This is an  appeal by way of certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing  the  judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in civil case No.  1161,  entitled The  Inter provincial Autobus  Co.,  Inc., ,plaintiff  versus Eibiano L.  Meer as Collector  of Internal Revenue, defendant and absolving the defendant-appellant therein from  the  complaint.

Plaintiff is a common carrier engaged in transporting passenger and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga.  Sometime in the year 1941  the provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental  examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by the plaintiff.  He found  that the  stubs of the receipts issued  during  the years  1938 to 1938 were not preserved; but those for the years 1939 to  1940 were available.  By referring, however,  to the  conductors' daily reports for 1936 to 1938, he  was able to ascertain the number of receipts for those years and these, together with those for 1939 to  1940,  gave  a total during the 5-year period from 1936  to  1940, of  194,406  freight  receipts issued.  Both the said daily reports of plaintiff's conductors and the available stubs did.not  state the value of the goods transported thereunder.   Pursuant,  however,  to  sections 121  and  127  of the  Revised  Documentary  Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance promulgated on September 16, 1924, he assumed that the value of the goods covered by  each  of the  above-mentioned freight  receipts amounted to more  than. P5,  and assessed a documentary stamp tax of P0.04 on each of the 194,406  receipts.  The tax thus assessed amounted to P7,776.24, which was collected  from the  deposit of the  plaintiff in the Misamis Occidental branch of the Philippine National Bank.  Plaintiff demanded the refund  of the amount, and upon refusal of the defendant, plaintiff filed the action.  The Court of First Instance of  Misamis  Occidental having  rendered judgment.in favor of the  plaintiff, the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  This court  reversed the decision appealed from  and absolved the  defendant  from the complaint,  Hence, this appeal.

In this Court petitioner-appellant presents the following propositions: (1) that the.judgment of the Court of Appeals is  null and void, because it had no  jurisdiction of the case, which  involves" the  validity  of an assessment; (2) that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because freight receipts are not bills of lading within the meaning of Section 1449, sub-paragraph (r), of the Revised Administrative Code of  1917,  and because the provision of section 121 of  the Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations, to the effect that if the bill of lading fails to state the value  of  the goods  shipped, it must be held that the tax is due, is illegal; (3) that the documentary stamp tax on freight receipts should be paid by the shipper of the merchandise, not by the carrier; and  (4) that the collection of the tax is illegal because  it was done beyond the period of limitation fixed by law for its. collection.

The first proposition,  that the  Court of Appeals  had no  jurisdiction  of the  appeal  from the.  Court  of  First Instance, is  well founded.  Both the Constitution and the Judiciary  Act of  1948  grant to  the  Supreme Court exclusive Appellate  jurisdiction  over all  cases involving the legality  of. any tax, assessment, or toll,  or  any penalty in relation  thereto. The Court of Appeals in turn has no jurisdiction.over cases the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of which is  granted the  Supreme  Court.  As tn% legality or  validity of the tax is involved  in  the  present  appeal the Supreme Court is  the one that had jurisdiction thereof and the  Court of  Appeals had none.   The  decision of the Court of Appeals  was, therefore, null  and  void.

But the claim that  freight tickets  of bus companies are not "bills of lading or receipts"  within the meaning of the Documentary Stamp  Tax Law is without  merit.   Bills of lading, in modern jurisprudence,  are  not  those issued by masters  of vessels alone; they now comprehend  all forms of transportation,  whether by sea or land, and includes bus receipts  for cargo transported.

"The term 'bill of lading is frequently  defined, especially by the older authorities, as a writing signed by the master of a vessel acknowledging the receipt of goods  on board  to. be transported  to a certain part and  there delivered  to a  designated  person or on his order.  This definition was formulated  at a  time when  goods were principally transported  by sea and, while adequate  in view  of the  conditions existing at that early  day, is  too narrow to suit present conditions.  As  comprehending  all methods of transportation, a bill of lading may  be. defined as a  written  acknowledgment of the receipt of goods  and . an agreement to  transport and  to deliver them at a specified place  to a person named  or on his order.  Such instruments are sometimes called  'shipping receipts,' 'forwarders' receipts' and 'receipts for transportation.' The designation, however, is not material, and neither is the form of the instrument. If it contains an acknowledgment by the carrier of the receipt of goods for transportation, it is, in legal  effect,  a bill of lading."   (9  Am. Jur. 662, Italics  supplied.)

Section  227  of  the  National  Internal  Revenue Code imposes  the tax  on receipts for  goods,or  effects  shipped from one port or  place to another port  or place  in  the Philippines,   The use  of the  word place  after port  and of the word  "receipt"  shows that  the receipts for  goods shipped on  land are included.

The. next claim involves the  validity  of  Department of Finance  Regulation  No.  26  dated  September 16;  1924, which provides:

"Sec. 121. Basis  of  the tax  and affixture  of  stamps. Bills of lading are exempt  from the documentary stamp tax imposed by paragraphs (q),and (r) of section 1449 of the Administrative Code when the value of the goods shipped is P5  or  less. Unless the bill  of lading states that the goods are  worth P5 or less,  it must be held that  the tax is due,  and  internal revenue officers will see to it that the tax is paid in P11 cases where the bill  of lading  doea not state that the shipment is worth P5 or less."

"Sec. 127. 'Chits,' memorandum slips, and  other papers not in the usual commercial form of bills of lading, when used by common carriers in the  transportation  of  merchandise or goods for the collection  of fees .therefor  are' considered  as bills of lading,  and  the  ordinal thereof issued or used should  bear  the documentary stamp as provided by paragraphs (q)' and (r) of section  1449 of the Administrative Code."

The above regulations were promulgated under the  authority of section 79 (B) of the Administrative  Code, (originally section 2  of Act 2803),  which  expressly provides:

"The Department Head shall have  power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit to do  so,  all rules, regulations,  orders,  circulars, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, necessary . to regulate the  proper  working  and  harmonious   and  efficient administration of each and' all  of the offices  and dependencies of , his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the  laws  relative  to  matters under the  jurisdiction of .said Department;  but none  of said rules or , orders shall  prescribe penalties for  the  violation thereof, except  as  expressly authorized by law.* * *"

Did the Secretary of  Finance  infringe  or  violate any right of the taxpayer when he  directed that tfre tax is to be collected in all cases where the bill of lading or receipt does not state that the shipment  is worth ?5 or less, or, m the language of the petitioner-appellant, when he (Secretary) created  a presumption of liability to  the  tax if the receipt, fails to state.such value?  It can not be denied that the regulation is merely a directive to the tax officers; it does not purport to change or  modify the law; it does not  create  a  liability  to  the  stamp  tax when  the  value of the goods  does not appear on  the face of the receipt. The practical usefulness of the directive becomes evident when account is  taken of the  fact that tax officers are in no position to witness the issuance of  receipts and  check the value of the  goods for which  they are  issued.  If tax officers were to assess or collect the tax  only  when they find  that the value of the goods covered by the  receipts is more than five pesos, the  assessment  and collection of the tax would  be  well-nigh impossible, as it is impossible for tax collectors to determine from the receipts alone, if they do not contain the value of the goods, whether the  goods receipted for exceed P5, or not. The regulation impliedly required the statement of the  value  of the goods in the receipts; so that  the collection .of the  tax can be enforced. This the petitioner-appellant failed to do and he now claims the unreasonableness of the provision as, a basis for his exemption.  We find that the regulation is not only useful, practical and necessary for the enforcement of the law on the tax on bills of lading and receipts, but  also  reasonable in its provisions.

The  regulation  above quoted  falls  within the  scope of the administrative power  of the Secretary  of Finance, as authorized in Section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, because it is essential to the strict enforcement  and proper execution of the law which it seeks to implement. Said regulations  have the force and effect  of law.

"In the very nature of things in  many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide general  regulations  for tlic various, and varying details'.for the management  of a  particular  department of the  Government.  It therefore becomes .convenient for the legislative department, of the Government,  by Law, in a  most general way,  to provide for the conduct,  control and  management of the work of the particular department  of the Government;  to authorize certain  persons,  in charge of the management, control, and direction  of the particular department, to adopt certain  rules and  regulations  providing  for the detail  of the management  and control  of such  department. Such  regulations have uniformly been held to have the force  of law, whenever they are found  to be in consonance  and  in harmony with  the general  purposes  and  objects  of ' the  law.   Many  illustrations  might he  given.   For instance, the Civil  Service Board is given authority to examine  applicants' for various  positions within the Government service.  The law generally provides  the conditions in a  most general  way,  authorizing the. chief of  such Bureau  to provide rules and regulations for the management of the conduct of examinations, etc.  The law  provides that the Collector  of  Customs shall  examine persons who  become applicants to  act  as  captains of ships  for  the coast wise trade, providing at the" same time  that the Collector of Customs shall establish  rules and regulations  for such  examinations.  Such regulations, once  established  and  found to be in  conformity with  the general purposes of the law,  are  just as binding upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original law itself.  (United States  vs.  Grimaud, 22 U. S., 506;  Williamson vs. United  States, 207 U.  S., 425;  United States vs.  United  Verde Copper  Co., 196  U.  S.,  207.)"  (United States vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil, 119, 125.)

Another reason for  sustaining  the validity of the regulation may be found in the principle  of legislative approval by re-enactment.   The regulations were approved on September   16,  1924.  When  the  National  Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18, 1939,  the  same provisions  on  stamp tax, bills  of lading and  receipts  were reenacted.   There is a  presumption that the Legislature reenacted the law on  the tax with  full knowledge of the contents of the  regulations then in force regarding bills of lading and receipts, and that it approved or  confirmed them because they  carry out  the legislative purpose.

"*   *  *.  of course, the rule does not operate to freeze a meaning which is  in evident conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Helvering vs. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119-121, 60 S. Ct.  444; 84 L.  Ed. 604 A.L.R.,  1368.  But  where a statute  is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by Treasury ruling and Congress thereafter reenacts the provision ¦without substantial change,  such action is to some extent confirmatory that the ruling carries out the congressional purpose."   (Mead  Corporation vs. Commissioner  of Internal Revenue, 116 F [2d] 187, p. 194)

"The  fact that  an  identical Treasury Regulation with regard  to computation of stamp tax on conveyances had been in effect during several re-enactments  of the  statute  was pursuasive evidence  of congressional approval thereof.  * *   *."  (Railroad Federal  Sav. and Loan Ass'n. vs. United States, 135 F [2d], p. 290)

"The law, I  believe, is now settled that substantial re-enactment of legislation which has  been construed by Treasury Regulations  is at least strong evidence of legislative approval of such construction. It is presumed that Congress knew of  the existing administrative interpretations of the statute.   *   *  *."  (Cargill  vs. United States, 46 F. Supp. 712, 716.)

"Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal, Revenue . under authority of the Revenue  Act of  1928 acquired the effect  of law by substantial re-enactment of provision of the 1928 Act in the 1932 Revenue Act.  * * *."  (S. Slater & Sons, Inc., vs.  White, etc., 33  F.  Supp.  329, 330.)

It is  to  be noted that  the regulation  does not purport to modify  or change  the  law in  the sense  that  when the value of the merchandise  (for which the receipt  is issued) does not appear thereon the tax  shall always be impose. Such a meaning would  have the  effect of changing the law; the regulation should not be understood in this illegal or authorized sense.   The regulation should be considered merely as a directive to internal  revenue officers to assess the tax and  collect the same.  As already  adverted to,  it only creates a presumption of the  liability of the taxpayer, which  presumption,  however, is  not conclusive  upon the taxpayer  who  can adduce  evidence that the tax  is  not collectible because  the value of the merchandise  concerned does not exceed the  amount of P5.  It was in  pursuance of this interpretation of the regulation  that the trial court permitted evidence to be introduced to  show that the petitioner-appellant is not subject to  the  tax on the receipts. Claim is made that the evidence submitted by the petitioner-appellant proved that the  freight  receipts  covered shipment of merchandise worth not more  than P5.  It is argued in support of this claim  that the said freight  receipts were issued to people carrying agricultural produce from one place to, another,  perhaps from their  farms to the towns or to their residences.  The Court of Appeals' decision,  upon  which the claim  is made,  does not  state that said receipts  were actually issued for shipments the value of which was not more than P5  each.  The decision of the Court  of  Appeals in fact is that the petitioner- appellant "merely tried to establish through his witnesses", the  facts above mentioned,  which is  not a  finding that' the receipts covered merchandise more than P5  in value. Upon  consideration of the claim  and the testimonies with which it is supported, we  are unable  to  agree with said contention.   It is  a common knowledge that when barrio residents or those living in  farms go to  town and bring along  with  them their daily needs on their daily "produce, they  ordinarily do not secure receipts for these  baggages or cargoes but keep these under their seats.  The common , practice  is for a passenger carrying cargoes  of small value not to secure receipts therefor; for convenience and economy he keeps them under his seat in the bus so as to make  them easily accessible when he goes down, and at the same time save the few centavos that the  issuance of the receipt  entails.  On the  other hand,  receipts for valuable cargo  are demanded, to  insure against their loss. Our conclusion is  that the  receipts must have been issued for  shipments  or  merchandise in excess of P5  in value. The evidence submitted notwithstanding, the fact that it has not been contradicted fails to prove to  our satisfaction that the merchandise for which receipts were issued were actually worth P5 or less.  Furthermore,1 the rule is that in actions for the recovery of  taxes assessed and  collected, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the assessment is illegal.

"All presumptions  are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments. The  good faith of tax assessors and the validity of their actions are presumed. They will be presumed to have  taken into consideration all the facts to which their attention was called.   No presumption can be indulged that all of the public officials of the state in  the various counties who have to  do 'with the assessment of .property for taxation will knowingly violate the duties imposed upon them by law."

"As a  logical outgrowth of  the  presumption  in favor of the validity  of assessments, when  such assessments  are  assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining' party.  It  is incumbent upon the property owner clearly to  show that the assessment  was erroneous, in  order  to  relieve  himself from it."  (51 Am.  Jur. pp. 620-621.)

"The burden is on him who seeks the recovery of a tax already paid  to  establish  those facts which show its invalidity.' United States is. Anderson, 209 U. S. 422, 428, 70 L. ed.  347, 46  Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; Fidelity  Title & T. Co. vs. United States, 259 U. S.  304, 306, 66 L. ed.,  953,  954, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep.  514. (Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Int. Rev., 73  L. ed., 704, 706.)

"* * *. But the  presumption is that  taxes  paid are rightly collected  upon  assessments correctly made by the commissioner,  and in a suit to recover them the burden rests upon  the taxpayer to prove all  the facts necessary to establish the illegality of the  collection.   United States vs. Anderson, supra.  See  United States vs. Rindskopt, 100 U.  S. 419, 26  L.  ed.,  * *  *."  (Niles Bement Pond Co.  vs. United States, 74 L. ed., 901,  904.)

The rule above-mentioned has not  been complied with and the action for recovery must be denied.

It  is  also contended  that the tax  should be collected from the holder of the receipt, and not from the one who . collected it, which is the transportation company. There is no  merit  in this  contention because the  law expressly provides that the tax should be paid by the one "making, signing, issuing, accepting,  or  transferring  the  same." (Section 1449, Revised Administrative  Code of 1917).  The receipts were made, and issued by the transportation  company; it is therefore  liable for the  payment of the tax thereon.

The last contention of the petitioner-appellant  is that the tax could no  longer be collectible because the same was assessed and collected after  seven years, the tax  having been due in  1936-1938  and the assessment having  been made in the year. 1947.  The period  within which a tax may be  assessed is ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud  or  omission  (section 332, paragraph  (a), National  Internal  Revenue  Code).   Petitioner-appellant cites, in support of his contention, paragraph (c) of the same action.   This paragraph refers to the  collection of the tax by distraint or by levy or by a proceeding in court, and the period prescribed  is within five years after the assessment of the tax.

Was the levy justified?  The discovery, according to the pleadings, took place in the year  1941  and  the  warrant of  distraint  or levy was  issued on September  30,  1946 (paragraphs 3 and.4 of the complaint).  The  pleadings do not show, neither  does  the  evidence, the specific date of the assessment.  It is  only  alleged in the complaint that the examination of the books took place  in the year 1941. In order to sustain the claim, of  the invalidity of the levy, it is necessary for the  plaintiff to allege and prove that the levy took place after five years from the date of the assessments.   But  the date, of the assessment has not been proved.  This  is  a material matter that the petitioner- appellant should have proved to assail the levy.   Because of his failure to do so the exemption  from levy may not be invoked by  him.  Besides, the question was not raised in the pleadings as a ground to  void the collection of the amount.   The  court cannot  assume  that  the  levy  and distraint took place beyond the period prescribed by law. This conclusion is supported by the  presumption of the regularity of the acts of public officers.  In any event the collection was  made  in  1947, within ten years after the discovery in  1941,  and the liability of  petitioner-appellant is not thereby  affected.

For  the foregoing considerations, the  judgment of the Court of  Appeals  is  declared void and that of the Court of First  Instance, reversed and the  respondent-appellee absolved from the complaint.  With costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Parás, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes,  A.,  Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.  B. L,, and Endencia,  JJ. concur.