The City of Manila sues the Manila Blue Printing Co., Inc., for unpaid license fees as a retailer of stationery and office supplies corresponding to the years  1938, 1939, and the first quarter of 1940.  During the said  period the gross sales made by the defendant to various persons and entities other than the  Commonwealth of  the  Philippines ranged from one thousand odd pesos to seven thousand odd pesos per quarter; and the gross sales made by it to the Commonwealth  of the Philippines thru the Division  of  Purchase and  Supply ranged from  thirty-one thousand  odd pesos to fifty-two thousand odd pesos per quarter.^[1]

City Ordinance No. 1925 as amended by No. 2529 fixes the amount of quarterly  license fees to be paid by retail dealers  according to  the  amount of the gross sales made during each quarter.  The defendant reported only its sales to various persons and entities other than the Government and paid only the license fees corresponding to those sales, claiming that its sales to the Government were exempt from the  operation of the said  ordinance because they were wholesale and  not retail.

The trial court held that defendant's sales to the Government, having been made to the consumer and not to a dealer for the purpose of resale, must be considered retail sales and  not wholesale and hence subject to the license fee imposed by said ordinance.

The question to determine is the definition of the phrase "retail dealers" used in the enabling Act and in the ordinance, in relation to the sales made by the defendant to the Government.  Section 2444 of the  Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3669  and  Commonwealth Act No.  76, in its subsection (m-2), empowers the Municipal Board of the City  of Manila "to tax and fix the license fee on *  *  * retail  dealer  in new merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the  payment of any municipal tax.  For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1)  retail dealers in general merchandise and  (2)  retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale  of textiles  *  *   *; hardwares  *  *  *; groceries ' *  *   *; drugs  *   *   *;   books, including stationery, paper, and office supplies; jewelry;  slippers; arms, ammunition; and sporting  goods."

The pertinent provisions of the ordinance in question read as follows :

"Section 1. Fee. There shall be paid to the City Treasurer the quarterly  license fees hereinafter provided  for any calendar quarter for engaging in any of  the businesses or occupations below enumerated, on the basis of the actual gross sales or receipts thereof during such quarter. Said payment shall be made at the end of the quarter or as soon thereafter  as  possible, but not  later than the twenty-fifth day of the first month of the following quarter:

"*      *      *      *      *      *      *

"Group 1-A. Retail dealers in new  (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax, such as:  (1) retail dealers in general merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of electrical supplies; sporting goods; office  equipments and materials; rice; textiles including knitted wares; hardwares, including glasswares,  cooking utensils and construction materials; groceries;, papers; books, including stationery:

"Class	Gross Sales				License Fee
1	Over		P125,000.00		P450.00
2	P113,055.00	to	125,000.00		407.00
3	103,885.00	to	113,054.99		374.00
4	94,165.00	to	103,884.99		339.00
5	85,830.00	to	94,164.99		309.00
6	78,055.00	to	85,829.99		281.00
7	70,830.00	to	78,054.99		255.00
8	64,445.00	to	70,829.99		232.00
9	58,610.00	to	64,444.99		211.00
10	53,330.00	to	58,609.99		192.00
11	48,610.00	to	53,329.99		175.00
12	43,885.00	to	48,609.99		158.00
13	40,000.00	to	43,884.99		140.00
14	36,385.00	to	39,999.99		137.00
15	33,330.00	to	36,384.99		120.00
16	30,275.00	to	33,329.99		109.00

"*      *      *      *      *      *      *

It is not denied that the defendant is a retail dealer it buys stationery and office supplies in large quantities and resells them to consumers at a profit.  The Government is a large consumer  of  stationery  and  office  supplies, and bought them from the defendant in large quantities during the period in question at prices  ranging from 10% to 50% lower than the prices at which the defendant sold them to the public or to private purchasers.

Were the sales thus made by the defendant to the Government retail, or wholesale, within the purview of the city ordinance above quoted?  The  plaintiff-appellee contends that they were retail because they were made directly  to the consumer and not to a dealer for the purpose of resale.  The defendant-appellant, on the  other hand, contends that they were wholesale because they were made in large quantities.

Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English language defines the word  "retail" as "the selling  of goods  in small  quantities,  especially by  those who have bought in large quantities to resell at a profit." Words and Phrases, volume 4 (2d series), page 370, is quoted by appellant on the subject as follows:  "The definition of the word 'retail,' as applied to sales is to sell in small quantities  as by the yard,  pound, gallon, etc.; to sell directly to the consumer in small quantities, such as are immediately called for by consumers.  'Wholesale' means sale made  in large quantities, as distinguished from those made in small quantities which  are to be regarded as  sales at retail."

There are  two criteria by which to determine whether a sale is retail  or wholesale.  One is by the, quantity, whether small or large; and the other is by the nature of the buyer, whether he is a consumer or a merchant who resells at a profit.  Which of these two criteria was intended by the Legislature when it used the phrase "retail dealers" in the enabling Act above  quoted and  by  the Municipal  Board when it used the same phrase in the ordinance it passed by virtue of said enabling Act?

We are inclined to believe, and so  hold, that both the Legislature  and the  Municipal Board  had the second criterion in mind, for the following reasons:

1. Merchants engaged in the sale of goods are generally classified as either wholesalers or retailers.  Wholesalers are those who  sell goods in large quantities to retailers, while retailers are those who sell them directly to the consumers.  All sales made by merchants classified as retailers or retail dealers are  presumed to be sales at retail.  When the enabling Act empowered the Municipal Board to tax and fix the license fee on  retail dealers, and when the Municipal Board by virtue thereof fixed the license fee on retail dealers according to the amount of their gross sales, both legislative bodies had in mind all the sales of such retail dealers,  because they are all presumed to be retail and not wholesale, regardless of the quantity of each sale.
   
   
2. We cannot assume that  in  approving the ordinance in question  the Municipal Board intended to exclude from its operation all sales made in large quantities and to include only those made in small quantities, because there is no way of determining what sales are large and what small.  Both adjectives are relative  terms.  The sale, for instance,  of one package of cigarettes by a corner store may be considered large when compared with its sale  of one cigarette, and the sale of one package by a larger store may be considered small when compared with its  sale of one carton; yet there can be no question but that the sale of one package by the corner store and of  one carton by the larger store to the customer are retail sales.  Likewise, no  distinction can be drawn between the sale by the defendant, for instance, of 100 reams of paper  to a private  office and 1,000 reams to the Government, both sales being made directly to the consumer ; and neither the one nor the other may be considered small or large from the point of view of the needs and  capacities  of the purchaser.  To adopt the criterion by the quantity would make the ordinance in question illusory and impracticable because the taxpayer and licensee could exclude from its operation all sales he considers large in comparison with other sales, altho all of them were made directly to the consumers.   Had  it been the  intention of the Mumcipa.1 Board to exclude large sales and  include only small ones, it should and would have fixed a definite amount in pesos by which to gauge the smallness or largeness of each sale.  It would have provided, for instance, that any sale amounting to P200  or  more shall be considered wholesale and those amounting to less than that shall be considered retail.
   
   
3. The license  fee or tax in question is not on the sales but on the sellers.  The amount of each sale is immaterial. What is material is the nature of the business of the seller, whether he is a  retail  dealer or  a wholesaler.  If he is a retail dealer, he comes under the operation of the ordinance and all sales made by him must be included in his return for the purpose of paying the license fee.  That is obviously the reason why the ordinance makes no distinction whatever between small and large sales and fixes no amount by which to determine their smallness  or largeness.
   
   It is possible that a merchant may do business both as a wholesaler and as a retailer,  for there is no  law which prohibits him from  engaging in both businesses at the same time.  But as a matter of  common knowledge, it is not customary for a wholesaler to engage in the retail business because his customers are the retailers, with whom as a matter of good business  policy he does not want to compete.  The defendant does not pretend to have been engaged in business both as a retailer and as a wholesaler.  What it pretends is that its sales to the Government should be considered wholesale because  they were made in large quantities and therefore should be excluded from the operation of the ordinance. We have seen that such contention  is untenable.  Being a retailer, all its sales to the consumers, no matter how large, fall within the operation of the ordinance in question.
   
   
4. In the case o£ Buenaventura vs. Collector of Internal Revenue (G. R. No.  22175),  this court,  interpreting the word "retail" used in  paragraph (a)  of section 1457 of the Administrative Code in connection with sale of food products  in public market places, said that the sales mentioned in said section should be considered  wholesale if  made for the purpose of resale, and retail if made  to the consumer. In adopting that criterion this Court took into consideration the same criterion established by the Administrative Code in taxing the retail dealers and wholesale dealers of alcoholic liquors and tobacco.  The enabling Act by virtue of which the ordinance in  question was passed, forms part of the Administrative Code.  Hence, in the  absence of a  definition of "retail dealers" in said enabling Act, we are justified in adopting the criterion  established in other parts of the Code to determine the meaning intended by the Legislature in using said phrase.  Moreover, as we have seen, that is the only reasonable and practicable criterion that can be adopted  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the ordinance in question.

As a last refuge appellant suggests that its sales to the Government  should be considered wholesale because the Division of Purchase  and  Supply makes a surcharge to the different offices  and  branches of the Government which requisition the supplies; that is to say, the Division of Purchase and Supply resells  them to  the different offices and branches of the Government.   We dismiss  the suggestion with the mere observation that the Division of Purchase and Supply is but an office of the Government  charged with the duty of purchasing its  supplies.  It  is not an independent mercantile establishment engaged in the purchase and sale of goods for profit.  The purchases made by it are-purchases made by the Government as consumer.

The  foregoing disposes of appellant's contentions.  The appellee, however, asks that the judgment of the trial court be modified by increasing its  amount from P1,107.70 to P1,489,40.  In its complaint the plaintiff-appellee alleged that the amount due from the defendant for unpaid license fees was P1,467.95; but in submitting the case to the trial court for decision upon a stipulation of facts, the plaintiff agreed to reduce its claim to P1,107.70 according to  the trial court, which said in its decision:

"La demandante conviene en que el impuesto que se debe cobrar a la demandada esta  fijado por la ley en P500 al ano, de modo que la suma total  que debe pagar,  por  sus ventas al por menor en los arios de 1938, 1939 y primer trimestre de 1940, es P1,192,  de la cual se debe deducir su pago de P185, quedando un remanente  de Pl,007, al que se debe agregar la cantidad de P100.70 como recargo."

The reduced amount  awarded by the trial court turns out to be erroneous because  Commonwealth Act  No. 76  has eliminated the maximum limit of P500 formerly fixed by  Act No. 3669;  but  since the reduction was agreed  to by  the plaintiff  and,  moreover, since  the latter did  not appeal, but only claims for the first time  in its brief in this  Court as appellee an amount even greater than that alleged in its complaint,  we cannot accede to the appellee's prayer.

The judgment is affirmed, with  costs.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

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^[1] The exact figures are given in the stipulation of facts, but for the purpose of this decision it is unnecessary to specify them.