El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila, an institution organized under the laws in  force in the Philippines,  brought this action to foreclose a certain mortgage on  real estate executed by the defendants to  secure the payment  of a debt contracted by their co-defendant Jose Fernando Rodrigo.

The latter appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff entity within the period of three months, or to  deposit  with the  clerk  of  the court, the  sums of P17,481.17, ^98, and P1,500  with interest at 10 per cent per annum upon the sum of P15,000 computed  from October 4, 1930; and  in default thereof the mortgaged  property described in the amended complaint and  in Exhibits A, A-1, B, and C, shall be sold at public auction; and also to pay the costs.

Juana Gatmaitan obtained a loan  of P15,000 from the appellee, El Monte de Piedad y  Caja de Ahorros  de Manila; and  in  order  to guarantee the fulfilment  of the obligation  she mortgaged her share in the property described in  certificate  of title No. 22559 issued to  her and Juana M.  Torres,  in favor of  said appellee; Juana M. Torres, as co-owner,  also  mortgaged, by the  same  deed, all her share in the property described in  said certificate of title.  Juana Gatmaitan having assigned all her rights, interests, and share in the property described in said certificate of title to the appellant Rodrigo, the latter assumed her obligation as to the P15,000 loan, and together with his co-owner Juana M. Torres, again mortgaged, in  favor of the creditor, all the property described in transfer certificate of  title No. 29292 which was substituted  for the original certificate of  title.  In this mortgage the appellant included another piece of property belonging  to him, described in Exhibit C,  registered in the registry of deeds in accordance with Act  No.  2837.

During the pendency of the action Juana  M.  Torres died and  was substituted  by  her  judicial administratrix, the codefendant Potenciana de Yupangco.  The essential conditions of the mortgage having been  violated, the creditor brought an action to foreclose the mortgage, and the judgment appealed from awarded to  it the amounts set forth at the beginning of this opinion, which represent the principal and interest remaining unpaid on October 4, 1930, the date of the liquidation by the appellee, plus the  amount advanced  as a fire insurance premium,  and the  amount stipulated in the penal clause.

The appellant assigns the following as  errors:  (a) The court erred in  rejecting  the agreement of November 15, 1930  entered into by counsel  for both parties and in not rendering judgment in accordance therewith;  and (b) the court erred in exercising jurisdiction over the  case  after the disapproval of the aforesaid agreement and rendering judgment therein notwithstanding the fact  that one of the mortgaged lands is in the Province of Bulacan.

On November 15,1930, before the case was heard, counsel for both parties entered into a written agreement whereby appellant  Rodrigo acquiesced  to the complaint and  consented that a judgment be rendered against himself alone according to the  petition contained therein, and, in turn, the appellee obligated itself to grant him  a period of six months to pay the sums claimed,  with the understanding that if the payment was made within the  period  thus stipulated the interest would be remitted and the penalty of P1,500 would  be reduced to half.  The agreement was reduced to writing and signed by counsel for  both parties but without the direct or indirect intervention of the parties themselves.   Later on counsel for the appellee realized that the  co-defendant judicial  administratrix  was thereby entirely relieved  from  the judgment prayed for,  which they claimed was contrary to what had been  agreed upon, which  was to  relieve her only of the personal  obligation to pay the loan, thus  leaving  in force  her liability as mortgagor.  For  this reason they  withdrew their consent, regarded the agreement as null and void and returned to the appellant the  check for P1,500 which they  had received in consideration of said  agreement.   When the  case came up  for hearing counsel  for the appellant submitted the agreement in  writing and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith.  Appellee's counsel objected to its admission and alleged that it had already been can- celled for the  reasons heretofore stated.  The court after hearing counsel for both parties declared it null and void and rejected it.

Considering all the foregoing facts  with   reference to the written agreement, we are of the opinion that the trial court rightly declared it null and void, and therefore did not commit the alleged error in rejecting it and not basing its  judgment thereon.  It is obvious that the agreement could have no legal effect  inasmuch as it was not signed either by  the  parties themselves  or  by  their  attorneys acting as their  duly  authorized  agents.  An examination of the document shows  that said  attorneys  signed  it as such, without the proper  authority from  their  clients or as their duly authorized  agents.  To  compound or com- promise  their clients' rights, lawyers must  have special authority or secure the direct intervention of the parties themselves.  (Art.  1809,  Civil Code and sec.  27, Code of Civil Procedure.)  Another ground supporting the court's judgment is the no less certain fact that the agreement did not reflect the real intention, at least of the attorneys for  the  appellee.  They maintain  that they  had agreed that the judicial administratrix would answer for the judgment foreclosing the  mortgage,  although she was relieved from the payment of the principal obligation.  As said agreement relieved her of both liabilities, counsel for the appellee  were within  their rights in refusing to recognize its  validity and in  attacking it as  incorrect and void.  It would have been evidently prejudicial to the appellee's rights had not a judgment been rendered against  the  judicial administratrix  as to  the foreclosure of the mortgage, in as much as it would prevent the  sale of all the mortgaged property, and  would constitute  a violation of  the  principle of  the indivisibility  of a mortgage obligation.  For these reasons the first assignment of error is untenable.

With reference to  the last, it is  sufficient to  state that two out of the three parcels of land mortgaged, are situated in the City of Manila.  Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the bringing of an action for foreclosure of a mortgage  in the court wherein the land or  some part thereof lies.  Therefore the court  of  Manila, as  well as that of Bulacan, had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and, consequently, the last  error assigned is likewise unfounded and without merit.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with  costs of this instance against the appellant.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J.,  Johnson, Street,  Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and  Villa-Real,  JJ., concur.