This is a petition for certiorari filed  on December 17, 1931, praying  that  this court suspend  the order  of the Public Service  Commission,  dated November 20,  1931, hereinafter fully set out,  and upon final hearing declare said  order null and void.  On December  18,  1931,  this court denied the prayer for suspension of said order and directed the  Public  Service Commission  to  certify  up to this court the  record  and proceedings  relating  to said order. The case was heard  on  its merits  in this court on  September  3, 1932, on the petition  and answer filed and the briefs and memoranda of the parties in support of their  respective contentions.

The record in the case before  the Public Service Commission is extensive and covers many collateral issues and correlated  facts. We shall  mention only the  facts that furnish the background for the  order  of  November 20, 1931, here in  question.

On September 27,  1930, the Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., Inc., a corporation,  executed a chattel mortgage  in favor  of Parsons Hardware Co.,  Inc. covering certain of its  assets, including five certificates, of public convenience  authorizing the  operation of  a bus service over  certain routes  in the Province of Tayabas.   This mortgage  was  approved  by the  Public  Service Commission in compliance with section 16, paragraph (h) of Act No. 3108 as amended.  Upon failure of the mortgagor to pay the debt at maturity amounting to about P51,000, the mortgage was foreclosed by  the  sheriff  of  Tayabas who sold the five certificates of public convenience above mentioned  to the  Parsons Hardware Co., Inc. for P30,000. Pour days after the sheriff's sale, that is, on February 9, 1931, the Parsons Hardware Co., Inc. filed with the Public Service Commission  a petition for the  approval of the sale and  transfer  to it of said  certificates.  Due  notice of  said petition was  published and the same was  set for hearing on March 24, 1931.  The Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., Inc. filed an  opposition to  said petition. On July  16, 3931, the Philippine Trust Company intervened as judicial receiver of the Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., Inc., appointed by the Court of First Instance of  Tayabas.  On August 18, 1931, the  Parsons Hardware Company, Inc.  transferred to the respondent, the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company all of  its rights, title and interest in the said  five certificates of public convenience; and by order of the commission, dated August 27, 1931; the latter was substituted as petitioner in the case instead of the Parsons Hardware Co., Inc.  After  a series of intermediate proceedings and several  postponements,  the commission again set the  case for hearing  for November 11, 1981, but continued  it  indefinitely  again on a motion  of Pio Gaudier and Felix Valencia (petitioners herein) who appeared  as intervenors and alleged that they were stockholders  of the  Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., Inc. and had filed  suit in the Court of First  Instance against Parsons Hardware Co.,  Inc., the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., the provincial sheriff of Tayabas, et al., attacking the legality of the sale of said certificates  made by the sheriff to the Parsons Hardware Co., Inc. on February 5, 1931, as aforesaid.

On November 13, 1931, the  Parsons  Hardware Co., Inc. and Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company  presented  a motion asking reconsideration of the order of indefinite postponement of November 11,  1931, and praying that "the Commission immediately proceed to definitely dispose of this case and approve the sale without prejudice to whatever action may be taken by the courts with regard to the complaint filed by the intervenors  in this case."  A hearing  was held before Commissioner  Del Rosario on November 14, 1931, after notice to all parties.   The petitioners presented their evidence.  The opponents, though present,  offered no  evidence; but the intervenors, Pio Gaudier and  Felix Valencia, filed a reply to the motion for  reconsideration.  The hearing  held  November 14,  1931,  resulted in the  following resolution and order which was signed by all of the com- missioners on November 20, 1931:

"RESOLUCIÓN Y ORDEN
"Se trata de una motion de reconsideration de la resolution de esta Comision de fecha 11 de noviembre de 1931, presentada por los abogados Isidro Santiago, en representation de la Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., y L. D. Lockwood en representation de la Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. en la que se alega lo siguiente :

"'Now  comes Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., and the  Laguna-Tayabas Bus, through their  undersigned  attorneys, and respectfully ask for a reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of  yesterday granting the motion presented by intervenors,  Pio Gaudier and Felix Valencia, and postponing this case until Case No. 40799 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is definitely decided,  and in support of this motion  for reconsideration of said  resolution set forth:

" '1. That, while it is true that the motion of the intervenors of  November 11, 1931, is similar to a previous  one granted by  order of the Commission of August  28, 1931, and  that  the circumstances are apparently similar,  yet there is a  difference as it is very obvious that the object of this  last motion is to  delay action of the Commission in this  case,  and it appears that there is a lack of entire good faith in that as it appears  in the motion the case first presented in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas was  dismissed on  September 15,  1931, because of lack of jurisdiction and these intervenors did not present a new case in a competent court until the day before this case was  coming  up  in the  Commission.   This  shows  that the intervenors were not interested in  prosecuting their supposed legal rights, but in  delaying the action of the Commission.

" '2.  That this  Commission should not delay its action in this case because of an  action presented in the Court of First  Instance.  This Commission does not have to do with legal questions  regarding the  legality or  illegality of the sale, made in favor of the  Parsons Hardware Co., and whatever action the Commission takes will not affect the action  in the court.  We wish to call attention to the fact  that,  while the sale and transfer is  not valid until approved by the Commission, the approval does not validate the same if per se it is invalid. The approval of the Commission will not therefore affect or prejudice the legal rights of the litigants in the court.

" '3.  That application for the approval of this sale  has been' duly  presented  and has been pending for several months.  Public  notice has also  been  duly given.   See Exhibits A and B.  It is alleged that the sale was made by the Sheriff of Tayabas in  favor  of Parsons Hardware Co.,  Inc. by virtue of a mortgage executed by the Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co.  This  mortgage which is the primary  transaction has  already  been approved  by this Commission.   The  substitution of  Laguna-Tayabas  Bus Co. for Parsons Hardware  Co., Inc. has already been admitted in open session on August 28, 1931, as appears in the stenographic  record.  Deed of Transfer of the rights of Parsons Hardware Co., Inc. to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. will be duly presented.

" 'The  case  is therefore in  order  for final hearing and disposition and we respectfully submit that it is the duty of the Commission to proceed and dispose of this case without prejudice to whatever action the courts may take.

" '4. That in this connection attention is called to the provisions of paragraph (h) of section 16 of Act No. 3108, which provides:

" ' "The approval herein required shall be given * * *" It should be noted that this is imperative.  "If it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the sale  *  *  *", "and that the same are not detrimental to the public interests."

" 'It therefore  seems to be imperative  upon the  Commission to approve the sale if there are just and reasonable grounds for making the sale, and if the same is not  detrimental to the public interest.  The  sale in this case is only a consequence of a mortgage, which has already been approved by this Commission.   Therefore, the "just and reasonable grounds" were determined when the mortgage was approved.  Now, the only question which remains is whether or not the sale will  be detrimental to the public  interests.  No question has been raised regarding this point by any  of  the parties.

" '5. That important rights  and financial interests are involved in this matter and  delay is causing, and will continue to cause, serious  prejudice to the interested parties and also to the public, for it is a matter of record in this Commission that  the  Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co. is in the hands of  a  receiver and has abandoned the operation  of many of its lines.

" 'Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that the resolution of yesterday indefinitely postponing this case be reconsidered; and that  the Commission immediately proceed to definitely dispose of this case and approve the sale, without prejudice  to whatever action may be taken by the courts, with regard to the complaint filed by  the  intervenors in this case.'

"De esta moción se envió copia al abogado de los terceristas con notificacion de que se  pediria que la moción se viera y se oyera ante esta Comision el dia 14 de noviembre de  1931, a las  9 de la mañana.

"En el dia fijado comparecieron las partes en este asunto habiendose presentado por el abogado Zagala, que representa a los terceristas, su escrito de contestation a la moción de reconsideration.

"Despues de  la vista  de esta  moción de reconsideración del  incidente se sometió, de acuerdo con la Ley, a la decision de la  Comision en Pleno.

"Obra unido  en este expediente marcado Exhibit C una copia del certificado de venta del Sheriff de la Provincia de Tayabas el 5 de febrero de 1931, y como Exhibit D una escritura publica otorgada ante la  fe del Notario Publico C.  de  G. Alvear de fecha 26 de agosto  de  1931,  que es un  documento de compraventa otorgada por Parsons Hardware Co., Inc.,  a favor  de la Laguna-Tayabas  Bus Co. de todo su derecho,  interes, titulo  y participaci6n en los certificados de conveniencia publica adquiridos por  la vendedora Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., en la venta hecha por el Sheriff de la Provincia de Tayabas de los certificados de conveniencia de la deudora Orlanes  & Banaag Transportation Co. en los expedientes  de  esta  Comision Nos. 16197, 16582, 16667, 20633 y 10756.

"Despues de  una consideraci6n de las razones alegadas por los mocionantes en  su motion de reconsideración, asi como de los argumentos  aducidos  por  el abogado de los terceristas  en  su contestation  a la referida  motion  de reconsideración, habida  consideration de todos los antecedentes del presents caso, esta Comision llega a la conclusión de que, si bien es verdad que el asunto civil entablado en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia  de Manila en el asunto Civil  No. 40799 puede afectar  en su dia a la  aprobaci6n que la Comision pudiera dar en el presente expediente de la venta hecha por el Sheriff de la Provincia de Tayabas de los certificados de conveniencia publica de Orlanes & Banaag Transportation  Co. a la compradora Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., pero no es menos cierto tambien que si este asunto quedara  pospuesto indefinidamente a las  resultas de aquel asunto civil, que no se puede calcular cuando podria tener fin, resultaria que los intereses del comprador, que en  este caso es la misma acreedora hipotecaria,  podrian quedar lastimados y consecuentemente  ineficaces todos estos  procedimientos,  mientras no se resolviera  el asunto civil de referehcia, si se ha de sostener la resolucion  de esta Comision de fecha 11  de noviembre de 1931.

"Es verdad tambien que los interesea de estos terceristas podrian  quedar  afectados  si  la  Comision aprobara ahora esta venta y el Juzgado de Primera Instancia declarara mas  tarde que la venta hecha por  el Sheriff es  nula y de ningiin valor como se alega en la demanda presentada ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de esta Ciudad de Manila.

"Tenemos ante Nos por tanto que considerar el interns individual en cuanto afecta a los derechos de los terceristas, que se invocan han sido lesionados, y, por tal motivo,  han acudido al tribunal correspondiente en  reparacidn de sus derechos que creen haber sido lesionados, frente a los derechos de la comunidad o del publico en general,  que asi mismo estan afectados en el  presente caso, puesto que la Orlanes &  Banaag  Transportation  Co.  por la situation  dificil de su estado economico vese ahora imposibilitada de seguir operando  en  las provincias de Laguna y Tayabas como la Comisidn  le tiene autorizado  en concurrencia con la  Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company.

"Por otro lado,  no  se  podria prever quó perjuicio o  que danos  se  causarian  a los terceristas  demandantes en ,el Juzgado de Primera  Instancia si se  aprobara  esta venta con miras principalmente de que el publico de las provinciaa de Laguna y Tayabas no queden perjudicados por la falta de un servicio que le es tan sumamente necesario.

"Despues de pesar las razones de uno u otro lado  y de considerar las cuestiones envueltas en  este expediente, y mirando principalmente el interes publico sobre el  que esta Comision  debe velar, y justificado  como lo esta  que existen motivos justos y razonables para que se de cierta efectividad a esta venta para que los intereses  del publico no queden perjudicados por el consiguiente abandono de la  operacion de la Orlanes &  Banaag  Transportation Co. de su operacion como resultado  de la  venta de sus certificados, hoy  en cuestion, y teniendo en cuenta, por otra parte, que la cesionaria  Laguna-Tayabas Bus  Co. es otra compania que opera en  la misma localidad, que es  una compania que esta llevada habil  y debidamente, que sirve al publico de una  manera propia, adecuada y convenient, y que tiene un capital muy considerable para poder prestar el servicio que ha dejado de prestar la Orlanes &  Banaag Transportation Co., esta Comision ha Uegado a  la conclusion de que a todas luces es imperativamente necesario que la  misma reconsidere  su  resolueion de fecha 11  de noviembre de 1931, en el sentido de que, sin perjuicio de que se vea este asunto  en su dia, se reconozca, como por la presente se reconoce, a la Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. como cesionaria de  facto de los certificados de conveniencia publica adquiridos en venta por la Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., en la subasta publica celebrada por el Sheriff de la Provincia de Tayabas el dia 5 de febrero de 1931, que luego fueron traspasados y cedidos a dicha  Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.  con derecho a operar  temporalmente bajo  dichos  certificados hasta nueva  orden en contrario  de esta Comision.

"En  su consecuencia por la presente se autoriza a la Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. a operar, con caracter temporal, el  servicio de transporte terrestre autorizado a  la Orlanes &  Banaag Transportation Co. bajo los expedientes" Nos. 16197, 16582, 16667, 20633 y 10756, sujetandose  estrictamente a las condiciones impuestas en todos y cada uno de los mencionados certificados.

"Esta resolución no resuelve ni afecta en manera alguna la  cuestión de la  legalidad de la venta verificada por el Sheriff Provincial  de Tayabas de los certificados de la Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., planteada por los terceristas ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, en el asunto civil No. 40799 y se entiende sin perjuicio de cualquier resultado de dicho asunto.

"Dictada, Manila, a 20 de noviembre de 1931.


"Conformes:

The order of the commission above quoted of November 20, 1931, is attacked in this certiorari proceeding on two grounds: 'First, that the petitioners  here  (oppositors below) did not have an "opportunity to defend their rights" at the hearing held  before the Commissioner Del Rosario on November 14, 1931.   They allege in substance that they were misled into believing that the only question that would be considered at that  hearing  was the reconsideration of the order of November 11,  1931,  postponing indefinitely consideration of the case on its merits.  But they made no objection on that ground at the hearing nor in their motion for reconsideration  of the  order of  November  20, 1931, which they filed with the commission on November 28, 1931. The motion for reconsideration filed by the applicants on November 13, 1931, which was duly served, expressly prays "that  the commission immediately proceed to definitely dispose of this case", etc.  It  is to be noted that the application had been pending before the commission since February 9, 1931, and the oppositors at different stages of the proceedings had filed objections to the sale and other pleadings on the merits.  The issues  were made up.   The gravamen of the opposition to the approval of the transfer of the certificates was the alleged illegality  of the  sale by the sheriff of Tayabas.  As that is a question for the  courts and not the commission, the commission delayed the decision of the  application until some one of the three suits involving that legal question might be decided.  After many months of waiting during which the Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co., Inc. was thrown into receivership and its  service demoralized,  it became apparent  to  the  commission that in the interest of  the parties and "having special regard to the public interest over which the  commission ought to watch", the commission, without granting the application  for the  approval of the transfer of the certificates, devised, in its order of November 20,1931, what may be called a modus vivendi, by which the public might not suffer "by reason of the failure of a service which is so extremely  necessary".   The order, on its  face, is purely interlocutory and temporary, subject to revocation or modification at any  time by the commission.  The order  does not approve the transfer of the certificates to the Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., or its transferee, the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.; on the contrary, it plainly holds that question in abeyance until  the validity of the sale  by  the  sheriff of Tayabas to the Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., can be judicially determined.

As  the commission, therefore, has not determined upon its  merits the petition  for the approval of the transfer of the certificates  to  the Parsons  Hardware Co., Inc., or its assignees, the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., the petitioners' objection that these merits have already been decided and they have not had their day in  court,  is unsound.

Nor do we find  any merit in the second  attack that is made upon the  order of November 20, 1931, namely, that it is the result of a hearing at which only one of the  com- missioners  (Commissioner  Del Rosario) was present.  It is alleged that the certificates of the petitioners  have  been revoked by the order of November 20, 19S1, and such revocation can be made, under Act No. 3844, section 2, approved November 9, 1931, only after hearing by at least two of the commissioners.  The contention is unsound, in our opin- ion, in both  particulars: First,  as we have seen, the order of November 20, 1931, does not revoke the certificates of the petitioners; second, the language of the statute referred to is not to be so narrowly construed as petitioners desire. Section 2, among other things, provides:

"*   *   *   ah contested matters that may be presented before the Commission shall  be heard and decided  upon by the Commission in full or at least by two Commissioners, and before any Commissioner  is assigned to write the decision or any resolution which affects  in some way the  right of the parties concerned, the matter shall be voted  upon by the members of the Commission who have taken part in the direction of the case:   *   *   *"

The record of the proceedings had before Commissioner Del Rosario on November 14,  1931, shows that no decision upon any matter determining  the rights of the parties was made by Commissioner Del Rosario,  The evidence apparently consisted only of two documents submitted by the applicants and the memorandum filed by  the intervenors. The fact that all the three commissioners  signed the order of November 20,  1931, seems  to us a sufficient compliance with section  2, supra.  We conclude, therefore, that both with respect to the hearing held on November  14,  1931, and  the order of November  20,  1931, there has been  a substantial compliance with the requirements of the Public Service Law.  We are mindful of that provisions contained in section 24, paragraph  (j), of Act No. 3108, which reads as follows:

"A substantial compliance with the requirements of this Act shall be sufficient to give effect to all the rules, orders, acts, and regulations of the Commission and they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal, or void for any omission of a technical nature in respect  thereto."

We  are aware  of the  difficult, complex and  unexpected situations which often arise to confront our Public Service Commission situations that  call for earnest  study,  nice discrimination  and a careful  balancing of the  rights and equities of public utility enterprises on the  one hand and the general public  on the other,  which is entitled  to receive adequate, safe and proper service.   It is impossible for the Legislature to foresee all those situations and complexities and to describe them in detail in  the regulatory statute. However, section 13  of Act No. 3108 as amended by Act No. 3316, contains the  following sentence,  which has  an analogy in  the  "general welfare"  clause of many  constitutions:

"The  Commission  shall  have general supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services and also over  their property,  property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises so far as may be necessary for the purposes of carrying out the  provisions of this Act." Whatever difficulty may be  encountered in bringing the order of  the  commission on  November 20,  1931, here in question,  precisely  within section  15, paragraph (i), we think it was within the power and jurisdiction of the commission to make said  order  under  the general grant of jurisdiction contained in section  13 of Act No. 3108  as amended.

The petition for  certiorari  is denied with costs against the petitioners.

Avanceña,  C. J., Street, ,Malcolm, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

---

DISSENTING
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

No matter whether it is purely interlocutory on its face, the  practical  effect of  the order  of the Public Service Commission sought to be reviewed  in this proceeding, was to deprive the petitioners of the right to use their  certificates of public convenience authorizing the  operation of a bus service over certain routes in the Province of Tayabas. It goes without saying  that  the petitioners could not be deprived of that right without due process of law without due  notice and hearing.  "The essential elements of due process of law are  notice and opportunity to defend.  In determining  whether  such  rights  have been denied,  the courts are governed by the substance of things and not by mere form."   (Simon vs.  Craft  [Ala. 1901], 182 U. S., 427, 436; 21 S. Ct.,  836; 45 Law. ed., 1165.)

In Lopez vs. Director of Lands (47 Phil., 23, 32),  this court  rightly  observed:   "By  'due process of law',  as Daniel Webster said in his argument before the Supreme Court of the  United States in the famous Dartmouth  Col- lege Case, is 'by the  law of the land   *  *   *  a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,  and renders judgment only after trial.   The meaning is, that every  citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and  immunities, under the protection of the general rules  which govern society.'   (4 Wheaton, U. S., 518, 581.)   'Due process of law'  contemplates, notice and opportunity  to be heard  before judgment is  rendered,  affecting one's  person or property."

In Bohol Land Transportation Co.  vs. Jureidini (53 Phil., 560),  this court held that before  a certificate of public necessity and convenience can be totally or partially revoked, the party thereby affected must be notified and heard.

In Ex parte Strieker (109 Fed., 145, 150), the court declared that due process of law means a course of legal proceeding, according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence, for the protection and enforcement of private and personal rights.   In other words:  "Due process of law in each particular case means,  such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of law  permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims  prescribe for the class of cases to  which  the one in  question  belongs."   (Cooley's Constitutional  Limitations, 8th ed., vol.  II, p. 741.)

What, then, are the rules and principles which  have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection of individual rights in the class  of cases to which  the instant case belongs?  In  the first place,  we have,  as  indicative of what is generally considered a  reasonable safe- guard, the rule that:  "When no  other provision is  made by law no action shall be taken on any motions or applications unless  it appears that the  adverse  party had notice thereof, three days before the time set for the hearing thereof."  (Rule 10 of the Courts of First  Instance.)  In the second place, we have the doctrine laid down by this court in Cing Hong So vs. Tan Boon Kong (53 Phil, 437), that: "Where a party litigant, without malice,  fault or inexcusable neglect, is not prepared for the trial of a case, the court exceeds the  discretion conferred  upon it by law in denying to said litigant a reasonable opportunity  to prepare for the trial  and  to  obtain due process of law  and proper protection under the law."

Turning- now to the case at bar, we find that the matter before the commission, which resulted in  the order sought to be reviewed, was a petition for the approval of the sale of five certificates of public convenience owned by the petitioners herein.   By order of the  commission, the case  was set for hearing on March 24, 1931.  After granting several postponements, the  commission  on November  11, 1931, continued the  case indefinitely.  On  November  13, 1931, the respondents Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company and Parsons Hardware Company, Inc., filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of indefinite  postponement of November 11, 1931, and prayed that "the Commission immediately proceed to definitely  dispose  of this  case and  approve the sale without prejudice to whatever action  may be taken by the, courts with regard to the complaint filed by the intervenors in this case."  This  motion was set for hearing, not by the commission, but by the movants themselves, at 9 a. m., on the following day.  Under these circumstances, and in the light of the principles above cited, can it be fairly and reasonably held that the petitioners were deprived of their right to use 'the certificates of public convenience in question, after due  notice of hearing?

The order in question is also objectionable on the ground that it was beyond the power of the commission to issue it.  The commission had authority under the law either to approve or disapprove the sale,  but it  had no  power  to recognize the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company as assignee de facto cesionaria de  facto whatever that means.  Its ju- risdiction was, furthermore, limited to granting  the relief prayed  for in  the motion for reconsideration,  namely: "that the  resolution  of yesterday  indefinitely postponing this case be reconsidered; and that the commission immediately proceed to definitely dispose of this case and approve the sale, without prejudice to whatever action may be taken by the courts, with, regard to the complaint filed by the intervenors in this case."  Instead, however, of acting on the issues specifically raised by the motion for reconsideration, the  commission decided some  other  question.  While we should make allowance  for the complex  situations which the  commission, has  to  confront in  the  discharge of its function, this court  is, in  my judgment, making a great mistake  in  sanctioning a practice so fraught with injustice.

I am of the opinion that the order of  the Public Service  Commission of  November 20, 1931, should be declared null and void  as prayed by the petitioners.

VILLAMOR,  J.: I  agree  with the  preceding opinion  of Justice Abad Santos.
IMPERIAL, J.: I concur.