This action was instituted on behalf of a baby girl named Linda Mohamed Barrueco to compel the defendant, as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco, to recognize her as a natural daughter of said deceased.  Previous to the commencement of the present action this same plaintiff, thru her grandmother and guardian ad litem Ciriaca Sulayao, had filed a petition in the intestacy of Julio Veloso  Barrueco (case No.  55129 of  the Court of First Instance of Manila) for the purpose  of obtaining a judicial declaration that she is the sole and universal heir of the decedent.  That petition was opposed by the herein defendant and, after due hearing, was denied  by Judge Gervasio Diaz, who in his decision rendered on November 20, 1939 (exhibit  Z), stated the facts as follows:

"Los hechos son claros, simples y no controvertidos. Desde el dia 22 de mayo de 1937 hasta el dia 12 de junio de  1939, el finado Julio Veloso Barrueco,  mayor de  edad, y  Gliceria Mohamed,  entonces menor de 18 y  hasta la fecha menor de edad, vivieron juntos  como  marido y mujer, al principio en Pasay, Rizal, y mas tarde  en la Ciudad  de  Manila, especialmente en los  altos de  la casa  No. 160 de la calle Legarda, cuyo primer  piso estaba ocupado  por el negocio establecido de dicho finado.   Ambos eran solteros, de buena reputation y no tenian impedimento para contraer matrimonio, pero no lo contrajeron, por motivos  que no aparecen en los autos; y como fruto de sus relaciones nacio la aqui solicitante, Linda Mohamed Barrueco, en el 'Mary Johnston Hospital' en la noche del dia 9 de junio de 1939. El finado  Julio Veloso Barrueco fue el que, a horas tempranas de aquella  noche, condujo al hospital  en su automovil a la parturienta Gliceria Mohamed; pero a altas horas de  aquella noche  misma,  cuando esta acababa de  dar a  luz a Linda Mohamed Barrueco, algunos deudores de dicho finado  que estuvieron disgustados de el, le atacaron, infiriendole heridas mortales; de las cuales fallecio en el 'Saint Joseph's Hospital' a horas tempranas del dia 12 de junio de 1939, o sea, a los tres dias de nacida dicha Linda Mohamed.  El finado pago los gastos de la hospitalizacidn  de  Gliceria Mohamed  en el 'Mary Johnston's Hospital', expreso constantemente en vida su deseo de que se bautice con su propio nombre y apellido el  nuevo  ser  que en  su seno  llevaba Gliceria Mohamed si  resultaba un nino,  y cuando  la Srta. Sofia  Reyes, amiga de el y  de Gliceria Mohamed, le  visito  en el 'Saint Joseph Hospital' el dia 10 de junio  de 1939, pregunto aun a esta si habia visto a su hija Linda.  Gliceria  Mohamed y Julio Veloso Barrueco han estado siempre viviendo juntos como marido y mujer, y solamente la muerte de este les separo."

The trial court (Judge Fernando  Jugo presiding) dismissed the complaint on the  grounds (1) that  the decision of Judge Diaz above referred to had rendered res adjudicata the compulsory recognition  of  the plaintiff as  a natural daughter of the deceased, and (2) that the facts proven did not entitle the plaintiff to such recognition under paragraph 2 of article 135 of the Civil  Code.  Judge Diaz and Judge Jugo both held  that the marital  cohabitation of the parents of the plaintiff child, as a result of which the latter was born, and the manifest intention of the deceased to recognize said child as his, were not sufficient to vest in the plaintiff the uninterrupted possession of the status  of  a  natural child of the deceased, the latter having died only three days after the birth of the former.

We find that both the parties and the trial court have  overlooked one vital aspect of the case, and that is, that in an action or proceeding to compel the recognition of a natural child of a deceased person the  legitimate heirs or kin  of the latter are necessary and indispensable parties.  (Briz vs. Briz and Remigio, 43 Phil., 763; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343.) Neither in this nor in the previous case have the potential heirs of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco been made parties. Consequently, no valid judgment upon the status which the plaintiff seeks to establish could have been rendered in the previous case; nor can it be rendered in the present case. That status still remains in open question and will continue so until the parties necessary and indispensable to its determination are given an opportunity to be heard.

Altho the facts found by Judge Diaz in the previous  case and reiterated by  Judge Jugo  in the  present case are, of course, not binding upon the potential heirs, who have not yet been heard, we deem it expedient and proper to express our opinion upon those facts  for the future guidance of the trial court, to which we shall have to remand this case for further proceedings.  If we were in accord with the lower court that, upon the proven facts, the plaintiff is not entitled to compulsory recognition as the natural daughter of the deceased,  it would serve no purpose to implead the potential heirs.

The lower court seems  to have  labored under the  misapprehension that  because the  plaintiff lived  only three days before her father died, she could  not have enjoyed the uninterrupted  possession of the status  of a natural  child of the decedent. But, under articles 29 and 30 of the  Civil Code, altho legal existence commences at birth the conceived child is considered as born for all purposes favorable  to it, provided  that when born it  shall have a human  form and shall live  twenty-four hours after complete separation  from the mother's womb.  Since the plaintiff fulfils that requisite, the acts performed by the putative father from the time the child was conceived tending to show that he recognized it as his natural child, should not be left  out of  consideration. Commenting on article 29, Manresa says:

"Queda, por ultimo, el reconocimiento de derechos civiles a los concebidos, o sean las  personas por nacer,  usando la expresion de  la ley  argentina.   El texto  primitivo  del Codigo, despues de afirmar que el nacimiento determina la personalidad, anadia 'sin  perjuicio de los casos  en que la ley retrotrae a una fecha  anterior los derechos del nacido.' Este precepto podia dar lugar a omisiones, porque si bien el Codigo sefiala en diversos lugares los derechos de los postumos, en otros era deficil interpretar que los  habia reconocido.   Asi, por ejemplo,  no existiendo  un  principio general, no hubieramos  podido afirmar que deben reconocerse los  derechos de los postumos relativos a la nacionalidad, pues la ley para  nada se ocupa de ellos en el titulo anterior a este.   Era, pues, oportuno, y asi lo  ha demostrado la reforma  del  Codigo, que se siguiese  la tradicion romana  consignada en la celebre  ley 3.a, tit.  23 de la Partida 4.a: 'Desmientre que estuviese la criatura en el  vientre de su madre, toda cosa que se faga o se  diga a pro de ella, aprovechase ende, bien asi como si fuese nacida; mas lo que fuese dicho  o fecho a dano de su persona o de sus cosas, non le empesce.'  Y esto se ha  hecho en la reforma del Codigo, prefiriendo  reconocer aquella existencia  imperfecta 'y pendiente  de la  condicion del nacimiento,  de acuerdo con el  derecho  de  Inglaterra, de  Portugal,  de Mejico, del Peru, de Costa Rica, de  la Republica  Argentina, que es el mas  explicito en este punto,  de Suiza y  de otras varias naciones,  a retrotraer  la fecha del nacimiento,  que era el sistema  admitido  anteriormente por el Codigo, y  que tiene precedentes en el de Sajonia."  (Codigo Civil, Manresa, 4th ed., vol. 1, pp. 192-193.)

Judge Diaz,  with whom Judge Jugo concurs, said in  his decision:

"*  *  *  Lo que se ha probado simplemente f ue que el finado dio a la madre de la solicitante la consideracion de  una verdadera esposa desde  que  esta concibio a aquella con el evidente proposito de reconocer como  hija suya a dicha solicitante cuando haya nacido, y nada mas.  A esta no se le dio la constante consideracion de una hija natural  porque aun no habia nacido, ni pudo haberle  dado dicha  consideracion su finado padre natural, porque este fallecio  a los tres dias de nacida  ella.  *  *  *"   (Exhibit Z.)

We think such opinion is untenable because it completely disregards the clear and express provisions of articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code.  Plaintiff's possession of the status of a natural child of  the deceased,  under the facts stated, was uninterrupted from the moment she  was conceived to the very last moment of her father's life. The open marital cohabitation of the parents; the father's act of bringing the mother to the hospital to deliver the child; his payment of the hospital expenses; his oft-repeated wish that if the child  in the mother's womb turned out to be a boy it be baptized with his own name; his having inquired, two days before his death, of a friend, Miss Sofia Reyes, whether she had seen his daughter Linda these acts and conduct are, in our opinion, sufficient to justify the uninterrupted possession by the plaintiff of the status of a natural  child of the deceased.

The judgment  appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the trial court with instructions that the legitimate  heirs or kin of the deceased Julio  Veloso Barrueco be included as parties defendant and summoned according to law, after which the case  shall be retried and decided anew.  There is no pronouncement as to costs  in this instance.  So ordered.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.