This  is  a petition for a review of a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals under section  18,  Republic Act No. 1125, affirming  the assessment  made by the  Collector of Internal Revenue  and ordering the petitioner to pay the sum of P2,938.20  as deficiency  sales tax imposed  by section  186,  as amended by Republic Acts Nos.  588, 594 and 894, of the National Internal Revenue  Code and surcharge  for the  period from 1949  to 1953  inclusive. The facts are not disputed.  As found by the Court  of Tax Appeals

This is an appeal  from the decision of the  respondent Collector of Internal  Revenue  assessing and demanding  from the petitioner the payment of the  sum of P2,938.20 as  deficiency  sales  tax and surcharge, and the additional sum of P250.00  in extra-judicial settlement of his  penal liability  for  violation  of  the provisions of the National Internal  Revenue  Code, or a total of P3,188.20.

 It appears  that petitioner  Lim  Tiong  owns and  operates the Manila Lumber which is provided with C-13 privilege tax receipt for buying  and selling  logs and lumber,  and  C-14  privilege tax receipt for  buying logs  intended to be  sold  after  having  been cut into standard sizes of  lumber.  The petitioner,  not  being  an owner  of  a sawmill, merely buys logs and have  them processed into lumber of various  sizes by  the Oriental Sawmill, Pio Barretto & Sons and other  sawmills in  Manila.   He then pays the sawmill owners  for their  services rendered  computed  on  the  number  of board  feet cut and/or  sawn.  (Memorandum  for  the Petitioner, p. 1;  Stipulation of  Facts, par. 2.)

Prior to September 22, 1950,  the  date when Republic Act No. 588 took effect, the  petitioner had  been paying 5 per cent sales tax on the gross  selling  price  of the lumber  after deducting the cost of the logs.  After the date just mentioned, the petitioner continued  to pay the 5  per cent sales tax but computed on the 33 1/3 % of  the gross cost of logs purchased and1 from which said lumber were processed,  pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 186 of the  National Internal Revenue  Code,  as  amended by Republic Acts  Nos. 588, 594  and 894.

On  May 21, 1954,  the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue issued  an  assessment and demand against the  petitioner requiring the payment of the  sum of P2,938.20 as deficiency sales tax and surcharge  covering the  period from  1949 to 1953,  inclusive, plus the additional amount of P250.00 in extrajudicial settlement of his penal  liability.  The said deficiency assessment which is the subject of  the  present appeal,  was computed  by  the  respondent on  the basis of 5% sales  tax  on the gross  sales of lumber less the cost of  the  logs converted  into such lumber in accordance with  the first paragraph of  Section 186 of the Tax Code, as amended.  The petitioner admits the correctness and accuracy of the figures in the deficiency  assessment but questions the basis  on which  the said assessment was computed.

The only question  at  issue  in this case is the determination  of whether or not the  petitioner is "an  operator of a  sawmill"  in order  that  he can  take advantage of the provisions of the  second paragraph  of section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code with respect to the payment of the  5% sales tax on  the lumber he  is  selling.

The petitioner contends that he is an operator of a sawmill or at least one  by fiction of law, as  according to him a sawmill  is a  factory  or manufacturing  establishment where logs are cut, sawn and converted into lumber of  different  sizes, and  as  in the  payment  of  sales tax he  is considered a manufacturer of lumber under section 186 of the National  Internal Revenue Code, he must be deemed also to be an operator of  a sawmill, for one cannot be a manufacturer of lumber without being an operator of a sawmill.  The  Court held:

* * * the records clearly show that  he does not  own or operate one, nor did he, at one time or another, ever enter into a contract of  lease of a sawmill.  No iota of evidence was presented to show that during the period in question, the petitioner was in possession of, or at  least had something  to do with  the running  of any sawmill.   He merely hired  the services of  operators  and owners of  sawmills on piece of work basis, and paid them for their work rendered computed on the number of  board  feet cut and/or sawn.

* * * It is  our considered opinion  that the term "operators of sawmills"  as used in section  186 of the National Internal  Revenue Code refers only to those who  actually supervise,  manage  and control the operation of  sawmills.  In the instant  case, the petitioner has no  say whatsoever in  the  management  and operation of  any  sawmill and we  hold that he is  not  an  operator  of  a sawmill.

Moreover, the petitioner does  not possess the necessary permit from the Director  of Forestry for the operation of a sawmill which is required by Republic  Act No. 460. To our mind, this  is  a clear index that the petitioner is in reality not an  operator of  a sawmill  which  he  pretends to be, and bolsters our  conclusion that he  should  pay  the percentage sales tax under the first paragraph of  Section  186 of  the National  Internal Revenue  Code.

There  is no reason which would justify a contrary pronouncement.

The petitioner claims that the judgment under review if not reversed  would violate the rule of uniformity in taxation ordained by the  Constitution,  because  there would be  original  sales of sawn  lumber manufactured  out of purchased  logs  taxed  on their  gross  selling  price  less the cost of logs purchased and original sales of the same sawn lumber taxed  on the 33 1/3%  of  the gross cost of logs purchased  and  intended for manufacture.  Section 186, as amended,  of the National Internal Revenue  Code makes a  distinction between the  basis  of the tax on original sales of forest products payable by the manufacturer or  producer and that on original sales payable  by operators and proprietors of sawmills who  buy logs for the purpose of sawing  and/or  cutting  them into lumber of standard sizes.   Within  each class  there is  uniformity of  taxation.   Hence the constitutional  mandate on uniformity of taxation  is not  infringed upon. Republic Act No.  460 requires operators of sawmills to obtain  from  the  Director of Forestry  permits for  the operation of such sawmills.   The reason why the petitioner did not secure any  permit  was because he  did not and does  not operate a  sawmill.

The  judgment  under  review is  affirmed,  with  costs against the petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,  Labrador,  Concepcion, Reyes,  J. B. L., and  Endencia, JJ., concur.