The intervenor  and appellant,  the Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc., moves for a  reconsideration of the resolution of this Court promulgated on July 20,1940, in so far as said resolution declared the deed of  sale, Exhibit D, void  in its entirety and denied certain remedies prayed for.

In the decision of this Court under date of  January 29, 1940, this Court held the sale in question  void and of no effect in  so  far as  the  three daughters,  Maria  Cristina, Josefina and Anita Cuaycong, were concerned  because they had not taken part therein,  but valid as to the widow and other children of Cuaycong who had consented  to the transaction.  In said decision, this Court ordered intervenor to remove the buildings constructed on Lot 178-B.  Then, in the resolution dated July 20, 1940, this Court held that said contract was void in its entirety.  The portion  of said resolution whose reconsideration is sought reads: "And with respect to the widow of Cuaycong and his children of age, the sale was also void, because they alienated, without a previous partition of the hacienda, a definite and concrete part thereof, although they had only an abstract and  undivided  share of said property."

We shall discuss three questions raised in the motion for reconsideration:, (1) Was the consent of the three daughters, Maria Cristina, Josefina and Anita  Cuaycong necessary to the sale in question?  (2) What rights  did the intervenor acquire in this sale?  (3) Whether the distillery building and other improvements  constructed on Lot 178-B should be removed by the intervenor.


On the first question, we believe the consent of the three daughters above named was not necessary to the validity of the  sale in question.   Each  co-owner may alienate  his undivided or ideal share in the community.

Articles 392 and 399 of the Civil Code provide:

"Article 392.  There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of a thing or of a right belongs undivided to different persons.

"Art. 399. Todo condueño tendra la plena propiedad de su parte y la de los frutos y utilidades que le  correspondan, pudiendo en su ebnsecuencia enajenarla, cederla o hipotecarla, y aim sustituir otro en su aprovechamiento, salvo si se tratare de derechos personales.  Pero  el efecto de la enajenacion  o hipoteca con relacion a los condueños estara limitado a la porcion que  se le adjudique en la division al cesar la comunidad.

"Article 399.   Each one of the co-owners shall have  the absolute ownership of his part and that of the fruits and profits  pertaining thereto,  and he may therefore sell, assign or mortgage it, and even  substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are involved.  But  the effect of the alienation or  mortgage with respect to the co- owners shall be limited to the share which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."

Manresa has the following to say on this subject;

"Cada condomino  lo es del todo, y sobre el todo  ejerce derechos dominicales, pero al mismo tiempo es proprietario de una parte realmente abstracta, porque hasta que la division se ef ectue no queda aquella  determinada concretamente. Los derechos de los comuneros son, por lo expuesto, todo lo absolutos que el dominio requiere, puesto que aquellos pueden gozar y disponer de la cosa  comun, sin  otras Hmitaciones que las  de no  perjudicar  en  el ejercicio  de su derecho los intereses  generates de la comunidad, y poseen ademds la plena propiedad de su parte, que pueden enqjenar, ceder o hipotecar: parte que,  repetimos,  no  sera cierta hasta el momento  de cesar la comunidad.  El derecho de propiedad, por consiguiente, tal y como lo define el art. 348 del presente Codigo civil, con sus notas de absoluto y coil su caracter de individualizacion,  aparece ejercido en el condominio,  sin otra diferencia entre la propiedad singular y la comun  que la que acertadamente  establece el codigo portugues (arts. 2175 y  2176), al  decir 'que  el propietario singular ejerce de modo exclusivo sus  derechos, y el proprietario en comun los ejerce conjuntamente con los otros'; pero, añadiremos nosotros,  estdndole atribuidos al  condomino de modo individual sobre  su parte indivisa todos los  derechos  de tal propietario, a mas  del uso  y  disfrute de la cosa,  que es comun a todos los  propietarios."  (Italics supplied.)

"Each co-owner owns the whole, and over it he exercises rights of  dominion, but at the same time he is the owner of a share which is really abstract,  because until the division is effected, such share is not concretely determined.  The rights of the  co-owners  are, therefore, as absolute  as dominion requires,  because they may  enjoy and dispose of the common property, without any  limitation other  than that they should not, in the exercise of their Tight, prejudice the general interest  of the community, and possess, in addition, the full ownership of their share,  which  they  may alienate, convey or mortgage: ivhich share, we repeat, will not be certain until the community ceases.  The right  of ownership, therefore, as defined in Art. 348 of the present Civil Code, with its absolute features and its individualized character,  is exercised  in co-ownership,  with no other differences between  sole  and common  ownership  than  that which is rightly established by the Portuguese Code (Arts. 2175 and 2176), when it says 'that the sole owner exercises his rights  exclusively,  and  the co-owner exercises them jointly with the other co-owners'; but we shall add, to each co-owner pertains individually, over his undivided share, all the rights of the owner, aside from the use and enjoyment of the  thing,  which is common  to all  the co-owners." (Italics supplied.)

Manresa further says that in the alienation of his undivided or ideal share, a co-owner does not need the consent of the others.  (Vol. 3, pp. 486-487,3rd Ed.).

Sanchez Roman also  says  ("Estudios  de Derecho Civil", vol. 3, pp. 174-175):

"Muestra el 399 la integridad esencial del derecho de cada condueno en la portion mental que en  el condominio o comunidavd le corresponded."

*      *      *      *

"*   *  *  el ser condueño o coparticipe de una propiedad no significa quedar privado de todo reconocimiento de disposition de la cosa, del libre uso de su derecho dentro de las condiciones circunstanciales  de tal estado juridico, ni que para ejercer el uso y disfrute, o ei de libre disposition, sea preciso el previo consentimiento de t&dos los interesados."

"Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co-owner in the mental portion which belongs to him in the co-ownership or community.

*    *     *    *

"To be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such juridical status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal,  that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained.

According  to Scaevola   (Codigo  Civil,  vol. 7, pp. 154- 155) :

"2.a. Derecho absoluto de cada comunero respecto de su parte o cuota. Respecto de esta se equipara al propietario individual. Es, en efecto, un propietario singular, con todos los  derechos inherentes  a tal  condition.   La cuota del comunero, o sea la parte que idealmente le corresponde en la cosa o derecho comun  y que se halla representada por una cantidad determinada, es  suya y puede disponer de ella como le plazca, porque no afecta al derecho de los demas. Dicha cantidad equivale a un credito contra la cosa o derecho eomtin, propiedad particular de cada acreedor (comunero). Las diversas cuotas suponen  idealmente otras tantas  unidades de cosa o derecho, pertenecientes de modo singular a los various propietarios. o sea una unidad a cada dueño."

"2nd.  Absolute right  of each co-owner with respect to his part or share. With respect to the latter, each co-owner is the same as an individual owner.  He is a singular owner, with all the  rights inherent in such condition.  The share of the co-owner, that  is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing  or right and is represented  by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does  not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is equivalent to a credit against the common thing or right, and is  the private property of each creditor (co-owner).   The various shares ideally signify as many units of thing or right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a unit for each owner."

It follows that the consent of the three daughters Maria Cristina, Josefina and Anita  Cuaycong to the sale in  question was not necessary.


The second question is: What rights did the intervenor acquire in this sale?  The answer is: the same  rights as the grantors had as co-owners in an ideal share equivalent iii value  to  10,832  square meters  of the  hacienda.  No specific portion, physically identified, of the hacienda has been sold, but only an abstract and undivided share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the common property.  What portion of the hacienda has been sold will not be  physically and concretely ascertained  until  after the division.  This sale is therefore subject to the result of such partition, but this condition  does not render the contract void, for  an alienation by the co-owner of his ideal share is permitted by law, as already indicated.  If in the partition this lot 178-B should be adjudicated to the intervenor, the problem would be simplified; otherwise, the sellers would have to deliver to the intervenor another lot equivalent in value to Lot No.  178-B.   Incidentally, it should  be stated that according to Rule 71, sec. 4, of the new Rules of Court, regarding partition of real estate, the commissioners on partition shall set apart the real property "to the several parties in such lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to  the improvements, situation and  quality of  the  different  parts thereof."    (Italics supplied.)  Consequently, without deciding that the commissioners on partition must assign Lot 178-B to intervenor, we deem it proper to state that if in the partition proceedings, the  commissioners should set apart said lot to intervenor, they would be acting within the letter and spirit of the provision, just quoted, of Rule 71, sec. 4; and  that they will probably make such adjudication.

In  the  Sentence  of December 29,  1905,  the  Supreme Tribunal  of  Spain declared that the alienation,  by a co-owner, of either an abstract or a concrete part of  the property owned in common does not mean the cessation of the ownership.  Said sentence held:

"No es  de estimar el primer motivo, porque tal  estado de derecho no desaparece, ni siquiera se desvirtua, con respecto a los copropietarios entre si, por haber ambos, o alguno de ellos,  ejecutado actos  que pudieran  reputarse no comprendidos en las facultades inherentes a la administracion, unicas que de mutuo acuerdo se habian conferido en determinados bienes, porque si bien todo condueño puede enajenar, ceder o hipotecar la propiedad  de su parte, el efecto de tal enajenacipn esta limitado, con referenda a los condueños, a la porcion que se le adjudique ulteriormente, conforme al articulo 399 del Codigo civil, y no implica la cesacion de la comunidad, ya  se refiera la venta a parte abstracta de los bienes,  ya a  parte  concreta y determinada  de los mismos, porque esto  ultimo, que podra afectar a la forma  y condiciones con  que en su dia haya de  practicarse la particion, no altera  en  manera alguna la situacion juridica de  los que poseen  colectivamente, mientras no se realice la division de la cosa comun, que  se declara no haber tenido efecto." (Italics supplied.)

"The first  assignment of error cannot be sustained, because such legal status does not disappear, nor is it impaired, with  respect to the co-owners between themselves  simply because both or either of them executed acts which  may be considered as beyond the powers inherent in administration, the only powers which by mutual agreement had been  conferred as to certain properties, inasmuch as although every co-owner may  alienate, grant, or mortgage  the ownership of his share, the effect of such alienation is limited, with reference to the co-owners, to the portion  which  may be adjudicated to him later, according to Art 399 of the Civil Code, and does not imply the  cessation of the community, whether the  sale refers to an abstract part of the property, or to a concrete and definite part thereof, because though in the latter case the form and conditions of the subsequent partition may  be effected, nevertheless, the juridical situation of the collective owners is not in any way altered so long  as the partition of the common property is not carried out, which is  declared not to have taken place."   (Italics supplied.)

Applying the above doctrine to the instant case, it cannot be said that the sale of Lot 178-B to the intervenor had the effect of partitioning the hacienda and adjudicating that lot to the intervenor.   It merely transferred to the intervenor an abstract share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of said hacienda, subject to the result of a subsequent partition. The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a  concrete portion of the hacienda  does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.  "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest."   (When a thing is  of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force  as it can have.") It is plain that Margarita G. Vda. de  Cuaycong and her children  of age intended to sell to intervenor no more than what they could legally and rightfully dispose of, and as they could convey only their ideal share, equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the hacienda,  that ideal share alone must be deemed to have been the subject-matter of the sale in question.  They are presumed to know the law that before partition, conventional or judicial,  no  coowner may dispose of any physically identified portion of the common property; and that any conveyance by a coowner is subject to the result of a subsequent partition.  This interpretation of the coritract does no harm to the minor daughters, as the sale in question is subject to the result of the partition which intervenor may demand.

As a successor in  interest to an abstract or undivided share of the sellers,  equivalent  in value to 10,832 square meters of the property owned in common, the intervenor has the  same right as its predecessors in interest to demand partition at any time, according to article 400  of the Civil Code which reads:

"Art.  400.   Ningun copropietario  estara  obligado  a permanecer en la comunidad.   Cada uno de  ellos  podra pedir en cualquier tiempo que se divida  la cosa comun.

"Esto no obstante, sera valido el pacto de conservar la cosa indivisa por tiempo determinado, que no exceda de diez anos.  Este plazo podra prorrogarse por nueva convencidn."

The third  and remaining  question is whether  the distillery building and other improvements constructed on Lot 178-B should be removed by the intervenor.  It is clear that the sale in question being  valid, subject to the result of the partition which the intervenor  has a right to demand as a coowner, the intervenor is  a builder in good faith. Hence, if in the partition already discussed, Lot 178-B should not be adjudicated to the intervenor as a coowner, then article 361 of the Civil Code would have to be applied.  Said  article provides:

"Art. 361.  El dueno  del terreno en  que se edificare, sembrare o plantare de buena fe, tendra: derecho a hacer suya la obra, siembra o plantaci6n, previa la indemnizacion establecida en los articulos 453 y 454, o a obligar al que fabric6 o planto a pagarle el precio del terreno,  y al que sembro" la renta  correspondiente."

Therefore, upon reconsideration we hereby  declare  the deed of sale, Exh. D. valid, binding as  it is,  not only upon the widow and her children who consented thereto but also upon her three  minor daughters  Maria Cristina, Josefina and Anita Cuaycong.   It is hereby further adjudicated that the intervenor as a coowner has a right to demand partition; that if in  the partition, Lot No. 178-B should not be adjudicated to the intervenor, then the rights of the parties concerned should be  governed by  article 361 of  the Civil Code, the intervenor being a builder in good faith; and that consequently, our order in the decision of January 29, 1940, requiring intervenor to remove  the  buildings  constructed on said lot should be and is hereby cancelled arid  withdrawn.

So ordered.

Yulo,  C. J., Horrilleno, Ozaeta, and Paras, JJ.,  concur.

MORAN J.;

I concur in the result by  analogy with the doctrine laid down in Teves de Jacosalem vs. Nicolas Rafols, 2  Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 31.