This  is an appeal from the judgment in Criminal  Case Nos.  1171 and 1172 of the Court of First Instance  of Quezon, wherein appellant Melquiades Gorospe was found guilty of murder and  sentenced in each to "suffer cadena perpetua, with the accessory penalties  of the law,  to indemnify the  respective  heirs  of Leon Padchanan and Melecio Guillen in  the amount of P6,000.00  in each case, and to pay the costs."   These two cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties, as the facts and circumstances. surrounding both are intimately connected and interrelated.

Five witnesses testified  for  the prosecution,  namely, Eduardo Paladio, Elpidio de la Torre,  David Valenzuela, Bernabe Andres and  Lucia Andres,  and established  the following facts:

Bernabe Andres, a middle-age fisherman of 50,  has two daughters,  Irene and Lucia. They married  Melecio Guillen and  Leon  Padchanan, respectively.  Guillen was  the barrio lieutenant of Sabili, municipality of Baler,  Quezon, while Padchanan belonged to the Easy Company, 2nd BCT, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,  both now deceased.

On the evening of June 10, 1953, between eight and nine o'clock, Bernabe Andres and his son-in-law Leon  Padchanan, then on a furlough, left their house in the  sitio of Sabang, to attend a dance at the house  of Andres  Queblar in the barrio of Sabili.  On their way thereto, they passed by the house of Melecio Guillen, the other  son-in-law of Bernabe Andres, to take him  along with  them. While Bernabe Andres  and  Padchanan were  in Guillen's house, a  certain Matilde Aganad arrived and reported to Guillen that Melquiades Gorospe, appellant herein, was having a quarrel with his nephew Bonifacio Gorospe  at the latter's house.  Conscious of his duty as barrio  lieutenant, Guillen repaired to the place  of Bonifacio Gorospe, accompanied by Padchanan  and their father-in-law Bernabe  Andres. Once there, Guillen called Bonifacio who in turn invited them to come  up.  Guillen  and Padchanan  obliged, while their father-in-law remained downstairs about  two  or three meters from the balcony.  The stairs of Bonifacio's house lead  directly  to  a corridor which runs toward the kitchen where there is another  staircase.  The balcony which consists merely  of a protruding extension of the flooring, unenclosed by any walling or railing and measuring around 1 x 1-1/2 meters, is just on the  lateral left side of the stairs, and about a meter high from  the ground, where one  can easily  go  without  ascending the stairs. Guillen and  Padchanan  squatted  side by side near each other on the balcony, facing the lateral side of the stairs and with their backs toward the  open space, while Bonifacio  squatted at  the  head of the  stairs,  facing  them. While the trio were talking, appellant Melquiades Gorospe suddenly appeared  in the balcony behind Guillen and Padchanan, and  without  any ado stabbed Padchanan on the right breast with a small bolo Exhibit A.   As Guillen was about to turn, appellant held him by the head and stabbed him first on  the left  forearm and then on the left chest, the bolo penetrating the lung, appellant saying at the same time  "I  will kill all of you."  Taken  by  surprise, Guillen and Padchanan ran away in  different directions, but expired in their flight.  Their father-in-law Bernabe Andres upon seeing the stabbing, ran away fearing that he might be  the next victim, and  hid himself near his house.  Appellant made his get-away along the corridor passing through  the kitchen  stairs.   While this  bloody event  was happening,  or  perhaps a little after,  Irene Andres (Guillen's wife)  called at her father's  house and asked  her sister Lucia  (Padchanan's wife)  to go  with her to Bonifacio's  house to inquire whether  their husbands were  still there.  Lucia told  Irene  to go  ahead as she would follow a little  later.  Lucia thus went to Bonifacio's house as she promised, but before she could reach the stairs,  she was met by Matilde  Aganad who told her to go  home as her infant breast-fed baby might catch cold, and that her husband Leon Padchanan was no longer in Bonifacio's house.  Lucia then started to go back home, but at this juncture she heard someone shout that there was  a dead  man in the place. It  was  only then that Matilde Aganad told her that her husband Leon Padchanan was dead.  Lucia went to the place where the voice came from,  and really  found  her husband  sprawled on  the ground, dead.  She embraced him and wept.

At about ten o'clock that same  evening,upon receiving a report, the chief of police of Baler, Elpidio de la Torre, accompanied by policemen, together with Dr. Cenon and sanitary inspector  Eduardo Paladio, went to the barrio of Sabili to make an investigation of the crime, and found the body of Padchanan, face up some forty meters from the principal stairs of Bonifacio's house, and that of Guillen about twenty  meters from the  balcony.  A handgrenade was  found inside the right pocket of  Guillen's troussers. Then the chief of police went to  the  house of Bonifacio and he found that there were bloodstains on the balcony, stairs,  and on the sleeping mat spread on the corridor. In view of the reluctance  of  the inmates of the house  to reveal how the killing happened, the chief of police brought them to the municipal building for investigation.  Among them were Bonifacio Gorospe, his sister Virginia Gorospe, some visitors of Bonifacio, and  appellant himself.  There they pointed to appellant as the killer, and the statements of Bonifacio  (Exhibit G),  visitor Hospicio Libag (Exhibit H) and of appellant himself (Exhibit F) were taken down, which were afterwards sworn to before Mayor David T. Valenzuela.  In appellant's statement Exhibit F,  he admitted having killed Guillen with the small bolo Exhibit A because he had  a grudge against Guillen since a year before when Guillen hit him with a piece  of wood on the leg for which he was  hospitalized, and  he also  admitted having killed Padchanan because he had  heard Padchanan remark earlier that evening that they would assault him.

Upon autopsy of the corpses by Dr. Cenan, assisted by sanitary inspector Eduardo Paladio, they found, with respect to Leon Padchanan

"*** * a stabbed wound with clean  cut borders and edges, measuring 1" x l/2" diameter, with the greater diameter lying perpendicular over the point 1" to the right of stenoclavicular junction right which just exactly corresponds in direction to the slit in the clothing. Probing revealed that the wound has taken an inferosposterior direction to about  4" deep.  On  opening up, there were clotted blood just beneath the fatty tissue and the clavicle at point 1"  to the right of stenoclavicular  junction was  almost completely severed  by a clean sweep of incision on the anterior aspect.  The wound has penetrated  deep into the lung tissues and almost severed the  subclavian vessel."  (Exh.  B). and with respect to Melecio Guillen

"* * * there was a  stabbed wound  with  clean cut  edges and borders measuring 2" x 1" diameter, with the greater diameter lying horizontally and exactly fit the 5th ICS left chest whose outer extremity  is in line with  MCL. Clotted blood was found beneath the edges  of  the wound. On probing the wound has taken a posteriorly direction.  On opening up the 5th rib was  slightly slashed from "beneath with separation of  small fragments toward the left, the pericardium  exposed up the left ventricle  of the heart and wound  ending posteriorly  penetrating the left lungs. The wound was  5" deep. "

There was incised wound, triangular in shape at forearm upper third,  anterior  with  apex  directed downward.  The  base is 21" and altitude is 2" with severance of upper third of superficial flexers of forearm left;  and palmaris longus muscle."  (Exhibit D).

The record discloses that appellant herein was originally indicted for this offense in Criminal  Cases Nos. 1113 and 1114 upon informations filed on  June 30, 1953, but inasmuch  as  the principal witnesses for the prosecution, particularly Bonifacio Gorospe, turned hostile by subscribing an  affidavit favorable to appellant, the Provincial Fiscal had to ask for the dismissal  of said cases,  and the court then sitting at Baler dismissed  them provisionally,  with appellant's consent, in its order of July  1st, 1954.   It was only after  such  dismissal that  witnesses Bernabe Andres who, according to the  evidence,  had  kept to himself the knowledge of the facts  and circumstances  of the killing of his two sons-in-law believing honestly that  he could not testify for the government by reason of his relationship, came to the open and subscribed an affidavit  before acting Mayor Cesario A.  Pimentel on July 2, 1954, relating how the crime was committed.   On the strength of this affidavit, assistant Provincial Fiscal Severino I. Villafranca filed the corresponding informations dated  July 6, 1954, which were docketed and now known as Criminal Cases Nos. 1171 and 1172 and asked the court for their revival.  The court, after making another preliminary investigation, revived these cases in its order of September 7, 1954, and its judgment is now appealed against.

Appellant in his defense admits having stabbed the two deceased, but alleges that he killed them in self-defense, and in support thereof he tried to show by his testimony and those of his nephew Bonifacio Gorospe and niece Virginia Gorospe that at about four o'clock in the afternoon  of June 10th,  1953, a certain Florencio Carreon who was courting Virginia was visiting her at  Bonifacio's house where she lives;  that in the course of that visit Florencio held  her hand, and her brother Bonifacio did not like Florencio's behavior, so the latter was  told to leave and never to return;  that later that afternoon while Bonifacio was in the store of Rafael Orlando, Padchanan and  Guillen arrived and asked  Bonifacio to buy drinks for  them,  so the three got drunk;  that Bonifacio went home and left Guillen and Padchanan in the store; that later that evening, at about 8:30, while the visitors in the house of Bonifacio were already lying down on the mat spread on the corridor of the house,  Guillen  and  Padchanan  arrived,  Padchanan carrying a .45 caliber  gun in his waist; that Bonifacio got the kerosene lamp  inside and put  it near the door; that in the course of the conversation among the three, Virginia was called and Guillen and  Padchanan wanted to take her with them, for her to  talk with Florencio Carreon at Guillen's house; that when Virginia refused to go with them, Guillen pulled her by  the arm,  so she screamed: "I don't want, I don't want; neighbors help;" that when appellant, whose house is  just about ten meters  from  Bonifacio's heard her screams for help, he armed  himself  with the bolo Exhibit A which  was  in its scabbard hanging on the wall, and rushed to her rescue; that upon arriving at Bonifacio's house he demanded explanation from Guillen and Padchanan, only to be told by Guillen that he should not interfere, whereupon Padchanan told Guillen to take out his handgrenade and blast the house so that all the inmates would be killed; that Guillen got his  handgrenade out and when he was about to pull  its safety pin, appellant unsheathed his bolo and stabbed Guillen;  that when Padchanan saw this, he squeezed appellant's neck, so appellant stabbed Padchanan without the latter having  a chance to draw his gun,  and that  both Guillen  and  Padchanan  ran  away; that appellant then returned to his house, but later went again to Bonifacio's place where he  met councilor Tomas Bitong whom he told that he had  just killed the two deceased; that  appellant took councilor Bitong to his house and there surrendered the bolo and its scabbard, and from there they went back to Bonifacio's house and thence appellant was conducted by the councilor to the municipal jail where his statement Exhibit F was taken by the chief of police.

After a careful scrutiny of appellant's contention, we find that he tried  to take advantage of the fact that  a handgrenade was found inside Guillen's pocket after his. death, and has  woven his defense around it, coloring the same with situations that are highly incredible and contrary to the natural  course of things and human behavior. First of all, it is hard to believe that Guillen took out his. handgrenade  and was about to pull its pin before he was stabbed by appellant, for the simple  reason that, if this were  true, then said grenade should  have exploded or at least  should have been found near the balcony  itself or at any place along his flight, and not right inside his pocket when he expired just twenty meters away from the balcony;  secondly,  were it true that Padchanan was armed with a .45 caliber gun at the time that Guillen was being stabbed, he would not, as a professional soldier, have just strangled appellant to defend his brother-in-law, but would have  conveniently used  his  pistol.   According to  Lucia  Andres, her husband Leon Padchanan  did  not carry his gun when he left for the dance but left it  with her, and this is corroborated by the testimony of  the  chief of police who stated that no gun was ever found  in the premises during  his investigation.  Thirdly, it is  hard  to  believe that Padchanan squeezed appellant's neck before he was stabbed, for according to eyewitnesses Bernabe  Andres, the first one  to be  assaulted was  Padchanan who immediately  ran and died on the way. Lastly, the defense put up by appellant is  entirely contrary  to what he  and his nephew  Bonifacio narrated  in their  statements Exhibits F and G, wherein both admitted that no conversation between appellant, on  the one  hand,  and Guillen and/or Padchanan, on  the  other,  had ever ensued,  and that the attack was made all of a sudden and  without warning; that appellant had a  grudge against Guillen since a year before by reason of Guillen's having struck appellant  with a piece  of wood, and according to appellant himself, he had to kill Padchanan because he had heard  him (Padchanan) say to Guillen while the two were passing in front of his house that evening that they would  assault him  (appellant).   Certainly it  is  more reasonable  to  believe that, with a  feeling  of revenge against Guillen and  goaded at the spur of the moment by Padchanan's threat, appellant armed  himself  with a bolo and followed them  to Bonifacio's house and there  dealt with  them before they could carry out what they,  in appellant's mind, proposed to do.

The evidence against appellant is so overwhelming  that even his counsel de officio stated  in his brief, by way  of comment, that

"After perusing the  evidence, the undersigned fully agrees with the reasons given  by the  trial court for believing the witnesses for the prosecution and discrediting appellant's defense and the testimony of his witnesses. In addition, the undersigned counsel notes that appellant narrated in the witness stand during the trial  a  story entirely  different  from what he  stated  in his confession executed before the chief of police and sworn to before the mayor immediately after the occurrence. Considering that  the  questions and answers 192 in said confession were explained and translated  from Tagalog to Ilocano and vice- versa to appellant before he was made to sign  and swore to it, and that these two officials were not shown to have  any motive or  reason for compelling appellant  to execute  a fabricated confession  appellant himself  admits  that  these  officials have no grudge against  him and therefore should  be taken to have acted regularly in the performance of their official duties in the investigation of the case, the undersigned counsel is constrained to disagree with appellant's claim that  the confession in question was executed by him without first understanding its contents. Obviously, appellant's story in the  witness  stand  can not but be an afterthought. Moreover,  in line with the  reasons given by  appellant in his said confession  for attempting against the lives of Leon  and Melecio, what  must have happened  was that appellant  really  followed  the victims that night to the house of Bonifacio  upon overhearing Leon's remarks that they (Leon and Melecio) were going to strike  at  him that same evening, and that upon overtaking them in Bonifacio's house, appellant started a  fight with the two."  (8-9, Appellant's Brief.)

The facts proven against appellant constitute the  crime of murder,  he having,  as  described  by  Bernabe Andres and supported by appellant's admission  in his  statement Exhibit  F, treacherously stabbed the  two deceased  one after the other on the night in question.

Appellant,   however,  invokes  two  mitigating  circumstances in  his  favor, namely, voluntary  surrender  and lack  of instruction or schooling  which,  according to him, the  trial  court  failed to consider.   With  respect to the first circumstance, the evidence does not  show that appellant  surrendered voluntarily; on the contrary,  according to the uncontradicted testimony  of  the  chief  of police, he had to take several persons, including appellant, to the municipal building for investigation  as  nobody  in  Bonifacio's  house  volunteered to  give information about the killing; and as regards the bolo allegedly  surrendered to councilor Bitong, the chief of police assured the court that it was only during  the course of his investigation in the municipal building that he learned that  the  said weapon was hidden in a  rice container locally known as  "buklod" in  appellant's house,  and for that  reason  he  had to  request the  councilor to  accompany one Leon Rabor  to fetch the bolo.

Regarding the second circumstance  of lack of instruction, the evidence  shows that appellant is really an  unschooled fisherman  of 50 who had only to use his thumbmark in lieu of signature, and the Solicitor-General agrees that this be considered  as mitigating circumstance in  appellant's  favor.  We do not, however,  subscribe  to this point of view, for  illiteracy  alone does not constitute  the alternative circumstance  of lack of  instruction,  for,  as we  have ruled  in  the  case  of   People vs. Ripas,  et  al., 95 Phil.,  63.

"The fact  that  Orbista thumbmarked the  document attesting to the promulgation of the decision, a sign that he did not know how to write, is not sufficient to  prove the existence of this alternative circumstance. Not illiteracy alone but also lack of sufficient intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the circumstance.  A person able to sign his name but otherwise so densely ignorant and of such low intelligence that he does not realize the full consequences of a  criminal act, may still be entitled to this mitigating circumstance. On the  other  hand, another unable to write because of lack of educational facilities or opportunities, may  yet be highly or exceptionally intelligent and mentally alert that he easily and even realizes the full significance of his acts, in which case  he may not invoke this mitigating circumstance in his favor."

Consequently, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating  circumstance present, the penalty  that should  be imposed  is  reclusion perpetua  in  accordance with the provisions  of Art. 248,  in relation to Arts.  77  and  64, paragraph  1,  of the Revised Penal Code,  and, therefore, the  decision  appealed from  which  imposes "cadena perpetua" should be accordingly modified.

Wherefore,  with the modification above  indicated,  the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs.

Paras C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes  A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes J. B. L., JJ.,  concur.