[ G.R. No. 46593, February 03, 1940 ]
RAMON TORRES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND JOSEGALLOFIN, ASACTINGCOLLECTOR OFCUSTOMSOF CEBU, PETITIONERS, VS. TAN CHIM, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
Tan Chim,the petitioner here,arrived at theport of CebuonJanuary 18,1937, and soughtadmission as a minor son of AlejandroTan Bangco.Afterhearing, the Board of SpecialInquirydecided todeny himentry on the groundthatthe status of hisfather hadnotbeen passed
upon by the Secretary of Labor.Apetition for habeas corpus was filedwith the Courtof First Instance of Cebu(civil case No. 308), which ruled that Alejandro TanBangco was a Filipino citizenjussoli,havingbeen borninManila onFebruary27, 1893. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals, by
decision ofFebruary 23, 1939, upheld the conclusion of thelower court and declined to overrule the doctrine inRoa vs. Collector ofCustoms, 23 Phil., 315, in the following commendable language:
Itis urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that we reexamine and reverse the doctrine laid down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, because the law,we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by tfcis court in that case.A suggestion of this kind should be sympathetically received but for the fact that the principle of territoriality or jussoli adopted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, stipra, does not have to be set asideby this Court for the reason that that principle is no longer predominating inthis jurisdiction afterthe taking effect of the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary principle of jussanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar should be decided on anentirely different principle because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we are of the opinion that this cannot be done unlesswe give are troactive effect to the Constitution.We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the authority of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, for the following reasons:
Our attention has been called to the case of Paz Chua vs.Secretary ofLabor,R. G.No. 46451,promulgated September 30, 1939, where we affirmed the decision of the Court ofFirstInstanceof Manila denying the writ of habeas corpus and holding that the applicants therein were not entitled toenter and reside in the Philippines on the basis of Philippine citizenship.Perusal ofour decision in that case will show that the factual and legal environment there was wholly different from that in the case at bar, as may be seen from the concluding paragraph of our decision in that case:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals isaffirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs.So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
CONCURRENTE EN EL RESULTADO:
VILLA-REAL, M.,
Al cesarla guerraquehubo entre los Estados Unidos de America y Espana, estas dos naciones celebraron en 10 de diciembre de 1898 un tratado de paz, que sellamo "Tratado de Paris," en cuyo articulo IX, parrafo 2.°, se provee que "Los derechos civiles y la condition politica de los habitantes naturales de los territorios aqui cedidos a los Estados Unidosse determinaranpor el Congreso." De acuerdo con dicho convenio,el Congresodelos Estados Unidos, por Ley de 1.° de julio de 1902, denominada "Ley de Filipina?/' dispuso en suarticulo4que"Todos los habitantes de las Islas Filipinas que residanenellas y que el oncede abril de mil ochocientos noventa ynueve eran subditos espanoles residentes en dichas Islas,y sus hijos nacidos con posterioridad a aquella fecha, seran considerados y tenidos como ciudadanos de las IslasFilipinas y como tales con derecho a la protection delos Estados Unidos exceptuandose aquellos quehayanelegido conservar su lealtad a la Coronade Espana, de acuerdo con las disposiciones del Tratado de Paz entre losEstadosUnidos y
Espana firm ado en Paris el diez de diciembre de mil ochocientos noventa y ocho.
Surge ahora la cuestion de siAlejandro Tan Bangco, padre del aqui recurrido,Tan Chim, era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899. En 27 de febrero de 1893, en que nacid en Manila, Islas Filipinas, el referido Alejandro Tan Bangco,imperabanenellas la soberania espanola y sus leyes.En dicho ano 1893 ya estaba envigor el Cddigo Civil, habiendose extendido su vigeneia a estas Islas por realdecreto de 1.° de julio de 1889.Elarticulo 17, parrafo 1.°, del citado Cddigo dispone que son espanoles "las personas nacidasen territorio espanol;" pero enel parrafo 2.° de su articulo 18 impone la condicion de que "Para que los nacidos de padres extranjeros en territorio espanol puedan gozar del benencio que les otorga el numero 1.° del articulo 17, sera requisite indispensable que los padres manifiesten, en la manera y ante los funcionarios expresados en el articulo19, queoptan,a nombre de sus hijos, por lanacionalidad espanola, renunciando a toda otra." El referido articulo 19 del mismo Codigoestatuye en su parrafo 2.o que "Los que se hallen en el Reino haran esta manifestacidn ante elencargado del Registro civil del pueblo en que residieren; los que residan en el extranjero, ante uno de los Agentes consulares o diplomaticos del Gobiernoespanol, y los que se encuentren en unpais en que el Gobierno no tenga ningun Agente, dirigiendose al Ministrode Estado en Espana." No habiendose establecido en Filipinas el Registro civil, el padre de Alejandro Tan Bangco nopodiacumplir con el requisiteexigido enel parrafo 2.° del articulo18arriba mencionado para que su hijo, nacido en territorio espanol,adquiriese la ciudadanfa espanola.Tampoco pudohaberlo hecho el mismo Alejandro Tan Bangco, de acuerdo con el parrafo 1.° del citado articulo19, que dispone que "Los hijos de un extranjero nacidos enlosdominiosespanoles, deberanmanifestar dentro del ano siguiente asu mayor edad o emancipacidn, si quieren gozar de la calidad de espanoles que les concede el art.17"; puesto que, en primer lugar, no existia, como ya hemos dicho, el Registro civil, y, en segundo lugar, an tea de que entrara en vigor la Ley de 1.° de julio de 1902, que determina la condicion politicadelos habitantes naturales de estas Islas, derogando implicitamente las disposiciones del Codigo Civil sobre la materia, el citado padre del recurrido era menor de edad yno podia cumplir los mencionados requisites. La manifestacion ante el encargado del Registro civil, exigida en el citado parrafo 2.° del articulo 18, en relacidn con el articulo 19,del Codigo Civil, siendo indispensable, yno habiendose establecidoaqui el referido Registro civil, el inciso 1.° del articulo 17del propio Codigo no tuvo efectividad en cuanto a extranjeros nacidosen estas Islas durante el regimene spañol.
Ladisposicionl.mde lastransitorias delCodigo Civil dispone que "Se regiran por la Iegislacion anterior al Codigo los derechosnacidos, segun ella, de hechos realizados bajo su regimen, aunque el Codigo los regulede otro modo o nolos reconozca. Pero si elderecho apareciere declaradoporprimera vez en elCodigo, tendra efecto desde luego, aunque el hecho que loorigine se verificarabajo la legislacidn anterior, siempre que no perjudique a otro derecho adquirido, de igual origen."El nacimiento deAlejandro Tan Bangco en 1893, habiendo ocurrido bajo el regimen del Codigo Civil, no puede aplicarsea el la Iegislacion anterior, pues esta,segundicha disposiciontransitoria, so1o regia losderechos nacidos de hechos realizadosbajosu regimen;por consiguiente, ni bajo la legislacidn anterior pudoel tantasveces mencionadoAlejandro TanBangco adquirir la nacionalidad espanola.
No habiendo Alejandro Tan Bangco adquirido la nacionalidad espanola por su mero nacimientoenterritorio espanol, no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899, y, por consiguiente, suhijo, el aquirecurrido, Tan Chim, no se hizo subdito filipino al entraren vigor elarticulo 4.° de la Ley del Congreso del.«de julio de 1902 antes citado, y no lo era cuando Wego al puerto de Cebu el 18 de enero de 1937.
Esta Corte, sin embargo, en una larga serie de decisiones, siendo la mas importante de las cualesla recaida en el asunto de Roa contra Administrador Insular de Aduanas (23 Jur. FiL, 321), citada con aprobacidn en otra decisidn posterior, recafda en el asunto de Haw contra Administrador de Aduanas (59 Jur. Fil., 646), aplicando la teoria de "jus soli" ha sentado invariablemente la doctrinade que el mero nacimiento de un extranjero en las Islas Filipinas antes del establecimiento del Commonwealth le hacia ciudadanofilipino. Esta doctrinaha sido por largo tiempo la regla por la cual se han guiado los extranjeros, sobre todo los chinos, al establecerse enestas Islas y dedicarse al comercio, a la industria y a la agriculture, contribuyendo con ello, en no poco, al desarrollo de las tres fuentes principales de la riqueza nacional.Teniendo en cuenta estosbeneficios, y el espiritu liberal que informa la reciente legislation sobre naturalization,haciendo mas facil y expedita la adquisicionde la nacionalidadfilipina por extranjeros que pueden contribuir al desarrollo cultural y material del pais, y noexistiendo ninguna razon de orden social, politico o moral que aconseje y justifique la alteracion de la doctrina, no creemos necesario hacerlo ahora.Creemos con el sabio jurista americano Cardozo que"Stare decisis is atleast the every day working rule of our law", y que "when a rule after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or withthe social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frankavowal and full abandonment." (Cardozo, The Natureof the Judicial Process.) En el presente caso no hay nada que sea incompatible con la justicia ni con el bienestar social. Imperial, M., disidente:
Concurro con la opinion del Magistrado Sr. Villa-Real de que "No habiendo AlejandroTan Bangco adquirido la nacionalidad espanola por su mero nacimiento en territorio espanol,no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899, y, por consiguiente, su hijo, el aqui recurrido, Tan Chim, no se hizo subdito filipino al entrar en vigor el articulo 4.° de la Ley del Congreso de 1.° de julio de 1902 antes citado, y no lo era cuandoIego al Puerto de Cebu el 18 de enero de 1937."
Disiento de la conclusion a que llega la mayoria al efecto de que el recurrido, como hijo menor de edad deAlejandro TanBangco, tienederecho aentrar y residir enel pais porque su padre riacio en Manila, Filipinas, aplicando asi el principio del jus soli y siguiendo la doctrina enunciada en los asuntos de Roa contra El Administrador de Aduanas (23Jur. FiL, 321), y Haw contra El Administrador de Aduanas,(59 Jur. Fil., 646).En el primero de dichos asuntos este Tribunal declaro que Roa era ciudadano filipino por raz6n de su nacimiento fundandose en la doctrina que sento el Tribunal Supremo de los EstadosUnidos en el asunto de United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 U. S., 649) de quesonciudadanos americanos los nacidos en territoriode losEstados Unidos de conformidadcon la Enmienda XIV de la Constitution de los Estados Unidos. La doctrina asi enunciada seaplic6 por este Tribunal no so1o en el asunto de Haw contra El Administrador de Aduanas sino tambien en los de Estados Unidos contra Ang (36 Jur.Fil., 915), y Estados Unidos contraLim Bin (36 Jur. Fil.,985). A mi juicio taldoctrina no halla apoyo en las leyes vigentes porque el articulo 1 de la XIV Enmienda de la Constitucidn de los EstadosUnidos, que provee que las personas nacidas o naturalizadas en los EstadosUnidos, y sujetas a la jurisdiccion de los mismos, sonciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y del Estado donde residen, no rige en este pats (U. S. contra Dorr, 2 Jur. Fil., 282, 195 U. S., 138,49 Law. ed. 128, 24 Sup.Ct. Rep.,808, 11 Jur. Fil.. 728; U. S. contra Bull, 15 Jur.Fil., 7). El hijo de padres chinos que no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899 no puede invocar la nacionalidad filipina por el solo hecho de haber nacido en el pais, porque no le alcanzan lasdisposiciones del articulo 2 de la LeyJones, Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del 29 de agosto de 1916.(Paz Chua contra El Secretario del Trabajo, R. G. No. 46451.)
Las razones que expone la decisionde la mayoria para liberalizar la aplicacion dela Ley de Exclusion de ciudadanos de la Republica de China son consideraciones que atanen al poder legislativeLa facultad de los tribunales se limita a aplicar la ley. Si los chinosnacidos en Filipinas o los hijos menores de padres chinosnacidos en el pafs deben ser considerados como ciudadanosfilipinos con derecho a entrar y residir en el, es cosa que debe decidirlo la Asamblea Nacional mediantela promulgacidn de una ley adecuada.
DISSENTING:
MORAN, J.:
With the recent unanimous decision of this Court in Paz Chua vs. Secreary of Labor, G. R. No. 46451, I thought the doctrine in the Roa case hasbeenimpliedly reversed, for there is between that case and the present one, no fundamental difference in facts that maywarrant the application of a different principle.But the majority decisionin the present caseabandons, in effect, the doctrine laid down in the Chua case and revives the Roa ruling.This, I fear, may be the ignis fatuus which the majority precisely sought to avoid.
There can be no question that theRoa ruling is erroneous. The second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provides:
The basis of the Roa doctrine was the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Courtin U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S., 649, to the effect that persons born in the United States were citizens thereof under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.Section 5, however, of the Jones Law provides:
The majority says nothing in support of thecorrectness of the Roa ruling, and seekssimply to justify its continued observance upon the fact that it "had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," and that "not only this Court but also inferiorcourts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executiveand administrative agencies of theGovernment had theretofore abided by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it."I do not yield to this judicial policy. If we haveinduced the Governmentand thepublic to follow and accept an error for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them tofollow and accept the same error once discovered. The ruleof stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error (15 C. J., p. 918).It is the duty of everycourt to examine its own decisionswithout fear and to revise them without reluctance (Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N. Y., 257).As was well said in a case, "Ihold it to be the duty of this court freely to examine its own decisions, and, when satisfied that ithas fallen into a mistake, to correct the error byoverruling its own decision.An acknowledged error must be more venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any series ofconcessions or extra-judicial resolutions, or even by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the principleof staredecisis.'* (Leavitt v. Blatchaford, 17 N. Y., 521,523.)"Precedents are to be regarded as the great storehouse of experience;not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation." (Per Bartley, C. J., in Leavittv. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.)Their "authority must often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak witha voice responsive to these demands." (Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.)
Indeed, I can find no serious obstacle to the propriety of correctingthe erroneous ruling laid down inthe Roa case. The doctrineof stare decisis is not the equivalent of res adjudicata (15 C. J., p. 919; Walpole v. Cholmondeley, 7 T. R. 138,148, 101Repr. 987). The first relates to legal principles; the latter, to specific facts.Accordingly, such persons who, like Roa, have secured judicial declaration of their status,are protected by the rule of res adjudicata; and those who, similarly situated, have not obtained such judicial declaration, but have acquired tangible rights in theexerciseof their bona-fidecitizenship,may, if such rights arestill existing, be saved from the effects of the reversal.If we agree that the Roa rulingis erroneous, the most logical course to follow is to reverseit butsaving, as a matter of equity, the vested rights above mentioned.
It is regrettable to note that, while the majority decision upholds the Roa doctrine, it, at the same time, tears into pieces the principle upon which the ruling is founded, leaving thus such ruling without foundation whatsoever either in law or in logic.This is, certainly, worse than reversing it. The majority says: "When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually, but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned inthe treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter going to China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here" (Underscoring mine.)TheRoa doctrine applies the principle of jus soli embodied in the 14th Amendmenttothe UnitedStates Constitution, andsuch principle, by its very nature, was never limited in its application to aliens born in the Philippines before the advent of the American sovereignty.For instance, in Haw v. Collector of Customs, 59 Phil., 612, to which said principle was applied,thepetitioner therein wasborn on February 13, 1916, and was held to be a Filipino citizen by the mere fact of birthin thiscountry.It is, therefore, obvious that the principle underlying theRoaruling,asoriginallyannouncedby this Court andconstrued in subsequent cases, applies not only to aliens born in the Philippines prior to the ratificationof the treaty of peace, but also to those born thereafter.The place, not the time, of birth was the decisiveconsiderationin thedetermination ofcitizenship thereunder.The restatement, therefore, of the Roa doctrine by the majority, confiningits application to aliens born before the ratification of the treaty ofpeace, and excluding therefrom those born thereafter, is a new principle which finds absolutely no support either in law or in reason.
With due respect to my brethren in the majority, I would say that when this Court continues to uphold a ruling known to be erroneous, with no plausible excuse therefor but public acquiescence therein, it may soon find itself compelled to make more mistakes in an effort to justify the previous ones.We may thus be building one error uponanother until, by their accumulation, we shall come to a point when going furtherwould beperilous and turningbackward impossible.
I therefore vote to reverse the Roa doctrine and the decision of the Court of Appeals based thereon.
Judgment affirmed.
"But theappellant impugns the soundness of thedoctrine laid down in the foregoing decisions and urgesus to overrule them.We donot think itnecessary to enter upon a discussionof the alleged misapplication of the law or erroneous conclusions reached inthecases referred to. It isour understanding that the decisions criticized are conclusive and bindinguponthisCourtand all other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as expressing the lawon thesubjectstreated therein.The rule ofstare decisis and"a becoming modesty" which demands of inferior courts 'conscious realization ofthe positionthat theyoccupy intheinterrelation andoperationof the integratedjudicial system ofthenation,"compels us to respect and follow these decisions, while unreversed, regardless of the divergencies of opinion that aresaid to existabouttheircorrectness (ThePeople of thePhilippine Islands and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners, vs. Jose0. Vera,Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mariano Cu Unjieng,respondents, G.R.No.45685,November 16, 1937).This should be our norm of conduct at least where the decisions sought to bedisregarded are not manifestly wrong, unjust or contraryto law, and where a departure therefrom mightonly result in 'going from one doubtful rule to another"A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities: Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner)was born here in 1893, both before the advent of American soverignty;(2)the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers, Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treatyof peace between the United States and Spain,both were minor residents of the Philippines; and(4)both, in their boyhood, went to Chinaf or the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines.The dissimilarities are: (1)Roa returned to the Islands after attaining the age of maturity, whereas TanBangco returned to this country when still a minor; and(2) the father of Roa was domiciled inthe Philippines until the year 1895 when hewent toChina and never returned, dying therein 1900, whereas, in the present case the record is silent on this point.The similarities are very close and the dissimilarities are in favor of Alejandro Tan Bangco. The Solicitor-General does not dispute the analogy and evidently yields to the proposition that if the doctrine in the Roa case, which has been followed in many subsequent cases, principally in Vano vs. Collectorof Customs (23 Phil., 480); United States vs. Ong Tianse(29Phil.,332); United States vs. Ansr (36 Phil., 858); United States vs. Urn Bin (36 Phil., 927); Go Julian vs. Government of the Philippines Islands (45 Phil., 290); Haw. vs.Collector of Customs,(59 Phil., 612), is to be adhered to, thenAlejandro Tan Bangco isa Filipino citizen, and consequently, the petitioner, who is his minor child, is also a Filipino.
Itis urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that we reexamine and reverse the doctrine laid down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, because the law,we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by tfcis court in that case.A suggestion of this kind should be sympathetically received but for the fact that the principle of territoriality or jussoli adopted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, stipra, does not have to be set asideby this Court for the reason that that principle is no longer predominating inthis jurisdiction afterthe taking effect of the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary principle of jussanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar should be decided on anentirely different principle because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we are of the opinion that this cannot be done unlesswe give are troactive effect to the Constitution.We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the authority of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, for the following reasons:
In Yu Ching Po vs. Gallofin, R. G.No. 46795, promulgated onOctober 6, 1939,we held that a person born in the Philippines ofa Filipino-mestizofatherand amestiza Chinesemother,notwithstandingvagueness in point of paternity and maternity,because according to our decision, "no dicen si es hijo de padre filipinoy de madre china, 6 si la es de padre chino y de madre filipina", is a Filipino citizen, for the reason that under Article 17, paragraph 1 of theCivil Code, which was in force in that year, he was a Spanish subject, which nationality he conserved.
- Asalready observed, the present case is similar to Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, in that the facts determinative ofcitizenship inboth relate to events which hadtaken place beforetheadventof Americansovereignty. Wecannot reverse thedoctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, if to convert Roainto an alien, after our finalpronouncement in 1912 that he was a Filipino.If we depart from the rule there established notwithstanding thealmost-exact analogybetweenthetwo cases, nothingshortof legalanachronism would follow, andwe shouldavoidthis result.
- While weprofess no "idolatrousreverence for precedents",(Philippine Trust Co.vs.Mitchel,59 Phil., 30), we should notoverlook the fact that the rule laid down in the Roa case had been adhered toandaccepted for more than 20 years before the adoption ofourConstitution; not only this Court but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; theexecutiveand administrative agencies of the Government had theretofore abided by it; andthe general public had acquiesced in it. Withal, our decisionsshould not be, as to a given period of time, upon the sameor similar factsand underthe same or similar circumstances, as fluctuating astoengender the phenomenon described by Mr.JusticeThompson, of the Supreme Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus.(Perkins v. Clements etals. 1 Pat. & H. (Va.)153.)
- When in Roa vs.Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, VOLUME 69.523 that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of thetreatyofpeace between theUnited States and Spain, of Chinesefatherand Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentionedin the treaty of peace, although in theirminority; thereafter, goingto China for thepurpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here.This was the rule at the time of the adoption of our Constitution.With it, the bench and the bar werefamiliar.The members of the Constitutional Conventionwere also aware of thisrule, andin abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the predominatingprinciple in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa,werecitizensof thePhilippines byjudicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.This is apparent from the following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:
"Delegate Aruego. Mr. President, may I just have one question?May I askMr. Roxas if, underthis proposition that youhave,all children born in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution was included?
"DelegateRoxas. No,sir: that istosay, ifthey are citizens in accordance withthepresent law, they willbe citizens. "DelegateAruego. But as Isaid they are citizensby judicial decisions.
"DelegateRoxas. they are citizensnow by judicial decisions, they will becitizens.
"DelegateAruego. I should like to make it clear that wearevoting on the proposition so that it will includeall those born inthePhilippines, regardless of their parentage,because I have heard some objectionshere to the incorporation intoto of the doctrineofjussoli.There are many who do not want to include, as citizens, children of Chinese parents, but they are included inthe propositionwe are voting upon * * *
"I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if that proposition would make Filipino citizens of childrenof Chinese parents born last year or this year.
"Delegate Roxas. No, because by the laws of the Philippine Islands, they are not Filipino citizens now." (Record of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session of November 26, 1934.)- In the caseof Commonwealth of the Philippines vs. Gloria Baldello, G. R. No. 45375, promulgated April 12, 1939, we heldthat a Filipinowoman,abandoned by her husbandwho was a native of Mexico but who was neither a Mexican nor American citizen, retained her Filipino citizenship, and inarriving at this conclusion, we said that, "our opinion findscorroboration in the ruleindicated in Roavs.Collector of Customs (23Phil., 315, 324-32-5), which is now a legal provision embodied in paragraph 7, Article I, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, to the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying aforeigner belonging to a nation the lawsof which do not allow her to acquire the husband'snationality." It should be noted that in this Baldello case we relied however indirectly onRoa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, andcited Commonwealth Act No. 63, which Act is but a partial expression of the modern tendency in theUnited States to accord distinctpersonalityto married woman by providing that the marriageof anAmerican woman to a foreigner does not operate loss ofAmerican citizenship.(Vide Act of Congressof September 22, 1922, 42 U. S. St-atr-L. p. 1022, ch. 411, sec. 3, 8U. S.C. A. sec. 9; Act of Congress of March,1931, 46 U. S. St.-at-L. p. 1511, ch. 442,sec. 4.)
Our attention has been called to the case of Paz Chua vs.Secretary ofLabor,R. G.No. 46451,promulgated September 30, 1939, where we affirmed the decision of the Court ofFirstInstanceof Manila denying the writ of habeas corpus and holding that the applicants therein were not entitled toenter and reside in the Philippines on the basis of Philippine citizenship.Perusal ofour decision in that case will show that the factual and legal environment there was wholly different from that in the case at bar, as may be seen from the concluding paragraph of our decision in that case:
"Siendo Chua Uang de padres chinos y teniendo la misma nacionalidad que estos por ser entonces menor de edad, es indudable que cuando fue a China a la edad de 13 anos, que debid haber sidoen 1927,ella continuaba siendo ciudadanaChina(Articulo 2,parrafo2, Capitulo II, de las Revised Nationality Laws of China, editada por FlournoyHudson,publicada por Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, citada enlapagina 9 del alegato del Procurador General). Cuandocontra jo matrimonio cuatro anosdespuesconYao Tian,otrociudadano de la Republica de China, ella, en el supuesto de que tenia nacionalidad distinta, siguio la de su esposo, a tenor del parrafo 1 de la citada compilation de leyes de China. Chua Uang nopuedeinvocarlanacionalidad filipinapor solo hecho de habernacido en el paisporque no le alcanzanlas disposiciones del articulo 2 de la Ley Jones, Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del29de agosto de 1916, porque no era subdita espanola el 11 de abril de 1899."We have not failed to reflect on the far-reaching consequences of our decisioninthis case, but considering the fact that the mother of Alejandro Tan Bangco, who is the father of the hereinapplicant, is aFilipina, and, under our Constitution, Alejandro Tan Bangco wouldhave the option, upon reaching majority, to adopt Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution) ;considering the benignpolicy of giving greater politicalrecognition to women, to the extent that in the United States marriage of an American woman to aforeigner doesnotoperate loss of her citizenship; and in view of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which is indicativeof thispoliticalrecognition, however partial, accorded to Filipino women;considering, further, the limited number of people who would be benefited by the application of the doctrineas qualified in Roa vs. Collector of Customs; and the reasonatthe bottom of Commonwealth vs. Gloria Baldello,and Yu Ching Po vs. Jose Gallofin, supra, we are of the opinionand sohold that the applicant, being a minor child of AlejandroTan Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals isaffirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs.So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL, M.,
Al cesarla guerraquehubo entre los Estados Unidos de America y Espana, estas dos naciones celebraron en 10 de diciembre de 1898 un tratado de paz, que sellamo "Tratado de Paris," en cuyo articulo IX, parrafo 2.°, se provee que "Los derechos civiles y la condition politica de los habitantes naturales de los territorios aqui cedidos a los Estados Unidosse determinaranpor el Congreso." De acuerdo con dicho convenio,el Congresodelos Estados Unidos, por Ley de 1.° de julio de 1902, denominada "Ley de Filipina?/' dispuso en suarticulo4que"Todos los habitantes de las Islas Filipinas que residanenellas y que el oncede abril de mil ochocientos noventa ynueve eran subditos espanoles residentes en dichas Islas,y sus hijos nacidos con posterioridad a aquella fecha, seran considerados y tenidos como ciudadanos de las IslasFilipinas y como tales con derecho a la protection delos Estados Unidos exceptuandose aquellos quehayanelegido conservar su lealtad a la Coronade Espana, de acuerdo con las disposiciones del Tratado de Paz entre losEstadosUnidos y
Espana firm ado en Paris el diez de diciembre de mil ochocientos noventa y ocho.
Surge ahora la cuestion de siAlejandro Tan Bangco, padre del aqui recurrido,Tan Chim, era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899. En 27 de febrero de 1893, en que nacid en Manila, Islas Filipinas, el referido Alejandro Tan Bangco,imperabanenellas la soberania espanola y sus leyes.En dicho ano 1893 ya estaba envigor el Cddigo Civil, habiendose extendido su vigeneia a estas Islas por realdecreto de 1.° de julio de 1889.Elarticulo 17, parrafo 1.°, del citado Cddigo dispone que son espanoles "las personas nacidasen territorio espanol;" pero enel parrafo 2.° de su articulo 18 impone la condicion de que "Para que los nacidos de padres extranjeros en territorio espanol puedan gozar del benencio que les otorga el numero 1.° del articulo 17, sera requisite indispensable que los padres manifiesten, en la manera y ante los funcionarios expresados en el articulo19, queoptan,a nombre de sus hijos, por lanacionalidad espanola, renunciando a toda otra." El referido articulo 19 del mismo Codigoestatuye en su parrafo 2.o que "Los que se hallen en el Reino haran esta manifestacidn ante elencargado del Registro civil del pueblo en que residieren; los que residan en el extranjero, ante uno de los Agentes consulares o diplomaticos del Gobiernoespanol, y los que se encuentren en unpais en que el Gobierno no tenga ningun Agente, dirigiendose al Ministrode Estado en Espana." No habiendose establecido en Filipinas el Registro civil, el padre de Alejandro Tan Bangco nopodiacumplir con el requisiteexigido enel parrafo 2.° del articulo18arriba mencionado para que su hijo, nacido en territorio espanol,adquiriese la ciudadanfa espanola.Tampoco pudohaberlo hecho el mismo Alejandro Tan Bangco, de acuerdo con el parrafo 1.° del citado articulo19, que dispone que "Los hijos de un extranjero nacidos enlosdominiosespanoles, deberanmanifestar dentro del ano siguiente asu mayor edad o emancipacidn, si quieren gozar de la calidad de espanoles que les concede el art.17"; puesto que, en primer lugar, no existia, como ya hemos dicho, el Registro civil, y, en segundo lugar, an tea de que entrara en vigor la Ley de 1.° de julio de 1902, que determina la condicion politicadelos habitantes naturales de estas Islas, derogando implicitamente las disposiciones del Codigo Civil sobre la materia, el citado padre del recurrido era menor de edad yno podia cumplir los mencionados requisites. La manifestacion ante el encargado del Registro civil, exigida en el citado parrafo 2.° del articulo 18, en relacidn con el articulo 19,del Codigo Civil, siendo indispensable, yno habiendose establecidoaqui el referido Registro civil, el inciso 1.° del articulo 17del propio Codigo no tuvo efectividad en cuanto a extranjeros nacidosen estas Islas durante el regimene spañol.
Ladisposicionl.mde lastransitorias delCodigo Civil dispone que "Se regiran por la Iegislacion anterior al Codigo los derechosnacidos, segun ella, de hechos realizados bajo su regimen, aunque el Codigo los regulede otro modo o nolos reconozca. Pero si elderecho apareciere declaradoporprimera vez en elCodigo, tendra efecto desde luego, aunque el hecho que loorigine se verificarabajo la legislacidn anterior, siempre que no perjudique a otro derecho adquirido, de igual origen."El nacimiento deAlejandro Tan Bangco en 1893, habiendo ocurrido bajo el regimen del Codigo Civil, no puede aplicarsea el la Iegislacion anterior, pues esta,segundicha disposiciontransitoria, so1o regia losderechos nacidos de hechos realizadosbajosu regimen;por consiguiente, ni bajo la legislacidn anterior pudoel tantasveces mencionadoAlejandro TanBangco adquirir la nacionalidad espanola.
No habiendo Alejandro Tan Bangco adquirido la nacionalidad espanola por su mero nacimientoenterritorio espanol, no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899, y, por consiguiente, suhijo, el aquirecurrido, Tan Chim, no se hizo subdito filipino al entraren vigor elarticulo 4.° de la Ley del Congreso del.«de julio de 1902 antes citado, y no lo era cuando Wego al puerto de Cebu el 18 de enero de 1937.
Esta Corte, sin embargo, en una larga serie de decisiones, siendo la mas importante de las cualesla recaida en el asunto de Roa contra Administrador Insular de Aduanas (23 Jur. FiL, 321), citada con aprobacidn en otra decisidn posterior, recafda en el asunto de Haw contra Administrador de Aduanas (59 Jur. Fil., 646), aplicando la teoria de "jus soli" ha sentado invariablemente la doctrinade que el mero nacimiento de un extranjero en las Islas Filipinas antes del establecimiento del Commonwealth le hacia ciudadanofilipino. Esta doctrinaha sido por largo tiempo la regla por la cual se han guiado los extranjeros, sobre todo los chinos, al establecerse enestas Islas y dedicarse al comercio, a la industria y a la agriculture, contribuyendo con ello, en no poco, al desarrollo de las tres fuentes principales de la riqueza nacional.Teniendo en cuenta estosbeneficios, y el espiritu liberal que informa la reciente legislation sobre naturalization,haciendo mas facil y expedita la adquisicionde la nacionalidadfilipina por extranjeros que pueden contribuir al desarrollo cultural y material del pais, y noexistiendo ninguna razon de orden social, politico o moral que aconseje y justifique la alteracion de la doctrina, no creemos necesario hacerlo ahora.Creemos con el sabio jurista americano Cardozo que"Stare decisis is atleast the every day working rule of our law", y que "when a rule after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or withthe social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frankavowal and full abandonment." (Cardozo, The Natureof the Judicial Process.) En el presente caso no hay nada que sea incompatible con la justicia ni con el bienestar social. Imperial, M., disidente:
Concurro con la opinion del Magistrado Sr. Villa-Real de que "No habiendo AlejandroTan Bangco adquirido la nacionalidad espanola por su mero nacimiento en territorio espanol,no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899, y, por consiguiente, su hijo, el aqui recurrido, Tan Chim, no se hizo subdito filipino al entrar en vigor el articulo 4.° de la Ley del Congreso de 1.° de julio de 1902 antes citado, y no lo era cuandoIego al Puerto de Cebu el 18 de enero de 1937."
Disiento de la conclusion a que llega la mayoria al efecto de que el recurrido, como hijo menor de edad deAlejandro TanBangco, tienederecho aentrar y residir enel pais porque su padre riacio en Manila, Filipinas, aplicando asi el principio del jus soli y siguiendo la doctrina enunciada en los asuntos de Roa contra El Administrador de Aduanas (23Jur. FiL, 321), y Haw contra El Administrador de Aduanas,(59 Jur. Fil., 646).En el primero de dichos asuntos este Tribunal declaro que Roa era ciudadano filipino por raz6n de su nacimiento fundandose en la doctrina que sento el Tribunal Supremo de los EstadosUnidos en el asunto de United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 U. S., 649) de quesonciudadanos americanos los nacidos en territoriode losEstados Unidos de conformidadcon la Enmienda XIV de la Constitution de los Estados Unidos. La doctrina asi enunciada seaplic6 por este Tribunal no so1o en el asunto de Haw contra El Administrador de Aduanas sino tambien en los de Estados Unidos contra Ang (36 Jur.Fil., 915), y Estados Unidos contraLim Bin (36 Jur. Fil.,985). A mi juicio taldoctrina no halla apoyo en las leyes vigentes porque el articulo 1 de la XIV Enmienda de la Constitucidn de los EstadosUnidos, que provee que las personas nacidas o naturalizadas en los EstadosUnidos, y sujetas a la jurisdiccion de los mismos, sonciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y del Estado donde residen, no rige en este pats (U. S. contra Dorr, 2 Jur. Fil., 282, 195 U. S., 138,49 Law. ed. 128, 24 Sup.Ct. Rep.,808, 11 Jur. Fil.. 728; U. S. contra Bull, 15 Jur.Fil., 7). El hijo de padres chinos que no era subdito espanol el 11 de abril de 1899 no puede invocar la nacionalidad filipina por el solo hecho de haber nacido en el pais, porque no le alcanzan lasdisposiciones del articulo 2 de la LeyJones, Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del 29 de agosto de 1916.(Paz Chua contra El Secretario del Trabajo, R. G. No. 46451.)
Las razones que expone la decisionde la mayoria para liberalizar la aplicacion dela Ley de Exclusion de ciudadanos de la Republica de China son consideraciones que atanen al poder legislativeLa facultad de los tribunales se limita a aplicar la ley. Si los chinosnacidos en Filipinas o los hijos menores de padres chinosnacidos en el pafs deben ser considerados como ciudadanosfilipinos con derecho a entrar y residir en el, es cosa que debe decidirlo la Asamblea Nacional mediantela promulgacidn de una ley adecuada.
MORAN, J.:
With the recent unanimous decision of this Court in Paz Chua vs. Secreary of Labor, G. R. No. 46451, I thought the doctrine in the Roa case hasbeenimpliedly reversed, for there is between that case and the present one, no fundamental difference in facts that maywarrant the application of a different principle.But the majority decisionin the present caseabandons, in effect, the doctrine laid down in the Chua case and revives the Roa ruling.This, I fear, may be the ignis fatuus which the majority precisely sought to avoid.
There can be no question that theRoa ruling is erroneous. The second paragraph of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris provides:
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of theterritories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress'Pursuant to this provision, Congress enacted the so-called Philippine Bill(Act of July1, 1902),section 4 of which provides:
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside thereinwho were Spanish subjects on the11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shallbe deemed and held tobe citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve theirallegiance to thecrown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of thetreaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signedat Paris, December 10, 1898.The same section of the Act of July 1, 1902, as amended by Act of March 23, 1912, was substantially incorporated in section 2of the JonesLaw (Act of August 29,1916), which provides:
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands whowere Spanish subjectson theeleventhday of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,except suchas shall have electedto preserve their allegiance to the Crownof Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signedat Paris,December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such othersas have since become citizens ofsome other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisitionof Philippine citizenshipby those natives of the Philippine Islands who donotcome within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insularpossessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of theUnitedStates, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of theUnited States if residingtherein."From the foregoing provisions of the Acts of Congress, the only persons who were considered citizens of the Philippines were all the inhabitants thereof who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and then resided in thePhilippines, and their children born subsequently thereto, except those who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain.Under the laws of this country, prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, children born in the Philippines follow the nationality of their parents while they remain under parental authority. (Sec. 18 Civ. Code.) Roa,being a minor, followed the nationality of hisfather, whowas a Chinese subject, and, therefore, couldnot be consideredas a Filipino citizen under the Jones Law.The holding, then, that Roa was a Filipino citizen by the mere fact of birth in this country, was evidently without support in the then existing laws of the Philippines. Andsuch is our ruling in Paz Chua case.
The basis of the Roa doctrine was the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Courtin U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S., 649, to the effect that persons born in the United States were citizens thereof under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.Section 5, however, of the Jones Law provides:
"That the statutory laws of the United States hereafter enacted shallnot apply to the Philippine Islands, except when they specifically so provided, or it is so provided in this Act."I know of no federal statute whicheither expressly or impliedly extends to the Philippines the principle of jus soli, as recognized in the14th Amendment tothe United States Constitution.It is, therefore, a clear error to give this principle force and effect in this jurisdiction.
The majority says nothing in support of thecorrectness of the Roa ruling, and seekssimply to justify its continued observance upon the fact that it "had been adhered to and accepted for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," and that "not only this Court but also inferiorcourts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executiveand administrative agencies of theGovernment had theretofore abided by it; and the general public had acquiesced in it."I do not yield to this judicial policy. If we haveinduced the Governmentand thepublic to follow and accept an error for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them tofollow and accept the same error once discovered. The ruleof stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error (15 C. J., p. 918).It is the duty of everycourt to examine its own decisionswithout fear and to revise them without reluctance (Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N. Y., 257).As was well said in a case, "Ihold it to be the duty of this court freely to examine its own decisions, and, when satisfied that ithas fallen into a mistake, to correct the error byoverruling its own decision.An acknowledged error must be more venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any series ofconcessions or extra-judicial resolutions, or even by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the principleof staredecisis.'* (Leavitt v. Blatchaford, 17 N. Y., 521,523.)"Precedents are to be regarded as the great storehouse of experience;not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation." (Per Bartley, C. J., in Leavittv. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.)Their "authority must often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak witha voice responsive to these demands." (Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.)
Indeed, I can find no serious obstacle to the propriety of correctingthe erroneous ruling laid down inthe Roa case. The doctrineof stare decisis is not the equivalent of res adjudicata (15 C. J., p. 919; Walpole v. Cholmondeley, 7 T. R. 138,148, 101Repr. 987). The first relates to legal principles; the latter, to specific facts.Accordingly, such persons who, like Roa, have secured judicial declaration of their status,are protected by the rule of res adjudicata; and those who, similarly situated, have not obtained such judicial declaration, but have acquired tangible rights in theexerciseof their bona-fidecitizenship,may, if such rights arestill existing, be saved from the effects of the reversal.If we agree that the Roa rulingis erroneous, the most logical course to follow is to reverseit butsaving, as a matter of equity, the vested rights above mentioned.
It is regrettable to note that, while the majority decision upholds the Roa doctrine, it, at the same time, tears into pieces the principle upon which the ruling is founded, leaving thus such ruling without foundation whatsoever either in law or in logic.This is, certainly, worse than reversing it. The majority says: "When in Roa v. Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually, but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,of Chinese father and Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentioned inthe treaty of peace, although in their minority; thereafter going to China for the purpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here" (Underscoring mine.)TheRoa doctrine applies the principle of jus soli embodied in the 14th Amendmenttothe UnitedStates Constitution, andsuch principle, by its very nature, was never limited in its application to aliens born in the Philippines before the advent of the American sovereignty.For instance, in Haw v. Collector of Customs, 59 Phil., 612, to which said principle was applied,thepetitioner therein wasborn on February 13, 1916, and was held to be a Filipino citizen by the mere fact of birthin thiscountry.It is, therefore, obvious that the principle underlying theRoaruling,asoriginallyannouncedby this Court andconstrued in subsequent cases, applies not only to aliens born in the Philippines prior to the ratificationof the treaty of peace, but also to those born thereafter.The place, not the time, of birth was the decisiveconsiderationin thedetermination ofcitizenship thereunder.The restatement, therefore, of the Roa doctrine by the majority, confiningits application to aliens born before the ratification of the treaty ofpeace, and excluding therefrom those born thereafter, is a new principle which finds absolutely no support either in law or in reason.
With due respect to my brethren in the majority, I would say that when this Court continues to uphold a ruling known to be erroneous, with no plausible excuse therefor but public acquiescence therein, it may soon find itself compelled to make more mistakes in an effort to justify the previous ones.We may thus be building one error uponanother until, by their accumulation, we shall come to a point when going furtherwould beperilous and turningbackward impossible.
I therefore vote to reverse the Roa doctrine and the decision of the Court of Appeals based thereon.
Judgment affirmed.