The question submitted for our decision is whether the facts  alleged in the complaint by the Government are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant bank.

The Court of  First  Instance  of Manila  sustained the demurrer, but the Government contends that the ruling was erroneous and prays, for the reasons given in its brief, that it be  reversed and the record remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

The allegations of the  complaint relevant to the point in question  are the following:

"2. That  on October 10, 1919, a  certain Mr. Federico Luchsinger, then a resident of the Philippine Islands, sold his Hacienda Progreso in La Carlota, Occidental Negros, to Messrs.  Urquijo, Zuloaga  and Escubi also of La Carlota, Occidental Negros, for the sum of 1*275,000, payable in five annual installments of P55,000 each.

"3. That,  thereafter, or on October 14, 1919, the said Federico Luchsinger appointed  the defendant herein  his true  and lawful attorney-in-fact with full  power among other things to collect all  credits standing in  his favor in these Islands and to pay to the Government of the Philippine Islands such taxes as might from time to time be due from him.

"4. That, thereafter, the said Federico Luchsinger  left the Philippine Islands to reside in Paris, France, where he has since remained and that he no longer has any real estate property in these Islands.

"5. That, thereafter, or  on  June 20, 1920, June 20, 1921, June 20,  1922,  June 20, 1923,  and June 20,  1924,  the defendant  collected  from Messrs.  Urquijo,  Zuloaga,  and Escubi the sum  of P55,000 on each  of the aforementioned dates, or a total of P275,000,  the same representing  the total selling price of the Hacienda Progreso which the aforementioned Federico Luchsinger had sold to Messrs. Urquijo, Zuloaga, and Escubi.

"6. That in the sale  of the said hacienda for the sum of P275,000, a net profit of P139,000 was realized by the vendor, which, distributed among the  five years in which the payments were made, represented net profits of P27,800 for each of the years from  1920 to 1925, inclusive.

"7. That on February 28, 1921, March  10, 1922,  March 23, 1923, February 27,  1924, and February 26, 1925, the defendant,  acting as attorney-in-fact of the said Federico Luchsinger, filed income-tax  returns on behalf of the latter in which returns the defendant omitted to mention the net income  represented by the collection of the payments for the sale of  the Hacienda Progreso.

"8. That the amount of income tax due from the said Federico Luchsinger on the profit realized from" the sale of the property in question is P5,077.87.

"9. That due demand for the payment of the taxes mentioned above from the Bank of the Philippine Islands has been made by the Collector  of  Internal Revenue but, notwithstanding said demand,  the  defendant has failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay the same.

"10. That the said amount of P5,077.87 is  subject to a surcharge of 5 per cent or  P253.89 and bears interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from January 20, 1928, to date of  payment.

"Wherefore, the plaintiff prays this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,077.87 plus P253.89, with interest on the P5,077.87 from January 20,  1928, together with the  costs of this action.

"Plaintiff also prays  for such  other relief as this court may deem just and equitable."   (Pages  2 and 3, Bill of Exceptions.)

Section 9, paragraphs (b) and (c)  of  our Income Tax Law, Act No. 2833, imposes the duty upon agents of making a complete return of the income and profits of their principal, paying the proper tax thereon.

The complaint  does  not  allege that the defendant bank was or was not aware that the sale  of estate had netted a profit to  their principal; that is to say, that said principal had received an  income subject  to the tax.   Should the complaint have alleged this in order to establish the defendant's liability, or  may  it be presumed from what has been alleged that the defendant bank was  positively aware of it? We believe the complaint need not allege that the defendant bank knew of such income, because being an agent of  said Luchsinger  especially  authorized with  full  power  to  pay all the taxes due the Government from the latter, the  presumption is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,  that the defendant bank as agent knew or would know in due time all the taxable income of its principal.

It should likewise be remembered that the  defendant's obligation which the complaint alleges to have been breached,  did not arise from  a contract, but from the law, and  it is therefore sufficient if the complaint alleges the breach of such obligation.

"Where the cause of action arises  out of the breach  of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, the declaration,  complaint, or petition should show the right of plaintiff and the duty of defendant, and state the nature of the duty and the facts from which it arose.   It has been considered, however, that if the  duty  is one imposed  by law, and involves no element of contract it need not be expressly alleged.  There must also be an  allegation of a  breach of the duty,  and while this may be averred by way of  a conclusion  it  is necessary to state the  facts which are relied on as constituting such breach."   (49  C. J.,  143,  144.)

The complaint  states that the defendant bank failed to include in the proper tax returns the income here in question.  Assuming that it was  the defendant's legal duty to do  so, such a failure constitutes  a prima facie breach of duty.  And if  it has  any excuse or reason for such an omission which does not appear in the complaint, the defendant  was bound  to  allege it in its answer.

We therefore hold that the complaint as it is,  gives rise to the presumption that the defendant bank knew of the income in question, and taken in connection  with this presumption which has not been overcome or  destroyed, the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action against the defendant bank.

If the latter, through excusable ignorance, did not know of the income in question  of  its principal Luchsinger, or for any  other legally sufficient reason believes it has  any defense to set up against the complaint, and to relieve itself of responsibility, it may in its answer allege such defense, and later establish  it  at the trial for the decision of the competent court.

But the complaint,  as it stands,  alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

For all these considerations, the order appealed from is reversed and the defendant's demurrer overruled, and it is ordered that the record be remanded to the court a quo for further  proceedings.   Without pronouncement as to costs.

Johnson,  Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.