At or shortly before noon on August 25,1942, in the cockpit of Gerona, Tarlac, and in the presence of a large crowd of cockpit habitues, the  ex-mayor  of that town, Nicolas Garcia, was treacherously daggered to death.  The assassin escaped unscathed and unidentified.

More than six months later, to wit, on March 6, 1943, an inspector of the Bureau of Constabulary named Pablo Fernandez filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court of Gerona  against Ricardo  Tipay,  Hipolito Ablan, and Joaquin Tipay for  the murder above mentioned, based upon three  self-incriminating  supposed  affidavits  written  in English  and  signed or thumbmarkecl  respectively by the three accused.

When the case was called for trial in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, the accused Joaquin  Tipay  pleaded guilty while  the  Qther  two accused,  Ricardo Tipay and Hipolito Ablan, pleaded not guilty.  The prosecution was not  able to present a single  eyewitness to the commission of the crime, and relied for the conviction of the accused solely upon their extra judicial affidavits.

The trial court convicted  Joaquin  Tipay upon  his plea of guilty, which he reiterated on the witness stand, declaring that he alone stabbed the ex-mayor to death because he had been ordered to do so by one Vicente Balbin, "a lieutenant of the soldiers who had fought in Bataan," who threatened to have him killed also if he disobeyed the order. The accused Hipolito Ablan was acquitted because  the trial court found that his alleged extra judicial confession or affidavit, Exhibit E, had been extorted from him by Inspector Pablo Fernandez by means of  force and  physical  violence upon the. said accused, aside from a promise to liberate him after  signing it.  The accused Ricardo Tipay was convicted upon  his supposed extra judicial confession or affidavit, Exhibit C, and, together  with Joaquin Tipay, was sentenced to suffer "cadena (sic) perpetua," with the accessories of the law,  and to indemnify  the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000.   Ricardo Tipay alone has appealed from that sentence.

As  already intimated, the only evidence against the appellant is his extrajudicial supposed confession which Inspector Pablo. Fernandez admitted  having  dictated in  English, altho  he claimed that it was a translation of what appellant had declared before him in Ilocano. Fernandez further declared that he first investigated the appellant while he was serving sentence in the provincial jail for  illegal possession of firearms, in the first week  of February 1943, when, witness affirmed, he  readily admitted his guilt, but  that  he did not take down his  confession in writing then and only did so when  he investigated him for the second  time  on March 2, 1943.

It appears  that the appellant is a 27-year-old rustic, engaged in farming as a land tenant, completely illiterate and, of course, totally ignorant of the English language,  in which the affidavit Exhibit C was written.  He  swore during the trial  as a witness in his own behalf  that one  day he was called to the headquarters of the Constabulary in Tarmac, where Inspector  Fernandez made him sign or thumbmark the said affidavit, without asking him  questions and without interpreting to him  the  contents of said document,  but simply telling him that once he had  signed it he would be permitted to go home.  The appellant's supposed affidavit, Exhibit C, is couched in almost the same words as his co- accused Hipolito Ablan's supposed affidavit, Exhibit E.  Exhibit C begins and ends thus:

"Now comes Ricardo  Tipay alias Ernesto Gapayan, married, 27 years old, residing at San Juan de Mata, Tarlac, Tarlac,  farmer by occupation and under oath deposes and says:

"That between the months of June, 1942, up to December 8, 1942, I was a member of the guerrilla band under Lieutenant Vicente Balbin of Gerona, Tarlac.  That on August 25, 1942, myself together with  other  guerrilla members namely, Joaquin Tipay, Hipolito Ablan, and three other fellows whose names I do not know, received an order from Lieutenant  Balbin  to go  to the cockpit  located in  the poblacion of Gerona, Tarlac, to kill the mayor of that town, Nicolas Garcia,  *  * *

"Further, the deponent sayeth not."

Exhibit E correspondingly reads as follows:

"Now comes Hipolito Ablang, married, 35 years of age, residing at San Juan de Valdez,  Tarlac, Tarlac, farmer by occupation and under oath deposes and  says:

"That between the months of June 1942 up  to October 1942, I was a member of the  guerrilla band under  Lt. Vicente Balbin of Gerona, Tarlac.   That  on  August  25, 1942, myself together with five other  guerrilla members, namely  Joaquin  Tipay,  Ricardo Tipay and three other fellows whose names I can not remember were ordered by Lt. Vicente Balbin to  go to  the cockpit  located at the poblacion  at Gerona, Tarlac,  for the  purpose of killing the mayor of that town,  Nicolas Garcia.  *  *  *

"Further, the deponent sayeth not."

On their face these two separate declarations could not have been spontaneously made by two different individuals. Assuming that the declarants spoke freely in  their own mother tongue, the above-quoted declarations could not have been a faithful  or accurate  translation of  what they  expressed.  No two persons will relate the same experience or impression in exactly the same words and in the same manner.  It is apparent that the two affidavits were a composition of one single author.  May such a composition be relied upon to doom a man to perpetual incarceration ?

It will be remembered that Exhibit E was accorded no probative value  by the trial  court because it had been  extorted  by force and violence  and promise of liberty.  Upon this point the trial court said:

"*   *   * Hipolito Ablang alega que ha sido maltratado por el  Inspector Pablo Fernandez  durante la investigacion, habiendo sufrido contusiones en la frente y labio, superior y una herida en la region intercostal izquierda a consecuencia de dichos  malostratos y fue de este modo obligado por el referido  Inspector  Fernandez a  declarar  y  suscribir su declaraci6n exhibito E ademas de haberle prometido libertad inmediata despues de que dicha declaraci6n fuera suscrita por el.  El haber sufrido este acusado Ablang a consecuencia de los malostratos, contusiones en  la frente y en el labio superior y herida en la  region intercostal izquierda  esta plenamente corroborado por  el Dr. Lagade, actual alcalde del municipio de  Gerona, Tarlac, y uno de los testigos del Gobierno, quien manifesto que el dia 6 de marzo de 1943 cuando el Inspector Fernandez de la Constabularia presento ante el, en ausencia del Juez de Paz, la querella contra estos acusados, Hipolito Ablang se quejaba de haber sido  maltratado, por lo que fue examinado por el Alcalde y encontro que realmente tenia  contusiones en la frente y en el labio superior y una herida en la regi6n intercostal izquierda y que estas contusiones pudieran  haber sido causadas  tres o cuatro  dias antes de la presentacion de la querella por instrumento romo. Este hecho ha sido negado por el Inspector Pablo Fernandez si Men admitio de una manera  indecisa  que realmente el acusado Ablang aparentemente tenia ya contusiones en la frente  y en el  labio superior cuando fue  traido en  su presencia para la investigacion correspondiente, pero  no relato las circunstancias bajo las cuales este acusado suf rid dichas contusiones y nego haber visto la herida en la region intercostal izquierda no  obstante el  hecho  de que  hasta la camisa del acusado tenia manchas de sahgre entonces como asi afirmo el Alcalde Dr. Lagade."

Exhibit C having been repudiated  during the trial by the appellant, who swore that  he did not comprehend its contents but that he merely affixed his thumbmark to it because he was told that if he did  so he  would be  permitted to go home, it  was incumbent upon the prosecution to  impeach that repudiation.  It having been clearly shown to the satisfaction of the trial  court that  Inspector Fernandez, in procuring Hipolito Ablan's signature to the affidavit, Exhibit E, resorted not only  to the  reprehensible and unlawful tactics of promising liberty but to the brutal act of committing physical violence and force upon the  person of the accused, we find no sufficient reason to  disbelieve the testimony of the appellant  Ricardo Tipay to  the  effect  that the said constabulary officer resorted to a similar but less violent method promise of immunity in inducing  him to affix his thumbmark  to the affidavit Exhibit  C.   It is true that Fernandez denied such testimony; but  the moment he stands convicted in the one instance  of committing a brutal and  criminal act, we can not believe that he acted  regularly and lawfully in the other instance upon the same occasion and for the same purpose.   We do not find it difficult to  believe  that one who could torture a fellowman to  extract a confession from his lips could also make a false promise of liberty to another to achieve  a  similar  end.  If, notwithstanding Inspector Fernandez' denial that he used  force  and violence upon Hipolito Ablan, the trial court found that he did resort to such a brutal and criminal  act, we do not find it difficult to believe that he also  resorted to  the unlawful promise  of liberty to secure the  appellant's affidavit, Exhibit C.

In  this  noonday of the  twentieth century,  when criminology and the investigation  of crimes have developed into a science in all civilized countries abreast with the progress and the ever-increasing enlightenment of the human race, to force or induce a suspect  to incriminate himself thru violence, torture, or trickery is a shameful disgrace a reversion into the barbarism  and the inquisitorial practices of the Dark Ages; and the minions of the law who would still resort to such crude and cruel methods are universally regarded as anachronistic blockheads, who should be immediately lopped off as  a  cancerous excrescence of  the body politic.

It is interesting to note that  in the affidavit Exhibit C the appellant is represented as being "armed witH a caliber .45 revolver," but  the  only participation in the crime attributed to  him was," in  the  words of the affidavit itself, the following:

"*  *  *  Nicolas Garcia upon seeing me took hold of my both arms  and we  grappled together.   While  we were grappling together I saw  Joaquin  Tipay stabbed him on the left side of his stomach.  After Joaquin Tipay slabbed him I was able to put him down. After putting him down Hipolito Ablan stabbed him twice in his breast and Nicolas Garcia was not able to stand  any more. Seeing this condi- tion of his, myself and the rest of my companions ran away.*  *  *"

Whether  that statement  was made by the  supposed declarant or dictated by the investigator as his own harvest, it sounds to us like  a  crude  fabrication.  Think of  a guerrillero, commissioned to assassinate an unwary victim and armed for that purpose with a .45-caliber revolver, who attempts not to make the slightest use of  that  powerful weapon but  simply allows himself to be held in both arms by  his intended victim, who apparently without knowing him or his intention grapples with him immediately upon seeing him!   We also note that the affidavits of the three accused disclose the theory that Lt. Vicente Balbin commissioned no less  than six persons to assassinate  an  un-suspecting and defenseless man in the cockpit, as if a squad or an excess of personnel were required to accomplish the dastardly  job and  at the  same time increase the chance of one or more of the  participants' being identified, caught, and made to squeal  on the instigator.   What is still more remarkable is that altho the complaint was based on said affidavits which denounced Vicente Balbin as the principal and  instigator of the crime, he  was not included as  one of the accused, in flagrant disregard of the requirement of the law that "all criminal actions must be commenced  *  * * against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor." (Sec. 1, Rule  106.)  In the annals of the Court we do not recall having come across such an amateurish investigator as this one whom the trial court has found guilty of employing physical violence to extort a confession from a suspect.

Nevertheless, the trial court gave probative value to the affidavit  Exhibit C (a)  because  the  record of the justice of the peace court (folio 17) shows that appellant pleaded guilty upon being arraigned there; (b) because the statement in said affidavit that appellant grappled with the deceased in the cockpit of Gerona is corroborated by the finding of the cadaver in the very same  cockpit; and  (c) because said  affidavit is further corroborated by the affidavit of Joaquin Tipay, Exhibit  D.  We find such reasons untenable.

The supposed arraignment of the appellant before the justice of the  peace was never mentioned during the trial, the record of it was not shown to appellant when he testified as a witness in his own behalf so that he could affirm or deny that he really pleaded guilty, and if he did, to explain the circumstances under which he made .the plea, and was not offered and admitted in evidence  during the trial. We have held that a preliminary investigation constitutes no part of the final proceedings in a cause unless it is presented in evidence, and that the facts adduced therein are evidence only for the purpose of testing the credibility of witnesses. (U. S. vs. Grant, 18 Phil., 122; U. S. vs. Laban, 21 Phil., 297; and U. S. vs. Lopez Quim Quinco, 33 Phil., 239, 240- 241.)  The wisdom and necessity of that doctrine are ex- emplified in the instant case.  It appears here that whereas the record of arraignment of the other two accused, Joaquin Tipay and Hipolito Ablan,  was  signed by  each of them on the dotted line provided for the signature of the accused, that of the appellant Ricardo Tipay does not appear to have been signed or thumbmarked by him.  We find the explanation for this in the fact that unlike his two coaccused who were detained in the municipal jail of  Gerona after their arrest and, therefore, easily available for arraignment before the justice of the peace, the appellant Ricardo  Tipay was at  that time a prisoner in  the provincial jail at the provincial capital and he, haviftg renounced the preliminary investigation,  was not brought  before  the justice  of the peace of Gerona, according to the testimony of the municipal mayor and acting justice of the peace, Pacifico Lagade, who, to the question propounded by the court, responded as follows:

"P. Este Ricardo Tipay, que le dijo a usted cuando le investigo usted ? R. I think Ricardo Tipay was not there, and according to what I know, if my memory does not fail, I think Ricardo Tipay was here in the provincial jail to be taken for investigation."

The very synopsis of the record signed and  forwarded by the justice of the peace Patricio T. Rigor (folio 25) contains the following item:

"March 23,  1943 The complaint read to the  accused Hipolito Ablang and Joaquin Tipay, and they entered the plea of  not guilty."

The  supposed arraignment of the  appellant, like that of his two coaccused, bears the date March 23, 1943, and  yet, altho said arraignment bears the signature of justice of the peace Patricio T. Rigor, it was  not mentioned in his certification of the record.  This fact, together  with the lack of signature or thumbmark of the appellant, tends to show that said justice of the peace must have signed the intended arraignment  of the appellant thru oversight.  Had that arraignment been shown to the appellant during the trial, he could have declared whether or not he was really arraigned and  whether  or  not  he  pleaded guilty,  and if necessary the justice of the peace could and should have been called as a witness.

As to the supposed corroboration of Exhibit C by the finding of the cadaver in the cockpit, it seems to us patent that it cannot be considered a corroboration at all because at the time the  affidavit was  prepared1,  the  body of the deceased had been found at the scene of the crime, and it would have been the height of carelessness and absurdity to state in said affidavit that the murder was perpetrated somewhere else.

As to the alleged corroboration of Exhibit C by Joaquin Tipay's supposed confession Exhibit  D,  suffice it to say that the latter was admitted, and could only have been admitted, to rebut the testimony of Joaquin  Tipay during the trial that he alone had killed Nicolas Garcia and that Ricardo Tipay had had no participation in the commission of the crime.  That extrajudicial confession of Joaquin Tipay was not admissible  and could not be considered as evidence  in chief against his coaccused, the herein  appellant.   As a rebuttal evidence, proceeding as it did from the same vicious origin as the affidavits Exhibits C and E, it can be accorded no probatory value.  Moreover, we do not need to consider and accept the testimony of Joaquin Tipay in favor of the appellant in the absence of any  valid proof against the latter.

It results from all the foregoing considerations that appellant's conviction by the trial court rests  upon incompetent and inadmissible evidence consisting solely of extrajudicial affidavits which are shown to have been unlawfully procured by  a constabulary investigator thru methods  abhorrent  to and condemned by all courts of the civilized world.

The judgment appealed from is-reversed  and the appellant Ricardo Tipay is hereby acquitted and ordered released  forthwith from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.

Yulo, C. J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.