This action is brought to recover the sum  of P29,600 on two causes against the administrator of the estate of the deceased Mariano Larena.

Upon his first cause of action, the plaintiff claims the sum of P9,600, the alleged  value  of services rendered by him to said deceased as his agent in charge of the deceased's houses  situated in Manila.   Under the second  cause  of action the  plaintiff alleges that one of the buildings belonging to the deceased and described in his complaint was built by him with the consent of the deceased,  and for that reason he is entitled to recover the  sum disbursed  by  him in its construction,  amounting to P20,000.

From the evidence it appears undisputed that from February, 1922, to February, 1930, the plaintiff rendered services to the deceased, consisting in the collection of the rents due  from  the tenants  occupying the deceased's houses  in Manila and  attending  to the repair of  said houses when necessary.  He also took any such steps as were necessary, to enforce the payment of rents and all that was required to protect  the interests of the deceased  in connection with said houses.   The evidence also  shows that during the time the plaintiff rendered his services,  he did  not receive any compensation.   It is, however, a fact admitted that during said period the plaintiff occupied a house belonging to the deceased without paying any rent at all.

As to the building whose value is claimed by the plaintiff, the record shows that said building was really erected on a parcel of land belonging to the deceased on Calle Victoria, Manila, and that the expenses  for  materials and labor in the construction thereof  were  paid by the appellant, the construction having begun in 1926 and terminated in 1928, but the ownership of the money invested in the building is in question.

Upon the  first cause the plaintiff-appellant insists that, the services having been rendered, an obligation to compensate them must necessarily arise.  The trial court held that the compensation for the services  of the plaintiff was the gratuitous use  and  occupation of some of the houses of the deceased by the plaintiff and his family.  This conclusion is correct.  If it were true that the plaintiff and the deceased had an understanding to the effect that the  plaintiff was to receive compensation aside from the use and occupation of the houses of the deceased, it cannot be explained how the plaintiff could  have rendered services as he did for eight years  without  receiving  and claiming  any  compensation from  the deceased.

As  to the second cause,  the  evidence presented  by the plaintiff is his own testimony,  that of  his witnesses, and several documents,  consisting of municipal  permit, checks, vouchers, and  invoices.  The testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the persons who sold the materials and furnished the labor, proves a  few unimportant facts, and as to the ownership  of the money  thus invested, there is only the testimony of the plaintiff-appellant, who  said  that it all belonged to him and that his understanding with the deceased was that the latter would get the rents of the house, and, upon his death, he would bequeath it to the plaintiff, but unfortunately, he died intestate.  This testimony, however, was objected to on the ground that it is prohibited by section 383, paragraph 1, of the Code  of Civil  Procedure, which provides that the party  to  an  action against an executor or administrator cannot testify on any fact that took  place before the death of the  person against whose estate the claim  is presented.   The lower  court admitted this testimony but did not believe it.   And  certainly it cannot be believed, even assuming it to  be  admissible,  in view of the circumstances appearing undisputed in the record, namely, the fact that the plaintiff-appellant did not have any source of income that could produce him such a large sum of money  as that invested in the  construction of the house; and the fact that the deceased  had more than the necessary amount to build the house.

But above  all,  the facts appearing from  Exhibit 40 are conclusive against the claim of the plaintiff-appellant.  Exhibit 40 is a book of accounts containing several items purporting to have  been  advanced by  the deceased to the plaintiff-appellant for the construction  of the house.   The plaintiff admitted that the first two lines constituting the heading of the account on the first  page were written by himself.   Said  two lines say:  "Dinero Tornado a Don Mariano Larena para  la nueva casa."  Appellant further admits that the first entry in Exhibit 40 was made by him and that the sum of P3,200 mentioned in the third entry was received by him.  It is to be noted that the first entry is dated February 1,1926, and the last is under the date of December 31,  1927.   The other entries are admitted by the plaintiff-appellant  to have been made by the deceased.  Finally the appellant admitted in cross-examination that this book, Exhibit 40, was his and that whenever he received money from the deceased, he  handed it  to  the deceased in order  that the latter  might enter what he had received.  The total of the items contained in this book is P17,834.72, which is almost the amount invested in the construction of the building.   Furthermore, the items entered in Exhibit 40, appear in Exhibit 41 as  withdrawn by the deceased,from  his account with the Monte de Piedad, and a corresponding entry appears in Exhibit 43 showing a deposit made by the plaintiff in his current account  with  the Philippine  National Bank.  From all of this it is  clear that the money invested in  the construction of the building in question did not belong to the plaintiff.

The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.  So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.