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This is an application for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from restraint of his liberty, by a ranking officer of the Constabulary, under a warrant of arrest issued by the Speaker of the House of  Representatives, pursuant to resolutions of the House finding the petitioner guilty of  contempt.  In addition to counsel for the petitioner and the Attorney-General for the  respondent, Honorable Ricardo  Nepomuceno and Honorable Monico Mercado, members of the House of  Representatives, have appeared as  amici curiae.

On September 16, 1930, the House of Representatives adopted the  following:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING AND RATIFYING THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HOUSE, NUMBER FIFTYONE, AND AUTHORIZING ALL PEACE OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH THE SAME.

"Whereas, the following resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on November 6, 1929:

"'RESOLUTION  REQUIRING  THE  SPEAKER  OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO ORDER THE ARREST  OF CANDIDO LOPEZ TO BE  CONFINED  IN  THE BILIBID PRISON FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

" 'Whereas, on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted, without any  justification,  the Honorable Jose D. Dimayuga, who was then and is now a member of the House of Representatives of  the  Philippine Islands, while said Representative was  going  to  the hall of  the House of Representatives to attend the sessions  which were then about to begin, as a result of which attack and assault  said Representative was  unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following, by reason of the threats which  Mr. Candido  Lopez  made against said Representative, Honorable Jose  D. Dimayuga;

" 'Whereas, these  acts of  aggression and assault were committed by the aforesaid  Mr. Candido Lopez  knowing full well as he then knew that said Representative was and is one of the members of the House  of  Representatives, who was then going to the hall of said House to attend the sessions thereof which were about to begin at the moment of the aggression;

" 'Whereas, said Candido Lopez appeared before the Committee on Privileges of the House of Representatives where he was notified that he was charged  with  contempt  for having  violated the  privileges of  one  of  the  members of this  house,  and then  and there had  the opportunity to defend himself personally and by counsel, and to adduce evidence in his favor;

" 'Whereas, all the foregoing facts have been established beyond  reasonable doubt; Now,  therefore,

" 'Be it resolved, To declare,  as it hereby declares, said Candido Lopez guilty of contempt of the  House of Representatives for having violated the privileges of one of the members of said House of Representatives;

"'Be it further  resolved,  To order, as it hereby orders, that said Candido Lopez be punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison, Manila, as any other transgressor of the law, for a period of twenty-four hours; and

" 'Finally be it  resolved,  That the corresponding  order of arrest be issued  in  due  form,  signed  by the  Speaker, stamped with the Seal of the  House  of  Representatives, and  addressed to the Sergeant-At-Arms,  Mr. Alfredo Javier, requiring and ordering the said  Sergeant-At-Arms to comply with this order.'

"Whereas, said resolution has not  been complied with up to the present  time, notwithstanding the efforts done by the Sergeant-At-Arms of the House of Representatives, because said Candido Lopez has concealed himself, taking advantage of all kinds of subterfuges in order to avoid compliance therewith and to defy the authority of this House;

"Whereas, the Committee on Privileges  of this House, acting on the petition for reconsideration presented  after the  approval of  said resolution, has  arrived at the conclusion that there  is no ground  to  modify or revoke the aforesaid resolution; Now, therefore,

"Be it resolved, To confirm  and ratify, as it hereby confirms and ratifies, the aforementioned resolution;

"Be it  further resolved,  To order and  authorize,  as  it hereby  orders  and authorizes, the  Sergeant-At-Arms of this  House,  or  his agents, or any official  or member of the Insular Police or any police officer, in compliance  with said resolution, to arrest said Candido Lopez for confinement in Bilibid Prison, Manila, to serve therein the sentence of twenty-four hours imposed by said Resolution;

"Be it  finally  resolved,  That the  corresponding order of arrest  be issued in due form, signed by the Speaker, stamped  with  the Seal of the House  of Representatives, and  addressed  to the  Sergeant-At-Arms  of this House, or any  of his  agents,  or any  official or  member of the Insular Police, or any peace officer, ordering and  requiring compliance with this order."

From the above, it will be observed  that the alleged assault by  Lopez oh  Representative Dimayuga occurred on October 23,  1929.  The House of Representatives adopted its original  resolution,  requiring the Speaker  to order the arrest of Lopez, to be confined in Bilibid Prison for twenty- four hours,  on  November 6, 1929.  The House adjourned that  session, the second, at midnight  on November 8, 1929, without the order of arrest having been served on Lopez. The confirmatory resolution hereinbefore  quoted  was approved  on September 16,  1930,  during  the third session of the Philippine Legislature.

It further appears that a new warrant of arrest  was issued by the Speaker of the House of Representatives on September 17, 1930.  Lopez was taken into custody by  Colonel De los  Reyes,  Assistant Chief  of  the  Constabulary, on September 19, 1930.  Immediately a writ of habeas  corpus was obtained from Honorable  Mariano  Albert, Auxiliary Judge of First Instance sitting in the City of Manila. Eight reasons were enumerated  to  show illegal  restraint of the petitioner, including as the most important the following :

"(a)  Because the House of Representatives is absolutely lacking  in authority and jurisdiction to try and punish any citizen in this country with  imprisonment for alleged assault  committed on any  person irrespective of  rank or social position, for the power to try and punish any person as charged with violation of law  lies  exclusively within the province of  the judicial department  of the Philippine Government;

" (b)  Because the House of Representatives has lost its jurisdiction over the person  of the petitioner and the offense charged, for the act complained of  is alleged to have been committed  on the person of  Representative Dimayuga on or about October 23, 1929, and the session of the House of Representatives having adjourned at midnight of  November  8,  1929,  any order issued after the period of that session in which the alleged offense was committed is without force and effect."  The Attorney-General, in his return, after  formal allegations, stated:

"4.  That the  Philippine House of Representatives  has power to order the commitment  of persons guilty of contempt against it and the Speaker of the House of Representatives  is empowered to  issue the warrant of arrest above referred to;

 "5. That this court has  no jurisdiction to entertain this petition, in view of the separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative  and Judicial Departments of the Government;

"6. That this court has no power to inquire into the correctness of the facts recited in the resolution of the House of Representatives punishing the petitioner for contempt."  The trial judge dismissed the  petition,  with costs, and remanded the petitioner to the  custody of the respondent for  compliance with the  order of  the House of  Representatives.  The  petitioner  appealed  from the judgment to this  court and here, in compliance with the law, the appeal has been given precedence over all actions pending in the Supreme Court."

In order to clear the ground for a decision of the  main issues, it  should first of all be noted that  no question of fact is involved,  since  no traverse  to  the return  was interposed, and since no exception to the denial of the application for permission to offer evidence was made in the court below.   We  agree  with  the Attorney-General that a strictly question of law, in other words of jurisdiction,  is presented for determination.  In the same connection, we may say further that the  court need  not inquire into the correctness of the facts recited in the original resolution of the House  of Representatives punishing the petitioner for contempt.   We cannot, however, concur with the statement of the Attorney-General that, because of the separation of powers, the courts have no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.   Where  the  liberty  of the citizen is ,concerned, the legality of the action taken  by the  legislative body  in punishing for  contempt is a proper subject for inquiry on habeas corpus.   (Zagala vs. Ilustre  [1925], 48 Phil., 282;  Lorenzo vs. Director of Health [1927], 50 Phil., 595; Burnham vs. Morrissey [1859], 14 Gray, Mass., 226, fully concurred in by the United States Supreme Court in Kilbourn vs. Thompson [1880], 103 U. S, 168.)

This leaves us then with the negation in the petition of the power  of the House of Representatives to order the commitment of persons guilty of contempt against it and with the affirmation  of this power in the return.   This leaves us further with the denial in the petition of jurisdiction in the House of Representatives on account of the power being only coextensive with the session of the body in  which the alleged contempt  occurred, not specially answered in the return.  There are  other points mentioned in  the assignment of errors and in the briefs, but the foregoing impress us as disclosing  the two main issues decisive of the  case. We will take them under view in order. I. Power of the House of Representatives to punish for contempt. For comparative and informative purposes, it is advisable to turn to the experience of Great Britain and the United  States.   The Houses of the British Parliament were originally courts of judicature,  and  still retain, on account of that origin, the power to punish for  contempt. But it is not to be inferred, because of this power of the Houses in the British Parliament, that a like power belongs to  legislative  assemblies in the British dependencies, as for instance, in the  House of  Assembly of Newfoundland. In  the United States, the theory of the division of powers negatives any implication  of  the possession by the  Congress of the United States of the  commingled legislative and judicial authority  as to contempts, which is exercised by the English House of Commons.  The two Houses of the Congress of the United States do not possess the general power of punishing for contempt, and the cases in which they can do so  are very limited.  The power to deal directly by way of contempt, without criminal prosecution, may be implied from the constitutional grant of legislative power to the Congress in so far, and so far only, as  such authority is necessary  to preserve and carry out the legislative power granted.   The two Houses of the Congress, in their separate relations, possess such auxiliary powers as are appropriate to  make the express powers effective. In these latter cases,  the power to punish for contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation.  Proceeding on this theory, punishment has been imposed for assaults upon members of the House of Representatives which prevented  members from  attending the sessions of  the House.  But the power does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such.   In the apt phrase of Chief Justice White of the United States Supreme Court, "It is a means to an end  and not the end itself."   (Burdett vs. Abbott [1811], 14 East,  1; Kielley  vs. Carson [1841], 4 Moo. P. C,  63; Anderson vs. Dunn  [1821],  6  Wheat., 204, questioned and  rejected as to some of its reasoning in later decisions of the United States Supreme Court ; Kilbourn vs.  Thompson, supra;  R& Chapman  [1896], 166  U.  S., 661; Marshall vs. Gordon  [1917], 243 U. S., 521; McGrain m  Daugherty [1927],  273 U. S.,  135.)

The power of the State Legislatures in the United States to punish for contempt may be somewhat broader in theory than that of the Congress of the United States.  A number of State constitutions and statutes authorize each House of the Legislature to punish for contempt.  Even  without express constitutional provisions, the view generally taken by  the State courts is that the  power to punish for contempt is inherent in the bodies composing  the legislative branch, and that the legislative bodies may  inflict punishment on those guilty of acts which tend directly to defeat, embarrass, or obstruct legislative proceedings.  (Ex parte Parker  [1906], 74  S. C, 466; 7 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cas., 874, 876 Note; In  re Davis [1897], 58 Kans., 368; State vs.  Mathews [1859], 37 N1. H., 450.)

With this background, we turn to consider the power of a legislative body  in the Philippines  to punish  for  contempt.  It is a question of first impression.

General legislative powers, with  certain exceptions,  are vested in the Philippine Legislature, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.   The Philippine Legislature, it has been said, has practically the same powers in the Philippine Islands,  within the sphere in which it may operate, as the Congress  of the United States.  (Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1926], 271.U..S., 528; Tiaco vs. Forbes [1913], 228  U. S., 549; Chanco vs. Imperial [1916],  34 Phil., 329; XL S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31'Phil.,  245.)  No express power  to punish for contempt was granted by. the Organic Act to the Senate and the House of Representatives save the power to deal with contempts committed by their own members.   The Senators and Representatives, except in specified  cases,  are,  however, privileged  from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses and in going to and returning from the same.

Act No. 1755 punishes disturbances of legislative bodies by fine or imprisonment, in the discretion of  the  court. Section 102 of the Administrative Code, similarly punishes contempts by recalcitrant witnesses of a legislative body or  committee.  The  Penal Code,   in  addition, contains various provisions  for the punishment of transgressors against the law. It is now argued  that, because of these laws, particularly Act No. 1755, the Philippine  Legislature has denned the punishable acts against its own authority,  and has delegated its power  of punishment  to  the courts.

The untenability  of this position is apparent on its face. In the first place, the Philippine Legislature could not divest either of its Houses of the inherent power to punish for contempt.  In. the  second  place, the same  act could  be made the basis  for contempt proceedings and for a criminal  prosecution. It has been held  that a conviction and sentence  of  a  person, not a member, by  the  House  of Representatives  of the  United  States Congress, for  an assault and battery upon a member, is not a bar to a subsequent criminal prosecution by indictment for the offense, (U.  S. vs. Houston [1832], 26 Fed.  Cas.,  379.)   In  the third place, and most important of all, the argument fails to take cognizance of the purpose of punishment for contempt, and of the distinction between punishment for contempt and punishment  for crime.  Let us reflect on this last statement for a moment. The implied power to punish for contempt is  coercive in  nature.  The power  to punish crimes is  punitive in  nature.  The first is a vindication by the House of its  own  privileges.  The second is a proceeding1 brought by the State before the courts to punish offenders.  The  two are distinct, the one from the other.  (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra.)

In the case of Re  Chapman,  supra,  the United States Supreme Court fully settled  the  point  that the Congress of the United States  could exercise its implied power  to punish for contempt to the end of the session of the House, even though  it had enacted a statute for the punishment of such contempt as a misdemeanor.  In refuting the contention  "that the  law delegates to the District of Columbia Criminal Court  the exclusive jurisdiction and power  to punish as contempt the  acts denounced, and thus deprives the Houses  of Congress of their  constitutional functions in the particular  class of  cases," the court, through  Chief Justice Puller, stated "that Congress could  not divest itself, or  either of  its Houses,  of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the power of either House  properly  extended."

Notwithstanding the  lack  of constitutional authority, it would hardly be reasonable to suppose that the Houses of the Philippine Legislature were intended to function in the restricted way in which an assembly like that of  Newfoundland was intended  to function.  A power essential to permit the Houses of the Philippine Legislature  to perform their duties without impediment, as contemplated by the Organic  Act, must be  assumed.  There is as much necessity for the Houses  in a territorial legislature to possess the power to punish for contempt as  there is for the Houses  in  the Congress  of  the  United States and the Houses  in the State Legislatures  to possess this power. Accordingly, we rule that a limited power to punish persons not members for contempt resides in the House  of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature.

II. Duration of the 'punishment for  contempt. Conceding,  without really having to decide,  that the  House  of Representatives, in the exercise of a fair  discretion with which  the courts should not interfere, was justified  in finding Lopez in contempt, as contemplated in the original resolution, we  pass to the consideration  of the second branch of the case.  As will soon appear,  the proposition which follows is accepted with hardly any dissent, namely, imprisonment for a term not exceeding the session of the deliberative body in which the contempt occurred, is the limit of the authority to deal directly by way of contempt, without criminal prosecution.

This is the rule in England for the  House of Commons but not for the House of Lords.  In.  the  celebrated  case of Stockdale vs. Hansard ([1839], 9 Ad. & E.,  1), Lord Denman, the Chief Justice,  in a masterly  opinion, to use the words of  the United States  Supreme  Court in Kilbourn vs. Thompson,  supra, said the following: "However flagrant  the contempt,  the  House of  Commons  can  only commit till the close of the existing session.   Their privilege to commit is not better known than this limitation of it. Though the party should deserve the severest penalties, yet, his offence being committed the day before a prorogation, if the House ordered his imprisonment but for a week, every Court in Westminster Hall and every Judge of all the courts would  be bound to  discharge him by habeas corpus."

Likewise  it may be said to be the rule for the Congress  of  the  United  States.  In congressional  practice, the only instance where a person was imprisoned by the House of  Representatives,  and  such  imprisonment  extended beyond the adjournment of the session, occurred in the case of Patrick Woods in 1870.   But the following year, in the  case of White  and Ramsdell, the United States Senate virtually repudiated the action of the House in Wood's case.  (Eberling,  Congressional  Investigations, pp. 180 et seq.)   The United States Supreme Court  has twice definitely  held that the power  is limited to imprisonment during the session of the legislative body affected by the  contempt.   (Anderson vs. Dunn, supra;  Marshall vs. Gordon,  supra.)   The language  of the higher  court in the case first cited  was: "And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the  legislative  body ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical  dissolution.  It follows, that imprisonment  must terminate with that  adjournment."   The language of the higher court in the case last cited was: "And  the essential nature of the power also makes  clear the cogency and  application of the two limitations which were expressly  pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to subjects  which justified  its  exercise is limited  to imprisonment and such imprisonment  may  not be extended beyond the session  of the body in which  the contempt  occurred."  Except where regulated  by express constitutional provisions, it is found to be the rule for  the States of  the  American Union that the imprisonment terminates with the  legislative session.  As the  Supreme Court of  Kansas puts  it, "The  extent of the punishment to be  inflicted, while resting in the discretion of the  legislative body imposing  it,  has never been held to extend beyond  fine and imprisonment;  and where imprisonment is imposed, it has always been held to terminate  with  the session of the legislature.  *  *   *   The power to imprison the citizen is not to be lightly implied."    (In re Davis supra.)

Just as  there is no good  reason to suppose that  the Houses of the Philippine Legislature would  be left without the power of  self-preservation to be realized through  the power to punish for contempt, so is there no good reason to suppose that  the principle relative to the termination of the imprisonment, which is acceptable to the House of Commons, the upper House and probably the lower House of the Congress of the United States, and the Houses of the State Legislatures, is not equally applicable to a House of the Philippine Legislature. At this point, it should be  explained that the Philippine Legislature meets annually.  It convenes on the 16th day of July of every year and continues in session not longer than one hundred days exclusive of Sundays.  Each legislature holds three sessions numbered according to their sequence as first,  second,  or third,  as the  case may be, (Organic Act, sec. 18; Admin. Code, sees. 94,  98.)

The language of the United States Supreme Court in passing on the duration of the imprisonment for contempt of the Houses of the Congress of the United States, and by  analogy on the duration of the imprisonment for contempt to the Houses of the  Philippine Legislature, really needs  no  interpretation.   When  the court  spoke  of the imprisonment terminating with "adjournment," the word "adjournment" was  clearly used  as  in the United States Constitution.  It is now sought to give to "adjournment" the  meaning of "final  adjournment"  at  the  end  of the triennial legislative period.  But this  interpretation  does not  accord with the  pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in the Pocket Veto Case decided only last year.  (Okanogan Indians vs. U.  S.,  U. S. Supreme Court, Adv. Op.,  503.)   Again when the United States Supreme Court spoke of  the  imprisonment not extending "beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred," the  word  "session" was used in  the constitutional sense. A strained  and  unnatural  grammatical  construction  is not  proper.   There is not one session either  of the Congress of the United States or the Philippine  Legislature, but in the case of the latter, there are three  distinct and separate sessions.

Giving application now to the exact words of the United States Supreme Court, which it  is  our bounden  duty to do,  "the session of the body in  which the contempt occurred" was the second session  of the Philippine Legislature.  That session was adjourned as provided by law, without the resolution affecting Lopez  having been  enforced. It  was this session beyond which the imprisonment could not be extended.  When at the next session, the third, the order of  arrest was  attempted to be  resuscitated,  the House was without legal right so to proceed.   The fact that the House at this third session, without a new hearing and adjudication, passed a confirmatory resolution of the resolution approved at the second  session,  added, nothing to the legal position of the House.  The legislative function to  act having ceased with the cessation of the legislative power in a previous session, a resolution could not be revived by mere  reapproval.

The proposition  previously enunciated will bear analytical  reexamination.  We have said that the power to find in contempt rests fundamentally  on the power  of self-preservation.  That is  true even  of  contempt of court where the power to punish is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive  principle.  Where more is desired, where punishment as  such is to be imposed, a  criminal prosecution must  be brought,  and in all  fairness to the culprit, he must have  thrown around  him all the protections  afforded by  the  Bill of Rights.  Proceeding a step further,  it is evident that,  while the legislative power  is perpetual, and while one of the bodies composing the legislative power disappears only every three years, yet the sessions of that body mark new beginnings and abrupt endings,  which must be respected.

Where a person,  who  is declared in  contempt of the House of Representatives at one session of the Legislature, is not committed to prison during that session, it is very doubtful if a new order for his commitment may be made at the next ensuing session of the Legislature.  This right has never been exercised by any  legislative body deriving from  the common law  system.  On the contrary, the uniform  practice  of such bodies appears to have proceeded upon the assumption that the power to  punish an invasion of legislative privileges  ends with the session during which the wrongful  act  was  done.  It is true that the rule expressed by the authorities on this  point was not formulated with reference to  the power  of a succeeding session to give  effect to the original resolution declaring the offender in contempt, but, as already  stated, the practice  of English  and  American legislative bodies  speaks loudly against the  existence  of the  power  for the House of Representatives in this case.  An innovation which experience has shown to be really unnecessary for the protection of the lawmaking body would be  most  unwise. Occasional acts  of  personal  violence against members of the Legislature  will no doubt  occur  over long periods of time, but their number will  not be  increased by the conclusion reached in this case, which is either that the offender  must be  committed to prison by the  offended body during its current session, or punishment must be left to the ordinary process  of the  courts,  wherein the penalties inflicted will tend to be more  severe in the main than those which would  have  been imposed  by the  legislative body itself.

We  recur again to the oft-repeated and  all  controlling thought that the legislative power to punish for contempt arises by implication, is justified only by the right of self-preservation, and is the least possible power adequate to the end proposed. We point  out again that where imprisonment is imposed for  contempt of a legislative body in the United States, it  terminates with the adjournment of the session of the body  in which the contempt occurred. We  emphasize again  the  absolute absence of any  judicial precedent which acknowledges  the  right of a  legislative body to  extend  punishment for contempt beyond  the adjournment of the  session,  and that to  go against  the unanimous authority to the contrary, would be to sanction a  power  for  the Houses of  the Philippine Legislature greater than that which any legislative body in the United States, including the Houses of the Congress of the United States, is permitted to exercise.  No  legal cause for the restraint of the petitioner is shown.

It follows from what has been said  that the trial court erred in refusing  to grant the writ of habeas corpus and its  judgment must be, as  it is  hereby, reversed,  and the record remanded with directions  to discharge the petitioner from custody.  So ordered, without costs.

Street, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Avanceña, C. J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING in part:

I agree with the majority opinion that  the Legislature has  inherent power to commit  the petitioner to twenty-four hours' imprisonment for contempt.  But I do not agree that the order  of commitment can only be executed during the particular session in which the act  of contempt was committed.   I therefore vote for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.

This case must be decided in accordance with the doctrine laid down by  the United  States  Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn, and  ratified in Marshall vs.  Gordon.

The doctrine referred to is epitomized  in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn as follows:  ''And  although the legislative  power  continues  perpetual,  the legislative  body ceases to exist  on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution.  It follows, that  imprisonment must terminate with  that adjournment."

From this doctrine it follows,  in  my judgment, that the imposition  of the penalty is  limited to the  existence of the legislative  body, which  ceases  to  function  upon its final  periodical  dissolution.  The doctrine refers to its existence and not  to any particular session thereof.  This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such a penalty  is  the right which  the  Legislature has to self-preservation,  and  which right is  enforceable  during the existence of the legislative body.   Many causes might be  conceived to  constitute contempt  to the  Legislature, which would  continue to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.

If the basis of the power of the Legislature to punish for contempt exists  while the legislative  body exercising it is in session,  then that power and  the  exercise thereof must perforce  continue until  its final  adjournment and the election of its successor.

Johns, J., with whom concur Villamor  and  Ostrand, JJ.,CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:

The opinion of Justice Malcolm is well written,  exhaustive, and learned,  and the authorities which he cites are all good law.

As stated, this case  is one  of first impression in this court, and from our point of view, the question presented has never been decided by any court.   All of the American authorities cited  and quoted are founded  upon the provisions of the  Constitution of  the  United  States or of some one  of its states, and there is a marked  legal distinction between  the  rule of construction of a constitutional provision and of a legislative act.

The people of the  Philippine Islands have never adopted a constitution,  and no  constitutional  convention  has ever been held here.   The primary power  to adopt a  constitution is vested in the people and not in the legislature.  The Constitution  of the United States was the final result of a constitutional convention composed  of delegates from the different states by whom it was prepared and then submitted to the different  states for adoption.  All of the state constitutions are the results of constitutional conventions.

In Words  and Phrases, vol.  2, p. 1462,  the word  "Constitution" is  thus defined:

"A constitution is not the beginning  of a country, nor the  origin of appropriate rights.  It is not  the  fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government.  It grants no rights to the people, but it is the creature of their power, the  instrument  of their convenience.  Designed for their protection in the enjoyment  of the  rights and powers they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the framework of political government, and necessarily based on the preexisting rights, habits, and modes  of thought. (State vs. County Treasurer,  4 S. C.  [4 Rich.], 520, 536.) 

"When the people associate, and  enter into a compact, for the purpose of establishing government, that compact, whatever may be its provisions, or in whatever language it may be written, is the constitution of the state, revocable only by the  people, or in the manner  they prescribe.  It is by this instrument that government is instituted,  its departments created, and the  powers to be exercised  by it conferred.   (Bates vs. Kimball  [Vt], 2 D. Chip., 77, 84.)

"A constitution is defined by Judge Story to  be a fundamental  law or basis  of government.   It is  established  by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own happiness, and  permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare.  (Mc-Koan vs. Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const., sees. 338, 339]; Church vs. Kelsey,  7 Sup.  Ct, 897, 898; 121 U.  S., 282; 30 L. ed.,  960.)

"A constitution is the form of government, delineated by the  mighty hand  of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed.  It contain the permanent will of the people, and is the  supreme law of the land.   It is paramount to the legislature, and can be  revoked  or altered  only by the authority that made it.  (Vanhorne's Lessee vs. Dorrance,  2 U. S. [2 Dall.], 304,  308; 28 Fed. Cos., 1012; 1 L. ed., 391.)

"A constitution is an act  of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish  the structure and  mechanism of their government, and in  which they prescribe  fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. (Eakin vs. Raub  [Pa.], 12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.)

"Every state  constitution  is  a  compact  made  by and between the  citizens  of a state to govern themselves  in a certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States is likewise  a compact made by the people of the United States to govern themselves, as  to general objects, in  a certain manner.   (Per Jay, C. J., in Chisholm vs. Georgia [Pa.], 2 Pall, 419, 471; 1 L, ed.,  440.)

"A  constitution is  the  written charter enacted  and adopted by  the people of a state through a combination of representatives, or in any way the people may choose to act, by which a government for them is obtained and established, and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, a state,  for all time to come, or during the life of the state.   (Lynn vs. Polk, 76 Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.)

"The term  'constitution'  is used in  several senses.  In a broad  sense of the term, we may speak of a constitution resting upon  usage or acquiescence,  as in England.  But in this country, when we use the term, we refer exclusively to the sovereign acts of the people,  acting by conventions  or in other constitutional  modes.   (Horsman  vs. Allen, 61 Pac, 796, 799; 129 Cal., 139 [citing Cooley, Const. Lim., pp. 5, 6].)

"In American constitutional law, the word 'constitution' is used in a restricted sense, as implying a written instrument agreed on by the people of the Union, or of any one of the states, as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers of the government in  respect to all of the points covered by it, which must control until it shall be changed by the authority which established it, and in opposition to which any act or regulation of any such department or officer, or even the  people themselves, will be altogether void.  (Cline vs. State,  36 Tex. Cr.  R., 320, 350; 36 S. W., 1099, 1107; 37 S. W., 722; 61 Am.  St. Rep.,  850 [citing Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 5].)

"The term 'constitution'  implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and,  while it contains provision  for revision, it indicates the will of  the  people that the underlying principles upon which it rests,  as well as the substantial entirety of the  instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.  (Li vermore vs. Waite, 36 Pac,  424, 426; 102  Cal., 113;  25 L. R. A., 312.)

"A constitution, 'according to the common  acceptation of the word  in the United States, may be said  to  be an agreement of the people,  in their individual capacities, reduced to writing,  establishing and fixing certain principles for  the government  of  themselves.  Among these principles,  one of the most important in all our constitutions  is to prescribe and limit the objects of legislative power.  The people  are sovereign, in power they are supreme, and the legislature acts by delegated and circumscribed authority; circumscribed as to its objects, circumscribed  as to its  extent over  these  objects.'  (State  vs. Parkhurst, 9  N. J. Law [4 Halst.], 427 443.)"

Ruling Case Law,  vol. 6, p. 16, says:

"2. Definitions  and Purposes  of Constitutions. A  constitution is a system  of fundamental  laws  or principles for the government of  a nation,  society, corporation or other aggregation of  individuals,  and it may be  either written or unwritten..  In the United States, the word 'constitution,' as applied to the organization of  the federal and state governments  always implies a writing, and  it is understood in the further restricted sense of an enactment by the direct action  of the people providing for  the form of government and  defining  the powers, of the several departments, thus creating a fundamental law  which is absolute and unalterable except  by the  authority from which it emanated.  Its purpose  is to  prescribe the  permanent framework of the system  of government and assign to the different departments their respective powers and  duties, and  to establish certain fixed first principles on which government is founded.  A constitution differs from a statute in that a statute must  provide the details of the subject of which it treats, whereas a constitution usually states general principles,  and builds the substantial  foundation and general framework of the law  and government.  In some  respects a constitutional provision is a higher form  of statutory law,  which the people may provide shall be self-executing where the object is to put it beyond the power of the legislature to render such provision nugatory by refusing to pass laws to carry it into effect.

"3. Permanency and Generality  of Constitutions. A constitution, unlike a statute, is intended not merely  to meet existing conditions, but to govern the future.  It has been said that the term 'constitution' implies an  instrument of a permanent nature.  Since it is recognized that its framers  could not  anticipate conditions  which might arise thereafter in the progress of the nation, and could not  establish all the law which from time to time might be necessary to conform to the  changing conditions  of a community, as a rule a constitution does not deal in details, but  enunciates the general principles  and general directions which  are intended  to  apply to all new facts  that may come into  being, and which may be brought within those general principles or directions.   It has been said that  it would have been  an  unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for  exigencies which, if foreseen  at all,  must have been seen dimly,  and  which can  be best provided for as they occur, and that it would have deprived the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.  Although the rigidity of a written constitution may at times obstruct progress, its stability is intended  to  protect the-people  from  frequent and  violent fluctuations of public opinion."

The same  rule is also laid down in Corpus Juris.

The people of the Philippine Islands  have never  adopted a  constitution or held a constitutional convention, and it must be conceded that any powers or duties which the Philippine Legislature may have were conferred  upon it by Acts of Congress of the United States, and that Congress is powerless to  adopt or even amend the Constitution  of the United  States or of any State of the United States, much less to adopt a constitution for the Philippine Islands. In the final analysis, any power which the Philippine Legislature may  have is not derived from  a constitution.

From  an  examination of the United States authorities cited  in  Justice Malcolm's opinion, it  will be found that all of them  are based upon the Constitution of the United States or of a state constitution, and that, for  such reasons in the cases cited, the court have held that the legislature, acting and sitting under a constitution, for its own preservation, has  limited, inherent power  to punish  for contempt.

As  Ruling Case Law  says:

"A  constitution differs from a statute in that a statute must  provide the details of the subject of which it treats, whereas  a constitution  usually  states  general principles, and builds the substantial foundation  and general framework  of the law and government."

As  stated  in Words and Phrases above quoted:

"The  constitution  is certain and fixed.  It  contains the permanent will of the people, and  is the supreme law of the land.  It is paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only  by the authority that made it."

While  the courts  have held  that in a certain  class of cases, the Legislature, sitting and acting under a constitution,  has the inherent power to punish for contempt,  no court  has ever held that the Legislature can invest a legislative act with that  inherent power,  and  that would  be especially true of a  criminal law or an act of a  criminal nature.

The facts in the instant case are important.

The resolution  of the  Philippine Legislature upon  which the petitioner was tried and  convicted  is as follows:

*       *      *       *       *       *       *

" 'Whereas, on  October 23,  1929, Candido Lopez  attacked and assaulted,  without any justification, the Honorable Jose D.  Dimayuga, who was then and is now a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands, while said Representative was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the sessions which were then about to begin, as a result of which  attack and assault said Representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day  and those of the two days next  following, by reason  of the threats  which  Mr.  Candido Lopez made against said Representative, Honorable Jose D. Dimayuga;

'"Whereas, those acts  of aggression  and assault  were committed by the aforesaid Mr. Candido Lopez knowing full well as  he  then  knew that said Representative  was and  is  one of the members  of  the  House of Representatives, who was  then  going to the hall  of  said  House to attend the sessions thereof which were  about to begin at the moment of the aggression;' "

*       *      *        *       *       *       *

This  is a  quasi-criminal proceeding in which there is no presumption of fact in favor of  the prosecution.  All of such presumptions are in favor  of the petitioner, and it appears that at the time the alleged acts were committed, the Legislature was not sitting in actual session.  Neither is it alleged  that they  were committed  in the  legislative halls or even in the legislative building.  Hence, analyzing the specific charge, we have this situation.  The petitioner assaulted  a member of the Legislature  who was en route to the legislative building to attend a session of the Legislature which had not been convened or called to order, and it was  for the  commission of  such an assault that he was  tried, convicted, and sentenced  by the Legislature to twenty-four hours in Bilibid Prison.

It is  conceded that on  October 9, 1907,  the  Philippine Commission,  which was created by  an  Act of Congress, enacted Act  No. 1755, which is as follows: "No. 1755. An Act to prohibit the disturbance of the Philippine Commission, the Philippine Assembly, or of any provincial  board or  municipal or  township council; to punish disorderly conduct in the immediate view or presence of said bodies; to punish the fraudulent altering of the draft of any bill, resolution, ordinance,  or  act  pending before  or enacted by any such body or the Philippine Legislature; to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence before the Philippine  Commission or Philippine Assembly, or before any committee of either or both said bodies, and  for other  purposes.

"By authority  of the United States,  be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:

 "Section 1. Any person who  willfully or by force or fraud prevents or attempts to prevent the meeting of the Philippine Commission or the organizing or meeting of the Philippine  Assembly  or  of  any   Insular legislative body  of the Philippine  Islands hereafter  established,  or  the meeting  or organizing of any provincial board  or municipal or township council, and  any person who willfully disturbs the  Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or any Insular  legislative body  of the Philippine Islands  hereafter established, or any provincial board or municipal or township council, while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly conduct  in the  immediate  view or presence  of any such  body  tending  to interrupt the proceedings of such body  or to impair the respect due to its authority, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two  thousand  pesos  or by  imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both, in the discretion of the  court."

*       *      *       *       *      *      *

That is very broad and comprehensive.   It not only applies to persons who by force or fraud prevent or attempt to prevent the meetings of  the Philippine Commission  or any Insular, legislative body, but it goes further and applies to any person "who is guilty of any disorderly conduct in the immediate view or presence of any such body tending to interrupt  its proceedings,"  or  "to impair the respect due to its authority."  For the commission of  any such acts, the  person "shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five  years, or by both, in the discretion of the court." Among the first things  which the Philippine Commission did  was to enact this law which has been  in force ever since.  By its own  act  the  Legislature vested the  power and authority in the courts to try, decide, and punish the identical act for which the Legislature itself tried  and convicted the petitioner.  But it is contended that the  Legislature has the inherent power to punish for contempt, and that it could not delegate that power to the courts.  There would be much force in that contention, if the Legislature was acting under and was a creature of a constitution.

The fact that said Act No.  1755 was approved by the Philippine Commission on October 9, 1907, seven days before the organization  of the Philippine Assembly, is  not without significance.   For it is to be presumed  that  the American members of the then Philippine Commission were aware of  the existing jurisprudence  as to  the  inherent power of  the legislative  bodies in the United States  to punish for contempt, and yet they deemed  it wise to pass said Act, thus indicating that the Philippine Assembly then about to be inaugurated ought not to possess the same inherent power  to punish for contempt third persons.   Not only this.   On March 10,  1917, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code, section 102  of which provides:

"Sec. 102. Contempt, of legislative body or committee. Any person who, being summoned to attend as  a witness before the Philippine Legislature, or either House thereof, or before any committee of either of said bodies lawfully clothed with authority to  take testimony, fails or refuses, without legal excuse, to attend pursuant to such  summons, and any person  who,  being present before any such body or committee, willfully refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce, upon  reasonable notice,  any material and  proper books, papers, documents,  records, or other evidence in his possession or under his control, required by any such body, shall  be punished  by  a fine not to exceed one thousand pesos, or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or  both such fine and imprisonment."

Assuming again that the Philippine Legislature was also aware of the  inherent power of the United States  Congress  and of the State Legislatures to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt, the inclusion of the above-quoted section in the Administrative Code clearly shows that said Philippine  Legislature  never  considered itself  possessed of such inherent power to punish third persons; otherwise such section of the  Administrative Code would have  been entirely superfluous.

We frankly concede that, where under a constitution the Legislature  is vested with and has the inherent power to punish for contempt, the  Legislature cannot delegate that power, for the simple reason that the power of the Legislature is inferior and subordinate to that  of the constitution.  It is for such reasons that the Legislature cannot adopt, modify or amend a constitution.  The power to do that  is vested  in  the higher authority of  the  sovereign people.

It will be noted  that in none of the  authorities cited in the opinion of Justice Malcolm is any mention or reference made to the provisions  in Act No. 1755  or  of  any similar provisions.   In fact, for aught that appears, there is no such or  similar provisions in the laws of any other country, and such provisions are sui generis to the Philippine Islands.  It is  very  apparent upon its face that the purpose and intent of Act No. 1755 was to vest the courts with the power to try and punish the alleged acts, and to do the very thing which the Legislature itself tried to do in this case.  If, as now claimed, the Legislature  has all of that inherent  power,  why  was Act  No.  1755 enacted? And why did it give the courts the power to  try and punish for such offenses?  Act No. 1755 was enacted for a specific purpose and to meet conditions then existing.  Its terms and provisions are broad and drastic, and its punishment is  severe, and it was  designed to protect the person  and body  of a  member of the Legislature or even of the  city council from an  assault or  bodily harm, and for  twenty-three years it has answered well  its purpose.

Much stress is  attached to the contention that the Legislature has such  inherent power  for its own  protection and preservation.  We frankly concede that, if the alleged acts were  committed within the halls  of the  Legislature and  while  it was sitting  in actual session, it would then have the power to maintain and preserve order and to do anything  necessary  for  the conduct of its own business or its  own preservation.  But, as stated, the alleged  acts were not  committed while the Legislature  was sitting in actual session, and it does not appear from the record that they were  committed even in  the  legislative building,  and assuming  everything to be true, as alleged,  it  does  not appear  that they resulted  in  any real or substantial interference with the proceedings  of the Legislature.

Article  587  of  the Penal Code provides:

"The penalty  of  arresto  menor shall be imposed upon any  person who  shall inflict  upon  another any physical injuries which shall prevent the person injured from working for a  period  of from  one to seven days, or shall make medical attendance necessary for the same period."

Under the provision of this article, if guilty as charged, the petitioner could be convicted and sentenced to from one to thirty days' imprisonment.

Hence, in the final analysis, if the Legislature has the power to punish a third person for contempt for  an assault upon  one of its members  outside of  its  legislative hall, that person would be guilty of three distinct offenses for one  and the same act.   He could be tried and  convicted by the  Legislature itself  for  an assault upon  one of its members, and sentenced to any period not beyond the legislative session.   He  could  then  be tried and  convicted by the court for the same  identical  offense under the provisions of Act No. 1755,  and fined not more than P2,000 or imprisonment for not  more than five  years, or by both, in the discretion of the court.   He could also be tried  and convicted by the court for that same offense under article 587 of the Penal Code,  and  sentenced to from one to thirty  days' imprisonment.

We  concede  that the United States decisions  lay down the rule that where the Legislature,  acting and sitting under a constitution, has the inherent power to punish for contempt,  that  a conviction  for that  offense  is  not a  bar to a  prosecution  in  the  court for  the  crime of assault and battery, which in the instant case would correspond to article 58.7 of the Penal Code.   Be that as it may,  none  of  those decisions are in point.  First,  for the simple reason that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands is not sitting or  acting under  a constitution, but is a creature of an Act of Congress of the  United States, which has no power to adopt or  even  amend the Constitution of the United States or any  State of the  United States, much less to  adopt  a constitution for the Philippine Islands.   Second, that  the people  of the Philippine Islands have never adopted  or held a  constitutional convention.   Third,  none  of those  decisions  are  founded upon  Act No.  1755  or  any  similar provision.   They are all based upon the inherent  power of a legislature  under a  constitution.  Fourth,  to  permit the  exercise of  that alleged inherent power of the Philippine Legislature under an Act of Congress would subject the offender to three different penalties.  One by the Legislature itself, one under Act No. 1755, and the third under article 587 of the Penal Code, and all for an act committed outside of the legislative halls, and while the Legislature was not sitting in actual session.

We are clearly of the opinion, upon  the admitted facts, that the Philippine Legislature had no legal right to try much less convict and sentence the petitioner to imprisonment in Bilibid.   That  when Act No.  1755 was  enacted it vested in the courts, by its express terms and provisions, the power to try  and punish contemptuous acts committed on one of its members outside of  the legislative halls and while the Legislature was not sitting in actual session,  in addition to which the alleged offender  could also be tried, convicted, and punished under article 587 of the Penal Code.

For such reasons, the alleged trial, conviction, and sentence of the Legislature is null and void,  and the writ should be  granted, and  to that extent we concur  in the result. From  this point  of view, it  is  unnecessary to discuss  or express an opinion on the remaining question.

ROMUALDEZ, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING in part:

With due respect to the majority opinion, I believe the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. It is alleged in the return  to the writ that on October 23, 1929, while Representative Jose Dimayuga was proceeding to the House of Representatives to attend  the session, the petitioner herein  knowingly assaulted said representative, thereby preventing him from  attending  the session of the house that day, and on two other days.

I  agree with  the  majority  opinion  that  these  facts must be admitted, inasmuch as they  were neither  duly traversed nor  contradicted,  and  the  petition to  present evidence to  the contrary having been  denied  without an exception from the petitioner.

I agree with the writer of the opinion  that the House of Representatives has sufficient power to take disciplinary action in cases of contempt like the one under consideration.   Such power  is inherent in the  right of the Legislature to self-preservation and the exercise of its functions; and in the particular case in question, I am of opinion that, in view of  the facts of the case, the authority exercised is also a necessary  consequence derived a  fortiori from the immunity of a member of the legislature from arrest for certain crimes and misdemeanors, while attending the legislative session or going to or from the sessions.

But I dissent from the majority opinion  where it denies to the House of Representatives the right to exercise that power during the present session, which is  a session of the same legislature,  though  subsequent to  that wherein the act of contempt was committed.   In my opinion, where, as in the case before  us, the members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was  committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein.

I see nothing contrary to this conclusion in the cases of Anderson vs. Dunn (6 Wheaton,  230),  and Marshall vs. Gordon (243 U. S., 521),  cited in the majority opinion, in the judgment appealed from, and in the briefs filed by both parties.  The restrictions laid upon the" penalty for this kind of contempt, as I  understand them, are merely that the punishment is limited to imprisonment, and that such imprisonment shall not  extend  beyond the session  when service begins.  These limitations have nothing to do with the exercise of the power to punish for contempt, but only with the duration of the imprisonment.  That is why it was said in Marshall vs. Gordon:

"And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two  limitations which were expressly pointed  out in Anderson  vs. Dunn, supra; that is, that the power, even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise, is limited to imprisonment, and such imprisonment may not be executed beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred."  (Italics ours.,)

If it were intended to limit the power to punish by  imprisonment the passage italicized should have read: "and the power may not be  exercised" (using "the power" instead of "such imprisonment" and "exercised" instead of "executed" as relating to power)  "beyond the session of the body  in which the contempt occurred."

The timeliness  of exercising that power at a session subsequent to that when the  contempt occurred, in general, is a matter strictly within the  discretion of  the  offended legislative body, and courts cannot pass  upon it unless there is evidence of a manifest  and absolute disregard of discretion, which does not appear from the record in the present case.  The facts of record show that the contempt was not punished  during the session when it occurred, not because of negligence or  condonation of the offense by the House, but because the petitioner could  not be arrested.

The following  is a  pertinent  ruling from the case of Marshall  vs. Gordon, cited  above:

"On the contrary, when an act is of such a character as to subject it to be dealt with as  a contempt under the  implied  authority,   we are  of opinion that  jurisdiction is acquired by Congress to act on the subject, and therefore there necessarily results from- this power the right to determine, in the use of legitimate and fair  discretion, how  far from the nature  and character of the  act  there is  necessity for repression to prevent immediate recurrence; that is to  say, the continued  existence of the interference or obstruction to the exercise  of the legislative  power.   And of course in such case, as in every  other, unless  there be manifest and absolute disregard  of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary  power coming within  the  reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise  of the authority is not subject to judicial interference."   (Italics  ours.)

The allegation that the petitioner was not duly heard is contradicted  by the return to the writ which  has not in any way been denied or controverted.

The warrant of  arrest signed by the Speaker  of  the House is perfectly  valid and the lack of an express oath taken in the act does not detract from the legal effect thereof,  as  shown by the Attorney-General in his brief, citing the case of McGrain vs. Daugherty (273 U. S.,  135).

There is no merit in the allegation that  the  respondent as a Constabulary  officer has no authority to  return  the warrant of arrest.   This is one of his functions provided in section 831 of the  Administrative Code, and the Constabulary  Manual adopted under the provision  of section 843 of said Code.

These are the considerations upon  the strength of which I believe that the power which the majority of this court has recognized in the House of Representatives  was legally exercised in the case at bar.

I vote for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.

JOHNSON, J., DISSENTING:

This is an  appeal from a very interesting and instructive opinion of Judge Mariano Albert denying the petition of the appellant for the writ  of habeas corpus.   The facts upon which the petition was based  are simple and may be stated briefly as  follows:

The appellant was arrested  on  the morning of September 19, 1930,  by the respondent by virtue  of  a warrant  of arrest signed by the  Honorable Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in  pursuance of a resolution  of said House approved September  16,  1930.  The warrant of arrest was issued by reason of an  alleged  act of contempt against the Legislature committed  on October 23, 1929,  upon the person of Representative Jose Dimayuga by the petitioner, during its sessions in 1929, The appellant now asks that said warrant of arrest be declared illegal and void and that he be released from said arrest.

Upon a full and careful consideration of the facts  and the law, Judge Mariano Albert denied the petition and  dismissed the same with  costs,  and  ordered  the petitioner remanded to the custody of the respondent for compliance with the  order of the Speaker  of the House of Representatives.  From that decision the petitioner  appealed,  and now, through his attorneys, makes two principal contentions: (a) That the  Legislature of the Philippine Islands has no authority to punish him, for contempt, and (6) that the alleged contempt having  been  committed  during  the former sessions of the Legislature (1929), the  Legislature which imposed the punishment during its period of sessions in  1980 is without right or authority to impose  the punishment complained of.

Upon these questions practically  every member of this court has presented  a separate opinion covering a wide range of subjects but differing in their conclusions.   Much has been  said which,  in my opinion, is not germane to  the subject before us.

The Legislature of  the Philippine Islands is  a duly  organized legislative body under an Act of the Congress of the  United States.  Its  authority  to act as a legislative body is not even now questioned by any of the parties in this action.  It is a body elected by the people for a definite period, with authority to  hold sessions and  to  enact laws upon the subjects delegated to it.  Being a regularly organized legislative body, we think the general rules governing  such bodies  should  be applied.  The  legislative body of the Philippine Islands is composed of two branches under the  law,  (a) a House of Representatives and (&) a Senate.

Cooley,  in his very valuable work on Constitutional Limitations, said:

"Each house has also the power to punish members for disorderly behavior, and other  contempts of  its authority, as well as to expel a member  for any cause which seems to the body to render it unfit that he continue to  occupy one of its  seats.  This power  is generally  enumerated in  the constitution  among those which  the  two  houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in  that  instrument, since  it would exist whether expressly conferred or not.  It is 'a necessary and incidental power to enable the house to perform its high functions, and it is  necessary to the safety of the state.  It is a power of protection.  A member may fee physically, mentally, or morally wholly unfit ; he may be affected with a contagious disease, or  insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language.'  And, 'independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legislative houses have the  power to protect themselves  by the punishment and expulsion of a member;' and the courts cannot  inquire  into  the justice of the decision,  or even so much as examine the proceedings to see whether  or not the  proper  opportunity for defense was furnished.

"Each house may also punish  contempts of its authority by  other persons, where they are committed  in its presence, or where they tend directly to embarrass or obstruct its legislative proceedings; and it requires for the purpose no  express  provision  of  the constitution conferring the authority.   It is  not very well settled what are the limits to this power; and in the leading case in this country the speaker's warrant for the arrest of the person  adjudged guilty of contempt was sustained, though it did not show in what  the alleged contempt consisted.   In  the leading English case a libelous publication concerning the house was treated  as a  contempt; and punishment has sometimes been inflicted for assaults  upon members  of the  house, not  committed in or near  the  place of  sitting, and for the arrest of members in  disregard of their constitutional privilege.

"When  imprisonment is  imposed as a punishment, it must terminate with the  final adjournment of the house, and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its  order, he  may  be released on habeas corpus."   (Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations,  pp. 190, 191, -7th ed.)

Accepting  as I do the eminent authority of Judge  Cooley and  the cases  cited  in  support  of his  argument,  I see no escape from the conclusion that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands  has inherent power to  punish for contempt all such cases as Judge Cooley mentions.  Many other cases might be cited in support of the  conclusions of Judge Cooley.  Many  of the other decisions are cited and clearly  discussed  by Judge Mariano Albert.  I feel that no  comments  are  necessary  to  sustain  the splendid argument  and the  wise conclusions  of  Judge Albert on that particular  question.

Granting that the Legislature  has inherent power  to punish for  contempt, we pass to a discussion of the second question, to wit, When  must  the punishment imposed be carried  into effect?  Upon that question Judge Cooley, as We have  stated  above, makes the statement: "When imprisonment is  imposed  as a punishment, it must terminate with  the final adjournment of the house,  and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order,  he may be released  on habeas corpus."  (Jefferson's Manual, sec. 18; Richard's Case, 1 Lev., 165.)

If I understand the statement of Judge Cooley and the authorities he cites, he means that a legislative body having the inherent power to  punish for contempt, may  punish contempts  at any time before the final adjournment of that body.  But what do we  mean by the phrase "final adjournment of that body?"   It  simply  means that  during the existence of the  particular legislature it may  punish for contempt at any time  before  "final  adjournment."  If  I understand correctly the authorities cited by Judge Cooley, "final adjournment" means  the time when  a  particular legislative  body goes out of existence as a legislative body. To  illustrate: the legislature may be elected  for a period of three years and no  more.   At the expiration of three years, that body ceases  to exist as a legislative  entity.  In other words, it has gone out of existence upon final adjournment, and  of course  having gone out  of  existence as a legislative body, it ceases to have any legislative authority, and not having any legislative authority or authority as a legislature, its power to carry into effect any of its orders has ceased and it is powerless to enforce any of its orders made during its legal  existence.

If an examination of the journals of the legislature may be made, we  will find that a distinction is made between (a) daily adjournments of the sessions, (b)  adjournment at the end of each period of sessions  and (c)  final adjournment,  by virtue of which the legislature  goes out of existence.  For the  daily adjournment, the following language is used: "Se levanto la sesion *  *  *,  acordandose celebrar la siguiente el............de............................, 19........."  The language for the adjournment of the legislature at each period of sessions is as follows: "El Presidente declaro levantada la sesion sine die del primer periodo de sesiones  *  *  *,"  while the language used for the final adjournment is: "Sr. Presidente:Ahora, caballeros de la Camara, de acuerdo con la  resolucion  concurrents adoptada por a'mbas camaras, se levanta la sesion de la Camara de Representantes sine die."

If we  may  be  permitted to examine the Congressional Record of the Congress of the United States,  we will find that different languages are used for (a) daily  adjournment,  (&)  adjournment  at the end of each  period of sessions, and (c) final adjournment,  by virtue  of  which it goes out of existence.  For daily adjournment the following language is used:  "Accordingly the  House, under the order heretofore  made,  adjourned  until tomorrow,  etc." For the adjournment at the end of each period of sessions, the following language is used "The Chair  (the Speaker) declares the first  session of the Sixty-fourth Congress adjourned without day."   For the final adjournment, which terminates the existence of that particular  body,  the following language  is used:  "I (the Speaker)  declare the House of Representatives  of the Sixty-third Congress adjourned  without day."

After  an  examination of the journals of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands as well as those of the Congress of  the United  States,  we observe  that there are  three classes of adjournments of sessions  of those legislative bodies:  (a) Adjournment of the sessions from day to day, (&)  adjournment of sessions from one  period to another, of  the same  legislature  or Congress,  and  (c) final  adjournment of  the particular legislature  or Congress, which means that that particular entity, as  a legislative  body, has  ceased  to exist and has no further  power as a legal entity for the purposes of legislation.

If I understand  the  facts in this case, the Legislature which authorized Manuel Roxas, its Speaker, to order the arrest of the appellant  on September  16, 1930,  is  exactly the same legislative  entity against which the appellant committed  contempt in 1929, and had  not  finally adjourned at  the  time  the present  petition for the writ of habeas corpus was presented to the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.   Said Legislature, therefore, at the time of  the consideration of the petition for  the writ of habeas corpus, still had full authority to carry into effect, through proper  channels, the order of arrest complained of.

There has been a good deal of discussion concerning the sessions  of the Legislature and its right to punish for contempt after the close of the sessions at which the contempt was committed.   In my judgment the argument which supports the contention that the power to punish has ceased to exist, after the close of the sessions  at which the contempt was  committed,  is  not  well supported,  unless  the close of  the period of sessions is a final adjournment or a sine die adjournment,  which means  that that particular legislative body, as a legislative entity, has gone out of existence.  In my judgment there is no support for the contention that the close  of a particular  period  of sessions deprives the legislative body of its right to punish for contempt committed during that period.

In view of all of the foregoing, I am forced to the conclusion  that the judgment appealed from  should be affirmed, with costs.