On July 16, 1958, appellant entered his appearance as counsel for the accused in Criminal Case No. 44304 pending in  the  Court of First Instance  of Manila.  On July 23,  1958, appellant received copy of a notice setting the hearing of the case on  August  5,  1958.  On the  same date he received copy of said notice, he filed a motion for transfer for the reason that on August 5 and 6, 1958 he will appear as counsel for the accused in a criminal case for  robbery  in band pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon attesting to the fact that appellant did upon agreement  made  between the prosecution and the defense on June  6, 1958,  at the same time praying that the hearing be set on August 4 or 11, 1958 if the calendar of the  court would so  permit. This motion was denied on  July 24,  1958  of which  appellant  was notified  on July 29, 1958.

Upon  being notified  of this denial, appellant filed  a motion  to  withdraw his  appearance as  counsel for  the accused for the reason that  he could  not attend  to the hearing of the case set for August 5, 1958 on account of his previous commitment with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, furnishing a copy of his motion to the accused. On August  1,  1958, the accused filed a motion for postponement giving  as ground  the  withdrawal  of his attorney,  but the court denied both  the motion  of appellant to withdraw and the motion  of the accused  to  postpone the hearing,  and on August 5, 1958, it  issued an  order citing appellant to appear to show  cause why he  should not be punished for contempt for his failure to appear at the hearing of the case set on said date.  Appellant appeared before  the court as ordered, and  by way  of explanation  he reiterated what  he  had  already advanced before to the effect that his failure was due to his appearance as counsel for the  accused  at the  hearing of  the criminal case pending before the Court of  First  Instance of Quezon  which  was set long prior to the hearing  of the present case.  This explanation not having been found satisfactory,  the court declared  appellant guilty of contempt and imposed upon him a  fine of F25.  Hence this appeal.

It  appears that when appellant  received on  July 23, 1953  the notice setting the hearing of the instant case on August 5, 1958, he filed on  the same date a  motion for postponement  giving as reason  the fact that on that same date of August 5, 1958 he will  appear as counsel for the accused in the case of robbery in band pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the hearing of which was set upon agreement made between the prosecution and  the defense in open court on June 6, 1958. It likewise appears that this  agreement took place much prior to the institution of the  instant case and even before appellant entered his appearance as counsel for the accused, and these facts appear undisputed for at the hearing of the motion citing  appellant for contempt  he submitted a certification  of the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Quezon attesting to the fact that appellant did in fact appear  as counsel for the  accused  on August 5 and 6, 1958  in the case pending before that court.  And to show that appellant moved to postpone  the  hearing not for purposes of delay but for a justifiable reason,  he asked" that the hearing be postponed to August  4 or 11, 1958, which  is one day before or several days after the date  set for that  purpose by the  trial court.  But notwithstanding this  explanation, appellant was found  guilty and was convicted.  He now comes  to this Court alleging that the trial court committed  a grave abuse of  discretion. While it is a settled doctrine that a motion to  postpone is not a matter  of right (Linis vs. Rovira, 61 Phil., 137; Parina  vs. Cabangbang, G. R.  No. L-8398,  March 21, 1956), but a matter  that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (Dimayuga vs. Dimayuga, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 2397;  Bautista vs. The Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, et al., 98 Phil., 409), there are however cases where the granting of the motion becomes imperative to afford substantial justice.  As this Court has aptly said: "While the granting or refusal of motions for continuance is discretionary, that discretion must be exercised wisely with a view to substantial justice"  (Capitol  Subdivision vs. Province of Negros Occidental, 99  Phil.,  633).  The discretion should be exercised in the light of the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case.

In the instant case, appellant appears to  have the  law on his side; and to show this suffice it to quote what the Solicitor General  says on  the matter:  "He  deserved  a more sympathetic understanding of  his  plight than  he was able  to  secure  from  the  lower court,  zealous as  it was undoubtedly for  a speedy trial of the principal case. When appellant committed  himself to a trial  for August 5  and 6, 1958  at  Lucena, Quezon  in  People of  the Philippines vs. Juan Masaes for Robbery  in Band, the agreement was made in open  court on June 6,  1958 between the  prosecution and  the  defense * * * at  a  time  when the case against the  herein accused Antonio  Martinez had not even been filed in court.  The instant case for grave threats  was only  filed on June 12, 1958 and  the  appellant filed his appearance  herein on July  16,  1958 when  the hearing at the Court of First Instance  of Quezon had already been  calendared.   Under  the circumstances, he immediately filed on  July  23,  1958 a motion  to transfer the date of the hearing  for  grave threats  to August  4 or 11, 1958.   The fact alone that appellant was willing to go to trial on August 4, one day before the actual date selected by the lower  court in the grave  threats case is convincing proof that appellant's motion for  postponement was  not dilatory, but a solution to his predicament, considering his commitment at the Quezon court."  We fully agree to this comment.

The Elks Club vs. The United Laborers and Employees of the Elks Club

The order appealed from declaring appellant guilty of contempt is set  aside, with costs de oficio.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia,  JJ., concur.