This  is an  appeal  by the plaintiffs and the defendant from a decision of Judge Ed. Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,  dated  January 14, 1931, the dispositive  part of which is as  follows:

"En virtud  de  estas  consideraciones,  el  Juzgado opina que debe fallar y falla esta causa  en cuanto a la demands de los  demandantes, en cuanto a la  demanda de los terceristas, se absuelve de una y otra a la demandada.   En cuanto a la contrademanda de esta,  se deelara a los demandantes contrademandados sin derecho  a  compraf el  terreno  de autos  y se expide en contra de dichos demandantes, sus encargados, aparceros y otros cualesquiera que obren en su hombre y representacion, para que se abstengan de  labrar, sembrar y cosechar en el terreno de  autos, y de molestar o perturbar de cualquiera manera y bajo cualquier pretexto a la demandada y sus encargados y aparceros en la limpieza, siembra,  cosecha y posesion del referido terreno.  En Quanto a la reconvencion de la demandada contra los terceristas,  se condena a estos a  pagar a dicha demandada la cantidad de seis mil pesos en concepto de canon devengado y no pagado sobre los terrenos arrendados por  los mismos durante los dos anos 1928 y 1929.   Y se  condena a  los demandantes y terceristas a pagar  mancomunada y  solida- riamente a la  demandada los 18  cavanes de palay para semilla  del terreno en cuestidn, los 45  cavanes de palay para manutenci6n  de  los aparceros en el  mismo, mas P115 por el mismo concepto, mas P237.70  por gastos  de siembra del palay cosechado en dicho terreno. Con las costas a loa demandantes y terceristas."

The principal contentions of the parties may be briefly stated as follows:

The plaintiffs brought this action on December 26, 1929 to compel the defendant to convey to them as the successors in interest  of the spouses Margarita E. Fermin and Sotero P.  Fermin a certain  parcel of land in the barrio of Sto. Tomas, municipality  of  Jaen,  Nueva Ecija,  for P14,800, in accordance with the contract of December 7,1927 (Exhibit C), whereby the defendant granted the  spouses Fermin an  option of buying  the land on  or before December 31, 1929  for P14,800, which sum the  plaintiffs offered to pay the defendant before  the expiration of that period.

The defendant in her answer, filed March 17, 1930, alleged that the spouses Fermin in violation of the lease contract, Exhibit C,  had  not paid the rent for 1928, and that she rescinded the contract of lease and the option of purchase from January,  1929,  and the spouses Fermin  delivered  to her the possession of  the land (Exhibit F);

That neither the spouses  Fermin nor the plaintiffs had paid or offered to pay the rent for 1929;

That the plaintiffs  offered to pay only P14,800, and not P36,000 for the two parcels as stipulated in  Exhibit C. Defendant set up a counterclaim of P4,000 for the palay and sugar  cane levied upon and sold by the sheriff notwithstanding the terceria interposed by her on November 18,  1929; and another of P3,000 for the rents for 1928.

On May  7, 1930, the defendant  filed a  cross-complaint for an injunction to prevent the plaintiffs from interfering with her cultivation of the land, and applied for a preliminary injunction, which was granted by Judge Ocampo on May 31, 1930.   An order for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction was  issued on July 23,  1930, conditioned on the plaintiffs' giving a bond for P6,000.  The defendant amended her cross-complaint on July 29, 1930 and asked for P4,600 as damages for 1930, P600 being the amount spent by the defendant in planting the crop after the preliminary injunction was issued  in her favor on May 31,  1930, and P4,000 as damages  for each succeeding year.

When the case was called for trial on August 11,1930, the attorneys for the plaintiffs and the defendant submitted the following agreed statement of facts:

"Las partes por medio de sus respectivos abogados que subscriben  convienen en los hechos siguientes:

1. Que los demandantes son conyuges, mayores de edad, residentes en Malabon, Rizal, y la  demandada es mayor de edad, viuda, y residente en 532 Colorado, Manila.
   
2. Que en virtud de un mandamiento de ejecucion librado en la causa No. 3608 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, titulada Irene Santos y  Jose D. Villegas  contra Margarita E. Fermfn y Sotero P.  Fermin, el Sheriff Provincial de Nueva Ecija ejecuto y vendio en publica subasta el interes y participacion que, en 2 de diciembre de 1929, pudieran tener Margarita E. Fermin y Sotero  P. Fermin en cierta parcela de terreno situada en el sitio  Kampugo, y que en la  declaracion de amillaramiento, tax No. 6646 se avalua en P10,240 y se describe como sigue:
   

   " 'Parcela de terreno situada eh el Barrio de Sto. Tomas, Jaen, Nueva  ficija,  de  una extension superficial de 544,503 metros cuadrados, poco mas o  menos, lindante al norte con Gervasia Alejandrino,  Felipe Gamboa y otros; al este, con calle que se dirige a Sta. Rosa; al sur  con el Estero Kampugo, y la calle que se dirige a Sta. Rosa; al oeste con Maximo Viola y el Estero Putlod; esta mejorado con un camarin que  contiene una trilladora  marca "ADVANCE  RUMELY" con su aparato  de la misma marca.'
   
   "Y en la declaration para fines de amillaramiento tax No. 4007 esta avaluada  en  P6,790  y se describe como sigue:
   
   "'Una parcela de terreno,  situada en  el Barrio de Sto. Tomas, Municipio de Jaen, Provincia de Nueva Ecija, I. F., con todas las mejoras y edificaciones, que mide una exten- si6n superficial de 66 hectareas, poco mas o menos, y linda al  N con  los herederos de Mamerto Natividad, Gervasia Alejandrino y Felipe Gamboa; al E eon la calzada de Sto. Tomas ; al S con Felipe Gamboa, Estero Kampugo, Estero Putlod y Estero Putot, y al O con los herederos de Andres Cepillo Cruz y  de Nicolas Cepillo.'

3. Que en eseritura publica de  fecha 29 de noviembre de 1924, ratificada ante el Notario Publico Sr. Ceferino M. Geraldez, de Manila,  los conyuges Margarita E. Fermin  y Sotero P. Fermin,  vendieron con pacto de retro por el precio de P10,300 la referida propiedad a la demandada Peregrina Tan, expirando el plazo para el retracto en 31 de enero de 1926,  habiendose  cedido  en arrendamiento  dicha  propiedad por Peregrina Tan a los mismos vendedores Margarita E. Fermin y Sotero P. Fermin.  Copia exacta de dicha eseritura se hace  parte de esta estipulaci6n como Exhibit A el mismo documento anexo a la demanda como tal Exhibit A.
   
4. Que  en 20 de mayo de 1927, la demandada Peregrina Tan subscribio  una declaration jurada  haciendo constar que la referida  venta Exhibit A  quedd absoluta e irrevocable por haber  expirado  el plazo para  recomprar la propiedad, sin que los esposos Margarita E. Fermin y Sotero P. Fermin la  hayan comprado.  Copia exaetade dicha declaracion se hace parte de este convenio y aparece como Exhibit B, anexo a la  demanda.
   
5. Que  en 7 de diciembre de 1927, la demandada Peregrina Tan y los conyuges Margarita E. Fermin y Sotero P. Fermin otorgaron una eseritura publica,  ratificada  ante el Notario  Publico de Manila,  Sr.  Calayag, en virtud de la cual la demandada Peregrina Tan se compromete y obliga hasta el dia 31 de diciembre de 1929, a vender a los citados esposos  la  propiedad  arriba descrita por el precio convenido de P14,800.  Copia exacta de dicha eseritura anexo a la demanda como Exhibit C se hace parte integrante de este convenio.
   
6. Que en la venta en publica subasta verificada por el Sheriff Provincial  de Nueva Ecija  en 2 de diciembre de 1929, el interns y  participacion que tuvieren los conyuges Margarita E. Fermin y Sotero P. Fermin en consideration al precio de P11,000 pagado por  los demandantes Jose D. ViUegas  e  Irene  Santos, el Sheriff  Provincial de Nueva ficija los adjudico a los  demandantes, como  consta en  el certificado de venta, copia del cual se hace parte integrante en este convenio, como Exhibit D, que es el mismo Exhibit D anexo a la demanda.
   
7. Que el dia 3 de diciembre de 1929, los  demandantes Jose D. ViUegas e Irene Santos  ofrecieron  a la demandada feregrina Tan el precio  de P14,800, pagadero  inmediatamente o en cualquier momento, tan pronto como dicha Peregrina Tan otorgase a favor de los demandantes la correspondiente escritura de venta.  Copia de dicha oferta escrita por los demandantes a la demandada marcada Exhibit  E anexo a la demanda se hace parte en este convenio.
   
8. Que la demandada  recibi6 dicha oferta escrita el dia 4 de diciembre de  1929, como consta en la  nota al pie del documento de oferta Exhibit E.
   
9. Que la demandada  Peregrina Tan en carta defecha 5 de diciembre de 1929  dirigida a los aqui  demandantes Jose D. Villegas e Irene Santos manifiesta que no acepta la oferta de compra hecha por los demandantes, y hasta ahora dicha demandada persiste en dicha negativa.  Copia de la earta de la demandada unida como Exhibit F en la demanda se hace parte en este convenio.
   
10. Que los demandantes reproducer dicha carta Exhibit F solamente para' demostrar la negativa de la demandada a cumplir la obligation de vender la propiedad por el precio de P14,800, y los demandantes niegan y  no aceptan los hechos alegados en dicha carta Exhibit F como fundamento alegado por la demandada para sostener su negativa.
    
11. Que segun la escritura Exhibit C de este convenio, los esposos  Sotero P. Fermin  y Margarita E.  Fermin, arrendatarios de las dos parcelas de terreno, podian comprar dichas dos parcelas 'durante el termino de  arrendamiento'.
    
12. Que  dentro  del tormino  del arrendamiento  segun dicho Exhibit C, 'si los arrendatarios, esposos Fermin, faltaren al cumplimiento de  todas o cualesquiera  de las condiciones convenidas para  el arrendamiento de las  parcelas descritas bajo las letras (a) y  (b)  del presente contrato, especialmente al pago del canon estipulado, la arrendadora podra dar  por terminado dicho arrendamiento y,  ademas, rescindir y dejar  sin efecto  su compromiso  de venta';

"Y piden respetuosamente al Hon. Juzgado apruebe este convenio de hechos."

On the same date the spouses Fermin were permitted to intervene in this ease.   They alleged that Exhibit  C was a simulated document, executed by the intervenors  and the defendant,  after the land in question had been attached by the plaintiffs, to assure the payment of the sum owing by the intervenors to the defendant;

That the intervenors never sold said land to the defendant, but only mortgaged  it.   They prayed  the court to declare Exhibit  C fictitious and simulated, and the intervenors the owners of the property.

In  answer to defendant's  cross-complaint,  plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had not suffered any damages by reason of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, because she had no  right thereto; that the defendant knew that Exhibits A, B, C did not express the true facts or intention of  the parties,  and that she had never been the owner "of  the property  in question,  and that all the  acts executed to consolidate  defendant's title  were in fraud of the plaintiffs, who had attached all the rights of the intervenors.

The intervenors did not appeal.  The case was complicated somewhat by their intervention, which  plaintiffs' attorney characterizes as  providential, but in our opinion there was nothing providential in the intervention of the spouses Fermin.  They would have us believe that Exhibit A was intended to be merely a mortgage  put  into the form of a pacto de retro sale at the instance of the defendant, and that Exhibits B and C were executed for the purpose of defeating the judgment of the  plaintiffs against the spouses Fermin.  In  other words, the  intervenors  contend that they connived with the defendant to defeat the plaintiffs. We are not favorably impressed by such testimony.  Defendant emphatically  denied the contention of the intervenors.  Plaintiffs' attorney criticizes  the failure of the defendant to call Attorney Mariano Escueta as a witness, but we find that it was agreed that he would corroborate her in all those matters wherein she had alluded to him  (p. 112, stenographic record).   Plaintiffs have adopted the contention of the  intervenors, and repudiated the agreed statement  of  facts.   The  evidence  does   not sustain  this contention.

"When the terms of a contract of sale with right of repurchase are clear and leave no doubt  as to the intention of the parties  who have employed in  the making of the said contract express words evidently showing their intention, it is not possible to infer from the  contents  of the document containing the said contract  that there has been another stipulation consistent with a loan upon a security of personal  property  and chattels which appear therein  to have been sold, and, for its true and real interpretation, the literal  sense of the stipulations of the contract above all other things should be followed in the absence of proofs which  show that the contracting parties had an intention distinct from  that  appearing  in the  contract."  (Chinchilla vs. Rafel  and  Verdaguer, 39  Phil., 888.)

"When it is evident that the  intention of the parties was to enter into a contract of purchase  and sale, it is not proper to regard the contract  merely as one of loan with mortgage.   The court cannot  make the contract  for the parties, nor determine their rights  in  accordance with a contract which they  did  not make."   (P.  Chaves y Hermano vs. Neri and Neri San Jose, 44 Phil., 94.)

We are convinced by a careful examination of the evidence,  oral and documentary, that Exhibit A was intended to be what  it purports to be, a pacto de retro sale of the property in question.  This document was recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Nueva  Ecija on December 8, 1924.  The  period  within which  the spouses Fermin could repurchase the property  for P10,300 was by verbal agreement extended at their request from January 31, 1926 to January  31, 1927.  They did not repurchase the property, and the defendant became the absolute owner thereof on February 1, 1927.  The spouses Fermin had no longer any interest in the property when the plaintiffs attached their interest in the property on March 17, 1927, and the plaintiffs consequently  acquired no lien on the property by attaching an interest that did not exist.  The defendant's ownership of the property was  not  affected by her failure  to file  a terceria with the sheriff, regardless of whether or  not she was informed of the attachment  (sec. 442 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

On May 27,  1927, the defendant filed with the register of deeds an affidavit for the consolidation of her title to the land now in question  (Exhibit  B).

The  spouses  Fermin paid the rent for  the years  1924 to 1926, and at their request the defendant permitted them to remain  in possession  of the land during  1927.  On December 7, 192.7 Peregrina Tan and  the  spouses Fermin executed a contract whereby Peregrina Tan leased the land in question  and another parcel  of land to the spouses Fermin for the years  1928 and 1929 for a rental  of P1,500 a year for each parcel, payable on December 31, 1928 and December 31, 1929.  To  guarantee the payment of  this rent, the spouses Fermin mortgaged certain  real and personal property  to Peregrina Tan.  It was further agreed that during  the  term  of the lease or until December 31,  1929 Peregrina Tan bound herself to sell the two parcels of land to the  sopuses Fermin for P29,000  and P14,800 respectively ; that  the spouses Fermin had paid in advance P6,500 on the purchase price of the first parcel, leaving a balance of P22,500;  that if the spouses  Fermin failed to fulfill any of the conditions of the lease,  the  lessor might terminate the lease and furthermore  rescind and cancel the agreement to sell, and retain the P6,500, without  prejudice to her right to collect the rent due.  In case of the non-fulfillment of all or any of the terms of the lease the lessees bound themselves to deliver the possession  of the two parcels of land to the lessor.  This document was ratified before a notary  public in Manila  on December 12,  1927 (Exhibit  C).

In the price of P14,800 stipulated for the purchase of the parcel of land now in question, the rent for 1927 was included.

In March, 1928, by agreement between the spouses Fermin and Peregrina Tan, the tract of land which included that sold by  the Fermins to Peregrina-Tan, was sub-divided, and the  sixty-six hectares  corresponding to Peregrina Tan were set off to  her and the remaining seventeen hectares to the Fer,mins.   A plan was made  showing the land corresponding  to each  party (Exhibit 3).

It appears that in the land registration case of Salvador Natividad, the above-mentioned parcels of land were  included in the applicant's plan, but that an opposition as to the 66 hectares was filed by  Peregrina Tan, and by the Fermins as to the  17 hectares, and that these oppositions were sustained by the court and  the two parcels excluded.

The spouses  Fermin did not pay the rent for 1928, and in January, 1929 Peregrina Tan declared the lease and  the agreement to  sell  terminated, an,d  the  spouses  Fermin delivered to  her the possession  of the  land.  Peregrina Tan put her overseer in charge of the land, and made preparations to have it  cultivated, but  in March,  1929  the spouses Fermin went to her house in Baliuag, Bulacan, and requested her not to put  new tenants on the land, but to allow their tenants to continue  to cultivate the land in order that the Fermins  might collect what their tenants owed them.  Peregrina Tan acceded to this request.

On December 2, 1929 the sheriff of Nueva  Ecija, at  the instance of the plaintiffs, sold at public auction the interest of the Fermins in the land in question to the plaintiff Irene Santos,  a judgment creditor  of  the Fermins,  for P11,000  (Exhibit D), and placed the purchaser in possession of the land.  She took possession of the crop of palay.

On December 3, 1929, the plaintiffs informed the defendant that they had bought at public auction the interest of the Fermins  ni  the  land in question, and tendered  her P14,800 for the land in accordance with the option granted the Fermins on December 7, 1927 (Exhibit E).

On December  5,  1929, the defendant refused the offer of  the plaintiffs,  stating that she was the absolute owner of  the land, free from all liens and incumbrances, from January,  1929, and that the Fermins had lost all their interest in the land because they had violated the conditions of the agreement of December 7, 1927, and had formally  delivered  to  her  the  possession  of the  land  in January,  1929 (Exhibit  F).

Although the plaintiffs claimed the right to purchase the land  for  P14,800 under  the agreement  of December 7, 1927, they never  offered to pay the rent therein stipulated.

It is clear from the foregoing facts that the Fermins lost their right to purchase the land in question by their failure to pay the rent for 1928, and that they had no interest in the land at the time of  the sheriff's sale on December 2, 1929, and that the plaintiffs consequently got nothing by their purchase of the rights of the Fermins.  It is elementary that a purchaser at sheriff's sale acquires no better title or greater right than the judgment debtor had.  The plaintiffs  therefore  had no cause of action against the defendant.

On defendant's counterclaim the trial court condemned the plaintiffs and the intervenors to pay the defendant jointly and severally 63 cavans of palay and P352.70.  These expenses were incurred by the defendant in planting the 1929 and 1930 crops,  which the plaintiffs  took possession  of.  Although  plaintiffs'  sixth  assignment  of  error relates  in part to this  finding, it is not relied on in appellants' brief, and no reason is adduced for setting aside the finding  of the trial judge.

The defendant as appellant makes the following assignments of error:

"PRIMER ERROR
"El Juzgado inferior erro al no condenar a los demandantes, solidariamente con los terceristas, a que paguen a la demandada P1,500 como canon del terreno en  cuestion, correspondiente al ano 1928.

"SEGUNDO ERROR
"El Juzgado inferior erro al no condenar a los demandantes,  solidariamente con los  terceristas, a que paguen a la demandada la suma de P4,000 como dafios y perjuicios correspondientes al ano  1929.

"TERCER ERROR
"El Juzgado inferior erro al no condenar a los demandantes a que indemnicen a la demandada en la  suma de P4,062 por los danos y perjuicios correspondientes al ano 1930.

"CUARTO ERROR
"El Juzgado inferior erro al no condenar a los demandantes a que indemnicen  a la  demandada por los frutos durante la apelacion  de los demandantes, a razon de P3,489 anuales comenzando  desde el ano 1931 inclusive hasta que ellos  hubieren abandonado el terreno a  la demandada."

We find no merit in defendant's first and second assignments of error.  The intervenors were sentenced to pay the defendant the rent for 1928 and 1929.  The mere fact that the plaintiffs bought the  interest  of the intervenors in the land, which proved to be nil, did  not make them liable for the obligations of the intervenors which had already accrued.  The defendant cannot deny  the plaintiffs the right to purchase the land because the intervenors did not pay the rent, and at the same time hold the plaintiffs for the rent.

With respect tb defendant's third  and fourth assignments of error, we  find  that the trial judge, for lack  of evidence, did not attempt to determine the value  of the crop or the rental value of the  land for 1930, because the trial was terminated on October 16, 1930 and the crop was not harvested until  December of that year.  Plaintiffs had no right to take possession of the land immediately after the sale  in December, 1929 or to retain it in their possession.   If the spouses Fermin, the judgment debtors,  had been  the owners of the land,  they  would have had the right to  retain possession of it for one year after the sale. The defendant is entitled to recover from the plaintiffs the reasonable rental value of the land  for the time that the plaintiffs have been in possession thereof.

The decision of the lower court is affirmed,  without a special finding as to costs, reserving to the defendant the right to prove in this  same cause  the  reasonable rental value  of the land  for  the time  that it has  been  in the possession of the plaintiffs.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

VILLA-REAL, J.: I dissent.