In virtue of a criminal proceeding for malversation of public funds instituted against him, petitioner-appellant was suspended from office on June 16, 1935. On July 30, 1937, judgement was rendered acquitting him of of the charge. Two years thereafter, appellant filed a petition with the trial court, praying that, by reason of his acquittal in the criminal proceeding aforementioned, a supplement decision be entered ordering the payment of his salary during the period of his suspension from office. The petition wa denied, and to the order of denial, he interposed the present appeal.

We hold that the petition was rightly denied. In a criminal proceeding against an accused, the judgment that the law authorizes to be rendered, is either on of the aquittal or of conviction with indemnity and the accessory penalties provided for by law. The payment of salary of an employee during the period of his suspension cannot, as a general rule, be properky decreed by the trial court in a judgment of aquittal. It devolves upon the head of the department concerned and is discretionary with him.
(Sec. 260, Rev. Adm. Code.)

Besides, the petition was filed after the lapse of two years from the rendition of the judgment. The effect of the petition, if granted, would be to modify a final judgment by adding  thereto a relief which was not originally contemplated therein. That such cannot be done is the law and the settled rule of this Court.

The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., cocnur.

Order affirmed.