This  is a motion to dismiss the appeal of Clara Webber and Gertrude Webber from two orders of the  Court  of First Instance of the City of Manila.  The dispositive part of those orders reads:

"It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the petitions of Clara Webber and Gertrude Webber, and Frema Fischler, for a reconsideration of the  order of  this court of July 19, 1932, shall  be and  they  are hereby denied, and the administrator of this estate is  hereby  authorized and directed to comply  with  said order  and  to take immediate steps toward transmitting  the said sum of P13,747.96  to the heir Fred Frankel  at his address  in New York City.

"It is further ordered and decreed that the administrator, the Philippine Trust Company, is hereby  authorized and directed to take the necessary  action  against Mrs.  Anna Hartske to recover from her the sum of P7,112.78 due to it under her agreement, for the purpose of satisfying and paying the balance due to the legatees in this  case,"

In settling the estate  of  the deceased, R. H. Frankel,  a final plan of partition, with the consent of all parties, was entered by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila on April 19, 1932.   Under that plan  Fred Frankel was entitled to one-half of the estate, and  the appellants with others were entitled to the other half of the estate, and that plan has become final.

Some time ago there was an agreement among all the participants of the second portion  of the estate to which these appellants concurred for a partial distribution of their share to which agreement Fred Frankel was not a party, and was not bound in  any way by that agreement.  Anna Hartske, and the Webbers, were parties to that agreement and Hartske agreed to pay back to  the administrator such funds as might  be necessary to make a final and correct distribution of the estate.  The court issued  the orders above quoted, well knowing that the administrator did not have enough funds to  pay both Frankel  and the Webbers.

It is  not  clear from the papers whether  this appeal is directed against both  orders or only one.  It is perfectly obvious on its face that the order  directing the administrator to take the necessary action against Hartske, is purely interlocutory and therefore can not be the basis of an appeal.

Looking at the orders in regard to the payment of Fred Frankel, it  is  at once  seen that his share of the estate is fixed and certain and that the decision of the Court of First Instance as to the amount of his share of the estate entered with the knowledge and consent of all parties, and made without exception of any  one, has become final.  As above stated he had no participation in the partial  distribution of the estate, nor had he  any interest in the relationship that may exist between the Webbers and Hartske.

The orders of the trial court directing his payment  are comparable  to the issue of a writ of execution upon a final judgment.   They not being in excess of the amount justly due are not questionable and give no right of appeal to the Webbers.  The motion to dismiss the appeal is sustained with costs against the appellants.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C.  J.,  Street, Villamor,  Villa-Real,  Abad Santos, Vickers, and Imperial,  JJ.,  concur.