This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action against the defendant.

The complaint  alleges that the defendant employed one Pedro Estrada as a chauffeur,  who operated defendant's car in Baguio on April 6, 1940; that on said date the said chauffeur, in driving the defendant's automobile No. 1-9940, thru negligence, carelessness, and imprudence,  caused the said automobile to bump and  hit the  plaintiff  while the latter was pouring water into the tank of the automobile belonging to  his  employer, Mr. Manuel Aguas, which was then parked in front of Villa Carmelita in Baguio; that the plaintiff suffered physical injuries, his kneeball having been broken, and was  confined in the hospital from April 6 to May 4,  1940; that before the  accident he was  earning a salary of P35 a month, but that as a result of the accident he became permanently disabled to perform his ordinary work. The plaintiff claims damages from the defendant in the sum of P10,000, upon the allegation that the defendant did not use and exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his said chauffeur.

The action is predicated upon article 1903, in relation to article 1902,  of the Civil Code.   These two articles read as follows:

"Art. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or  negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

"Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding  article is enforcible,  not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

"The father, or in case of his death, or incapacity,  the mother, is liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live, with them.

"Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the  branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

"The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not  if the damage shall have been caused by the official  upon  whom properly devolved the duty of doing  the  act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.

"Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for  any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

"The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove  that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to  prevent the damage."

It is  needless to  say  that article 1902  is not applicable against the present defendant even assuming as true the allegation that he  failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his  chauffeur because such failure  on his part was not the proximate cause of the damage complained of.  He did hot by such act or omission cause the damage in  question.  Said article would be applicable against the defendant's chauffeur alone, who himself was guilty of the negligent acts by which the damage was caused.   (Johnson vs. David,  5 Phil., 663, 666- 667.)  It is,  however, insisted for the appellant that the appellee should be held responsible  for  the  acts of his chauffeur under article 1903.  But said article specifies the persons who are held responsible for the acts and omissions of another; and, as found  by this Court in the cases of Johnson vs. David, supra,  and Chapman vs.  Underwood, 27 PhiL, 374, "the  driver  does not fall within the list of persons in  Article 1903  of  the Civil  Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible."  It is not  alleged that the appellee is the owner or director of an establishment or business and that he  was employing his chauffeur in such business at the time the latter is alleged to have caused the damage.

We are not persuaded that the interpretation of the codal provisions in question heretofore made by this Court in the cases above cited is wrong.  Indeed, we feel that  for the Court to so interpret said provisions as  to include  persons other than those therein specified as liable for the acts and omissions of another would be an  invasion of the  powers and  prerogatives of the legislature.  The later of  the two cases above cited (Chapman vs. Underwood) was  decided by this Court on March 28, 1914, and for nearly three decades the legislature has not seen fit to  change the law  as interpreted by this  Court.

The judgment appealed  from is  affirmed, but no finding is made as to costs because the appellant has beep allowed to litigate  as a pauper.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, and Horrilleno, JJ,, concur.

---

BOCOBO, J., with whom concurs PARAS, J.,

I  am constrained to dissent because  I believe the strict and narrow interpretation by the majority overthrows the principle of responsibility enunciated in article 1903 of the Civil Code,  The majority opinion by exempting from liability those employers who are not engaged in  any enterprise defeats the object which the legislator contemplated.


Articles 1902 and 1903 provide:

"Art. 1902. El que por accion u omision causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, esta  obligado a reparar el dano causado.

"Art. 1903. Lo obligacion que impone  el artlculo  anterior es exigible, no solo  por los actos u omisiones propios, sino por  los de aquellas  personas de quienes  se  debe responder.

"El padre, y, por muerte o incapacidad de este, la madre, son responsables de los perjuicios causados por  los hijos menores de edad que yiven en su compania.

"Los tutores lo son de los perjuicios causados por los menores o incapacitados que estan bajo su autoridad y habitan en su compania.

"Lo son igualmente los dueños o directores de un establecimiento o empresa, respecto de  los perjuicios causados por sus  dependientes en el servicio  de los ramos en que los tuvieran empleados o con ocasion de sus funciones.

"El Estado es responsable en este concepto cuando obra por mediacion de un agente especial;  pero no cuando el daño hubiese sido causado por el funcionario a quien propiamente corresponda la gestion practicada, en cuyo caso sera aplicable lo dispuesto en el articulo anterior.

"Son, por ultimo,  responsables los maestros o directores de artes y oficios respecto a los perjuicios causados por sus alumnos o aprendices, mientras  permanezcan bajo su custodia.

"La responsabilidad  de que trata este  articulo cesara cuando  las personas en el  mencionadas prueben que  emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia para prevenir el daño."

It will be seen that the first paragraph formulates a general principle, while the ensuing enumeration refers to those persons who are presumed to have acted negligently either in choice or supervision.  But this list does not free from liability those persons who, though not included in the enumeration, are nevertheless in fact negligent and therefore come within the general principle.  In the instant case, although the defendant is not one of those who are presumed to be negligent because he is not the owner or director of an establishment or  enterprise, yet he is responsible on the general principle of  the first paragraph of article 1903 because the complaint alleges  (and defendant admits in his motion  to dismiss the complaint)  that he  (defendant) has been  negligent  in the  selection  of Pedro  Estrada as his driver,  and that he has  negligently failed to prevent the damage.  Paragraphs 3  and 9 of the complaint allege:

"3. That defendant did not use and exercise all  the diligence of a good father of a family in  the selection of his said chauffeur,  so that he has engaged and employed the services of the said operator who is careless, negligent, and imprudent in the performance of his service as such auto operator;

*     *     *      *      *     *     *

"9. That defendant was and still is duty bound to pay damages to plaintiff, due to the carelessness of his chauffeur, as alleged above, which caused the physical disability of the plaintiff, and further, because of his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the said accident and the said damage, but defendant never has shown willingness to pay damage to said plaintiff;"

In other words, if the defendant had been the owner or director of any establishment or enterprise, it would not have  been necessary to allege  negligence on  his  part in choosing or overseeing his driver Estrada, because such negligence would have been  presumed  by  Art. 1903, but inasmuch as he is neither an owner nor a director of any business, it was necessary to  allege  negligence on his part in selecting his driver, and by failing to prevent the damage, which allegations were made in the complaint in this case and admitted in the motion to  dismiss the complaint.

Paragraph 2 of article 1903, Civil Code, reads, "El padre, y, por muerte o incapacidad de este, la madre, son responsables de los perjuicios causados  por los hijos menores que viven en su compania".  Supposing a case of negligence of a son, who was not living with  his father, would the latter be responsible for the former's negligence? I believe that if the father and the son happened to be together at the time of the damage,  and the father was negligent in not preventing the son's negligent act, the father would be liable. My reason is that although the father is not presumed to be negligent because his son is not living with him, yet because the father proved to be negligent, he is, in my opinion, responsible.

The above illustrates my theory that the enumeration of cases in article 1903  does not exclude other cases where the father, employer, etc., are shown to have been negligent.

In addition to the foregoing hypothetical case, let me present this one:  Referring to  owners of establishments, suppose the employee negligently caused the damage while he was doing work in a branch other than that in which he was regularly employed, but the owner or  employer was present and he was really and  actually negligent  in  not preventing the damage?  I believe the owner or employer is liable, although paragraph 4 of article 1903 requires that the employee be "en el servicio de  los rames en que  los tuvieran empleados o con ocasi6n  de sus funciones."  My reason again is that although the owner or employer is not presumed to  be negligent because the employee was doing work in another  branch, nevertheless, the  owner or  employer being actually negligent, he  is liable.

Another case may  be supposed:  There is a private charitable institution where beggars  live and are taken care of. One of the employees through negligence, while burning certain odds and ends, caused a neighboring nipa house to catch fire and to be burned down.   The owner or director of  the institution had been previously  warned of the danger  but he negligently failed to prevent the employee's negligent act. I believe the owner or director is liable, although the charitable institution is not one of the  cases enumerated in article 1903, My reason is the same:  The owner or director was really and actually negligent, though he is not presumed to be so.

The same reasoning and conclusion may be had in the case of  a private physician who  negligently fails to supervise his nurse whose negligence causes injury to a patient.

Other cases could  be supposed, but these four show that the enumeration of instances of  presumed negligence in article 1903 does not exclude cases of actual and proved negligence.

In the  present case it is  alleged in the complaint (and admitted in the motion to dismiss)  that defendant was negligent  in  not preventing the damage.  Therefore,  he is liable under article 1903.


Let me now take up the two cases relied upon by the majority: Johnson vs. David, and  Chapman vs. Underwood. Those two cases support my opinion that the defendant herein is liable.

In the first case, Johnson vs. David, 5 Phil., 663, it was found that the master had not been negligent either in the selection of or  vigilance over his cochero.  This Court said:

"The question presented by these facts is, Is the owner of a carriage driven by his cochero, liable for injuries growout of the negligence of said cochero, in  the absence of such owner ?

"No evidence was adduced during the trial of said cause to show that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the cochero or that he had any knowledge that such cochero was  incompetent or of the general  negligent character of said cochero, if such existed.  *   *  *"  (p. 666.)

In the other case, Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil., 374, it was also found  that the defendant, the owner of the automobile,  although present in the vehicle,  had  had no reasonable opportunity to prevent the driver's  negligent act.  This Court said:

"*  *  *  On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to  prevent the act  or the continuance,  injures a person or violates the criminal  law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.  The  act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

"In the case before us it does not appear from the record that from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury,  sufficient time intervened to give the  defendant  an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the  happening of the accident  was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver." (p. 377.)

It is thus  clear that this Court, in the two cases cited by the majority, did not hold the owner of the private vehicle responsible as he was not negligent either in employing or overseeing his driver.  These two cases impliedly hold that if the owner of a private vehicle is negligent, in the choice of or vigilance over his driver, he (the owner) is liable.  In the instant case, the defendant was negligent in these particulars, as  alleged in the complaint  and admitted by defendant in his motion to dismiss.


The defendant is liable not only as employer of the driver (Art. 1903)  but  also as owner  of  the automobile.  If we analyze Chapter II, Title XVI of Book IV  (Arts. 1902-1910) which treats of obligations arising from culpa or negligence, it will be noted that after enunciating the general principle of responsibility for culpa aquiliana (Art. 1902), the chapter proceeds to  regulate the liability  under two aspects: first, responsibilty for another person's  negligence (Arts. 1903-1904)  and obligation for damage caused by a person's property (Arts. 1905-1910). The defendant as the owner of the automobile is liable for damages, it being admitted in the motion to  dismiss that the driver acted with negligence, carelessness and imprudence.   (Arts. 1905-1910.) It seems unreasonable and unjust to exempt the owner of a private automobile simply  because he is not specifically listed in articles 1905-1910, ignoring the fact that he plainly comes within the fundamental principle of those articles. As Manresa says in commenting on the explosion of engines, excessive smoke, etc. in article 1908:   (Vol. 12, p. 640, Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil.)

"Respondiendo dicho  articulo al principio general que informa la materia objeto de este capitulo, de  que  aquel que cause a otro un daño por accion u omision, mediando culpa o negligencia, debe repararlo,  enumera algunos casos que pueden dar lugar a dicha reparation; pero debemos advertir que no son los unicos, y que la cita  de los cuatro  expresamente consignados en el referido articulo solo esta hecha demostrationis causa; y en su virtud, en todos aquellos otros que puedan suscitarse  en la prdctica, y  en que exista  la misma razon fundamental, habra lugar a la reparation, porque esta no depende de la expresion en la ley de las causas que la motivo, sino del principio esencial que antes hemos dicho, y por consiguiente, no  puede dejar de haber lugar a ella porque los casos o sus causas no figuran en el Codigo,

"Esta es la opinion general  de  los tratadistas,  y  lo contrario resultaria una injusticia irritante y  un desconocimiento de los derechos de los perjudicados, falto de toda razon juridica."   (Italics supplied.)

It will be observed that applying the principle of analogy, Manresa includes the ownership of other things than those enumerated in these articles because the same fundamental reason exists.  And we know that automobiles have killed and injured more people than  have dogs or ruinous buildings,  or  exploding engines or any of the things specified in articles 1905-1910.


Coming  now to a more detailed discussion  of analogy as applied in  this case, the principle of analogy should be distinguished  from liberal  interpretation.  Under the principle  of analogy, the complaint herein states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Professor Clemente  de Diego, an  outstanding authority on the Spanish civil law and author of several books on the civil law of Spain, has written  an essay on "La Analogia en el Codigo Civil Español" in  the Revista de Derecho Privado, (Vol. I, pp. 370-376, Sept. 1914).

After citing  certain provisions  to show  that analogy is authorized by the Spanish Civil Code,  he says:

"La misma prescription del articulo  6.o,  al invocar los principios  generales de  derecho  como fuente juridica en defecto de ley y de costumbre, comprueba la tesis, toda vez que el procedimiento analogico es el primer paso  en la indagacion y aplicacion de tales principios.

"La analogia forma parte de la dotacidn de medios  e instruments con que el poder judicial cuenta para el  ejercicio de su mision.  Tampoco de la interpretacion se dice nada en el titulo preliminar del Codigo;  solo se dan reglas mas alia con respecto a  testamentos y contratos, y ¿quien puede deducir de ahi que no es licito a los jueces interpretar las leyes?  La interpretacion y la analogia son  recursos naturales e intrinsecos elementos de la funcion de juzgar que no han menester de declaracion expresa del legislador  para ser licitamente empleados."

De Diego then proceeds to discuss the nature of analogy in part thus:

"¿Cual es  la naturaleza de  la analogia?  ¿Es un simple modo de interpretacion y aplicacion del derecho,  o es mas bien un procedimiento de produccion del derecho y en tal respecto verdadera  fuente juridica?   Entre  los autores antiguos era muy general confundirla con la interpretacion extensiva, sin pensar  en que en esta al fin hay una voluntad real del legislador, bien que expresada en formula estrecha e inadecuada, mientras que en la analogia falta completamente esa voluntad en cuanto que el legislador no previ6 el caso de que se trata.   Savigny y Thol, en las obras citadas en estos articulos, creen que interpretacion y analogia son dos cosas distintas.   Winscheid y Unger a cuya opinion se inclina Regelsberger entienden que es un procedimiento intermedio  entre  la   interpretaci6n  y la produccion del derecho, acercandose mas- a aquella la analogia de ley y a esta. la  de derecho.  Geny, que tan a fondo ha  estudiado la cuestion, la coloca decididamente fuera de la interpretacion, constituyendo un  procedimiento especial de investigacion cientifica del derecho y de alumbramiento de nuevas reglas juridicas, bien que tomando por hilo conductor el espiritu y disposiciones concretas de un derecho positivo.

"En la analogia, si es de ley,  sobre la base  de una disposicion legal se busca una solucion para un caso no comprendido en ella, solucion que habria dado el legislador si en el caso hubiera pensado; si es de derecho,  montandose  por encima de todo el derecho positivo y  guiada por los principios  informadores  de este, busca  una  solucion que no discrepe,  sino que este en armonia con el espiritu general del derecho.  Manteniendose la analogia dentro de este  y buscando tan solo las soluciones latentes en  el sistema de un derecho, hay que convenir en que es mas bien un procedimiento de aplicacion del derecho que de creacion del mismo.

"Pero no es pura aplicacion  del derecho ni mera  interpretation, porque esta no fija ni halla normas nuevas como la analogia.  En efecto, no es la norma misma  que  preve un caso la que se aplica a otro semejante,  sino el principio juridico fundamental  de  aquella norma,  y por tanto mas general y comprensivo del caso  previsto y del no previsto; ese principio en esta  determination  representa  una regla mas alta y extensa que la primitivamente formulada.  No es, ya lo hemos visto, pura aplicacion mecanica de  una norma existente a un caso en ella no comprendido, sino investigation  de  un principio mas elevado y mas  general  y obtencion de una regla aplicable a los dos casos semejantes.

"De todo lo dicho hasta aqui se deduce la diferencia  que corre entre la interpretacion  y  la analogia.   Como acertadamente dice Coviello, difieren  por sus supuestos, por su fin y por su resultado.   Por sus supuestos, porque la analogia supone la falta de norma expresa,  mientras la interpretacion supone su existencia.  Por  su fin, porque el de la analogia es la investigacion del priricipio juridico, del que emana la regla por aplicar al caso  previsto y al no previsto; el de la interpretacion es hallar el sentido de la norma.  Por sus resultados, porque la analogia fija una regla nueva, latente y no formulada en el sistema juridico, lo que no sucede en la interpretation.

*     *     *      *      *     *     *

"Claro es que tienen un elemento  comun, y esto es el motivo principal de la confusi6n general de  los dos procedimientos.  El elemento comun consiste en que en ambos se trata de un caso no comprendido en las palabras de la norma, y la diferencia esta en si esta o no previsto  en  el entendimiento del legislador; lo primero es mas visible ciertamente que lo segundo, y he aqui la razon de por que no escudrinando atentamente las cosas seamos dados a estimar por interpretacion extensiva lo que no es mas que  aplicacion analogica,"

It is  my humble  opinion, therefore,  that the principle of analogy, as conceived by the jurists, and as distinguished from liberal interpretation, would place the owner of a private  automobile within the "principio juridico fundamental" of liability  under Articles  1902-1910 of the Civil Code, although  such owner was not specifically foreseen by  the lawmaking body.  Examining articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code, one can see the general principle of responsibility  for culpa aquiliana in Article 1902,  and then such liability is applied to acts of dependents  (Articles 1903-4), and on  account of the ownership of property, whether the negligence is of the owner or of persons under him.  (Arts. 1905-1910).

As to the first kind (acts of dependents),  I reiterate the view that the enumeration in article 1903 (parents, guardians, directors of  establishments, the State  and teachers) is complete only as to those who are presumed to be negligent in the selection or supervision, but does not exclude those who, though not mentioned in Art. 1903,  are alleged and proved to be negligent in selection or supervision.  Such is the ratio decidendi in the two previous cases of Johnson vs. David and Chapman vs. Underwood.

Now then, by analogy as conceived by De Diego and other jurists, the employer of a driver of a private  automobile comes within the  fundamental principle of liability of one person  for another's acts because of negligence in selection or  supervision, even though such employer was not specifically foreseen by  the drafters of the Civil  Code.

For the same reason, the defendant is liable as the owner of the private automobile because he comes under the "principio juridico fundamental:  (of which De Diego speaks) regarding the liability for damages caused by one's property.  In this case, the automobile  pertained to defendant, and the defendant's driver was  admittedly negligent.

The rule of analogy eadem dispositio, ubi eadem ratio is plainly applicable to the present  case.  What is the reason for the general principle found in  the first paragraph of article 1903?   That a person is liable for the acts of those who are under his custody or in  his employment because of his negligence in not preventing the  damage.  As Manresa says:

"Desarrollando  en ellos  el Codigo los principios fundamentales de  dicha responsabilidad, la  impone  por  cuatro conceptos distintos, en  todos los  cuales son extraños al obligado los  actos u omisiones determinantes del daño reparable, pero en los que no deja de haber una  razon  o un motivo de culpa por su parte.

"Esos conceptos son;

"1. Por los danos y  perjuicios causados por las personas que el responsable tuviera bajo su custodia o dependencia.

*     *     *      *      *     *     *

"Por la misma razon,  aquel que por su industria, por su profesion o por otras circunstancias, tuviere alguna  otra persona a su servicio  o  bajo su dependencia  u custodia como sucede a los dueños o directores de un establecimiento o empresa respecto de sus dependientes, y a los maestros o directores de artes y oficios con relacion a sus alumnos y aprendices , debe exigir de ella que cumpla su cometido con la actividad y diligencia necesaria, y si por faltar a estas diera origen a un perjuicio, deben  venir obligados a indemnizar al  perjudicado aquel que tuviera a  su servicio a bajo su vigilancia al que causo el daño,  *  *  *"  (pp. 607, and 608-609.)

Now, then, the  reason for holding an employer in  business, that is, because he negligently failed to prevent the damage liable is  the same reason for holding an employer who is not in business, answerable, namely, that he negligently did not prevent the damage.  Indeed, there is greater reason for making the owner of an automobile for personal use responsible than the proprietor of a motor  vehicle devoted to business.  The former keeps a car for comfort and convenience, while the latter's maintenance of a motor ve hicle contributes to tjie economic  development of the country. Incidentally, it shoujd'be remembered that all governments  discourage the  luxury of  having private cars for pleasure.

At this juncture, it is well to remember that the rule declared in the first paragraph of article 1903 is found in all legal systems because it embodies  a general principle of justice, which is, that one must exercise due care in supervising a minor, ward or pupil, or in selecting and supervising an employee.

That par. 1 of article 1903 expresses  a general principle is seen when we read Manresa's comment as above quoted.

It will be noted that according to Manresa, the code develops four "fundamental  principles":   that a person  is liable when  he has others under his "custodia o dependencia"; and that such responsibility exists when a person by his  industry, profession, or other circumstances has others in  his  service  or employment.   There being  a general principle of  right, it should be given a wide application..  It is for  such  situation as  the present  that the Roman law ordered the  judge "ad similia procedere" because the law could not cover  all cases, and no exception or limitation should be made unless  it is clearly and expressly laid down by the law.  In this case, however, the majority makes an exception by mere inference and  implication, in open contravention of the general principle  under consideration, and resulting in a  manifest injustice because though the plaintiff has been permanently disabled for ordinary work, the  majority would have him obtain the indemnity from the  driver, Pedro Estrada,  who is presumably too poor to pay adequate damages. To compel plaintiff to seek an illusory remedy is a virtual denial of  that remedy. He  is placed between Scylla and Charybdis, for while he can not sue the employer, he can get no satisfaction from an impecunious driver.  As  Manresa says, one of the reasons for article 1903 is that employees do not usually have sufficient means for indemnity (comment on Arts. 1903 and 1904).

Moreover, the principal basis of the liability recognized in article 1903 is the negligence of the employer in failing to prevent  the damage  (Manresa's comment, supra).  But the majority in  exonerating the defendant simply because he is  not engaged in business would change the philosophy of article 1903 from that of negligence on the part of the employer in selecting and supervising the employee into that of economic benefit for the employer.  Such a shift of juridical foundation  of article 1903 is warranted lpy neither the letter nor the spirit thereof.  Nor can such alteration of philosophy be justified in any manner, for it is absolutely indifferent to the injured party whether or not the employer is engaged  in business; what is important to him and in the interest of justice is that he be indemnified by the person who has been  admittedly negligent in selecting the careless driver and in failing to prevent the damage.


Laws should  be progressively  construed, so that they may meet new conditions, so long as they fall within the general purpose of the legislature.

Thus we read in 26 R. C. L., pp. 778-9:

"24. Extension of Operation to New Cases and Subjects. A general law  may, and frequently does, originate in some  particular  case or class of cases which is in the mind of the legislature at the time, but so long as it is expressed in general language the courts cannot, in the absence of ex- press  restrictions, limit its application to these  cases, but must  apply it to all  cases that come within the terms and its general purpose and policy.  Hence statutes  framed in general terms apply to new cases  that arise, and  to new subjects that  are  created,  from time to  time, and which come  within their general scope and policy.  It is a rule of statutory construction that legislative  enactments  in general  and  comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects and business within their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage."

It is this progressive interpretation that keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory.  It is obvious that legislators want their creation to be a rule of conduct for an indefinite time.  To carry out that  desire of the legislator,  a statute should always be made adaptable by  the courts to  the changing conditions of  the social order.  A strict interpretation, such as the majority adheres to, would render a statute obsolete shortly after it has been enacted, for human progress is always on the wing.  Consequently, judicial statesmanship is ever mindful that time  and tide wait for no static, fossilized statute, which  is the  fetish of rigid, literal interpretation.  Courts are not museums for useless, anachronistic laws.

Therefore, while it is true that the  speeding  automobile was  not yet in existence in 1889, when the Spanish Civil Code was  promulgated,  nevertheless,  because  it  had  become such a public menace when this case arose, killing and maiming countless people  everywhere, it should  for this very reason be deemed to be within the rule of liability of the employer, whether the employee is driving it for the master's profit or pleasure.  This latter-day, speeding Juggernaut must somehow be curbed by making all owners responsible so that they will be careful in the choice and supervision of their drivers.

It is not quite accurate to say, as the majority does, that the Legislature has not seen fit to change the law  as interpreted by this Court.  Sec. 65, Act No. 3992 (the  Automobile Law) makes it the duty of the operator, in case  of an accident, to give the name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle, and it is also the duty of the owner Or driver of an automobile to notify the police.   Said statutory provision reads:

"Sec. 65. Duties in case of accident. In the event that any  accident should occur  as a  result of the operation of a motor vehicle upon a highway, the operator shall stop immediately, and, if requested by any person present, shall show his chauffeur's license, give his true name and address and also the true name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle.

"It shall  be the duty of the owner  or driver of a motor vehicle to notify at once  the  nearest peace officer, police station,  or municipality  when it comes  to  his knowledge that his vehicle has  been concerned in an accident."

It will thus be seen that recent legislation impliedly places upon both the owner and  the  driver  the duty  of preventing accidents by requiring the operator to give the name and address of  the owner,  and by making them report all such mishaps to the police  so that the peace officers may inquire into the liability, if  any, of either the owner or the driver, or both.  It should be  noted that the new  law applies to all owners and drivers of automobiles, whether for business or  not.

Therefore, even granting, arguendo, that article 1903 did not originally include automobiles not used for any enterprise, yet we must read said article in connection with the new Act (3992) and thus include automobiles within the scope of Art. 1903.


It is an  established rule of  interpretation of laws and contracts, that in case of doubt, that construction which is in favor of natural right should be adopted.   (Sec. 294, Act 190; sec. 66, Rule 123, Rules of Court.)

In the instant case, it is admitted by defendant, through his motion  to dismiss the complaint,  that he  has  not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of Pedro Estrada as his chauffeur; that he engaged a careless driver; that he, defendant, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage; that said Estrada,  in driving  the defendant's  automobile, through negligence, carelessness and  imprudence, caused said automobile  to bump and hit the plaintiff while  the latter was pouring water into the tank of the car belonging to plaintiff's employer;  and  that  plaintiff  suffered injuries which permanently disabled him to perform his ordinary work.   It is therefore the plaintiff's natural right to be indemnified either by  defendant or by the  driver Estrada or by both.   But the adoption of a strict interpretation of article 1903 leaves plaintiff helpless and dependent for the rest of his life, because he can not expect to  obtain adequate damages from Estrada, who may reasonably be presumed to be without means to indemnify  plaintiff. With due respect to my colleagues who signed the majority opinion, I can  not bring myself to turn a deaf ear to plaintiff's plea for relief.  I therefore unhesitatingly  follow a liberal interpretation of article 1903, considering  that the latter killeth and the spirit giveth life. To  prevent the enormous injustice of letting this victim, who  has been crippled for life, suffer  uncompensated from the defendant's own admited negligence in  selecting and supervising  a careless driver, I would  give efficacy to and apply  in this case the general principle laid down in the first paragraph of article 1903 which I again quote:

"La obligation que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los  actos  u omisiones  propios,  sino  por los de aquellas ^ersonas de quienes se debe responder."

In this attitude, I do not share the majority's  unfounded fear of invading the powers and prerogatives of the legislature because I think article 1903 plainly covers the present case, as already explained, and. because I  am firmly  persuaded that courts should breathe  into the  cold wording of codes  and statutes the warm spirit of right and justice and equity.  After all, the lawmaker can only frame the skeleton for the adjustment of rights among  the citizens, so that it is the proper and inherent function of the courts to import to that skeleton tle flesh and blood and sinew of the reality of social conditions.  Far from invading legislative powers, the courts in this manner fulfill their true mission by causing the legislature's theory to stir and pulsrate with the actuality of real problems in the relations among men, to the end that the abstract rule may become a living principle of effective justice.


Finally, this case raises the serious question of whether courts should-tie their hands in the administration of justice. This is a problem that affects the very raison d'etre of the  courts.  Fortunately, we have, among  other principles, that of analogy as presented by the jurists.  Such principle which according to De Diego "forma parte de la dotacion de medios e instrumentos con que el poder judicial cuenta para el ejercicio de su mision", is at the disposal of the courts to prevent a palpable injustice as in the present case where a poor man, disabled for  life because of negligence of others, entreats us to  afford him  relief.  Should we deny him redress because of a timid concept of the  judicial power?  Any restricted and inadequate view of the judicial function  is  not  in keeping  with  the role which the courts have always played in the whole civilized world. To mention but a few well-known examples:  the jus honorarium of the Roman praetor, the usus modernus pandectarum during the reception of the Roman law in Europe; and the decisions of the French courts which have for generations adapted the French Civil Code to changing conditions.  The Supreme Court of the Philippines has in the last four decades  likewise been  a  great factor in building up the Philippine legal system, in spite of many lapses into extreme legalism and technicality.  I venture to say that the majority  opinion  in  the present  case is one  of  those lapses.   The Spanish Civil  Code (Art. 6)  ordains that the courts, in case of doubt, should apply the general principles of right or "derecho" (as  distinguished from statute  or "ley"),  which include the norms of natural justice and good conscience.  In this task the courts  do not really "make laws."   Hence, in my humble  opinion, the  majority's fear of invading the powers and prerogatives of the legislature in this case, is groundless.  Courts do not legislate by merely digging  out of the bottom of primary  concepts of  right (or "derecho") a rule on which to base  a decision, just as a miner does not "make" the gold which he extracts from the subsoil.  The rule of analogy, as above set forth, is one of the tools with which courts bring out principles from the latent mass of right or "derecho".


Summarizing, I believe defendant is liable because:

1. Though he is not presumed to be negligent, yet he is admitted to have been actually negligent.  So this case is not excluded by article 1903.
   
   
2. The Johnson and Chapman cases  support  my theory because in those cases the defendants were exonerated on the ground that there was no proof they had, been negligent.
   
   
3. As owner of the private  automobile, he is liable under  articles 1905-1910,  which make  owners  of  things responsible for damages.
   
   
4. We must apply the following principles:
   
   (a)  The  rule of analogy, as distinguished from  liberal interpretation.
   
   (b)  Progessive interpretation of statutes,
   
   (c)  The  construction favoring a natural right.  Plaintiff being crippled for life, and the driver being too poor to pay adequate damages,  the owner  of the automobile should be solidarily liable with the driver.
   
   
5. This Court should not tie its hands in administering justice.  Its duty is to help build up the Philippine legal system by a broad view of its functions.

Therefore,  I believe the complaint  herein states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. My vote is for the reversal of the judgment appealed from.