"Wherefore,  the court declares that the only heir of the deceased Antonio Escobar was his wife Luciana de los San- tos,  now deceased, whom her heirs  succeeded and whose testamentary proceedings are likewise pending in this court, as above stated,  and that neither  Maria Luciano nor Pe- trona  Esguerra is entitled to participate in the estate of the  deceased Antonio Escobar.

  "After this  judgment becomes final,  the entire estate of the  deceased Antonio Escobar shall, by operation of law, pass to the testamentary estate  of the deceased Luciana de los  Santos.  Let  a copy of this resolution  be attached to the record of the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Luciana de los Santos, civil case No. 43599.  So ordered."

  In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the fol- lowing sole alleged  error as committed by the court a quo in its order to wit:
 
 "The lower  court erred in not recognizing and declaring Maria Luciano as the sole legal heir of the deceased Antonio Escobar and therefore entitled to the entire intestate estate of the latter."

  The following facts proven at the trial, some by stipula- tion of the parties  and others by  a preponderance of the evidence, are necessary and pertinent to the resolution of the questions raised in this appeal, to wit:

  On January 1, 1837, a girl four days old, alleged to be a natural daughter  of Leon  Escobar and Josefa Esguerra, was baptized in the Ermita church and given the name of Tomasa Escobar (Exhibit  1-Maria Luciano).

  Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra were  married  on August 2,  1838 (Exhibit 1), and subsequently had legiti- mate  children named Antonio  and  Fortunato   Escobar. With  said spouses and their two legitimate  children lived Tomasa,  Guia and  Nicolas Escobar.   All of them  called said spouses "tatay"  (father) and "nanay"  (mother), re- spectively.  Tomasa was called by the other children "ma- nang" (a term accorded in certain regions to  the elder sister).   Tomasa Escobar grew up and lived under the care of the spouses Leon and Josefa  Escobar until she married. Said spouses supported her, treated  and presented her as their daughter, and she was publicly known as such. When Tomasa Escobar became a widow,  she went back to live with said spouses,  together with her  only  daughter,  the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano who was born on December  17, 1864  (Exhibit 4).  Leon Escobar built  a house for Tomasa Escobar  and her daughter and the two lived there.  Leon Escobar visited them in said house almost every day and sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them  company at night.  Upon Tomasa Escobar's death, Leon Escobar took said Maria Luciano into his home until she married and was taken by her husband to the province. Leon Escobar died on February 12, 1887 (Exhibit 2-Lu- ciana de los Santos).  When Fortunato Escobar became ill, his brother Antonio Escobar asked Maria Luciano to come to  Manila to nurse him, sending her money for passage. Upon  Fortunato Escobar's death,  Antonio  Escobar took Maria Luciano into his home where she lived until Antonio's death.

  The claimant-appellant Maria Luciano claims to be the legitimate niece of the deceased Antonio Escobar, alleging that she  is the legitimate daughter of  Tomasa Escobar, a legitimated sister of said deceased Antonio Escobar by the subsequent marriage of their parents, and therefore the only heir to the estate of her said uncle.

  First of all, it is necessary to determine whether or not Tomasa  Escobar was a natural daughter of the spouses Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra, legitimated by subse- quent marriage of the latter.

  We have seen that Tomasa Escobar was born on Decem- ber 29, 1836,  and her alleged parents Leon  Escobar and Josefa Esguerra were married on August 2,  1838, that  is under the prior legislation which is Law I, Title XIII* Par- tida IV.  Her  status as  a legitimated  daughter should therefore be  determined by said law which reads as fol- lows:

  "Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV. Moreover, the children which a man has by a woman whom he keeps as a concubine will be legitimate,  if he marries her  afterwards; for al- though children of this kind are not legitimate  when they are born, marriage has such force that, as  soon  as the father and mother are  married, the children become for that reason, legitimate.   This same rule applies where  a man has a child by his female slave and afterwards mar- ries her; for marriage has such extraordinary power that, as soon as this is done,  the mother becomes free, and the children legitimate, for this reason."

  It is  a well-established doctrine, both in Spain  and ii* the Philippines, interpreting Law  11 of Toro, that  a child is considered natural when at the time of its conception or birth its parents could have married without  dispensation and when the father has expressly or tacitly acknowledged it.   (Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195; Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil.,  697; Capistrano vs. Estate of Gabino,  8 Phil., 135; De  Gala vs.  De Gala, 42 Phil., 771; Larena and Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil., 1017;  Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861.)

  The fact that before and after their marriage the spouses Leon. Escobar and Josefa Esguerra had Tomasa Escobar with them and their legitimate children; the fact that they supported her, took care of her, and treated and presented her to society  as their daughter, and the fact that they built a house for her and her daughter, all show that said spouses  Leon Escobar  and Josefa Esguerra acknowledged her as their daughter.   Pursuant to the provisions of Law 11 of Toro,  cited above, such acknowledgment, in addition to the freedom of her  parents to marry without dispensa- tion at  the time of her conception or birth, gave Tomasa Escobar the status of a natural child of Leon  Escobar  and Josefa Esguerra (Requejo vs.  Rabalo, 34  Phil., 14),  and according to Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV, quoted abov$, the  subsequent marriage of the latter legitimated her-  (Co- sio  vs. Pili,  10 Phil., 72; Requejo vs. Rabalo, supra.)

  The question  now arises whether or not the claimant- appellant Maria Luciano, as legitimate daughter, born under the prior legislation, of Tomasa  Escobar,  a  child  legiti- mated by subsequent marriage, is entitled to  inherit from the intestate estate of a brother of her mother who is a legits imate son of said Tomasa Escobar's parents, and who died on July 21,  1932, under the present law.

  The twelfth transitory provision of the Civil Code reads as follows:

  "12. Rights to the inheritance of a person who may have died, with or without a will, before this Code was in force, shall be governed by the prior legislation.  The inheritance Of those who died after that time, with or without a will, shall be allotted and divided in accordance with this Code, but in harmony, in so far as the latter  permits  it,  with the testamentary dispositions,   therefore  the  legitimes, betterments, and legacies  shall  be  respected;  but  their amounts shall  be reduced when it is not possible in any other manner to give to each participant in the inheritance the share pertaining to him, according to this Code"

  According to the above quoted transitory provision, in- asmuch as Antonio Escobar died after  the Civil Code took effect, his  inheritance should be allotted  and divided in accordance with  said Code.

  Article 953 of the Civil Code provides that should chil- dren  of brothers or  sisters  exist, the  surviving spouse shall, concurrently with said children, be entitled to receive the part of the inheritance in  usufruct assigned him or her in article 837,  that is, one-half of the estate  in usufruct. When Antonio  Escobar died intestate on July 21, 1932, his niece, the herein  claimant-appellant Maria Luciano, daugh- ter of his sister legitimated by subsequent marriage of their, parents, was entitled to inherit the full ownership of one- half of his  estate and the naked ownership of  the other half, the usufruct of which belonged to the surviving spouse. However, the usufructuary right of the widow Luciana de los Santos was extinguished  upon her death which took place on December 27, 1932 (article 513 of the  Civil Code)-? thereby consolidating  the naked ownership with the usu- fruct of the other half in the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano.

  The court a  quo, in  rejecting the claim of the claimant- appellant Maria Luciano to the estate of her uncle  Antonio Escobar, based its opinion on  article 943  of the Civil  Code which  provides that  "a natural or legitimated  child has no right to succeed ab  intestate the legitimate children £nd relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or  relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child," interpreting the word "legiti- mated" to mean a child legitimated by royal concession as well as one  legitimated  by  subsequent  marriage.  Such interpretation could not have been the intention of the leg- islator, inasmuch as article 122 of said Code considers a child legitimated by subsequent marriage to be in  parity with a legitimate  child and grants the former the same rights as those of the latter, while article 127 of the same Code grants a child legitimated by royal concession only those rights conferred upon acknowledged natural children by article 134.  If children legitimated by subsequent mar- riage have the same rights as legitimate children, and those legitimated by royal concession only have the same  rights as acknowledged natural children, the word "legitimated" employed in article 943 et seq. of  Section III, Chapter IV of Book Three of the Civil Code, alternately with the word "natural", with reference to the hereditary  portion to which the child of one class or another is entitled,  refers only to a child legitimated by royal concession and not to one  legitimated by  subsequent marriage.  Therefore, the provisions of the above cited article 943 of the Civil Code are not applicable to the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano, and the provisions of  article, 953 of the same Code are the ones applicable to her.

   In view of  the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold:  (1)  That the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, justified by direct acts of its parents and their family under the legislation prior to the Civil  Code, constitutes tacit recognition of paternity (Law 11 of Toro);  (2)  that a child, who has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of natural child,  justi- fied by direct  acts of its parents  and their family both before and after their marriage which was celebrated under the prior legislation, is considered as legitimated by subse- quent marriage (Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV); (3) that the legitimate daughter of a daughter legitimated by sub- sequent marriage, now deceased, is entitled to inherit from a brother of her mother who is a legitimate son of the same parents who legitimated  her mother by subsequent mar- riage, and who died after the Civil Code took  effect;  and (4) that the word  "legitimated"  employed in Section III, Chapter IV of Book Three of the Civil Code, refers to chil- dren legitimated by royal concession and not to those legit- imated by subsequent marriage.

  Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the claimant-appellant  Maria  Luciano is declared to be  the sole heir to  the intestate estate of Antonio Escobar, with the  costs against  the appellee.  So ordered.

  Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.