This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija by the brothers and sisters Manuel Castro, Pedro Castro, Maria Castro,  and Consolation Castro, with whom are joined, under representation of a proper  guardian ad litem, the four minors Maximiana, Aurea,  Catalina, and Ceferino,  also  of the  surname  of Castro,  children of Vicente Castro, deceased  brother  of the four plaintiffs first named.  The plaintiff Maria Castro is assisted by  her husband, Vicente Garcia, and Consolacion Castro by her husband, Ricardo Nilo.  The defendant is Jose Castro,  or Jose de Castro, elder  brother of the four plaintiffs' first  above named and  Uncle of the four minors mentioned.   The purpose of the action is to obtain a decree to the effect that the four adult plaintiffs and  the four minors, children of Vicente Castro, are each owners  of an undivided one-sixth interest in a parcel  of land located in the sitios  of Ablang, Saguingan,  and  Pinamunghian, barrio of  San Juan, municipality of Lieab,  Province  of Nueva Ecija, having an area of 418 hectares, 76 ares, and 72 centares, covered by Torrens certificate of title No. 1515 issued in the name of the defendant, Jose de Castro.  The complaint also asks  for an  order for the partition of said land among the plaintiffs and defendant, as well  as to recover from the defendant the respective shares of the plaintiffs in  the produce of  said land from  the year  1909 till the filing of the complaint, or the value of  the same  in money.

Upon hearing the cause the trial court entered judgment declaring that the four adult plaintiffs,  and the four minors in representation of their deceased father, Vicente Castro, were each entitled  to 139,489 square  meters  of  the land in question and entered a  decree requiring the defendant to execute in favor of the plaintiffs appropriate deeds, proper for inscription in the registry of  property, conveying  to each plaintiff in  interest  the amount of land stated.  His Honor also ordered the  defendant to deliver to each of the four adult plaintiffs and  to  the  minor Tieirs of Vicente Castro his or her appropriate share in the produce  of the land for a number of years prior  to the filing  of the complaint.  This interest the court estimated at 287 cavans of palay, with a value  of P861,  for  each share.  Finally his Honor ordered that  the defendant should effect the corresponding  operations of subdivision  for the  purpose of segregation and  delivery  to  each of  the parties  plaintiff  his   or  her  appropriate  share  in   the land.  At the same  time the plaintiffs were absolved from  a cross-complaint filed by the defendant seeking to recover damages for unjust vexation.  From this judgment both the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed.   The appeal of the plaintiffs is directed to the supposed inadequacy of the  portions awarded by the court to each of the  plaintiffs in both the land and  the produce received from  it,  while the defendant appeals from the action of the court in awarding  to the plaintiffs  any part of either the land or its produce.  No contention is raised  by the defendant with respect  to the dismissal  of his cross-complaint.

The land which is the principal subject of this  action is located in the sitios of Ablang, Saguingan, and Pinamunghian, of the barrio of San Juan, in the municipality of Licab, Province  of Nueva Ecija,  and consists  of  nearly 419  hectares.  It formerly belonged to Mariano Tinio, who  died in the year 1888.   He was  survived by his widow, Silveria Bondoe, and her three children, Maximiana, Manuel and Catalina, as well as by three children of an earlier marriage, namely, Casimiro, Esperanza and Agaton.  All  six of these children are now dead, but Agaton left four children,  now adults, namely, Pascual, Eligio, Juana, and Irene. The child of Mariano Tinio with  whom we are here more particularly concerned is Maximiana, who married Valentin  Castro.  To this pair were born six children, the oldest of whom is Jose Castro, the defendant in this lawsuit.  The five younger children were Vicente,  Manuel, Consolacion, Maria and Pedro.  Vicente is now dead but was  survived by his four minor children, Maximiana, Aurea, Catalina, and Ceferino.

Maximiana Tinio died in  August, 1909.  At that time the defendant Jose Castro was the only one of her children who was of age, he having been born about the year 1886. The other children of Maximiana Tinio were then all minors, the youngest having been born in the year 1907.  Valentin Castro, relict husband  of  Maximiana Tinio, married Damiana Bernabe before a great while as his second wife.  Valentin  appears not to have been a vigorous man.  But the oldest  son, Jose, had received some  education and he soon proved himself alert and competent  in farming operations.

Mariano Tinio,  the grandfather  and great grandfather of the plaintiffs, left considerable property to be shared by his widow, Silveria Bondoc,  and his  children  by the two marriages above-mentioned.  The proof shows that, though no formal  partition  was made, his heirs divided the property, a suitable portion being assigned to each. The land which is the subject of this action appears to have been assigned to Maximiana, and we so find, although the question whether it did in fact go to her by extra judicial partition is the major disputed point in the case.  Our reasons for finding that this land was thus assigned to Maximiana as a part of her portion of her father's estate will be more fully stated  later. Suffice it here to say that there is proof to show that Maximiana exercised possession over this property and reduced part of it to a state of cultivation.

This land lies low and in  its former natural state was under  water for a good part of the year.  In the life of Mariano Tinio part of  it had been reduced to cultivation, and the prospects for the fruitful development of the property were then good.  But as  a result possibly of the destructive ravages of rinderpest in this section of the country in the eighties, followed in the nineties by the revolution against Spain and  the later insurrection against the  sovereignty of the United  States, the property appears to have reverted  to a wild  state and came to be covered almost entirely by such growth as is commonly found in low ground.

Three or four years after civil order had been restored Maximiana Tinio began bringing portions of the property back into a state of cultivation.  In this  she  was aided  by her son, Jose Castro, while he was still  a member of his parent's family.   After  his mother's death in  1909, Jose, as the oldest child and only competent manager among the heirs, assumed the administration of this  land.,  We believe that, in so doing, Jose Castro acted as representative of  all of the children.   However, he now claims  that he had taken possession of this property in his own right, prior to his mother's death, by virtue of an assignment of the property made to him. by  his mother, acting in  concert with her brothers and sisters.

On July 28, 1912, Jose Castro applied, in  the Court  of Land Registration, for the registration of this land in his name,  alleging that he had acquired it by inheritance,  as sole heir  of his  deceased mother.   In  this petition  there was a suppression of the fact that he then had five younger brothers and  sisters, all of whom were then minors, and who, supposing the property to have been inherited from the mother, would have been equally interested  with himself.

This proceeding, after various vicissitudes, was finally decided in favor of the petitioner, Jose Castro, but upon an appeal the decision was reversed and the petition dismissed by the Supreme Court on a technical ground not involving the merits of the petitioner's claim (De Castro vs. Director of Lands,  31 Phil, 461).

In October  of the year 1919,  the  same petitioner began a second proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to register the same land in his sole name.  In the petition filed in this proceeding the petitioner alleged that he had acquired the land by inheritance from his mother, Maximiana  Tinio.  In this he again suppressed the fact that he then had  five younger brothers  and  sisters, who, supposing the property  to have been inherited from the mother, would have been equally interested with himself. When  this proceeding came .on for  hearing the petitioner did not testify as a witness, though he was present in court when the case was  heard.  Upon this  occasion only two witnesses appear to have been presented in his behalf.  One of these was the petitioner's uncle, Manuel Tinio,  at one time Director of Lands.  This witness there testified that this land had belonged to his sister, Maximiana Tinio,  in life, as owner, having  come  to her through extrajudicial partition, that she had  received it by inheritance, and had been in possession after 1898, and finally that Jose de Castro had  acquired the property  as her  heir.  The witness was not asked whether there were other  heirs of Maximiana Tinio in addition to Jose Castro, but the court drew the legitimate inference that Jose Castro was the sole heir. The court therefore adjudicated the property to Jose Castro by virtue of this proof of continued possession and heirship.

All of  the brothers and sisters of Maximiana, as well  as she herself, are  now dead, but Clemente Hernandez, relict husband of Catalina Tinio, was introduced  as a witness  in court and he  testified to the fact that he heard a conversation between Manuel Tinio  and Jose Castro, in the course of which the  latter informed his uncle that the petition for registration of the land in Jose's name had been denied, whereupon Manuel Tinio told him that he ought to make application for the registration of the land in  "your name and the names of your brothers and sisters".  Jose de Castro then said that, although the property should be registered in  his  (Jose's)' name, the interests of his  brothers and sisters would not be prejudiced.   Manuel Tinio assent- ed to this and told Jose to come to his office at the Bureau of Lands for the execution of the document desired by Jose Castro.

Our  interpretation of this and other  evidence bearing upon the point is that, although Jose Castro really desired to get the property registered in his own name, the explanation which he gave to his uncles and  aunts was that he was acting  in a representative capacity for all of his brothers and sisters, as well as himself, and that registration in his own name was desirable in order to prevent the expense of the appointment of a guardian to represent the other minor children if they should be brought into the proceedings.  Accordingly  his uncle,  Manuel,  who knew  very well that he himself and his own  brothers and sisters had no real interest in  the property but that the brothers and sisters of Jose Castro  did have  an interest therein, assented to the scheme and thereafter aided  the defendant in obtaining the registration of the  property, in the belief that Jose was acting for all the heirs.

This brings us to the point where it is desirable to state more exactly  the contention  of the defendant.  He  says that on Christmas day in 1907 a family gathering was held at the Tinio  home  in Licab and that in the course of the conference his uncle Manuel told  them all that, inasmuch as the land in the sitio of Ablang  had not  been  declared for taxation by anyone, there was danger that in time the property would become public land.  It was thereupon suggested that Jose should take possession of the property and assume liability for the taxes.  To this all present assented; and Jose's mother said that' she also transferred her share to Jose.  As  a result of this informal conference Jose took possession  and began the gradual  labor of reducing the property to a state of cultivation.   Also, in the year 1908, he declared the property for taxation in his  own name.

It  is important  to  note that,  in the  first proceeding started by Jose Castro to register the land, he himself testified as a witness in his own behalf, and  in the course of his testimony he claimed that the land had originally belonged to his grandfather, Mariano Tinio,  who had  died more than twenty-five years  previously; that after  the death of Mariano this land passed to the possession of the widow and children of Mariano  Tinio; and, finally,  that these heirs,  including  his  mother, Maximiana, and  the children of Agaton, then already dead, ceded the property to him (Jose  Castro).  Being asked  further about this transfer, the witness said that there was a writing but he had  left it in Licab.  As  a matter of fact there was  no such document;  and when the petition for registration was presently denied for lack of proof of the transfer, the petitioner set about curing the trouble by getting all of his living uncles  and aunts, in conjunction with the four adult children of Agaton, to execute gratuitously  quitclaim deeds transferring  to Jose Castro the several undivided interests supposed to be vested in them as heirs of  Mariano Tinio. These  documents  (Exhibits 3,  4 and 5)  were  made  the basis of a successful motion for the reinstatement of the proceeding; and it was in reliance upon them that the Court of Land  Registration decreed  the  land to  Jose Castro, though, as already stated,  the petition was finally thrown out in  the Supreme Court.

There is a  consistency then in the attitude of the defendant in  this, that when he testified as a witness for himself in his  first registration  proceeding, and when he testified in this case, he claimed that he had acquired an undivided four-fifths interest in the  property by the cession of the shares of his uncles and aunts.   This contention was accepted as true  by the trial court in this  case,  with  the result that the defendant was declared the exclusive owner of the  undivided four-fifths interest supposed to have been acquired by him from his  uncles and aunts.  At  the same time the trial court held that there was no sufficient proof that Maximiana Tinio had ever transferred her undivided one-fifth interest in said property to the defendant.  The result  was that the plaintiffs  were  declared entitled to their pro rata interest in the undivided fifth of their mother.

A careful study of the evidence leads  this court to the conclusion that, as  already  suggested, the title  to all of this  land had vested in  Maximiana Tinio by extrajudicial partition and that her brothers and  sisters had no interest in the property which could have passed from them to Jose Castro, by virtue of their several  quitclaim  deeds.  The execution  of those deeds  was evidently a mere formality, and this step  was taken  for  the  sole purpose of clearing the way for Jose Castro to get the property registered; and while there is  no proof that all of the Tinio heirs executed these  transfers in the belief that Jose was acting for his brothers and sisters as well as himself, yet there is proof that the signatures of at least two (Manuel and Catalina) were secured upon the representation of Jose Castro that the interest of the heirs should not be prejudiced by registration in the sole name of the defendant.  The fact that the grantors in those quitclaim deeds executed those documents  gratuitously  suggests  that they  considered  themselves to have no real interest in the property, and the fact that  said  deeds  were  executed  merely  with  a  view  to clearing up the title for registration is suggested by recitals contained in the  documents  themselves  to the effect that the grantee, Jose de Castro,  should  have the rights to petition for the registration of the land in accordance with prevailing laws  (Exhibits 3 and 5).

The distribution of the property among the heirs  of Mariano Tinio appears to have been effected under the supervision of Casimiro Tinio, and that this land was assigned to Maximiana in her own exclusive right is consistent with the fact that  the other property pertaining to  Mariano Tinio was distributed to the various heirs without complaint from  any.  Under these circumstances it would  reveal  a truly  anomalous  state of  affairs  to suppose that  all  the other property pertaining to  the  estate of Mariano Tinio had been distributed to the various  heirs in several exclusive rights but that Maximiana was merely  given  possession  of this as  an unpartitioned portion of her father's estate.  When these circumstances are considered in connection with the fact that  the defendant in  two  different petitions of registration filed years apart represented to the court in each case that the title to this property had been obtained by him by inheritance  from his   mother, they should be taken, we think, as supplying sufficient proof that Maximiana was the owner of the  entire tract by inheritance and extrajudicial partition.

The attorneys for the plaintiffs claim that the record in the  second registration proceeding, and  especially so much thereof as consists  of  the defendant's petition  and his representation to the court that his  mother had been the owner of this  land, constitutes  a conclusive  estoppel against him,  and that it is not permissible for  him in  this case to assert that  he acquired an  undivided interest in four-fifths of the property from his uncles and aunts by virtue of the documents above referred to.   Technically, it seems to us that there is no true estoppel  here, for the plaintiffs were not  direct parties to either proceeding  and had no notice that either was pending.  On the other hand, there is nothing on which to predicate an  equitable  estoppel, or estoppel in pais, for the  reason that none of the plaintiffs were misled by the defendant's supposed representation or  acted in reliance upon its truth.  We are of the opinion, however, that the statements made in the petitions filed by the defendant in those  land registration proceedings are  admissible in evidence against himself, being in the nature of admissions against his interest,  and they strongly corroborate the inferences which we draw from the other proof  in the case  to the  effect  that the  entire interest  in the property in question had passed  to  Maximiana Tinio  by extrajudicial partition and that the same passed upon  her death to all of her children.

Upon  the  foregoing facts it is evident,  and it  must be so declared,  that, when the defendant procured the registration of this land in his own name, he was  acting in a trust capacity and  as representative of all of his brothers and sisters.   As a consequence he is now  holding the registered title thereto in a trust capacity, and  it  is proper for the court to  declare that the plaintiffs are entitled to their several pro rata shares, notwithstanding the  fact  that the certificate of registration is in the name of the defendant alone.   The case on this point is controlled by the doctrine of Severino vs. Severino  (44 Phil., 343,  350),  where an uncle who was acting as agent or administrator of property belonging to a niece had  procured  a Torrens title in his own name.  It was held that he must surrender the property to the niece and transfer  the  title  to her.

But  it is strongly urged  for the defendant that,  even supposing that the  defendant in this case had procured the title to be registered in his own name as representative of himself and his younger brothers and sisters, yet he had repudiated the trust more than ten years before this action was begun, and it is insisted that he has acquired  title by adverse possession.  In  support of  this contention, based upon the repudiation of the trust and subsequent  adverse possession, the attorneys  for the defendant  point to the testimony of Manuel Castro who exercises the role  of chief promoter  of this litigation on  the  part  of the  plaintiffs. This witness testifies that  back in 1916, 1918, and at other times,  he had besought his uncle to recognize the right of his younger brothers and sisters  in the property and to give them their part  of the  produce.  The defendant,  Manuel says, ignored the request and  put  aside the claim upon one excuse or another.  We note, however, that this supposed repudiation of the trust first took place before Manuel Castro had reached his majority, and we are  unable  to see how a minor with whom another  is  in  trust  relation can be prejudiced by repudiation of the trust addressed to him  by the person  who  is subject to the trust obligation. The  defendant in our opinion is not entitled to the benefit of prescription from his  supposed repudiation of the trust.

With respect to the form in  which the court  below attempted to dispose  of this  case,  we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from erred not only in the  amount of the portions adjudicated to  the  several  plaintiffs but in the  manner in which the court attempted  to  effect the division.  The  proof shows  that this large tract  of  land consisting of about  419 hectares is of unequal quality, and to concede the same number of square meters to each would certainly result in an unequal distribution of the property. The proper form in which the decree should be drawn is to declare  the plaintiffs the owners of certain  undivided interests; and the cause will  have to be remanded for further proceedings looking towards a proper partition of the property.

With respect to the manner in which the defendant has developed the land in controversy and brought  it largely into a state of productivity,  his sagacity  and industry appear  to be  beyond criticism.  He took possession nearly twenty-five years ago of a tract of land that was submerged in water during a great part of the year and which was then encumbered by wild growth.   As the years  passed he gradually reduced the property to a state of cultivation, a process accomplished by drainage  and irrigation.  All of this necessitated  the  expenditure  of capital  and the reinvestment of such profit as might  have been derived  from the crops gathered therefrom.  The trial court came to the conclusion  that each  of the  plaintiff-owners  might claim the sum of P861 as his equivalent of his share of the produce for the time during which the defendant has been in possession of the property.   Under the decision to be rendered by this court each  of  the four adult plaintiffs, and the minor  plaintiffs  in  representation of their deceased father,  Vicente Castro, will recover  an undivided  one-sixth of the entire land; but, as to the profits, we are of the opinion  that they have not demonstrated a right to an accounting for profits obtained by the defendant  from this land in the past.   The delay of the plaintiffs in  undertaking to enforce the rights which are involved in this action, while not fatal to their claim to  be owners of the  land in community with the  defendant, nevertheless  operates unfavorably upon  their claim  to an accounting for  profits. The expenditures made by  the  defendant in developing the property, though undoubtedly  large, are  uncertain, which fact is due to the long period of time that has passed; and we  are of the opinion that the  interests  of equity require  that the claim to  an accounting for profits  be disallowed.

Therefore, affirming  the appealed judgment  in the part consistent with this decision and reversing the same  in the part inconsistent herewith,  it is declared that the plaintiffs, Manuel Castro, Pedro Castro, Consolacion  Castro, and Maria Castro,  in conjunction  with  the minor  plaintiffs, Maximiana,  Aurea, Catalina,  and Ceferino, representing the interest of their father, are each the owner, in community with  the defendant, of an undivided one-sixth  of the property which is the subject of this action; and the cause is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for appropriate proceedings, for the partition of the same among the plaintiffs and  the defendant  according to their  respective interests.  So ordered,  without  pronouncement  as  to  costs.

Malcolm, Villa-Real,  Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.