In this original action  arising from  an election  contest with reference to the office of third member of the provincial board of Albay, it is prayed that a writ of prohibition be issued against  the  respondent judge requiring  him to desist and  refrain from having his order of July 11, 1931, executed or enforced.

It appears from the complaint and the answer: (1) That the petitioner filed a motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of Albay  contesting the election of the respondent Francisco Perfecto, upon the grounds alleged therein;  (2) that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an order on July 11, 1931, requiring the petitioner to give  two kinds of bond in order that proper proceedings might be  taken  on his  motion  of protest: A personal bond for P3,000  and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay  within the time specified in the order.  These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for  P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

The petitioner invoked  section 482 of the Election Law in support  of his contention.  The respondent judge bases his action upon the same section and also upon section 479 as lately amended by Act No. 3699.  Section 482 provides:

"Bond or cash deposit  required of contestants. Before the court shall entertain any such contest or counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with two sureties  satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses  and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond.  *   *   *"

This section,  it should be observed, is preceded  by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required  of  contestants," which apparently indicates  that the court  taking cognizance  of the  election contest may require the contestant either to give a bond or to make a cash deposit.   But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between giving a personal bond and depositing a sum of money  in lieu thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant.  If there be any conflict between the heading of the  section under question and the body, it must be settled according to the canons of statutory construction.  Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says:  "Headings prefixed to the titles, chapters, and  sections of  a statute or code may be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt or ambiguity; but inferences drawn  from such headings are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of  the  enacting clauses."  In a  case in Kansas (Griffith vs. Carter, 8  Kan., 565), it is said that when a statute is divided into separate subjects or articles, having appropriate  headings,  it must be presumed and held that the provisions of each  article are controlling upon the  subject  thereof  and  operate as a general  rule for settling such  questions as  are embraced therein.   But the rule accepted by  most of the  authorities is that if the chapter or  section heading  has been inserted merely for convenience of reference, and not as an integral part of the statute, it  should not be allowed to  control the interpretation.   (Union Steamship Co. vs. Melbourne Harbour Trust Comm'rs., L.  R. 9 App. Cas., 365.)

Applying this rule to the case at bar,  it will be seen that the present section provides that before the court entertain any contest  or counter-contest  or admits an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond with two sureties to the satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond.  The contending parties differ in this that while the respondent judge holds that the court may require either a bond or a cash deposit, the petitioner maintains that it is to him  alone the choice is given to file a personal bond or to make a cash deposit in lieu thereof,  inviting our attention to the opinion  of the Attorney-General  dated August 21, 1928,  on the interpretation  of  the aforesaid section 482 of the Election Law. The Attorney-General was of the opinion that in election contests the contestant had to give a personal  bond in the amount fixed by the court with two  sureties  satisfactory to it,  and that since he was under this alternative  obligation, according to article 1132 of the Civil Code,  he was entitled to choose one or the other of the alternatives. We hold that  the court may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make a cash deposit in  lieu thereof.

We shall now see how the court has demanded two kinds of bond of the  petitioner by means of the order dated July 11, 1931.   It reads as follows:

"The bond to be given by the petitioner within five days hereafter with solvent sureties satisfactory to this court is hereby  fixed at five thousand  pesos  (P5,000) whereof P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and  P2,000 in cash to be deposited by the petitioner with the provincial treasurer within the time given.   Both bonds shall answer for the costs and  expenses arising from this contest.  The P2,000 cash  shall be applied to the payment of the first costs  of transportation and the daily allowances of such municipal treasurers, and municipal, provincial, and  insular employees as may be cited to appear before the court in connection with this contest,  and the commissioners' fees of those whom the court may appoint."

Although this order provides that  of the P5,000 bond, P3,000 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and  P2,000 in cash (or as subsequently altered, P3,500 shall be in the form of a personal bond, and P1,500 in cash); nevertheless, the amount of P1,500 in cash does  not coincide with the legal definition of a bond,  inasmuch as  it is intended to defray the initial expenses arising from  the contest.  In reality, this sum of money is an advance given by the contestant to defray the required expenses for the expedition of the contest.  Formerly the provincial treasury paid these expenses in the first  instance, but section  479 of the Election Law which so provided, was amended by Act No. 3699, relieving the provincial treasury of this obligation, thereby implying that in  election cases the contestant is to supply whatever may be necessary for the prompt despatch of his protest.

There is no question as to the court's discretionary power to demand of a contestant a certain sum  of money in advance to meet the initial  expenses arising from the contest, such as the production of ballot boxes in court,  etc.   It is true that  the bond obliges the contestant or his sureties to pay  all the costs arising from  the contest, should he  be defeated, but the bond is not to be executed until the  final determination of the protest.  And it is well known that certain services are required in the course of election contests which must be paid for immediately,  because it would be unjust to delay their  payment  until the termination of the contest.

Considering the order  of July 11, 1931, in this sense, we believe that although it  does not adhere  strictly to legal technical phraseology, there is in  it no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of judicial  discretion to be rectified by means of the  writ applied for.

Wherefore, the petition must be and is hereby denied, without special pronouncement of costs.   So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and  Imperial,  JJ., concur.