as. the actual . holder of the office  of mayor.

THE SUSPENDED MAYOR DOES NOT "ACTUALLY."  HOLD
THE  OFFICE OF MAYOR

As already  adverted  to, when a mayor is suspended his office becomes temporarily vacant  (Laxamana vs. Baltazar, supra,; section 2195, Revised  Administrative Code; Section 21 [a], Republic Act No. 180).  This fact is absolutely inconsistent with the theory that he actually holds the office of mayor, during the period of  suspension.

Moreover,  said  mayor may be "reinstated" in office (section 2192, Revised Administrative Code)., This means necessarily that, during  said suspension, the,mayor does not actually hold his  office, for reinstatement is  restoration  to  a  possession  formerly . enjoyed,  and  thereafter lost.  Such, loss of. actual  possession  is  total. The suspended mayor retains nothing  but the naked title he is completely  stripped of  the beneficial enjoyment  of  the powers appurtenant to the office.  The forfeiture,  though temporary, of the official attributes save as to  the naked title is  such that the  suspension ipso  facto  deprives the. mayor  even of the  right to compensation.   (Section 2192,  Revised Administrative Code).  What is  more,  the emoluments attached to his  office become due, by operation of law  (section 2187,  do. do.), to the vice-mayor .acting as .mayor.

THE LEGISLATIVE  INTENT

It  is urged that the phrase "actually  holding",  in section  27  of Republic Act No.  180,  was  meant to refer only to "permanent"  incumbents and does  not apply  to those  holding office in a temporary character. We  cannot accept this view, for the following reasons, to wit:

1.  The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to any elective local official who  run?' for an  office he  actually holds.  It  does not qualify the nature of said possession,  so long as, it  is "actual".  It is irrelevant,  therefore whether the office is  held temporarily or permanently.
   
   
2. One of  the  purposes of Congress, it is claimed, in providing that the filing of the certificate of candidacy shall  not operate as a resignation, when  a local elective officer runs for  an office  he is  actually holding, is that:

"By  continuing in office  the office holder allowed and expected' to use the prerogatives authority and influence of his office in  his campaign for his election or re-election to, the office he was holding.

It is  obvious,  however, that as the one vested by law with the authority to exercise the powers and  discharge the duties of the  mayor petitioner is  the person  who could carry  out said alleged intent of  the law-maker. Upon the other  hand, the, suspended mayor  could not be so, even if he wanted to, for his suspension prevents him from  availing himself,  during the election campaign, of the authority, influence  and prerogatives of the office of mayor.

3. Admittedly, if the acting mayor had been  appointed by the President, the filing of his certificate  of  candidacy for the  office of mayor would not operate as a resignation from  said  office.  Said presidential  appointee could have received, however, either a  regular or permanent appointment, or a designation  or temporary appointment.  We are unable to find any valid and sufficient reason and none  has been offered in  the  majority opinion why a discrimination should be  made in favor of the  person so given,  by the Executive, a temporary appointment and against  one, like petitioner herein, chosen by the  law itself, from which the Chief Magistrate of the land derives his power to make said appointment.
   
   
4. The, last paragraph of section  2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666, the former election law, reads as follows:
   

"Any elective provincial, municipal, or  city  official  running for an office, other than the one for "which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of  his certificate of candidacy."

This  provision was amended  by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, which eliminated the clause  "other than the one for which he has been last elected", and substituted, in lieu  thereof,  the words  "other than the  one  which he is actually holding".  Explaining the purpose of the amendment, in reply  to criticisms made  by members of the Senate who belonged to  the then minority party, Senator Tirona,  Chairman of  the  Committee  sponsoring  the measure  on the  floor  of  the Senate and, in, effect,  majority spokesman in relation  thereto, had the following to say:

"Precisamento, por el hecho. de  que  una gran mayoria de los gobernadores provincialos, miembros de la Junta Provincial, alcaldes, vice  alcaldes y concejales municipales, son de nombramiento, queda justifieada la disposicion del articulo 27,  porque si  se  aplicara  a esos  funcionarios la prohibicion de que no pueden ser candidatos a los Carlos que ocupan a  menos que damitan, se produciria un grave des harajuste que podria  perjudicar la administration de los asuntos pro vinciales y municipales. Por que?  Porque el cambio de todos esos funcionarios provinciales no. se podiia hacer facilmente, Daria lugar a muchos conflictos de grupos o  facciones; a una, infinidad  de  cuestiones." Congressional record of  the 1st Congress of the Republic, Vol.  II, p.  108).. (Italics supplied.)

It is apparent, from the foregoing, that the amendment merely sought to minimize the number of vacancies resulting from the filing of certificate of  candidacy by persons holding local elective offices.   The reason was  both administrative and political.   Administrative, because too many vacancies, it was feared, would gravely disrupt the administration of local  governments..  Political, because every vacancy would create the difficult problem, of filing the  same precisely on  the eve of elections.  Indeed, each vacancy is more likely to lead to political discontent than to political expediency, considering  that, for every appointment  to' fill  a vacancy, there  would  generally be several disappointed  and  disillusioned candidates therefor,  who might, as a consequence work against the administration;

5. The journals of Congress contain  ample evidence  of the  fact  that,, when  section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 666 was  amended by section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, the  members of both  Houses knew that there  existed  a sizeable number of local officials holding elective positions by  virtue  of presidential appointments,  some  of which were  temporary, in nature.  Yet,  Congress approved the amendment with  the understanding  that it would apply equally to the permanent and the temporary appointees of the executive branch.  Obviously, therefore, the phrase "actually holding", in said section 27, does not refer solely to "permanent" officers.
   
   
6. Although the aforementioned amendment was bitterly criticized by the minority members of Congress, by reason of its favorable effects upon  said presidential  appointees and upon the  political party then in power,. nothing was said in the course of the deliberations of the  lawmaking body, to  indicate, even if remotely, the intent  to exclude, from the benefits of said amendment,  those who may  be actually holding local elective offices by operation of law. Said journals are absolutely silent on this point.
   
   
7. It is argued for the respondents that section 27 contemplates an office from  which its incumbent could resign, and that  it could not apply,  therefore, to the'  office  of mayor, which  petitioner  claims to  hold  actually,  for,  as vice-mayor acting as  mayor  during  the   suspension  of the mayor, said petitioner  cannot resign from the office of  mayor. Let us  examine carefully said section  27, which,  for convenience,  we reproduce  once  more.
   

"An  elective provincial, municipal, or city official  running' for an office, other than the  one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the  moment of the filing of his  certificate of candidacy."

It will be noted that  the word "office"  is twice used therein; firstly, in the expression "running  for an office, other than the one which  he is actually holding;" and, secondly in the clause "shall be' considered resigned from his office."  Obviously, the latter  refers to  an office from which it is possible to  resign.  Does the former allude  to an  analoguos  situation?   We  do  not  think so,  for the "office" first mentioned is the one  for which  the candidate is running. Moreover, it  specifically refers to an  office "other than the one which he is actually holding."   Even if the office actually held by  the  candidate were  one he could give up by resignation, he could  not possibly do  .so as to the "other" office,  for which he  seeks the popular mandate,  because he does not hold that office as  yet.

Must  the office  he is "actually  holding" be one from which he could resign,  if he so desired?  One can resign from an office to which he had  been duly elected  or appointed.  If such were the office contemplated in section 127, the  same would have  used only the word  "holding," ' without  the qualification  "actually," it  being clear particularly to the members  of Congress, most of  whom are lawyers that an office may be held materially by one who has not been elected or appointed thereto, such as the ease of a vice-mayor  acting  as  mayor, in compliance with Article 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code,., in view of the suspension of the mayor.

The situation visualized in section 27 would be more apparent had  petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of provincial  governor.  This  being other than the offices he is actually holding those of vice-mayor and mayor-he would be deemed, by  operation of said section 27, resigned from "Ms" office, namely that of vice-mayor. Having thus relinquished this office, we would, necessarily, have no more authority  to  act as mayor.  In other words, the office he is "actually holding" need not be necessarily his office, and this is not unusual  under the Law on Public Office.  Otherwise,  the word "actually" would be not only unnecessary, but inconsistent with the alleged purpose of the law.

8. It is. next  said that,  in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, "Congress contemplated only one office  actually, held."  This view is based upon the clause "an office other than the one  which is  based  upon  the  clause  "an office other than the one which  he  is actually  holding," in said provision, with  emphasis   on  the phrase  "the  one".  It will be recalled that said clause is only an amendment of the last paragraph  of section 2 of Commonwealth  Act No. 666, reading:

"Any  elective provincial,  municipal, or  city  official running for an office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from  MS office from the  moment of tie filing 01 his certificate of candidacy."   (Italics supplied.)

In other words,  the  word  "one" was  not inserted, by 1 Republic Act No.  180.  It was part of said section 2 of Commonwealth Act.No. 666, which referred to an elective local official "running for an office other than the one for which  he has  been lastly  elected."  Since, normally,  a person is elected to only one office, it was only natural for said section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 to use the word "one".  But,  let us suppose  that, during the effectivity of Commonwealth Act  No. 666, a law was passed permitting an individual to  run for, and  hold, two offices, say, for instance,  the  positions of municipal mayor  and member of the provincial board,  and that while holding both elective offices, the incumbent should, in a subsequent election, file  his certificate of candidacy for  municipal mayor only, would he not be  entitled to continue in office, as mayor  and  as  member of  the provincial board,  despite the fact that he is not running for the  last office?  Obviously, the word  "one" was  used  in  Commonwealth  Act No. 666 (section 2) merely because it assumed that, the person concerned had been elected only to one office.  This did not mean, however, that  one  legally elected  to, and holding, two elective offices,  Was sought to be excluded from the benefits of said enactment.

Similarly, section 27 of Republic Act No." 180  assumes- in line  with the ordinary course of events. that one discharging the duties of a given office does not hold  any other office, without implying  necessarily, that,  otherwise, he would be denied the  benefits  of said provision.  As pointed  out in the  preceding  pages,  the  purpose of said provision was to permit an  incumbent to remain in office if he  did not seek  to change  the status quo, such as the case of  petitioner herein.

EXAMPLES ANALYZED

Several examples  have been given to illustrate the  alleged validity of respondents' pretense.   Let us  analyze said examples:

The  first  is,  substantially, as  follows:  A vice-mayor, while acting  as  mayor, filed  his certificate  of  candidacy for vice-mayor.  Thereupon,  the  provincial  governor, alleging that said  candidate is  actually holding the office of mayor and that  he is not running for such  office, asked him  to vacate  it.  After  giving up, reluctantly,  the office of mayor, the  vice-mayor,  asserts  that lie  actually holds the office of vice-mayor; that, since he is running for re-election therefor, he is not deemed resigned as vice-mayor; and  that,  as vice-mayor,  he  is entitled to  act  as mayor. Then, the assertion is made that "this possible, undesirable and  anomalous  situation  is another: reason  why; section 27  may  not be applied  to  "the  case of  a vice-mayor, .acting as mayor."  But,  why should this  situation  be undesirable  or anomalous?   Is it  not merely  a  natural and  logical consequence of the fact that section 2185 of the Revised  Administrative Code  requires the vice-mayor, in the event therein contemplated,  to hold,  at  the same time, two offices, namely, the office of vice-mayor and that of mayor?. Is the holder  of such offices not bound to discharge the duties  of both?  Is he, as a consequence,  not entitled,  logically  and by law, to  all the privileges and prerogatives attached to said offices?  Is the  right to run for election  to  an office  actually  held,  without  resigning therefrom, not one of such privileges  or  prerogatives ? I  Is it not only fair, just and reasonable that  the  increased responsibilities of the  vice-mayor, acting  as mayor, be coupled  with  a  corresponding increase  in  his powers, exemptions and  immunities?

The second example is couched in the following language;

"The regular incumbent  Mayor files his certificate of candidacy for the same  office of Mayor.  Then lie goes on leave  of  absence" or falls sick and, the Vice-Mayor  acts  in his place, and while  thus acting he also files his certificate of candidacy  for the  same office of Mayor.  Then the Vice-Mayor also goes on  leave or fails sick or is suspended, and because the regular Mayor is  still unable  to return  to office,  under section 2195 of the  Revised  Administrative T Code, the councilor who at the last general elections received the highest number of votes, acts as Mayor and while  thus acting he *" . also  files  his certificate of  candidacy for the office  of Mayor.  The Vice-Mayor also campaigns for the same post  of  Mayor claiming like the herein  petitioner that he did not lose his office  of Vice- Mayor because  he filed  his certificate,  of  candidacy  while acting as Mayor and thus was actually holding  the office of Mayor. Using the  same  argument the councilor  -who had previously acted as Mayor also campaigns  for his election to' the same post of Mayor while keeping his  position' as councilor. Thus we would have this singular  situation  of  three  municipal  officials  occupying  three separate and distinct offices,  running for the same office of Mayor, yet keeping their  different respective  offices, and strangel enough two  of those offices (Vice-Mayor and Councilor)  are different from the office of Mayor they are running for.  Could that situation have been contemplated  by the Legislature in  enacting section 2 the Revised Election Code?  We do not think so, and yet that would happen if  the contention of the  petitioner about' the meaning of "actually holding office" is to prevail."   (pp. 14-16.)

The example is most ingenious,  but, to our mind,  not in point.   In  order  that the mayor, the  vice-mayor and the  municipal  councilor alluded to  could run  for  mayor, without resigning from their respective offices,  pursuant to section 27 of  Republic Act No. 180, it would be necessary that each be "actually holding" the office of mayor. Inasmuch,  however,  as "actual holding" is equivalent  to material or physical  possession, and "possession as  a fact cannot be  recognized  at  the  same  time in two  different personalities,  except in  cases of co-possession"  (Article. 538,  Code  of  Civil Procedure) it  follows  that it  would be necessary to  determine which one, among the officers involved  in the  example, is "actually holding" the office of mayor, and  that the person declared to  be in  physical possession of. such office should be the only one not deemed to have resigned in  consequence of the filing of his certificate of candidacy for mayor.  Although  not indispensable for the determination of  the  case at bar, it  would seem that  said privilege  belongs solely to the officer in fact  discharging  the  duties  of the office of mayor, at the time of the expiration of the statutory period for the filing of certificate of candidacy.  Indeed, until then,  the other officers could withdraw  the certificates of candidacy already filed  by them,  and file  other certificates of  candidacy for the respective offices  actually  held by them at such time, thus avoiding the implicit resignation which otherwise may result from  the. application of said section 27.

EXCEPTIONS  MUST BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY

The rule  of statutory construction to  the  effect that exceptions must  be strictly construed, has been  invoked ¦in favor  of respondents herein.  It  is  claimed that,  as a matter  of  general rule, a local elective official who runs for an elective office is, pursuant to section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, deemed to have resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy; that such rule does not  apply, when he runs for an office other than  the one he is actually holding; and that, this is the exception which should be construed strictly.

The argument is logical, but  its  major  premise  is predicated upon the  assumption  that  said  section 27  establishes  the general rule.  We  believe,  otherwise.  To  our mind,  the general rule is  that  an elective official shall remain in  office  for  the  full  term  for  which  he was elected, although  he may have  filed a certificate of candidacy.  The exception is that he shall be  deemed' to have resigned from his office, from the time of the filing of said certificate of candidacy, if (1)  he is a provincial, municipal or city official, and (2)  the office  for which  he runs is other than the one he is actually holding. if he runs for the office  he is actually holding,  the general rule applies he shall not be deemed to  have resigned  from his office. In other words, the provision implying a resignation from the filing of the  certificate  of candidacy in the exception, which should be construed strictly.

This interpretation  is demanded,  not  merely by  the fact that Republic Act  No.' 180 is- a part of our  law on Public Officers, and should be construed jointly with the latter, but,  also, by the fundamental principles underlying the  democratic system of  government established  in the Philippines.   Indeed,  petition was chosen by the  direct vote of the  people, in whom sovereignty resides.  Upon the other hand, Republic Act  No. 180 was passed not by the people themselves, but by their representatives.  The people elected petitioner  herein for a  term  ending on December  31,  1955.  In  the  absence of  clear, positive and  unequivocal provision of law to the  contrary,  the member  of Congress, as  agents of  the people,  must be presumed to have intended to respect said direct mandate of their principal.

In the case of a vice-mayor acting as mayor,1 who runs for mayor, the intention  of  Congress to oust him from both offices is far from being patent or incontestible.  In fact, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in section 27 of Republic Act No. 180, in relation to sections 2187,  2192 and 2195' of the Revised Administrative Code, connotes that petitioner is  actually holding the office of mayor,  for which he ran at the last general elections, and that, accordingly, he shall not be deemed to have resigned upon the filing of  his certificate  of candidacy  for said office.  Indeed, it is admitted, in  the  majority opinion,  that the  letter of said section  27 favors  petitioner herein said opinion states that,  literally, petitioner is actually  holding the  office  of mayor.   At  any  rate,  the factors analyzed in the foregoing  pages, the very efforts exerted in  said opinion to bolster up the  stand therein taken  and the conflicting views  among  the members of this  Court, who are almost equally divided  on the issue under  consideration, eloquently demonstrate that the law upon which respondents  rely is, at  least,  not free from ambiguities or  doubts.  Hence,  the  same  should be  resolved in favor of petitioner's continuance in  office,  for the full term for which he was elected.

THE ACTUAL HOLDER OF  AW  OFFICE HAS PRESUMPTIVELY 
A BETTER RIGHT THERETO

Although a public office is not  property, in  the strict setise of the word, the right to  a  given  person to hold a particular  office partakes of the  nature of a property, in that he  cannot be  deprived of  such  right  without due process of law, (42 Am. 886-888;  State vs. Wadhams, 67 N.W. 64, 64 Minn. 318, 324; Christy vs. Kingfisher, 76 P. 135, 1375, 13 Okl. 585; Hamilton vs. Brennan.  119 N.Y.S. 2d 83 [20 Gen.  Digest p. 864]);  11 O.S.  1951 Su 572 Laison  vs. Bunch,  225 P.  2d.  486 (21 Gen,  Digest p. 348) 1953; Emerson vs.  Hughes, 90 A. 2d. 910, 117 Vt. 270 [19  Gen. Digest p. 287] 1953;  Hanchey vs. State ex rel  Roberts 52  So 2d. 429  [15 Gen.  Digest p.  369, 1952]).

A person actually holding an office, pursuant to law, is, therefore, in a condition analogous to one in physical possession of a  property, under claim of  ownership.  Pursuant to  Article 541 of the  Civil Code of the 'Philippines, such "possessor  in the concept of  owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged  to show or prove it." He who wishes to  recover  the property  from  its  possessor as owner must prove,  therefore,  a better  title thereto.  Similarly, the actual holder of an office, under color of  title, like petitioner  herein, must be respected and protected, in the enjoyment  of said  possession,  unless the party seeking  to eject him therefrom shall  establish satisfactorily that said title is defective and that his (claimant's) is the legitimate and stronger title.  In other words, doubts must be resolved,in favor  of the actual holder of the office.

At any rate, to our mind,  the law is patently in favor of petitioner herein.   When  he  filed his certificate  of candidacy for the  office of mayor of San Juan  del Monte, Rizal, he was  actually discharging  the duties and  exercising the powers of  said  office.  The public and the very Government,  as well as the  law (section 2187,  Revised Administrative Code), regarded him as  the acting mayor of said  municipality. He  received the  emoluments appurtenant to the office. He had all of the responsibilities attached thereto, including the civil and criminal liabilities which would accrue to the' regularly elected mayor, in case of nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in office.

Upon the other hand, having been suspended as mayor , of San Juan del Monte, Engracio Santos was  stripped of his functions as such, he1 could not, and did not, discharge the  same.  He was not  entitled  to  collect the compensation corresponding to said office,  which compensation  was paid to herein petitioner.  In other  words, the latter  was literally and  legally  in actual  physical possession of the office of mayor.

Moreover, the language of section 27 of  Republic  Act No.  180 is too  plain, simple and clear to  admit of construction.   It is well  settled that "where the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of the statute there can be no question as to the  meaning, there is no room for construction."   (People ex rel. Wood vs. Sands, 102  Cal. 12,' 36 Pac.  404.)

Again,  in ordinary, as  well as  in  legal,' parlance, to hold actually an office  is to have physical or legal  possession thereof, to occupy the office  in fact or really, as  distinguished from, or opposed, to its  presumptive or constructive possession.   To declare, therefore, that Engracio Santos who does not, and cannot, perform  the functions of mayor of San Juan del Monte not petitioner herein' who actually,  really,   materially and in fact discharges the same is the persons "actually holding" said office, does not amount merely to a construction, of the meaning of "actually,  holding",  but  to  giving  thereto   its  opposite meaning,  its  exact antithesis.  With due  respect, to  the. learned view  of our  distinguished colleagues to  the contrary, we do not feel that judicial power may go that far, consistently with the principle of separation  of powers.

Wherefore,  we  are  of the  opinion  that  the  petition should be  granted and that  the  writ  of preliminary injunction,  issued upon the institution of this  case,  should be made permanent.