These two actions were commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila on April 16,  1930, for the purpose of securing from  the  defendant the possession of two  drug stores located in the City of Manila, covered by two chattel mortgages executed by the deceased Jose B. Henson in favor of the plaintiffs.

In the first case the plaintiffs alleged that Jose B.  Henson, in his lifetime, executed in their favor a chattel mortgage (Exhibit A) on  his drug store at Nos. 101-103  Calle Rosario,  known as  Farmacia Henson, to secure a loan of P7,000, although it was made to  appear in the instrument that the loan was for P20,000.

In the second case  the plaintiffs alleged  that they  were the heirs of the late Don Florentino Torres; and that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in favor of Don Florentino Torres a chattel mortgage  (also  Exhibit A)  on his three drug stores known as Henson's Pharmacy, Farmacia Henson and Botica  Hensonina, to secure a loan of P50,000, which was later reduced to P26,000, and for which, Henson's Pharmacy at Nos. 71-73 Escolta, remained as the only security by agreement of the parties.

In both cases the plaintiffs alleged  that the defendant violated the terms of the mortgage and that, in consequence thereof they became entitled to the possession of the chattels and to foreclose their mortgages thereon.  Upon the petition of the  plaintiffs and after the filing of the necessary bonds, the court issued in each case an order directing the sheriff of the City of Manila to take immediate possession of said drug stores.

The defendant filed practically the same answer to both complaints.  He denied generally and specifically the plaintiffs' allegations, and set up the following special defenses:

(1) That the chattel mortgages (Exhibit A, in G. R. No. 34385 and Exhibit A, in G. R.  No. 34386)  are null and void for lack of sufficient  particularity in the description of the property mortgaged; and

(2)  That the chattels which the plaintiffs sought to recover were not the same  property described in the mortgage.

The defendant also filed a counterclaim for damages in the sum of P20,000 in  the first case  and P100,000 in the second case.

Upon the issue  thus raised  by the pleadings, the two causes were tried  together by agreement  of the parties. After hearing the evidence adduced  during the trial and on July 17, 1930, the Honorable Mariano Albert, judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion, arrived  at  the  conclusion (a) that the  defendant defaulted in the payment of interest on the loans secured by the mortgages,  in violation of the terms thereof; (6) that by reason of said failure said mortgages became due, and  (c) that the plaintiffs,  as mortgagees, were  entitled to the possession of the drug stores Farmacia Henson at Nos. 101-103 Calle Rosario and Henson's Pharmacy at Nos. 71-73 Escolta.   Accordingly, a judgment was rendered in favor of the  plaintiffs and against the defendant, confirming the attachment of said drug stores by the sheriff of the City of Manila and the delivery thereof to the plaintiffs. The dispositive  part of the decision reads as follows:

"En virtud de todo lo expuesto, el Juzgado  dicta sentencia confirmando en todas sus partes  las 6rdenes de fechas  16 y 17 de abril del presente afio, dictadas en las causas Nos. 37096 y 37097, respectivamente, y  declara definitiva  la entrega hecha a los demandantes por el Sheriff de Manila de las boticas en cuesti6n.  Se condena en costas al demandado en ambas causas."

From that judgment the defendant appealed, and now makes the following assignments of error:

"I. The lower court erred in failing to make a finding  on the question of the sufficiency of the description  of the chattels mortgaged and in failing to  hold that  the  chattel mortgages were null and  void for lack of particularity in the description of  the chattels  mortgaged.

"II. The lower court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to introduce evidence tending to show that the stock of merchandise founcl in the two drug stores was not in existence or  owned by the  mortgagor  at the time of the execution of  the mortgages in question.

"III. The lower court erred in holding that the administrator of the deceased is now estopped from contesting the validity of the mortgages in question.

"IV. The lower court erred in failing to  make a finding on the counterclaims of the defendant."

With reference to the first assignment of  error, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the question therein  raised, inasmuch as according to our view on the question of estoppel, as we shall hereinafter  set forth in our discussion of the third assignment of error, the defendant is estopped from questioning the validity of these chattel mortgages.

In his second assignment of error the appellant  attacks the validity of the stipulation in  said mortgages authorizing the mortgagor to sell the goods covered thereby  and  to replace them with other goods thereafter acquired.   He insists that a stipulation authorizing the disposal and  substitution of the chattels mortgaged does not operate to ex- tend the mortgage to after-acquired property, and that such stipulation is in contravention of the express provision  of the last  paragraph of  section  7 of Act No.  1508,  which reads as follows:

"A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to  cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and  placed  in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding."

In order to give a correct construction to the above-quoted provision of  our Chattel Mortgage Law  (Act No.  1508), the spirit and intent of the law must first be ascertained. When  said Act was placed on  our statute books  by the United States Philippine Commission on July 2,  1906, the primary aim  of that law-making body was undoubtedly to promote business and trade in these Islands and to give impetus to the economic development of the country.   Bearing this in mind, it could not have been the intention of the Philippine Commission to apply the provision of section 7 above quoted to stores open to the public for retail business, where the goods are constantly sold and substituted with new stock, such  as drug stores, grocery stores, dry-goods stores, etc.  If said provision were intended to apply to this class of business, it would be practically impossible to constitute a mortgage on such stores without closing them, contrary to the very spirit and purpose of  said Act.  Such a construction would bring about  a handicap to trade and business,  would  restrain the circulation of capital, and would defeat the purpose for which the law was enacted, to wit, the promotion of business and the economic development of the country.

In the  interpretation and construction of a  statute the intent of  the law-maker should always be ascertained and given  effect, and courts  will not follow the  letter  of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the spirit  of  the Act.  On this subject,  Sutherland,  the foremost authority  on statutory  construction, says:

"The Intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the  lawmaker.  The  intent is the vital  part,  the essence of the law, and the  primary rule of  construction is to ascertain  and give effect to that intent.  The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,  although  it may  not  be consistent with  the strict  letter  of  the statute.  Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the  true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general  purpose of the act.  Intent is the spirit which  gives life  to a legislative enactment.   In  construing statutes the proper  course is to start out  and follow the true intent of the  legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and  promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature."  (Vol. II  Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.)

A  stipulation  in the  mortgage,  extending its scope and effect to after-acquired  property, is valid and binding

"*   *  *  where the after-acquired property is in  renewal  of,  or in  substitution for, goods on hand when the mortgage  was executed, or is  purchased with the proceeds of the sale of such goods, etc."   (11 C. J., p. 436.)

Cobbey,  a  well-known authority on  Chattel Mortgages, recognizes the validity of stipulations relating to after-acquired and substituted  chattels.   His views are based on the decisions of the supreme courts of several states of the Union.  He says:

"A mortgage  may,  by express stipulations, be drawn to cover goods put in stock in place of others sold out from time to time.  A mortgage may be made to include future acquisitions of goods  to be added  to the original  stock mortgaged, but the mortgage must expressly provide that such future acquisitions shall be  held as included in the mortgage.  *  *  *  Where   a  mortgage  covering the stock in trade, furniture, and fixtures  in the mortgagor's store provides that 'all goods, stock in trade, furniture, and fixtures hereafter  purchased by the mortgagor shall be included in and covered by the mortgage,' the mortgage covers all after-acquired  property of the classes mentioned, and, upon foreclosure,  such property  may  be taken and sold by the mortgagee the same as the property in possession of the mortgagor at the time the mortgage was executed." (Vol. I, Cobbey on Chattel Mortgages, sec. 361,  pp. 474, 476.)

In harmony with the foregoing, we are of the  opinion (a)  that the provision  of the  last paragraph of section 7 of Act No. 1508 is not applicable to drug stores, bazars and all other stores in the nature of a revolving and floating business;  (6) that the stipulation in the chattel mortgages in question, extending their effect to after-acquired  property, is valid and binding; and (c) that the lower court committed no error in not permitting the defendant-appellant to introduce evidence tending to show that the goods seized by the sheriff were in the nature of after-acquired property.

With reference to the third assignment of error, we agree with the lower court that, from  the facts  of record, the defendant-appellant is estopped from contesting the validity of the mortgages in question.  This feature of the case has been very ably and fully discussed by the lower court in its decision, and said discussion is made, by reference, a part of this opinion.

As to the  fourth  assignment  of  error  regarding the counterclaims of the defendant-appellant, it may be said that in view of the conclusions reached by the lower court, which are sustained by this court, the lower court committed no  error  in not making any  express  finding as to said counterclaims.  As a matter of form, however, the counterclaims should have been dismissed, but as the  trial  court decided both cases in favor of the plaintiffs  and confirmed and ratified the  orders  directing  the sheriff to take possession of the chattels on behalf of the plaintiffs, there was, in effect,  a  dismissal of the defendant's counterclaims.

For all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment appealed from  is  in accordance with the facts and the  law, and  the same should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.  So ordered.

Avanceña, C.  J., Street, Malcolm,  Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez,  Villa-Real, and Imperial,  JJ., concur.