Petitioner and appellant claims as  a resident Chinese merchant that he is entitled to the admission to these Islands of his wife and three minor children who were denied admission by  a board of special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs on the  ground that the petitioner had failed to prove that he was a merchant.   On appeal the Acting Collector of Customs  confirmed the decision  of a board  of special inquiry.  A  petition for  habeas corpus  was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on  behalf of the applicant, which petition  was  denied.  The  case  is now brought  here on appeal.

Petitioner showed that he had a 2  per cent interest in a Chinese co-partnership of Seng Kee & Company.  A certified copy of the articles of the co-partnership was produced and,shows that the co-partnership is  engaged in importing and  exporting,  manufacturing,  and general commercial enterprises.  The value of petitioner's  interest of said co- partnership is placed at the sum, of  P4,500.  It is also shown that he is employed by the firm as a customs broker at a  salary in  the  neighborhood  of a  thousand  pesos (P1,000) per annum, but is not shown by any satisfactory proof that he is actually  engaged in buying and  selling merchandise  in connection with the  business  of Seng Kee & Company.  It was also  claimed by petitioner at the hearing that he formerly  owned an independent mercantile business in the City of Manila of the value of P45,000 which had been burned  and on which  the insurance was unpaid.  The nature of this business and all other  details relative thereto  was not shown by the  applicant who disclaimed knowledge of its affairs  saying that the business was in the hands of his manager.

The real question presented may  be simply stated.  It is;   Does ownership  in. a  Chinese co-partnership engaged in mercantile enterprises make such a  holder a merchant within the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act?   Prom  a practical standpoint, the ownership  of one  share of stock can  not make a man a capitalist.   The ownership of  one  share of stock of a mining corporation does not make a  man a miner. If the ownership  of  a minor share in a mercantile  co-partnership would make, as a matter of law, a merchant out of a  laborer, it is easy to  see how  Chinese co-partnerships of the Philippines would expand and  how  impossible it would  be to  enforce the  Chinese Exclusion  Act. The customs officials in administering the Immigration Law must determine  whether the applicant is or is not in fact a merchant and the mere ownership of a share in a mercantile business is not conclusive  that a person occupies that status.  Congress has denied  a  merchant as used  in the Chinese Exclusion Act as:

"*  *  *  a person engaged in buying and selling merchandise, at a fixed place  of business,  which business is conducted in his name, and who during the time he  claims to be engaged as a merchant,  does not engage in the performance of any manual labor, except such as is necessary in the conduct of his business  as such merchant."   (U. S. C. A. tit.  8, sec. 289.)

The contention of petitioner  and appellant is disposed of by the decision of the Supreme  Court of  the United States.   Tulsidas  vs. Collector of Customs  (262 U. S., 258, 264.)

"A merchant is the  owner of the business; a salesman or manager, a servant of it;  and especially so under the Immigration Law.  The policy of the law must be kept in mind.  It is careful to distinguish between the status of a merchant and those below that status.  A merchant is fixed in it and made constant to it by  his financial interest; a salesman or manager is but an employee, however else he may be denominated, and may withdraw from his employment at any moment of time and become a competitor in the ranks of labor, using the word in the sense the law implies."

After  reviewing the record of the board  of special inquiry and the action of the Insular Collector  of Customs it can not be said that they have abused the authority and discretion  vested in  them by law.  The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña,  C.  J.,  Street,  Villamor,  Villa-Real,   Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.