This is  an appeal from the ruling of the Court of First Instance  of Manila sustaining the  demurrer filed by  the defendants  on the ground of lack of  jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

The plaintiff corporation  alleges that it  entered  into  a milling contract with the defendant Ricardo de Leon with reference  to certain land situated  in  the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, whereby the said defendant  bound himself, among other things, to execute the necessary deeds to record the contract in the registry of deeds, and both parties agreed to  submit all differences to  arbitrators and  any litigation to the Court of First Instance of Manila.   The complaint also alleges that the defendant Rafael Fernandez, being  aware  that Ricardo de Leon  had contracted these obligations, had the land mentioned in the milling contract conveyed to him, and that as the plaintiff  had loaned the defendant Ricardo de Leon some money upon the security of the crops,  and as his co-defendant  Rafael  Fernandez is now disposing of such crops, a receiver should be appointed to avoid damage to the plaintiff.   Finally, it is alleged that the defendants refuse to appoint the arbitrators whom, according to the contract  it is incumbent upon  them to appoint, and to execute the deeds required to record the milling contract in the registry.  Wherefore, the complaint prays for the appointment of a receiver to take over the land in question,  and  for an order addressed to the defendants requiring them to appoint  two arbitrators and to execute the necessary  deeds for  the  proper  recording of said contract. As we have stated, this complaint was demurred to.

The ruling  of the  trial court was based upon the allegation that the  land,  which was  the  subject matter of the contract sought to be  enforced, was situated  in the Province of Pampanga, and also upon section 377  of  the Code of Civil Procedure.

The  Courts of First Instance of these  Islands are, by virtue of Act No. 136 (section 56) providing for the organization of courts, vested with jurisdiction  in  all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, and section 377  of  the Code of Civil Procedure, which only  determines  the venue,  did not deprive them of this jurisdiction.   These two laws may stand together: there is no inconsistency  between them. Section 56 of Act No. 136 sets forth the jurisdiction of such courts;  section 377  of the  Code named above  establishes the procedure for exercising said jurisdiction,  and in prescribing the place where actions  with reference to  real estate are to be brought, it does not determine the jurisdiction over the subject matter but grants a personal privilege to the  parties litigant.

"*   *  *  On general principles, and construing the statutes of venue as a whole, the courts have repeatedly  held that enactments which fix the venue of a  domestic cause in the county in which the subject of action  is situated, although  perhaps imperative in their terms, are neither  jurisdictional nor mandatory, but give to the party, even when sued for real estate, the  privilege of having the litigation conducted in the county in which the land lies.  The result is often in seeming conflict with the letter  of the statute. Its ratio  decidendi, however, is that statutes of  venue regulate, not the jurisdiction of the courts,  but only their procedure.  As respects jurisdiction of the subject matter, the question is not whether a particular parcel of land lies within  the territorial  district assigned to the trial court, but whether this court is vested with the right to hear and determine the general subject involved in the action.   If a court has the right to try title to land, the fact that the particular  land in suit lies within another  county of the state does  indeed give defendant a right to  object, but his objection  is grounded in  a personal privilege."  (40 Cyc, 41-43.)

For  this reason in  Manila Railroad Co.  vs. Attorney-General (20 Phil., 523), this court defined the  scope of section  377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and stated: "The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction  of  the court over the  subject matter.  It becomes merely a matter of method, of  convenience to the parties litigant.  If their interests are  best sub-served  by bringing in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos  Norte, there is no  controlling reason why  such a course should not be followed.  The matter is, under the  law, entirely within the control of either party.  *   *   *" The doctrine laid down  in this case  of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, was followed by this Court in the cases of Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37) ;  Katigbak vs. Tai Hing Co. (52 Phil., 622)  and  Marquez  Lim  Cay vs. Del Rosario  (55 Phil., 962).

It is  further alleged in  the  complaint  that  the plaintiff corporation  and the defendant Ricardo de  Leon agreed and the defendant Rafael Fernandez is aware of this stipulation that all litigation arising from the milling contract  should be brought in the  Court of  First Instance  of Manila.  By this  agreement the parties waived the legal venue, and such waiver is valid and legally effective, because it was  merely  a  personal  privilege  they waived and the complaint does not show that  the waiver was contrary to public policy or to the prejudice of third person.   (Art. 4, par. 2, Civil Code.)

"It is a general principle that a  person  may renounce any right which  the law gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of  such a nature that  its renunciation would be against public policy. This right of renunciation  is so thoroughly established, and was at the time of the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure,  that its exercise by a defendant  in relation to  the venue of an action will not be held  to have  been abridged by section 377 without very clear provision therein  to that effect.  There being no part of such  section express  enough to accomplish such result, such section  does  not  abridge the right of the  defendant to renounce the  privilege conferred upon him  thereby.   If the parties consent  thereto there is no legal reason why the Court of First Instance of Manila may not take cognizance of and  determine a  controversy affecting the title to  or an interest in real estate situated in Ilocos Norte or any  other  province."  (Syllabus No. 8 of the  decision in the  case cited of Manila Railroad Co. vs.  Attorney-General,  20  Phil., 523.)

The defendant Ricardo de Leon did not file a brief. Counsel  for the appellee Rafael Fernandez contends in his brief that the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, cited above,  is not applicable to the case at bar because in that case it was the plaintiff who petitioned  for the dismissal of the case on the ground of wrong venue, while in the instant case it is the defendants who,  upon the same ground, ask for dismissal.  Counsel contends that only the defendant may object to the venue. We find no ground for this reasoning.  The  doctrine laid down in the case of  Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General has the  same force and scope whether the venue is objected to by the  defendant or by the plaintiff.  It was there held  that the  Manila Railroad Co.  was stopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the court to which it had voluntarily submitted.  If that party had not thus voluntarily waived  discussion of jurisdiction, it would not have lost the privilege of having its case tried and adjudged by the court in the place where the real property involved was situated. (Vide syllabus No. 11, 20 Phil, 526.)

Counsel  for the  defendant Rafael  Fernandez  contends that his client cannot be bound by the milling contract in question, which is not recorded on the back of the Torrens transfer certificate of title to the land, citing section 39 of Act  No. 496.  The provision cited refers  to  liens and encumbrances, to real rights, whereas the waiver of venue attributed to the defendant Fernandez refers  not to a real right, but to a personal privilege;  and there  is no special form required to give legal effect to the waiver of rights of this  kind, so much so that the mere failure to object to a wrong venue is generally held to constitute a sufficient waiver.

"Failure specifically to object to a  wrong venue  before demurring or pleading to the merits is generally held sufficient to constitute a waiver."   (27 R. C.  L., 784.)

According to the  complaint  under consideration,  this defendant,  Rafael Fernandez, knowing the obligations that his co-defendant Ricardo  de Leon had contracted, entered into negotiations with him, and  had  the latter convey to him the title to the land mentioned in the milling contract. (Paragraph V, complaint.)

There are other reasons for holding that the Court of First Instance of  Manila  has  acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as well as jurisdiction over the defendants.

Inasmuch as said court,  according  to section 56 of Act No. 136, had universal jurisdiction (so-called by this court in the  aforementioned  case  of Manila  Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General)  over  cases like the present,  the general appearance of the defendants conferred upon the Court of First Instance of Manila which, as  stated in the  beginning, already had it full jurisdiction.

"It being a fundamental principle of the law that consent of parties cannot give to a court jurisdiction of the subject matter, and that the  question of want of such  jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the  proceedings,  even on appeal, it follows that a general or voluntary  appearance does not give jurisdiction of the  subject matter, whatever may be its effect as regards jurisdiction of the person.  But where the  court possesses jurisdiction of the general class of cases to which a particular suit belongs, it will acquire jurisdiction over the  subject matter on  the parties'  voluntarily coming before the court, the one demanding relief and the other defending.   *  *   *

"Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, a general  or voluntary appearance by defendant is so far equivalent to the service of  process as to confer on the court jurisdiction of his person, and thereafter he is estopped to object for  the want of such jurisdiction." (4 C. J., 1349-1351; Italics ours.)

That the defendants  in this  case  entered a voluntary appearance is borne out by the record.

The defendant Rafael  Fernandez before demurring, filed a pleading objecting  to  the court's jurisdiction to try the case and praying that the plaintiff's motion for the appointment  of  a receiver be  denied.   (Pp.  14-18,  Bill of Exceptions.)   The defendant Ricardo de Leon in like manner filed a pleading which may be seen on pages 19 and 20 of said Bill of Exceptions.   The two defendants then filed separate  demurrers, that of Rafael Fernandez based upon lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,  and the failure of the complaint to state  facts  sufficient to constitute a cause of action,  and that of Ricardo de Leon upon the ground that the  complaint was ambiguous, unintelligible, and vague, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

These  pleadings, even that of Rafael Fernandez which states that it was a special appearance, constitute,  in our opinion,  a voluntary general appearance.   Whenever, as in the instant case, the defendant opposes the plaintiff's motion or demurs upon other grounds than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, he is deemed thereby to submit to the court, and his  appearance is held to be a general and  voluntary appearance.

"Acts  Recognizing Case as in Court. 1. Generally. Broadly  stated, any action  on  the part of  a defendant, except to object to the jurisdiction over his person which recognizes the case as in  court,  will  constitute a  general appearance.  Thus a party makes a general appearance by objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action, whether objection is made by a motion or by formal  pleading.   *  *  *  A  general appearance is also made,   *  *  *  by  contesting or resisting a motion;  *  *  V   (4 C. J., 1333, 1334.)

"The filing  of a  demurrer, unless  based solely  on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the person, constitutes a general appearance, whether it is filed to plaintiff's original pleading,  to an amended or substituted pleading, or to a counterclaim or a cross complaint."   (4 C. J., 1337, 1338; Italics ours.)

The order appealed from is  hereby reversed, and the judgment rendered  in consequence thereof,  set aside, and it is ordered that the record be remanded to the court below for further proceedings in the premises.

We make no pronouncement of costs.

Avanceña,  C. J., Johnson, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

STREET, MALCOLM, VILLAMOR, and OSTRAND, JJ., dissent.