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[NARCISO GUTIERREZ v. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ](https://www.lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1e18?user=fbGU2WFpmaitMVEVGZ2lBVW5xZ2RVdz09)
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[ GR No. 34840, Sep 23, 1931 ]

NARCISO GUTIERREZ v. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ +

DECISION

56 Phil. 177

[ G. R. No. 34840, September 23, 1931 ]

NARCISO GUTIERREZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO, AND SATURNINO CORTEZ, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

D E C I S I O N

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance  of Manila against the five defendants, to recover damages  in  the  amount  of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of an  automobile accident.  On judgment being rendered as prayed  for by the  plaintiff, both sets of defendants appealed.

On February 2,1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon  bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality  of  Las Piñas,  Province  of  Rizal.  The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez.   The  automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in  all, were accommodated therein.  A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso  Gutierrez,  was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila.   The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fractured right leg which required medical attendance  for a considerable period of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears  not to have healed properly.

It is conceded that the  collision  was caused by negligence pure and simple.  The difference between the parties is that, while the plaintiff blames both sets of defendants, and the owner of the passenger truck blames the automobile, and the owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the truck.  We have given close attention to these highly debatable points, and having done so, a majority  of  the court are of the opinion that the findings of the trial judge on all controversial questions of fact find sufficient support in the record, and so should be maintained.  With this general statement set down, we turn to consider the respective legal obligations of the defendants.

In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as  concerns  the Gutierrez  family, it  may  be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching  the bridge  and  the truck, he  lost his head and so contributed by  his negligence to the accident.  The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor  vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his  son.  Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.

We are here dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which  arise from fault or negligence.  At the same time, we believe that,  as has been done  in other cases,  we can take  cognizance  of the common  law rule on the same subject.  In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits  to run it, where the car is  occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it.  The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of  the  owner's business,  so that he is liable for the negligence of the  child because of the relationship of master and  servant.  (Huddy  On Automobiles,  6th ed., sec. 660; Missell vs.  Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.)

The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of  contract which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated  by the  allegations  of the complaint, not controverted, and the evidence.  The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur.  While these  facts are not  as  clearly evidenced as are those which convict the other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by the trial judge.   In its broader  aspects,  the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from  opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way  to the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.

The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed  contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of his keeping his foot outside the  truck, which occasioned his injury.  In this  connection,  it is sufficient to state  that, aside from the  fact that the defense of contributory negligence was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory  of the case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters.

The last subject for consideration relates to  the amount of the award.   The appellee suggests that the amount  could justly be raised to P16,517, but  naturally is not serious in asking for this sum, since no appeal was taken by him from the judgment.  The other parties unite in challenging the award of P10,000, as excessive.  All facts considered, including actual expenditures and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which  may cause him permanent lameness, in  connection  with other  adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair  and  reasonable.  The  difficulty in approximating  the damages by  monetary compensation is well elucidated by the divergence of opinion  among the members of the court, three of whom have inclined to the view that P3,000  would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member has argued that  P7,500  would be none  too much.

In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified,  and the  plaintiff will  have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally,  for the sum of P5,000,  and the costs of both instances.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

I vote for an indemnity of P7,500.

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