Florentino Mamatik was accused of acts of lasciviousness committed in  the  Municipality of Pugo, La Union, and in an  uninhabited place, against the person of one Maria Langas, thirteen  years of age.  When the case was called for arraignment before the  Court of First Instance of La Union, the defendant appeared without counsel and the  court appointed  Atty. Ramon R. Villalon, Jr. as his counsel de oficio, and  on the latter's petition that arraignment be postponed in order to enable him to  confer with his  client, arraignment was  set for December 10, 1956. On that day, the defendant appeared without his counsel de oficio.  The Court asked him  where his counsel was and  Mamatik answered  that a lawyer was no longer necessary because  he would  enter a  plea of guilty.   Thereupon, he  was arraigned and he pleaded guilty.  In open court,  he was  sentenced to an indeterminate  prison sentence ranging from five (5) months of arresto mayor to two  (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision coreccional,  and to pay the costs.  Thereafter and on the same day, the clerk of court issued Judicial Form  No. 34, committing  the person of  Florentino Mamatik to the  Director of  Prisons, saying that  "the time of imprisonment will commence to run on the 10th day of December, 1956".

On  December 19, 1956, Atty. Manuel B. Lasmarias, as counsel for defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that when arraigned, his client had no counsel; that there were several facts which were not presented nor brought to the attention of the  court which if considered may mitigate the penalty; and that defendant was ready  to  present those facts.  After counsel had  filed a memorandum  to support his motion  for reconsideration, the court on December 26, 1956 denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the decision rendered on December 10,  1956 had  already become final because  the accused has started to  serve his  sentence the same day. The accused   is appealing  from  the order  denying  his motion for reconsideration,  and  not for reopening  the case.  In his  brief, he  makes the  following assignment of errors:

"I. The lower  court erred in allowing  the appellant to enter a plea of guilty, instead of postponing  the arraignment due  to the absence of counsel de oficio.
"II. The lower court erred  in ruling  its decision  has  already become  final due  to partial service of the  sentence by the appellant.
"III.  The lower court erred in not  reopening the  case  on  the grounds alleged in the motion for reconsideration and memorandum in support thereof."

After  carefully considering the facts in the case, particularly the circumstances attending appellant's arraignment, plea of guilty,  the  sentence and the  order of commitment, we are fully satisfied that the appeal is without merit.  As the Solicitor General well observes  in his brief, the trial court proceeded cautiously in arraigning the appellant and fully satisfied  itself that his rights were  duly protected, and that  he understood  the  information and the consequences of his plea  of guilty.  We reproduce the transcript of the  stenographic notes of what happened  in court  on the day of arraignment, December 10, 1956, not when the case was first called for the arraignment of the accused on December 4, 1956, when appearing without counsel, he was given an  attorney  de oficio who between that date and December  10,  1956, must have conferred  with him and must have advised him as to what should be done to best serve his interest:

"COURT:  (To accused)  Where is  your lawyer?

ACCUSED: I  do not have lawyer, your Honor.

Court: This  is only for the reading of the information to you, do you need the services of lawyer for the purpose of arraignment?

ACCUSED: No more, your Honor,  as I am entering a plea of guilty.

COURT: Do you need  a lawyer for purposes of entering a plea of guilty?

ACCUSED: No more, your Honor.

COURT: Do you want the information to be read to you now?

Accused: Yes sir.

COURT: (To the Clerk.)  Arraign the accused.  (The information is read to the accused in the Ilocano dialect which the accused understands.)

Special  Deputy  Clerk Mamaril: Did you understand  the information read  to you?

Accused: Yes, sir

Special  Deputy  Clerk of Court Mamaril:  What  is your plea, guilty or not guilty?

Accused: I plead guilty, sir.

Court: Sentence. (The Court promulgates the  sentence in open court.)"

The main contention of counsel for appellant is that on the date he filed his  motion for reconsideration, the decision had not yet become  final, because defendant  had not yet commenced to  serve his  sentence.

According to Section 7, Rule 116 of the  Rules of Court, a judgment in  a criminal case becomes final after expiration of the period for appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally  served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right  to appeal.   The record shows that appellant voluntarily commenced to serve his prison sentence on the same day that said sentence  was meted out  to  him in  open court.   The  charge against. him was simple  "acts of lasciviousness".   That he was guilty thereof, there can  be no  question,  because  after having  the benefit of counsel de oficio, he voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.   Even his motion for reconsideration does not question his guilt.  He merely alleged therein that there were facts not presented or brought to the attention of the court and which if considered, may mitigate the penalty.  Presumably, he referred to mitigating circumstances.  In this connection,  it may be stated that his plea of guilty was considered as a mitigating circumstance to compensate the aggravating circumstance  of uninhabited place.  We can think of no other mitigating circumstance in his favor.  If there were, he or his counsel de oficio  could easily have called the attention of the court to the same.

After the sentence,  appellant was not merely returned to prison as a detention prisoner, but he was  sent  there with the "mittimus" to  serve his sentence.  That was on December 10, 1956.  Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued against him on December 17,  1956, for the payment of the fees  in the justice of  the Peace  Court which first took charge of the case, the Court of First Instance, and of the Sheriff, which writ was returned unsatisfied on the same day.  In issuing the order of commitment as well as the writ of execution, the trial court must have been fully convinced from the  attitude and acts of  defendant, that its  sentence had  become final.

"A 'mittimus' after conviction is, in criminal cases, similar  to an  execution after judgment  in a  civil case.   It is final process.  It  is  carrying into effect the  judgment of the court.  (Scott vs. Spiegel, 35 A. 262, 67  Conn.  349)" (22 CJS p. 511)

It was only on December 19  that his new counsel, Atty. Lasmarias, filed a motion for reconsideration, not to try to prove  that  his client  was innocent of the charge, but that he would try to prove mitigating circumstances.

In view of the  foregoing, the order denying the motion for  reconsideration is hereby affirmed with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,  Concepcion,  and Endencia, JJ., concur.