[ G.R. No. L-2580, December 07, 1949 ]
PABLO RICOHERMOSO, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ AND BERNARDINO RICOHERMOSO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J.:
The contention that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion is untenable. In the first place, the motion for postponement was not accompanied by affidavits of merit as required by section 5 of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. In the second place, the action is one of forcible entry filed in and decided by the justice of the peace court in 1946, and set for trial by the Court of First Instance first on July 15, 1947, and again on July 16, 1948, or one year apart. Considering the summary nature of the action, it cannot be said that the petitioner has not been given enough time to be in readiness for trial.
While the respondent judge properly denied the postponement, he committed an error in dismissing the appeal. Under section 9, of Rule of Court No. 40, "a perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the judgment of the justice of the peace or the municipal court, and the action when duly entered in the Court of First Instance shall stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that court, as though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced," except of course in forcible entry and detainer cases when, upon failure of the defendant to comply with the conditions for staying execution, the Court of First Instance orders the execution of the appealed judgment which does, not, however, bar the appeal from taking its course. The respondent judge was accordingly bound to proceed with the trial and decision of the case after he had denied petitioner's motion for postponement.
Wherefore, the order of the respondent judge dismissing petitioner's appeal is set aside and the case is restored for further proceedings. So ordered without costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.