On May 28, 1947, the plaintiff Jesus L. Uy filed in the Manila court of first instance a complaint against the defendant spouses to foreclose a real estate mortgage, executed by the husband as attorney-in-fact of his wife, to secure the payment of a debt totalling P70,000.00 contracted in February and May of the year 1944.

The defendants moved for dismissal of the action invoking the executive orders Nos. 25 and 32, temporarily suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations in the Philippines.

On August 15, 1947, the Honorable Felipe Natividad, Judge sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence this appeal.

There is no question that this debt is within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32. Republic Act No. 342 has not lifted the moratorium as to debts contracted during the Japanese regime, like the present indebtedness.

However, it is the contention of the appellant that the orders merely stop the execution of any judgment that may be obtained against the debtor, but they do not prohibit the hearing of nay compliant to establish the creditor's right, especially where the debtor denies liability. The point must be decided against the appellant in view of our decisions in General v. De Venecia (44 Off. Gaz., 4913) and in Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Hon. Conrado Barrios, G. R. No. L-1539.

In the first, the Court, in banc, said:

"It is our view that, upon objection by the debtor, no court may now proceed to hear a complaint that seeks to compel payment of a monetary obligation coming within the purview of the moratorium. And the issuance of a writ of attachment upon such complaint may not, of course, be allowed. Such levy is necessarily one step in the enforcement of the obligation, enforcement which, as stated in the order, is suspended temporarily, pending action by the Government."

In the second, a division ruled that:

"While the debt moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter can not file a suit against him in the courts of justice requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs and to pay them (after the moratorium) There is no such action to compel defendant to acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet payable, distinct and different from the action for recovery or payment of a debt already due and payable, against the debtor who reuses to pay it. To allow the plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded in the complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay legal interest on the amount claimed form the filing of the said complaint, as well as the attorney's fees of 10% of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if the defendant's obligations to the plaintiffs were already payable and he had failed or refused to pay them. said Executive Order No. 25 as amended by Executive Order No. 32 not only suspends the execution of the judgment that the court may render so far as it orders the payment of debts and other monetary obligations, as stated in the resolution in said case, but also suspends the filing of suit in the courts of justice for the enforcement of the payment of debts and other monetary obligations therein referred to, if timely objection is set up by the defendant debtor."

It is true that in Moya v. Barton, (45  Off. Gaz., 237), we affirmed a judgment that required the defendant to pay rentals for the period from November, 1944, to September, 1945, although we suspended the execution of the payment of rentals accruing up to May 10, 1945. But that position was adopted because the complaint sought to enforce an obligation, part of which was covered by the moratorium order and part was not so covered. The instant case is different, inasmuch as the whole obligation is included within the moratorium decree.

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.
Paras, and Tuason, JJ., reserved their votes.
Padilla, and Montemayor, JJ., did not take part.