The petitioner is the manager of B. I. Sehwani & Co., a mercantile firm doing business  in Bacolod, Occidental Negros.  On and before August 18, 1944,  said company had 1,579 pairs of men's shoes in stock, of which 928 pairs were leather or army shoes and 651 pairs were rubber or tennis shoes, having purchased the same between June 5,1943, and June 5,1944, at prices ranging from P23.70 to P92 a pair of the leather shoes and from P4.50 to P15 a pair of the rubber shoes. In June 1944 the Constabulary of Occidental Negros needed 600 pairs of shoes and tried to purchase them from the petitioner's store but were told by the petitioner that he had very few shoes left, there being then only six or seven pairs in the showcases of the store.  On August 8 of the same year the constabulary inspector, having received information that petitioner's establishment still had a great quantity of shoes,  again  spoke to the  petitioner  requesting his cooperation, but the petitioner again told him that he had no more shoes than those displayed in his stores, there being only 30 pairs in each of  the two stores  on Gonzaga street. But after  searching the bodega behind one of the stores the Constabulary found more shoes hidden in sacks  and boxes. The Constabulary took 582 pairs, which were the only shoes they found then, with the understanding that they were to be  paid for  later at the  price to  be agreed by the parties. On August  17 the petitioner presented  to the office of the inspector a bill for P104,900, at the rate of P100 a pair of the tennis shoes and P400 a pair of the army shoes.

About that date the Constabulary again received confidential information that the petitioner was still keeping a great quantity of shoes; and to verify it they sent a private person to  buy a pair, for which the price of P600 was demanded at  the store of the petitioner. Thereupon the Constabulary procured  a search warrant and searched the bodega of the firm  on Luzuriaga street where,  notwithstanding  the petitioner's repeated assertions that he had  no more shoes, they found 997 pairs contained in eight tampipis and three sacks. These, together with the 582 pairs previously taken, brought the number of shoes seized to 1,579 pairs.

Formerly, in October 1943, the Constabulary had-bought 210 pairs of leather shoes from the petitioner's establishment and paid P29.50 a pair.  When on August  8, 1944, the constabulary inspector reproached the petitioner, for having repeatedly denied the existence of his stock of shoes, the petitioner replied:  "You know that we are merchants and, to tell you the truth, this is the only line of our business where we want to realize a good profit.  You will recall that when we sold shoes to you last October we hardly made a profit; and that is the reason why we do not like to give you any more shoes."

Upon  the foregoing  facts the  respondent  judge  found the petitioner guilty of hoarding, in violation of Act No. 65, in connection with Ordinance No. 7, as alleged in the information, and sentenced  him to  suffer two years of imprisonment  and  to  pay a  fine of P50,000, declaring confiscated in favor  of the Government the shoes in question with the exception  of 90  pairs taken from the stores of the company.

The accused  petitions us to  annul  that  sentence on the ground that the  respondent judge of  the court of special criminal jurisdiction of Occidental Negros  had no jurisdiction to try and  decide the case. He contends that the word "commodities"  used in, Act No. 65 as well  as in Executive Order No. 157 comprehends only  prime commodities, and that shoes are not listed as prime commodities in  Order No. 21 promulgated by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce pursuant to Executive Order  No.  210 of the Chairman of the former Executive Commission.

The Solicitor General in his answer agrees with the petitioner and joins the latter in his prayer for. the annulment of the sentence.

At first blush some members of  the Court, including the writer of this opinion, were of the impression that the petitioner's contention was correct.   But after  deliberation and a  careful examination of the legal provisions herein involved, we find such impression to be erroneous.

The  only question before us is whether the respondent judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.  That question  in turn  hinges  on whether  the  commodities  the hoarding1 of which is penalized in Act  No.  65, in relation to Executive Order No. 157,  are commodities in general or only what has been specifically designated as prime commodities.

Ordinance No,  7, creating the courts of special criminal jurisdiction, provides that said courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine crimes  and offenses penalized by Act  No. 65.  This Act imposes heavier penalties for "violations of food control  laws, when committed by public officers  and employees, and for  similar offenses when committed by. private individuals or entities."  Among the offenses specifically mentioned in section 2 of said Act for which  heavier penalties  are imposed, is:

"(g) Cornering or hoarding commodities for the purpose of obtaining unjustifiable profit thereby, even  if the maximum prices  have not been fixed for  such commodities. 'Cornering'  and 'hoarding'  as  used herein shall have the same meaning as these terms have under subsection (d), section six of  Executive Order Numbered  One hundred and fifty-seven, above mentioned."

Section 3  of the same  Act also provides that the penalty prescribed by existing laws and ordinances  shall be imposed  in its maximum period in cases of violation  of the laws, ordinances, and orders mentioned  in paragraph (b) of section 2 thereof, when committed  by private individuals or  entities.   Among the orders mentioned in  said paragraph is Executive  Order No. 157, as amended.  This executive order is entitled "On Price Control of Commodities," and prohibits in  its  section 6, among  others, the following:

"(d) Cornering or hoarding commodities for the  purpose of  obtaining unjustifiable profits therefrom, even if maximum prices have not been fixed  for such commodities. For the purposes of this Order, 'cornering' shall mean the acquisition of commodities with the  intent of creating, or tending to create, or effecting artificial scarcity thereof ill the market,  in order to alter prices;  and 'hoarding' shall mean the keeping or concealing of1 commodities in amounts or quantities in excess of the ordinary demands of trade or business."

It will  be  noted from the provisions of Act No. 65 and Executive Order No. 157 above quoted that their scope is not limited or confined to prime commodities.  There is nothing in Executive  Order No.  157  that  would warrant such limitation.  Indeed, section 8 of said executive order  as amended by Executive  Order  No. 229, provides among other things as follows:  "Any commodities  involved in the offense shall be subject to confiscation.  *  *  *  In case commodities  confiscated  under this  Order are prime commodities, as defined in accordance with Executive Order No. 210, they shall be sold to  control organizations at reasonable prices."  This clearly  implies that the commodities regulated by said executive order include both prime and nonprime commodities.

Both the petitioner  and the Solicitor  General seem to be misled by the title of Act No.  65, which  mentions "food control laws," and by Executive Order No. 210, which is entitled "On the Control of the Distribution of Prime Commodities." At first blush, one reading the title "An Act Imposing Heavier Penalties for *  *  * Violations of Food Control Laws" gets the impression that the laws referred to deal with  the control of foodstuffs  only.  But upon examining the body  of the Act,  one will readily see that the penal provisions  of Act No. 9, Ordinances Nos.  1 and  2 promulgated  by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Executive Orders Nos. 157 and 210, as amended, of the  Chairman of the former Executive Commission, are incorporated  therein by sections 2  (b) and 3 of said Act; and said  Act, ordinances,  and executive orders do not all refer exclusively to foodstuffs. The phrase "food control" used in the title of Act  No. 65 is apparently used as a  convenient, albeit  inadequate, term  to indicate a number of statutes intended  to alleviate the  acute  suffering of the people due to the scarcity of foodstuffs and other needed commodities, for the violation of which heavier penalties are imposed.  It is not contended here that the inadequacy or inaccuracy of the title-of. an Act vitiates or nullifies its provisions.  That  question is not before us.

It is true that Executive Order No. 210, the penal provisions of which are also incorporated tjy reference in Act No; 65, regulates the distribution of prime commodities and authorizes the Commissioner of Agriculture and Commence to designate the commodities that are considered as prime, and that Order No. 21 of said Department  does not include shoes among the  prime commodities therein listed.   But the petitioner is not charged with a violation of Executive Order No, 210 but with a yiplation of Executive Order No. 157 as incorporated, in  Act No. 65,  and the two executive orders are separate an4 distinct.   The former deals with "the  control of the distribution of prime commodities," while the latter deals with the "price control of commodities"  in general.   Hence, the fact that shoes are not prime commodities within the purview of Executive Order No. 210 does  not necessarily mean that they are not comprehended  within the purview of Executive  Order No, 157, the penal provisions of which are incorporated by reference in Act No. 65, under  which the petitioner has been prosecuted; and since Ordinance No. 7 expressly confers upon  the respondent judge exclusive jurisdiction to try and determine offenses  penalized by Act No, 65, the inescapable conclusion is that said judge had jurisdiction  to try and decide this case.

Wherefore,  the  petition must be  and is hereby  denied, with costs.

Yulo, C. J., Horrilleno, Moran, and Paras, JJ., concur.