This is a petition filed under section 513 of the  Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the judgment rendered by the respondent judge on February 4,1929  in cadastral case No. 41 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, G.  L. R. O, Cad. Rec. No. 925, and to restrain the respondents from executing it until they receive a further  order.

The facts upon which the petition is  based are as follows: In civil case No. 4753 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,  for recovery of property, in  which the  present respondent Paulino Solis y Suniga was plaintiff and the petitioners were defendants, judgment was rendered by the respondent judge absolving the defendants from the  complaint and declaring them to be the owners of the property in litigation, which is lot No. 3183 of the cadastral case mentioned  above.  The therein plaintiff  appealed from  that judgment to the Supreme Court and the case was docketed as G. R. No. 30145.  Because of  illness the stenographer was unable to transcribe his notes in the case, for which reason this court on August 15,  1929 ordered that the case be remitted to the court of origin  for a new trial.  During the pendency of this new trial, cadastral case No. 41 came up for hearing and after entering a decree of default, the court took up lot No. 3183  which was then claimed only by the respondent Paulino  Solis y Suniga.  The hearing upon this lot took  place in the  absence of the petitioners who now allege that they had filed an answer claiming the same property, but that it is not in the record because of having been mislaid.  On February 4, 1929, judgment was rendered adjudicating  the land and  improvements to the  aforesaid respondent, and in due time final decree No. 392351 and the original certificate of title No. 37303 were issued.   The petitioners  did not become aware of these proceedings  until August  25, 1931,  when the sheriff served notice upon them of a writ of  possession issued in the registration proceedings, at the instance of the then claimant and now respondent Paulino Solis  y Sutiiga, and demanded that they at once vacate said lot. As a year had elapsed since the issuance of the final decree, the petitioners had no speedy remedy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and so they decided to file the present proceeding before this  Supreme Court; but they first petitioned for,  and obtained from the Court of First Instance  a stay of execution of the writ of possession  pending final judgment  in  these proceedings.

In a sworn answer filed on October 23, 1931, the respondents  admit all the paragraphs of the petition with the exception  of  Nos. 7,  8, 9, and 10, with reference  to which they set up the following defenses: That lot No. 3183 of the cadastral case No. 41 of the Province of Pangasinan, G. h. R. 0. Cad.  Rec. No. 925, was adjudicated to the respondent Solis by virtue of the judgment rendered on  February 4, 1929; that on February 4, 1930 the final decree was issued; that  on August 2, 1930 the original certificate of title No. 37303 (Exhibit A of the respondents)  was duly issued to said respondent; that an undivided half of the land was  sold to the innocent purchaser, Regino Solis;  that it is untrue that at the  hearing upon  the aforesaid lot no evidence was  adduced in support of the right invoked by said respondent; that  the petitioners did not  file  any answer claiming the  same  lot of land;  and  lastly, that the  said petitioners cannot properly claim the benefit of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which they have filed their petition.

The question raised by the foregoing facts is whether the petitioners may invoke section 513 of the  Code of Civil Procedure for the  purpose  of having the final decree issued in cadastral  proceeding No. 41 of Pangasinan revoked  or set aside; or, in other words, whether the provisions of section 513 are applicable to the present case where it appears that a final decree of registration has  already been  issued.

That question of law has  already been decided in the negative in Sotto vs. Sotto (43 Phil., 688 et seq.) and Evangelista vs. Director of Lands and Judge  of First Instance  of Pampanga (45 Phil., 848 et seq.).  In  the first case, in discussing the question of law, we said:

"From the time of  the  passage of  Act No.  1108 until the filing of the petition in the recent case of Caballes vs. Director of Lands (41 Phil., 357) the  final decrees in land registration cases were always regarded as indefeasible and it apparently did  not  occur to the members of the legal profession that the provisions  of section  513, supra, could be applied to such  decrees or to the  orders or decisions upon  which they were based.  Aside  from the dictum  in the Caballes  case, this court  has consistently held that final decrees in land registration cases could not be reopened except under the circumstances,  and in the  manner, mentioned in section 38 of the Land Registration Act.  (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil., 49; City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324; Cuyugan and Lim  Tuico  vs.  Sy Quia, 24 Phil., 567; Broce vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581;  Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil., 31; De Jesus vs. City of Manila,  29 Phil., 73; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rodriguez, 29 Phil.,  336; Legarda and Prieto  vs. Saleeby,  31  Phil., 590; Mariano Velasco  & Co.  vs.  Gochuico & Co.,  33  Phil.,  363; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Sunico  and Catli, 36 Phil., 279; Bias vs. De la Cruz and Melendres, 37 Phil., 1; and  Government of the Philippine Islands vs.  Abural, 39 Phil., 996.)

"The dominant principle of the Torrens system of land registration is that the titles registered thereunder are indefeasible or as nearly so as it is possible to make them. (Niblack's Analysis of the Torrens System, paragraphs 5, 161, and 166; Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 40 and 41; Dumas' Registering Title  to Land, p. 31; Hogg  on the Australian Torrens System, pp. 775 et seq.) This principle is recognized to the fullest extent in our Land Registration Act and gives the Act its  principal value.   (See Land Registration Act, sections 38 and 39.)

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"If we,  on the other hand,  hold that in land registration matters section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to those judgments which  are not  covered by final decrees of confirmation (of which the Caballes case offers a good example) all difficulties in reconciling the amended section 14 of the Land Registration Act with its other sections  disappear and the registration system established by the Act will remain  intact.  In view of the fact  that it obviously  was not the intention of the Legislature to introduce any  radical changes in the system  itself, this seems to be the only rational construction which can be placed upon  the law.

"Such an interpretation can in reality impose no material hardship upon the aggrieved  party; he still has his right of action for damages against  the  person who has unjustly deprived him of his  land and if the title has  not been transferred to a third party, an attachment may be levied upon the land.  Recourse may also be had to the assurance fund in proper cases.   Furthermore, we have already held in the case of Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna, and Obinana  (40 Phil., 620), that in  certain cases  a suit in equity  may be maintained to compel the conveyance of registered land to the true owner.

"A person who, through no  fault of his own, has been deprived of his  land  through  registration  proceedings is thus offered all the remedies which he, in justice and equity, ought to have; to go farther and allow his claims to prevail against the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value from the holder of a registered title is neither justice nor common sense and is, as we have seen, subversive of the  object of the Land Registration Act.  This,  as far  as  we can see, would be the inevitable and logical consequence of adopting the doctrine that final  land  registration decrees may  be reopened; it is inconceivable that a certificate of title can stand when the decree upon  which it is based fails.

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"For the reasons stated, we hold that the so called  'decree of confirmation and registration  provided for  in the Land Registration Act is not a judgment within the meaning of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that such a decree cannot  be reopened  except  for the reasons  and  in the manner stated in  section 38 of the  Land Registration Act."

According to the facts admitted in the pleadings filed in the aforementioned cadastral proceeding, the  final  decree had already been issued, and the petition now filed tends precisely to annul or set aside said final decree; we see no reason for not applying the principles  laid down  in the Sotto case, supra, and holding that in the case before us the provisions of section 513 of  the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked because they are inapplicable.  We reiterate what was laid down in that case to the effect that the remedy afforded  by said section  513 cannot  and  should not be extended to land registration cases where  the final decree mentioned in Act No.  496 has already been issued. In such case the proper proceeding would be that prescribed in section 38 of the last-named Act,  if the period fixed had not already elapsed.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied, with costs against the petitioners.  So ordered.

Avanceña,  C. J.,  Johnson, Street,  Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.